

Understanding Culture, Society, and Politics

Reader

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**Department of Education
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Understanding Culture, Society, and Politics
Reader
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Introduction to the Reader

How can we better understand culture, society, and politics?

An understanding of culture, society, and politics, as well as their interrelationships with one another, can be best attained through a systematic study. With this in mind, we draw the articles in this Reader mainly from the disciplines of anthropology, political science and sociology. We organized the selections to cover the major areas of these three disciplines, and to shed light on Philippine and global cultural, social, and political realities. Chapter 1 provides some conceptual handles for understanding everyday experiences and observations of culture, society, and politics. Thomas Hyland Eriksen (2001) illustrates the definitive and ambiguous ways by which the concept of culture has been understood in terms of how people live their lives. C. Wright Mills invites students to view the world around them in terms of the intersection of private lives and the larger social and historical context. Lydia Yu-Jose points out the limits of Western notions of politics to understand the Philippines and its democratic institutions and processes.

The remaining readings in this Chapter offer some definitions of culture, society and politics. In defining culture and society, Thomas Hyland Eriksen (2004) situates the individual in the broader social world in which he or she is embedded. Andrew Heywood then presents four views of politics as affairs of the State, public affairs, conflict and compromise, and power.

Chapter 2 examines human biocultural and sociopolitical evolution to provide students with an understanding of human origins and the capacity for culture. Conrad Kottak introduces students to the biological, genetic, geological, and geographical processes that powered human evolution through the birth of civilizations. Bringing the discussion to the Philippines using evidence from geological studies and archeological work, F. Landa Jocano tracks the roots and unfolding of Filipino society from pre-history to contemporary times.

In Chapter 3, we look at how individuals learn culture and become competent members of society through enculturation or socialization. The development of one's self is a product of socialization, and Hiromu Shimizu illustrates this point by showing how the social environment in which Filipino children grow up orients the child towards getting along and being cooperative with others. Another article, by Michael Herzfeld, dissects how individuals become socialized to become indifferent persons, with social indifference being conditioned by State, and the political and ideological interests that underpinned bureaucratic structures. Still, members of any society have to work toward a continued collective existence. Richard Bellamy explores what citizenship is, why it matters and what are the challenges that confront its possibility today.

Chapter 4 explores our membership in particular social groups, and brings us to the topic of social structure, or the organized aspects of social life. On a smaller level, social structure refers to the interrelationships between particular social groups in a society such as kinship and *barkada*. On a broader sense, it refers to the interrelationships of the social institutions of a society. Mary Hollnsteiner examines “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude) reciprocity that serves as a continuing economic mechanism up to today. The next readings provide insights into the workings of various institutions such as family, religion, and civil society. Alfred McCoy identifies the elite families as a powerful socio-political institution in the Philippines and presents cases of political dynasties in the country. Jose Magadia examines the

transformations of political and social institutions and how it brought about new modes of relationship between Philippine State and Filipino society after the EDSA People Power Revolution.

Chapter 5 introduces students to the realities of social stratification, or the hierarchical arrangement of the members of society, usually according to wealth, power, and prestige. Herbert Gans identifies the functions of poverty in society, while pointing out that while poverty is functional to society, there are ways to solve it. The work of B.R. Rodil shows how ethnic marginalization and social inequality unfolds in Philippine society. Rodil illustrates how the enactment of land registration and titling legislations as well as policies that facilitated the resettlement of farmers from Visayas and Luzon to Mindanao between the 1900s to the 1960s contributed to the minoritization of Moro and indigenous communities. These communities were once the ethnic majority in Mindanao. Walden Bello then reminds us that social stratification also exists among nations by discussing the social cost of globalization, particularly the devastating effects of free trade and monopolistic competition principles on the agricultural sector of the country.

The final chapter focuses on cultural, social, and political change, or the transformations of cultural, social and political institutions over time. George Ritzer's notion of the McDonaldization of society, which emphasizes predictability, efficiency, calculability, and substitution of human labor by machines, epitomized some of these changes. Challenges to human adaptation and social change abound, and Garret Hardin explains how the "tragedy of the commons" results from individuals' maximization of self-interests.

How can we respond to these changes? Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow explore the politics outside and beyond the political system of the nation state. They present various ways of understanding what social movement is, how it starts, and how it is sustained.

With these selections, we hope to make the student's introduction to the study of culture, society, and politics insightful. We likewise hope that through the course, students gain knowledge of culture, society, and politics for *both* understanding and action. It is by knowing our culture and society better that we become aware of our capacity to act politically in building alternative futures.

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CHAPTER 1

1 Introduction: Comparison and Context

THOMAS HYLAND ERIKSEN

Anthropology is philosophy with the people in.

— Tim Ingold

This book is an invitation to a journey which, in the author's opinion, is one of the most rewarding a human being can embark on—and it is definitely one of the longest. It will bring the reader from the damp rainforests of the Amazon to the cold semi-desert of the Arctic; from the skyscrapers of Manhattan to mud huts in the Sahel; from villages in the New Guinea highlands to African cities.

It is a long journey in a different sense too. Social and cultural anthropology has the whole of human society as its field of interest, and tries to understand the connections between the various aspects of our existence. When, for example, we study the traditional economic system of the Tiv of central Nigeria, an essential part of the exploration consists in understanding how their economy is connected with other aspects of their society. If this dimension is absent, Tiv economy becomes incomprehensible to anthropologists. If we do not know that the Tiv traditionally could not buy and sell land, and that they have customarily not used money as a means of payment, it will plainly be impossible to understand how they themselves interpret their situation and how they responded to the economic changes imposed on their society during colonialism.

Anthropology tries to account for the social and cultural variation in the world, but a crucial part of the anthropological project also consists in conceptualising and understanding similarities between social systems and human relationships. As one of the foremost anthropologists of the twentieth century, Claude Lévi-Strauss, has expressed it: 'Anthropology has humanity as its object of research, but unlike the other human sciences, it tries to grasp its object through its most diverse manifestations' (1983, p.49). Put in another way: anthropology is about how different people can be, but it also tries to find out in what sense it can be said that all humans have something in common.

Another prominent anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, has expressed a similar view in an essay which essentially deals with the differences between humans and animals: If we want to discover what man amounts to, we can only find it in what men are: and what men are, above all other things, is various. It is in understanding that variousness—its range, its nature, its basis, and its implications—that we shall come to construct a concept of human nature that, more than a statistical shadow and less than a primitivist dream, has both substance and truth. (Geertz 1973, p.52)

Although anthropologists have wide-ranging and frequently highly specialised interests, they all share a common concern in trying to understand both connections within societies and connections between societies. As will become clearer as we proceed on this journey through the subject-matter and theories of social and cultural anthropology, there is a multitude of ways in which to approach these problems. Whether one is interested in understanding why and in which sense the Azande of Central Africa believe in witches, why there is greater social inequality in

Brazil than in Sweden, how the inhabitants of Mauritius avoid violent ethnic conflict, or what has happened to the traditional way of life of the Inuit (Eskimos) in recent years, in most cases one or several anthropologists would have carried out research and written on the issue. Whether one is interested in the study of religion, child-raising, political power, economic life or the relationship between men and women, one may go to the professional anthropological literature for inspiration and knowledge.

The discipline is also concerned with accounting for the interrelationships between different aspects of human existence, and usually anthropologists investigate these interrelationships taking as their point of departure a detailed study of local life in a particular society or a delineated social environment. One may therefore say that anthropology asks large questions, while at the same time it draws its most important insights from small places.

It has been common to regard its traditional focus on small-scale non-industrial societies as a distinguishing feature of anthropology, compared with other subjects dealing with culture and society. However, because of changes in the world and in the discipline itself, this is no longer an accurate description. Practically any social system can be studied anthropologically and contemporary anthropological research displays an enormous range, empirically as well as thematically.

An Outline of the Subject

What, then, is anthropology? Let us begin with the etymology of the concept. It is a compound of two Greek words, 'anthropos' and 'logos', which can be translated as 'human' and 'reason', respectively. So anthropology means 'reason about humans' or 'knowledge about humans'. Social anthropology would then mean knowledge about humans in societies. Such a definition would, of course, cover the other social sciences as well as anthropology, but it may still be useful as a beginning.

The word 'culture', which is also crucial to the discipline, originates from the Latin '*colere*', which means to cultivate. (The word 'colony' has the same origin.) Cultural anthropology thus means 'knowledge about cultivated humans;' that is, knowledge about those aspects of humanity which are not natural, but which are related to that which is acquired.

'Culture' has been described as one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language (Williams 1981, p.87). In the early 1950s, Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred Kroeber (1952) presented 161 different definitions of culture. It would not be possible to consider the majority of these definitions here; besides, many of them were—fortunately—quite similar. Let us therefore, as a preliminary conceptualisation of culture, define it as those abilities, notions and forms of behaviour persons have acquired as members of society. A definition of this kind, which is indebted to both the Victorian anthropologist Edward Tylor and to Geertz (although the latter stresses meaning rather than behaviour), is the most common one among anthropologists.

Culture nevertheless carries with it a basic ambiguity. On the one hand, every human is equally cultural; in this sense, the term refers to a basic similarity within humanity. On the other hand, people have acquired different abilities, notions, etc., and are thereby different because of culture. Culture refers, in other words, both to basic similarities and to systematic differences between humans.

If this sounds slightly complex, some more complexity is necessary already at this point. Truth to tell, during the last decades of the twentieth century, the concept of culture was deeply contested in anthropology on both sides of the Atlantic. The influential Geertzian concept of

culture, which had been elaborated through a series of erudite and elegant essays written in the 1960s and 1970s (Geertz 1973, 1983), depicted a culture both as an integrated whole, as a puzzle where all the pieces were at hand, and as a system of meanings that was largely shared by a population. Culture thus appeared as integrated, shared in the group and sharply bounded. But what of variations within the group, and what about similarities or mutual contacts with neighbouring groups—and what to make of, say, the technologically and economically driven processes of globalisation, which ensure that nearly every nook and cranny in the world is, to varying degrees, exposed to news about football world cups, to waged work and the concept of human rights? In many cases, it could indeed be said that a national or local culture is neither shared by all or most of the inhabitants, nor bounded—I have myself explored this myth regarding my native Norway, a country usually considered ‘culturally homogeneous’ (Eriksen 1993b). Many began to criticise the overly neat and tidy picture suggested in the dominant concept of culture, from a variety of viewpoints. Alternative ways of conceptualising culture were proposed (e.g. as unbounded ‘cultural flows’ or as ‘fields of discourse’, or as ‘traditions of knowledge’), and some even wanted to get rid of the concept altogether (for some of the debates, see Clifford and Marcus 1986; Ortner 1999). As I shall indicate later, the concept of society has been subjected to similar critiques, but problematic as they may be, both concepts still seem to form part of the conceptual backbone of anthropology. In his magisterial, deeply ambivalent review of the culture concept, Adam Kuper (1999, p.226) notes that ‘these days, anthropologists get remarkably nervous when they discuss culture—which is surprising, on the face of it, since the anthropology of culture is something of a success story’. The reason for this ‘nervousness’ is not just the contested meaning of the term culture, but also the fact that culture concepts that are close kin to the classic anthropological one are being exploited politically, in identity politics.

The relationship between culture and society can be described in the following way. Culture refers to the acquired, cognitive and symbolic aspects of existence, whereas society refers to the social organisation of human life, patterns of interaction and power relationships. The implications of this analytical distinction, which may seem bewildering, will eventually be evident.

A short definition of anthropology may read thus: ‘Anthropology is the comparative study of cultural and social life. Its most important method is participant observation, which consists in lengthy fieldwork in a particular social setting’. The discipline thus compares aspects of different societies, and continuously searches for interesting dimensions for comparison. If, say, one chooses to write a monograph about a people in the New Guinea highlands, one will always choose to describe it with at least some concepts (such as kinship, gender and power) that render it comparable with aspects of other societies.

Further, the discipline emphasises the importance of ethnographic fieldwork, which is a thorough close-up study of a particular social and cultural environment, where the researcher is normally required to spend a year or more.

Clearly, anthropology has many features in common with other social sciences and humanities. Indeed, a difficult question consists in deciding whether it is a science or one of the humanities. Do we search for general laws, as the natural scientists do, or do we instead try to understand and interpret different societies? E.E. Evans-Pritchard in Britain and Alfred Kroeber in the USA, leading anthropologists in their day, both argued around 1950 that anthropology had more in common with history than with the natural sciences. Although their view, considered something of a heresy at the time, has become commonplace since, there are still some anthropologists who feel that the subject should aim at scientific rigour similar to that of the natural sciences.

Some of the implications of this divergence in views will be discussed in later chapters. A few important defining features of anthropology are nevertheless common to all practitioners of the subject: it is comparative and empirical; its most important method is fieldwork; and it has a truly global focus in that it does not single out one region, or one kind of society, as being more important than others. Unlike sociology proper, anthropology does not concentrate its attention on the industrialised world; unlike philosophy, it stresses the importance of empirical research; unlike history, it studies society as it is being enacted; and unlike linguistics, it stresses the social and cultural context of speech when looking at language. Definitely, there are great overlaps with other sciences and disciplines, and there is a lot to be learnt from them, yet anthropology has its distinctive character as an intellectual discipline, based on ethnographic fieldwork, which tries simultaneously to account for actual cultural variation in the world and to develop a theoretical perspective on culture and society.

The Universal and the Particular

“If each discipline can be said to have a central problem,” writes Michael Carrithers (1992, p. 2), “then the central problem of anthropology is the diversity of human social life.” Put differently, one could say that anthropological research and theory tries to strike a balance between similarities and differences, and theoretical questions have often revolved around the issue of universality versus relativism: To what extent do all humans, cultures or societies have something in common, and to what extent is each of them unique? Since we employ comparative concepts—that is, supposedly culturally neutral terms like kinship system, gender role, system of inheritance, etc.—it is implicitly acknowledged that all or nearly all societies have several features in common. However, many anthropologists challenge this view and claim the uniqueness of each culture or society. A strong universalist programme is found in Donald Brown’s book *Human Universals* (Brown 1991), where the author claims that anthropologists have for generations exaggerated the differences between societies, neglecting the very substantial commonalities that hold humanity together. In his influential, if controversial book, he draws extensively on an earlier study of ‘human universals’, which included:

age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, community organization, cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art, divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, family, feasting, fire making, folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, government, greetings...

And this was just the a-to-g segment of an alphabetical ‘partial list’ (Murdock 1945, p.124, quoted from Brown 1991, p.70). Several arguments could be invoked against this kind of list: that it is trivial and that what matters is to comprehend the unique expressions of such ‘universals’; that phenomena such as ‘family’ have totally different meanings in different societies, and thus cannot be said to be ‘the same’ everywhere; and that this piecemeal approach to society and culture removes the very hallmark of good anthropology, namely the ability to see isolated phenomena (like age-grading or food taboos) in a broad context. An institution such as arranged marriage means something fundamentally different in the Punjabi countryside than in the French upper class. Is it still the same institution? Yes—and no. Brown is right in accusing anthropologists of having been inclined to emphasise the exotic and unique at the expense of neglecting cross-cultural similarities, but this does not mean that his approach is the only possible way of bridging the gap between societies. Several other alternatives will be discussed, including structural-functionalism (all societies operate according to the same general principles), structuralism (the human mind has a common architecture expressed through myth, kinship and other cultural phenomena), transactionalism (the logic of human action is the same everywhere)

and materialist approaches (culture and society are determined by ecological and/or technological factors).

The tension between the universal and the particular has been immensely productive in anthropology, and it remains an important one. It is commonly discussed, inside and outside anthropology, through the concept of ethnocentrism.

The Problem of Ethnocentrism

A society or a culture, it was remarked above, must be understood on its own terms. In saying this, we warn against the application of a shared, universal scale to be used in the evaluation of every society. Such a scale, which is often used, could be defined as longevity, gross national product (GNP), democratic rights, literacy rates, etc. Until quite recently, it was common in European society to rank non-Europeans according to the ratio of their population which was admitted into the Christian Church. Such a ranking of peoples is utterly irrelevant to anthropology. In order to pass judgement on the quality of life in a foreign society, we must first try to understand that society from the inside; otherwise our judgement has a very limited intellectual interest. What is conceived of as 'the good life' in the society in which we live may not appear attractive at all if it is seen from a different vantage-point. In order to understand people's lives, it is therefore necessary to try to grasp the totality of their experiential world; and in order to succeed in this project, it is inadequate to look at selected 'variables'. Obviously, a concept such as 'annual income' is meaningless in a society where neither money nor waged work is common.

This kind of argument may be read as a warning against ethnocentrism. This term (from Greek '*ethnos*', meaning 'a people') means evaluating other people from one's own vantage-point and describing them in one's own terms. One's own '*ethnos*', including one's cultural values, is literally placed at the centre. Within this frame of thought, other peoples would necessarily appear as inferior imitations of oneself. If the Nuer of the Sudan are unable to get a mortgage to buy a house, they thus appear to have a less perfect society than ourselves. If the Kwakiutl Indians of the west coast of North America lack electricity, they seem to have a less fulfilling life than we do. If the Kachin of upper Burma reject conversion to Christianity, they are less civilised than we are, and if the San ('Bushmen') of the Kalahari are non-literate, they appear less intelligent than us. Such points of view express an ethnocentric attitude which fails to allow other peoples to be different from ourselves on their own terms, and can be a serious obstacle to understanding. Rather than comparing strangers with our own society and placing ourselves on top of an imaginary pyramid, anthropology calls for an understanding of different societies as they appear from the inside. Anthropology cannot provide an answer to a question of which societies are better than others, simply because the discipline does not ask it. If asked what is the good life, the anthropologist will have to answer that every society has its own definition(s) of it.

Moreover, an ethnocentric bias, which may be less easy to detect than moralistic judgements, may shape the very concepts we use in describing and classifying the world. For example, it has been argued that it may be inappropriate to speak of politics and kinship when referring to societies which themselves lack concepts of 'politics' and 'kinship'. Politics, perhaps, belongs to the ethnographer's society and not to the society under study. We return to this fundamental problem later.

Cultural relativism is sometimes posited as the opposite of ethnocentrism. This is the doctrine that societies or cultures are qualitatively different and have their own unique inner logic, and that it is therefore scientifically absurd to rank them on a scale. If one places a San group, say, at the bottom of a ladder where the variables are, say, literacy and annual income, this ladder is

irrelevant to them if it turns out that the San do not place a high priority on money and books. It should also be evident that one cannot, within a cultural relativist framework, argue that a society with many cars is 'better' than one with fewer, or that the ratio of cinemas to population is a useful indicator of the quality of life.

Cultural relativism is an indispensable and unquestionable theoretical premise and methodological rule-of-thumb in our attempts to understand alien societies in as unprejudiced a way as possible. As an ethical principle, however, it is probably impossible in practice, since it seems to indicate that everything is as good as everything else, provided it makes sense in a particular society. It may ultimately lead to nihilism. For this reason, it may be timely to stress that many anthropologists are impeccable cultural relativists in their daily work, while they have definite, frequently dogmatic notions about right and wrong in their private lives. In Western societies and elsewhere, current debates over minority rights and multiculturalism indicate both the need for anthropological knowledge and the impossibility of finding a simple solution to these complex problems, which will naturally be discussed in later chapters.

Cultural relativism cannot, when all is said and done, be posited simply as the opposite of ethnocentrism, the simple reason being that it does not in itself contain a moral principle. The principle of cultural relativism in anthropology is a methodological one—it helps us investigate and compare societies without relating them to an intellectually irrelevant moral scale; but this does not logically imply that there is no difference between right and wrong. Finally, we should be aware that many anthropologists wish to discover general, shared aspects of humanity or human societies. There is no necessary contradiction between a project of this kind and a cultural relativist approach, even if universalism—doctrines emphasising the similarities between humans—is frequently seen as the opposite of cultural relativism. One may well be a relativist at a certain level of anthropological analysis, yet simultaneously argue that a particular underlying pattern is common to all societies or persons. Many would indeed claim that this is what anthropology is about: to discover both the uniqueness of each social and cultural setting and the ways in which humanity is one.

Suggestions for further reading

1. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: *Social Anthropology*. Glencoe: Free Press 1951.
2. Clifford Geertz: *The Uses of Diversity*. In *Assessing Cultural Anthropology*, ed. Robert Borofsky. New York: McGraw-Hill 1994.
3. Adam Kuper: *Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School* (3rd edition). London: Routledge 1996.

2 The Promise

C. WRIGHT MILLS

Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps. They sense that within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this feeling, they are often quite correct: What ordinary men are directly aware of and what they try to do are bounded by the private orbits in which they live; their visions and their powers are limited to the close-up scenes of job, family, neighborhood; in other milieux, they move vicariously and remain spectators. And the more aware they become, however vaguely, of ambitions and of threats which transcend their immediate locales, the more trapped they seem to feel.

Underlying this sense of being trapped are seemingly impersonal changes in the very structure of continent-wide societies. The facts of contemporary history are also facts about the success and the failure of individual men and women. When a society is industrialized, a peasant becomes a worker; a feudal lord is liquidated or becomes a businessman. When classes rise or fall, a man is employed or unemployed; when the rate of investment goes up or down, a man takes new heart or goes broke. When wars happen, an insurance salesman becomes a rocket launcher; a store clerk, a radar man; a wife lives alone; a child grows up without a father. Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both.

Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. The well-being they enjoy, they do not usually impute to the big ups and downs of the societies in which they live. Seldom aware of the intricate connection between the patterns of their own lives and the course of world history, ordinary men do not usually know what this connection means for the kinds of men they are becoming and for the kinds of history-making in which they might take part. They do not possess the quality of mind essential to grasp the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world. They cannot cope with their personal troubles in such ways as to control the structural transformations that usually lie behind them.

Surely it is no wonder. In what period have so many men been so totally exposed at so fast a pace to such earthquakes of change? That Americans have not known such catastrophic changes as have the men and women of other societies is due to historical facts that are now quickly becoming “merely history.” The history that now affects every man is world history...

The very shaping of history now outpaces the ability of men to orient themselves in accordance with cherished values... Is it any wonder that ordinary men feel they cannot cope with the larger worlds with which they are so suddenly confronted? That they cannot understand the meaning of their epoch for their own lives?... Is it any wonder that they come to be possessed by a sense of the trap?

It is not only information they need—in this Age of Fact, information often dominates their attention and overwhelms their capacities to assimilate it... What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves. It is this quality, I am going to contend, that journalists and scholars, artists

and publics, scientists and editors are coming to expect of what may be called the sociological imagination.

The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions. Within that welter, the framework of modern society is sought, and within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated. By such means the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles and the indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public issues.

The first fruit of this imagination—and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it—is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within his period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances. In many ways it is a terrible lesson; in many ways a magnificent one. We do not know the limits of man's capacities for supreme effort or willing degradation, for agony or glee, for pleasurable brutality or the sweetness of reason. But in our time we have come to know that the limits of 'human nature' are frighteningly broad. We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography, and that he lives it out within some historical sequence. By the fact of his living he contributes, however minutely, to the shaping of this society and to the course of its history, even as he is made by society and by its historical push and shove.

The sociological imagination enables us to grasp **history** and **biography** and the relations between the two within society. That is its task and its promise. To recognize this task and this promise is the mark of the classic social analyst. It is characteristic of Herbert Spencer—turgid, polysyllabic, comprehensive; of E. A. Ross—graceful, muck-raking, upright; of Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim; of the intricate and subtle Karl Mannheim. It is the quality of all that is intellectually excellent in Karl Marx; it is the clue to Thorstein Veblen's brilliant and ironic insight, to Joseph Schumpeter's many-sided constructions of reality; it is the basis of the psychological sweep of W.E.H. Lecky no less than of the profundity and clarity of Max Weber. And it is the signal of what is best in contemporary studies of man and society.

No social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey. Whatever the specific problems of the classic social analysts, however limited or however broad the features of social reality they have examined, those who have been imaginatively aware of the promise of their work have consistently asked three sorts of questions:

- (1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are its essential components, and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?
- (2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we are examining affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it moves? And this period—what are its essential features? How does it differ from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history-making?

- (3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining?

Whether the point of interest is a great power state or a minor literary mood, a family, a prison, a cree—these are the kinds of questions the best social analysts have asked. They are the intellectual pivots of classic studies of man in society—and they are the questions inevitably raised by any mind possessing the sociological imagination. For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self and to see the relations between the two. Back of its use there is always the urge to know the social and historical meaning of the individual in the society and in the period in which he has his quality and his being.

That, in brief, is why it is by means of the sociological imagination that men now hope to grasp what is going on in the world, and to understand what is happening in themselves as minute points of the intersections of biography and history within society... They acquire a new way of thinking, they experience a transvaluation of values: in a word, by their reflection and by their sensibility, they realize the cultural meaning of the social sciences.

Perhaps the most fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination works is between 'the personal troubles of milieu' and 'the public issues of social structure'. This distinction is an essential tool of the sociological imagination and a feature of all classic work in social science.

Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware. Accordingly, the statement and the resolution of troubles properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu—the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity. A trouble is a private matter: values cherished by an individual are felt by him to be threatened.

Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life. They have to do with the organization of many such milieus into the institutions of an historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieus overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger structure of social and historical life. An issue is a public matter: some value cherished by publics is felt to be threatened. Often there is a debate about what that value really is and about what it is that really threatens it. This debate is often without focus if only because it is the very nature of an issue, unlike even widespread trouble, that it cannot very well be defined in terms of the immediate and everyday environments of ordinary men. An issue, in fact, often involves a crisis in institutional arrangements, and often too it involves what Marxists call 'contradictions' or 'antagonisms'.

In these terms, consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees,

15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. The very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals.

Consider war. The personal problem of war, when it occurs, may be how to survive it or how to die in it with honor; how to make money out of it; how to climb into the higher safety of the military apparatus; or how to contribute to the war's termination. In short, according to one's values, to find a set of milieux and within it to survive the war or make one's death in it meaningful. But the structural issues of war have to do with its causes; with what types of men it throws up into command; with its effects upon economic and political, family and religious institutions, with the unorganized irresponsibility of a world of nation-states.

Consider marriage. Inside a marriage a man and a woman may experience personal troubles, but when the divorce rate during the first four years of marriage is 250 out of every 1,000 attempts, this is an indication of a structural issue having to do with the institutions of marriage and the family and other institutions that bear upon them...

What we experience in various and specific milieux, I have noted, is often caused by structural changes. Accordingly, to understand the changes of many personal milieux we are required to look beyond them. And the number and variety of such structural changes increase as the institutions within which we live become more embracing and more intricately connected with one another. To be aware of the idea of social structure and to use it with sensibility is to be capable of tracing such linkages among a great variety of milieux. To be able to do that is to possess the sociological imagination...

3 Politics, You, and Democracy

LYDIA N. YU-JOSE

According to one of the great Greek philosophers, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), a human being is a political animal; he is not human but a beast or a God if he could live outside the state (Ebenstein, 1966, 66).

The state that Aristotle knew was small—a city-state. Imagine it to be as small as Singapore with fewer people. In this small and very intimate city, it was not hard for everyone to participate in politics. For, in this city-state that existed before the birth of Christ, even ceremonies involving the Gods were civic, not religious, ceremonies. The Olympics, which started in ancient Greece, were political activities. In other words, almost everything was political.

Today, with very rare exceptions, all human beings live not in city-states, but in nation-states. Nation-states are much bigger in size and population than city-states. The Philippines is a nation-state, so is the United States of America. Given its larger size and population, can we still say that human beings are political animals? That he is not human if he can live outside the state? The question has become more complicated since the advent of globalization, one characteristic of which is the ease for individuals to transfer residence from one nation-state to another.

Another way of putting the question is: Now that our lives are more complicated and definitely more modern than the lives of the ancient Greeks, can we still say that politics affects all of us?

In case of coup d'état, you will not go to class because it is dangerous. When an antigovernment rally causes traffic, you might come to class late. If you are at least 18, you have to register and vote. These are political phenomena that affect us, but you may argue that coup d'états, rallies, and elections do not happen every year. Besides, you may not have classes on the day that a coup d'état or a rally happens. Likewise, even though you gain the right to vote when you reach 18, you may choose not to vote and register. Therefore, you may say, politics does not affect you; you can avoid it.

The obviously political coup d'état, antigovernment rallies, elections, and the like may not affect all of us. They may affect only the activists and the concerned citizens. And, the effects are not felt everyday. However, there are many aspects of life that are political, even though they may not seem to be. Births have to be registered. Some countries have laws limiting the number of children per family. Couples who want to get married have to secure a license. Some countries have mandatory prenatal examination of pregnant women. Deaths have to be registered. Alcoholic drinks are not supposed to be sold minors. Wage earners must at least receive the minimum salary legislated by the state. Building permits have to be secured before you can build your house. In some countries, you must see to it that the height and size of your house do not deprive your neighbor of sunlight at certain times of the day. You have to pay your taxes. Schools and universities have to abide by the school calendar approved by the state. Some of the subjects in your curriculum are mandated by the state. You must have a passport if you want to travel abroad. Garbage trucks collect your garbage at least once a week. In some countries antipollution measures are enforced to ensure the health of the citizens. Philippine presidents welcome overseas Filipino workers at the airport when they come for Christmas. Senior citizens and students enjoy

discounts in theaters, museums, and other establishments. These are only a few examples of the political aspects of life that at first glance may not look political.

But they are all political matters, or at least, results of politics. They may have positive effects on you, like being able to live in a clean, pollution-free environment; being able to dry your clothes in the sun; enjoying discounts; feeling important when you are welcomed by your country's president at the airport and being called a "modern hero;" being ensured of a decent salary. Others may be negative, like having to bear the sight and smell of garbage in front of your house, because the garbage trucks do not come regularly to collect them; having to miss a school year or a semester because you transferred abroad and the school calendars of your country and your school abroad do not jibe; having to abort a child because the mandatory prenatal examination reveals that the child would not be a normal baby. Others may be potentially negative or positive depending on your attitude and circumstances, while others may just seem to be necessary regulations to be complied with in a civilized society.

What is Politics?

While there is a long list of political aspects of life, there are aspects that are not political and different thinkers have different ideas as to what these are. Take, for example, this anecdote in the life of a Filipino journalist/literary figure:

In Malacañang recently, at a nonpolitical Sunday lunch for three—the Chief Executive, his special assistant and this educational note taker—the sixth President of the Republic reminisced about his boyhood training during those crucial years when the mold had not yet hardened, when the pliant intelligence had just started to be shaped and sharpened; the same mind that today, operating at the pinnacle of political power, makes the fateful decisions for good or ill, involving as they do the nation's well-being, honor, security and survival. (Brillantes 2005, 57).

The journalist had lunch with no less than the President of the Philippines in Malacañang and yet he calls the lunch "nonpolitical." Why does he describe the lunch nonpolitical? When is a lunch in Malacañang with the Philippine President and his special assistant a political one and when is it not? In other words, what is politics?

Politics may be defined in different gradients of inclusiveness. Some scholars are too inclusive that they define almost everything as political, while others exclude a number of items, but they differ in what they exclude and include. There are scholars who consider any activity that involves power—who gets what, when, and how—as political (Lasswell 1936).

Some scholars locate politics in a collectivity. They believe that politics "is at the heart of all collective social activity, formal and informal, public and private, in all human groups, institutions and societies, not just some of them, and that it always has been and always will be" (Leftwich 1984, 63). They believe that politics is the root of many problems that may not look political. These scholars consider a medical problem, such as the outbreak of epidemics, economic problems like unemployment, famine, and poverty, social problems manifested in crimes, as results of politics (64). They believe that they have political explanations, but a thorough understanding of them may need an interdisciplinary approach; that is, an application of knowledge about society, about psychology, about the state, about science and technology, about economics.

Politics may be defined in a narrow sense in terms of arena of activity in the modern world. It has a narrow meaning when defined in relation to the state. Thus, Aristotle's dictum that

man is a political animal, in a way, connotes a narrow definition of politics because he said this in connection with the state, the *polis* in Greek, *res publica* in Latin, which means ‘affairs of the state’. Taken in the context of Aristotle’s time, however, relating politics to the state is to give it a broad meaning because the *polis* during this time was the encompassing political unit and everything revolved around it. It would only be when we directly translate *polis* to mean the modern state that Aristotle’s concept of what is political becomes narrow.

To some thinkers of modern times, like Michael Oakeshott, having ‘affairs of the state’ implies that there are affairs which do not belong to the state, and are not political. There are personal affairs, like relationships between lovers, among siblings, among friends. There are social affairs, like birthday parties, weddings and meetings of a Rotary Club or a Lions Club. The state does not get involved in them and ordinary people do not want to be and are not involved in politics. Politics is reserved to the *statesmen* and *stateswomen* (note the emphasis) (Oakeshott 1962).

“Politics in the modern world obviously happen for the most part in nation-states—that is to say, in communities with a certain past, with a certain social makeup and with a certain set of arrangements for making political decisions. All these are givens. Politics, in the famous Oakeshott phrase, consists of ‘attending to’ these decision-making arrangements” (McClelland, 1966, 775).

Political discourse well then is about what is latently present but not yet there, or, to put it another way, the discussion of statesmen will be about the right time and the right way of responding to the sympathy they feel for what does not fully appear. Intimations come to those who are already engaged in the practice of politics (though there is no reason in principle why they should be contained to practicing politicians), but they do not come singly. Intimations are like a signal from the world, but one of the world’s problems with the world is that it sends many signals and sometimes so many that, taken together, they constitute a noise. The art of politics lies in being able to hear the separate signals clearly and knowing which to respond to and which to ignore. The statesmen have no set of prior criteria which tell him which or what kind of intimations he ought to pursue. (778-79).

David Easton (1959) further refines the meaning of politics as state affairs by defining politics as the authoritative allocation of values in a society. To Easton, an allocation of values that is not authoritative is not political and in society, it is the state that has the authority to allocate values.

On the other hand, Robert Dahl (1984) defines politics as any activity involving human beings associated together in relationship of power and authority where conflict occurs. This is a less inclusive definition than that of Easton, in the sense, that the use of power and authority is political only when there is conflict. But in another sense, it is more inclusive because the use of power and authority is not limited to the state.

Still a narrower definition of politics is one that relates it to government: “Government is the arena of politics, the prize of politics, and, historically speaking, the residue of past politics” (Miller 1962, 19). This definition is narrower than the definition that relates politics to the state because government is only a component of the state. The definition excludes many things, such as the electorate’s behavior, civil society, political education, interest groups, and many other aspects we now consider as political.

On the other hand, the definition includes activities, which, ideally, should not be political. Government normally includes making decisions and politics and implementing them.

Usually, decisions and policies are made through discussion, negotiation, compromise, and promulgation of laws, rules, regulations, administrative orders, and other forms of expressing the outcome of discussion, negotiation, and compromise. The laws, rules, regulations, and administrative orders should be implemented. The implementation aspect should no longer be political. It should just be a routine. It is, however, still very much function of government. It usually belongs to the bureaucracy, which, ideally, should not be political. If, even this aspect of government is still political, there will be a lot of instability and unpredictability. In fact, this is one of the occasions when citizens complain about “too much politics.” There is too much politics when there is still haggling, compromise; unpredictability is a situation when there should not be, when there should no longer be politics.

Bernard Crick relates politics to the state, but he does not believe that there is politics in all states. To him, politics does not exist in a tyranny, or in a totalitarian state. Neither does he believe that it exists in a democracy where only the majority is heard.

Crick (1982, 141) says “politics is a way of ruling in divided societies without violence.” By “divided societies,” he means societies where there are a variety of different interests and opinions. Differences in interests have to be resolved not by force, but through conciliation. Crick asserts: “Why do certain interests have to be conciliated? And the answer is, of course, that they do not have to be. Other paths are always open, including violent means. Politics is simply when they are conciliated” (30). Crick does not believe that force or violence should be used to settle differences.

To Crick, politics and totalitarianism cannot coexist. There can be politics only when there is diversity. There can be no diversity when everything is political. There is diversity only when there are political and nonpolitical activities. In a totalitarian state, everything is political and because of this, politics is annihilated (151).

Democracy is compatible with politics, “indeed politics can now scarcely hope to exist without it” (73). But it should not be that kind of democracy that Aristotle describes as mob rule, or that kind of democracy against which Alexis de Tocqueville (1969, 246–76) warned us: tyranny of the majority. It should be that kind of democracy where there is equality and liberty, respect for differences, and a commitment to resolve them through compromises.

Politics means compromises, but these compromises “must in some sense be creative of future benefits—that each exists for a further purpose.” Or at least, some purpose, like “enabling orderly government to be carried on at all” (Crick 1982, 21–22).

Given this array of meanings and scope of politics, it is obvious that there is no single correct answer to the question “what is politics.” The only thing they all say common is that politics is a relational activity. You cannot have politics with yourself (except in a figurative sense); there should be at least two people interacting with each other. The authorities we have mentioned are also in agreement that politics is a purposive activity. But, of course, while politics is relational and purposive, not all activities that are relational and purposive are political. That brings us back to the issue of the existence of many correct meanings and delimitations of politics.

Going back to the nonpolitical lunch of our journalist, we may guess in what sense he uses the word political. Perhaps to him the lunch was nonpolitical because the people at the dining table avoided talking about the government. They avoided discussing the affairs of the state, and just chatted about the crispy *hito* (catfish), chicken adobo with lots of garlic, and *saluyot* with shrimps and bamboo shoots. They talked only about nice things. Our journalist has a narrow

definition of politics. But not everyone will agree with him. To others, even such mundane conversation about food is political.

Confronted with such wealth of ideas about what politics is, we have to choose just one definition, if only to make our search for answers manageable. But the choice, although with a taint of arbitrariness, as is usually unavoidable in a scientific quest, has to be a well-reasoned out choice. If we do not do this, we will get bogged down in circuitous weighing of the narrow and the broad, the classical and the postmodern meanings of politics.

Political Science and Definition of Terms

Intellectual debate will not progress if there is no agreement about which meaning of a concept the discussants will adopt, at least tentatively, or for the limited purpose of examining a clearly defined problem. To proceed with our examination of Philippine politics and democracy, we have to agree on what to focus on and which meaning of politics to adopt. For the purpose of this chapter and the succeeding ones, we will limit our use of the concept politics to that activity that refers to the state, bearing in mind that this is not the only meaning of politics.

Politics is a relational, purposive activity that may occur in any arena—between two persons, a family, an office, the government, or the state—but among these, the study of politics on the level of the state is the most important not only because common people like our journalist above, tell us that the state is the ‘pinnacle of political power’, but also because great philosophers have said so.

Aristotle and the French political thinker of the Romantic period, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) consider the state as the highest of all social organizations (Aristotle, *Politics*, in Ebenstein, 75; Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, in Ebenstein, 447). This is true even in our modern times. The state is the highest organization we can be born to, live in, and die in/for. It is the highest not only because it is higher and larger than family, village, province, and so on, but also because it is the organization that molds us and gives us character. Man and woman, being human, need some kind of order or authority that will help them tame their instincts. The state does that. Human beings need to express their rationality and creativity, some have to channel the urge to rule; others are inclined to cooperate; still others need to feed their soul. All these, according to Aristotle and Rousseau, are made possible only in the state. A life that is truly human is possible only in the state.

St. Augustine of Hippo (A.D. 354-430), a medical Christian scholar, believed that the state was a necessary evil. The human being had original sin and he needed the state to help him lead a normal life. If only man had remained an angel, he would not have needed the state. According to St. Thomas, man is by nature a social being, and he needs the state to guide him towards perfection. To St. Augustine, the state is like medicine; it is needed because man is sick. To St. Thomas, the state is like food: it is needed for a man’s nourishment.

In modern times, G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), a German philosopher, explains the nature of the state in this way: From one point of view, the state is a necessity that is higher and outside personal life, family life, and social affairs. Persons, families, civil society are subordinate to it and dependent on it. From another point of view, the state is within them; state interest of individuals.

In other words, studying politics, studying the affairs of the state, is studying about us. If we study politics, we may understand why some are poor, others are rich. We may find solutions to problems like unemployment, crime, (and) pollution. And, if we successfully act on our

findings, we may be able to improve our lives. Other modern thinkers agree that the state is the apex of power, but they do not agree that it has positive impact on our lives.

Karl Marx (1818-1883), another German philosopher and his collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), for example, called the state the instrument of the exploitation of the proletariat and predicted that it would wither away. Anarchists, however, believe that individuals and communities can exist without any authority ruling over them (Curtis 1981, 34–38).

But even Marx, Engels, and the Anarchists did try to study and understand the state before they concluded that society did not need it. If, to Marx and the Anarchists, the state was the cause of suffering of humankind, it must, indeed, be a worthy thing to study, if only to find out how to get rid of suffering and how human beings can lead a good life.

Therefore, we will be safely within the ambit of common sense if, out of so many meanings of politics, we decide to focus on a definition that relates politics to affairs of the state. Of all the possible arenas of relational and purposive activities, it is the arena of the state that is most pervasive and has impact on most of the citizens most of the time.

State is defined as a “political association that establishes sovereign power within a defined territorial area and possesses a monopoly of legitimate violence” (Harrison and Boyd 2003, 17). By focusing on the state, we indeed define politics as an activity that involves the use of threat of use of power. The political question, therefore, is how power and the threat of using it are shared.

Scope of Politics

To say that politics is the affairs of the state is only to identify a locale of politics that is worth studying. We only say that granted that there is politics for as long as there are at least two interacting individuals, it is politics that happens in the realm of the state that is worth studying. We still have to ask what affairs of the state are and what are not.

Oakeshott says that there are affairs of the state and there are personal, private affairs. But that leaves the question of what is personal or private and what is not personal or public. What human activities may be taken up by statesmen for discussion? What human activities are negotiable in public? What human activities may be declared illegal? What human activities may be subjected to the state’s control or management?

There have been many debates about the scope of the state, but for our purposes, let us limit ourselves to debates that concern religion, economy, and husband-wife relationship.

By the close of the fifth century, a Christian father by the name of Pope Gelasius thought he has solved the jurisdictional problem of the church and the state by declaring that spiritual matters belong to the church, and temporal matters belong to the state (Ebenstein 1996, 187–188). Actually he did not solve anything, because he did not say what things were temporal; in other words, political. The state can say that it can tax the church for the use of a piece of land, because property is temporal, not spiritual. The church can refuse to pay by arguing it should not pay tax because it uses the land not for profit, but for the spiritual welfare of its followers by preaching under the trees and roaming around where there are trees and shades. The debate can go on endlessly.

As a matter of fact, the separation of church and state is still a very vibrant issue in the Philippines. Can a priest run for public office and still remain a priest? Should priests refrain from

discussing elections, pending bills in Congress, graft and corruption, and the like from the pulpit? Are political candidates mixing religion and politics when they seek charismatic religious leaders' endorsement? Did Cardinal Sin violate the principle of separation of church and state when in 1986 he called on the people to come to EDSA to topple the Marcos dictatorship?

With regard to the economy, such prices of goods, wages, ownership of business, and the like, opinions are divided too. Believers in laissez-faire ("let alone policy," a policy where the government intervenes to the minimum in the management of the economy and instead, leaves it to the forces of the law of supply and demand) say the state should concern itself only with peace and order and should leave the economy to follow its natural flow, or cycle of booms and busts. To them, the economy is not something that should be discussed and legislated upon.

If so, what happens in cases of economic crises, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Asian financial crisis of the 1970s, and the twenty-first century financial global crisis? Different governments responded differently depending on the extent of their adherence to the laissez-faire doctrine.

Other economists believe in state intervention, and they are further divided into various schools of thoughts as to how the state should intervene in the economy, over and above its function of ensuring peace and order; that is, which aspects of the economy can be politicized. Some believe that the state should prohibit private ownership. Others believe that private property may be allowed in some cases, and should be state-owned in other cases. Others believe private property and gaining profit on one's business should be allowed, but that taxes should be paid to the state and the state should use the taxes to provide each citizen free education, free hospitalization, free medicine, and other social services.

Such variety of ways and means of politics-economics interaction is obvious in the current global movement towards free trade agreements. A look at a treaty signed by the Philippine and Japan, known as JPEPA (Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement), for example, allows free trade on selected commodities, but restricts or prohibits it on other items. In other words, even a treaty like this has elements of laissez-faire (no imposition of tariffs, let the market decide) as well as protectionism (impose tariff on some imports, cannot be left alone to the market forces).

The household, on one hand, particularly the relationship between husband and wife, is outside the scope of the state, the liberal would say. Incest and spouse beating, quarrels between husband and wife, between siblings, are personal affairs; not affairs of the state, according (to) them. On the other hand, others believe that in cases of domestic violence, the state should step in. Some states have taken this line, and that is why today, it is not uncommon to find laws meant to protect spouses from violence and children from undue parental neglect.

There are some feminists who declare that the personal is political; meaning to say, violations of human rights that occur even in husband-wife relationship are matters that call for a state policy (Frazer and Lacey 1993, 72–76). Unlike the liberals who hold on to a limited view of the scope of the state because they believe that state intervention is a curtailment of individual freedom, feminists claim that such individual freedom is meaningless because in the condition of inequality between men and women, only men can enjoy such rights. From a feminist point of view, broadening the scope of state power is justified if it results in more real equality between men and women and in giving women legal protection against gender-related violence and bias.

In contrast to the above views that all recognize limitations on the scope of politics and state intervention, although with a wide range of variation, is the totalitarian view: everything is

political; everything is under the control of the state, and only the dictatorial ruler and the people around him can argue with each and make decisions for everyone. The state can prescribe religion, or dictate a state religion; the state can confiscate all properties and put them under state ownership; the state can control schools and dictate the curriculum. Everything is under the state.

We have succeeded in limiting the definition of politics by choosing the state as its focus, but we have not succeeded in pinpointing what exactly are state affairs and what are not. In other words, we have agreed to limit the discussion of phenomena that happen in the arena of the state, but we have failed in deciding what events that happen in this arena are political and what are not. How broad or how narrow should be the scope of the state is an unresolved issue. Discourse about it is by itself a reason why the study of politics is important and challenging. And it has become more challenging with the advent of globalization and the idea of the porous state that greatly impacts on the extent to which the state reaches its citizens.

Three Basic Attitudes Towards Politics: Active Participation, Rejection, Indifference

Part of the difficulty of delimiting the scope of state is the complexity of the relationship between the state and the individual. It is also difficult to determine which in this relationship is the cause, and which is the effect. It is hard to delimit the scope of the state because it is hard to define the relationship between it and the individual, or is it hard to define the relationship between the individual and the state because the scope of state power is not defined?

A way out of this dilemma, which is similar to the dilemma of which comes first, the egg or chicken, is to analytically separate the two naturally inseparable entities, the state and the individual. Moreover, instead, of trying to understand the whole gamut of state-individual relationship, let us decide to focus on just one aspect, the individual's attitudes towards the state.

No human being has ever known a life without the state, whether it be city-state (like Athens and Sparta), empire-state (like the Macedonian Empire and the Roman Empire), or nation-state (like the Philippines). No one has denied that it is the highest and the most powerful organization.

But attitudes towards the state range from total rejection of the necessity of it to full acceptance. Or from indifference to state affairs to active participation in them. And there are several variations of rejection, acceptance, indifference, and participation. These attitudes are present throughout the ages, but some of them were more prevalent than the others in particular periods of political history. Active participation was more prevalent in ancient Athens. Rejection and indifference were more prevalent during the age of the empire-states. In the modern nation-states, active participation is assumed to be the ideal because almost all states claim that their form of government is democratic, and active participation is one of the components of democracy.

Active Participation

In ancient Greece, before the city-states were conquered by the Macedonian Empire, the prevalent attitude towards the state was active involvement and direct rule by citizens. The small size of the city-state and the intimacy of life encouraged this attitude. The affairs of the state were everybody's business, except for the foreigners and slaves were not considered citizens (Sabine 1961, 3–19). The most popular of the city-states in terms of citizen participation was Athens, which practiced direct democracy.

However, Plato (427-347 B.C.), the teacher of Aristotle, criticized Athenian democracy and taught his disciples that statesmanship was an occupation not meant for just anyone. The ruler had to go through a rigorous physical, mental, and moral training, according to him. Every citizen was part of the state, but not all could rule, he said. Some would just perform jobs necessary for the economic needs of the state, others for defense, and others for actual ruling.

What is the implication of this Platonic idea in today's democracy? There is indeed, active participation of the Platonic state, but it is one of actively performing the role assigned to each one by the state. The role making decisions for everyone is monopolized by the ruler, and Plato would have liked this ruler to be a philosopher-king. Alas, Plato realized that a true philosopher would rather philosophize than rule. Plato's tentative solution to the dilemma was to have a rule of law, but then, he mused, how could it be assured that good laws were made and obeyed? His solution was a turnaround from the rule of law, for he recommended a nocturnal council that could serve as watchdog, twenty-four hours a day, to see to it that good laws are made and obeyed. Plato's dilemma is similar to the present-day government's dilemma. For example, in the Philippines, judicial review is instituted in order for the courts to rule whether a law or an executive order is in accordance with the Constitution. But supposed the judges, who are human beings are wrong, or morally upright enough to make the right judgment? Likewise, we have the institution of the ombudsman, who is supposed to be the watchdog of all government actions. But suppose the ombudsman does not do his duty properly, who will watch the ombudsman?

Whether a philosopher-king or a nocturnal council, or whether it is the rule of law, it is clear that in this aspect, Plato is not democratic because he does not allow active participation in decision making by those who are ruled.

Aristotle, a student of Plato, was more concerned about rule of law. He recognized that depending on the social makeup of a city-state, its government could be the rule of a king (monarchy), the rule of a few nobles (aristocracy), or the rule of the many who are poor (democracy), but what was important was that no one, not even the rulers, were above the law. Otherwise, the rulers would only be ruling for their own interests. The monarchy would then be a tyranny; aristocracy would be an oligarchy, and democracy mob rule.

Aristotle, like Plato, criticized the participatory, direct democracy of Athens. Aristotle did not endorse the system of each male citizen having a chance to rule. He also favored a polity, or a mixed government, where there were elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. If we apply these concepts to the generic forms of government, monarchy would be the executive, aristocracy the legislature, and democracy the citizens. Compared to roles played in a feast, monarchy and aristocracy would be the cooks or the decision makers, and democracy the citizens or the guests. Aristotle believed that the guests, not the cook, were the best judges of the food. Meaning to say, citizens (the guests) may not actually rule, but they should be vigilant and see if the government (the cook) is performing well or not. Aristotle, like Plato, had a limited idea of citizen participation, but at least, there is accountability, an important component of modern democracy.

Both Plato and Aristotle cast a critical eye on the prevailing democratic system of government during their times. Aristotle tends to be more democratic than Plato, but advocates of democracy today will still find his concept of very limited citizen participation not democratic enough.

The main point, however, is that the fact that Athens is the homeland of such varied and anti-establishment philosophies proves that there was active thinking, teaching, and participation

by these philosophers and their disciples, as well as detractors. Plato, Aristotle, and other thinkers of the time were not apathetic to the state of things, but were rather bothered by them and deeply involved in them.

Rejection, Indifference, Quiet Participation, Rebellion

A small minority in the time of the city-states rejected participation in the state. These were the Skeptics or Epicureans, on the one hand, who believed that affairs of the state were not their business and not worth their attention. For as long as the state could protect them and their property, that was enough. For them, the best kind of government was monarchy because they did not have to participate. Only the monarch had to bother about keeping order in the society (Sabine 1961, 129–38). If you do not vote because going to the polls is a waste of time and you would rather watch a movie, you are a skeptic. You are skeptical about politicians if you think they only use your taxes for their own enrichment.

The Cynics, on the other hand, believed so much on the rationality and morality of individuals as individuals that they rejected the need for the state. The wise human being, according to them, could attain his goal without the state. Only fools needed the state (Sabine 1961, 129–38). If you do not vote because you do not think anyone of the candidates is worth your vote; if you refuse to join in anti-government rallies because you believe that your life will not get any better even if you do, if you do not care about politics because you believe only you can help yourself, you are cynical about politics.

We do not have to split hair over the difference between a cynical and a skeptical attitude towards politics because nowadays the two words are interchangeable.

The Stoics, meanwhile, were indifferent towards the state. Stoics were of two kinds; submissive and rebellious. The submissive Stoic accepted any kind of rule, even a tyrannical one, because he believes that the tyrant could harm him only physically, not morally or spiritually. He would abide by immoral law because it was his fate to be under such an immoral rule, but for as long as he knew what was wrong and what was right, his soul was intact (148–58). The state increased taxes? That's fine, I can still afford it, you may say. This is similar to the stoic who quietly and without complaint does his duty. The state suppresses freedom of expression? That's fine, you may say, I will just keep my mouth shut.

The rebellious type, on the other hand, would fight for what his conscience dictated, even if it meant physical harm, even death. What was important was the freedom of his soul. He was indifferent to the pain that his action would bring him (ibid). You may be the rebellious type who goes to the streets defending freedom of expression. Never mind if the senator who sponsored the law suppression is your party mate; never mind if it would mean being arrested and imprisoned. This is similar to the rebellious Stoic who believes that no physical or material means available to the state can harm him because these tools of torture do not reach his soul. The rebellious stoic uncompromisingly fights for principles.

The word “Stoic” is hardly used today in connection with political attitudes. The words apathy, indifference, “above politics,” and rebellious are instead used.

Skepticism, cynicism, and stoicism became the prevalent attitude during the age of the empire-state, such as Macedonian and Roman empires. The huge size of the empire-state was a cause of alienation. Unlike in the small city-states where everyone practically knew each other and everyone was physically close to the pinnacle of political power; in the bigger empire-state, it was easy for an individual to feel left out and for him to escape from the affairs of the state. The

negative response was to stay out of it and depend on one's own resources, like what the Cynics thought was the right thing to do. Another negative response was simply to come to the state for protection of life and property, and to avoid any participation in it, like what the Skeptics or Epicureans thought was the correct thing to do. The Stoics, on the other hand, had a positive response, but it was either a quiet acceptance of one's principles.

It would be an oversimplification to say that an individual is an active participant, is cynical, indifferent, "above politics," or rebellious. Most of the time we assume any one of these attitudes, depending on what aspects of politics we are referring to. We are usually active participants in elections. We are sometimes cynical, sometimes indifferent, sometimes above politics, sometimes actively involved in politics, depending on many factors and circumstances.

Does the Size of the Political Unit Matter?

The downfall of the empire-state was followed by the rise of the nation-states, bigger than city-states, but not as big as the empire-states. Up to this point, a mistaken impression might have been created that the size of the political unit is the cause of active participation or alienation; that the smaller the political unit, the more involved the citizens are. This is not so, because in ancient Sparta, which, like Athens, was also small, there was no active citizen participation. In the United States, which is bigger than Singapore, there is more political participation than in the latter.

Size is not the only factor that affects active participation or alienation, but is one of the many important factors. If you imagine finding yourself in a class of 100 students, you will understand why it is harder to recite in that class, than in a class of 35 students. On the other hand, a class may only have 35 students, but if recitation is not encouraged here, you will also find it hard to recite. Likewise, if you are not the type to recite, and the professor encourages recitation, somehow, you would be persuaded to recite.

It is therefore not surprising that in contemporary times, resizing the state is one of the main preoccupations in politics.

Many democratic nation-states are divided in to substate units, like the local government units in the Philippines. The assumption is that the smaller local government units will promote more active participation. And more active participation means deeper democracy. On the other hand, there is also a movement towards a political entity bigger than the nation-state. The European Union is a case in point. One may ask, if it is already difficult for an individual to meaningfully participate in a nation-state, how can he or she meaningfully participate in the European Union? Would meaningful, wider, more active participation be limited to the local government units?

Participation and Democracy

Active participation most of the time, if not always, is a must in a state like the Philippines that claims to be democratic. Democracy is from the Greek word *demo kratos*, which means rule of the people. Actual, direct rule of the people, as we have said above, was possible only in a small city-state like Athens. In democratic nation-states people "rule" in the sense that the laws should be in accordance with what they want. Statesmen are not free to do whatever they wish, because they are accountable to the people. If the people are not satisfied with the performance of the persons to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the state, they may remove them from office. Regardless of the size of the political entity, regardless of the level of administration, that is, a supranational administrative agency of the European Union, or a local

government unit of a nation-state, election is the minimum required mechanism for democracy to work.

Exercising one's right to vote is the basic minimum that democracy requires. A democratic state cannot afford to have a majority of its citizens refusing to participate in elections. In fact, casting one's voice is not enough. The vote has to be guarded citizens have to see to it that the result of the elections is a true expression of their will. Otherwise, there will be the danger of being ruled by people they did not choose.

There are other ways of participation, such as forming associations, writing to one's representative in the legislature, expressing one's opinion in a letter to the editor of a newspaper, and the like.

Participation is most important in sustaining conversation, negotiation, discussion, compromises, making policy decisions, implementing and evaluating these decisions, making the decision-makers accountable for their actions, and indeed, the demos also have responsibility and are also accountable for their actions.

Democracy is the most sought-after form of government. No nation-state today will admit that it is not democratic, despite evidence to the contrary, thus, underlining the vivid presence of politics, the core of which, like that of democracy, in discussion and continuous negotiation. Which democratic system is really democratic is a political question.

It is not easy to obtain, maintain, and promote democracy because embedded in it is a potentially self-destructing characteristic: openness. Democracy, to be true to itself, has to be open to all other ideologies, even those that are against it, such as communism, totalitarianism, and fascism. If a democratic state bans such ideologies, it will be contradicting the essence of democracy. On the other hand, it will be quite consistent for a totalitarian, a communist, of a fascist state to ban democracy.

Democracy requires participation in discussion and negotiation. And it has to be a patient, free, and peaceful participation. For someone who has the gun, it may be easier to silence the other who discusses and argues with him/her, but this only means the gun wielder cannot do the more difficult task of politics, and thus resorted it the easier course of killing. Violence, indeed, is present in politics, as seen in the turmoil the world has experienced—wars, revolutions, coup d'état, and the like, but at the very moment that it is only the gun that speaks, but lives again once the gun is silenced. For, as Aristotle has said, man is a political animal. Survival is important for him/her, and the essence of this survival is talking, not shooting. Even if one is silenced in a nonviolent way, the act is still not justified because the silenced person cannot participate in the discussion and negotiation, and both he/she and the one who nonviolently silenced him/her contribute to the death of democracy.

It is common knowledge that there is a continuing debate as to whether the Aristotelian ideal is democratic or aristocratic. What matters is not which one is the correct answer, but that the debate continues. Aristotle sought the best form of government. The consensus now is that democracy is the best form of government—not perfect, but is still the best. How to repair its imperfections is a discussion that can continue only with wide participation of the most number of people.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed politics, as it limits its working definition in relation to the nation-state. It has stressed the point that politics and the study of it is an ancient preoccupation, and is still a major concern of all societies today.

It has discussed various kinds of attitudes towards the state, and stresses that active participation most of the time is a necessary requisite for a vibrant democracy. The direct form of democracy Athens once had cannot be retrieved for actual use in the modern nation-state. But democracy is now the system desired by most states. Given the size and complexity of nation-states, further complicated by globalization of the late twentieth century, representative democracy is the best form of democracy we can have.

Questions remain, the most basic of which is what aspects of social life fall under state power? This is a classic question that lies beneath all other questions such as how powerful should the executive be? What is the extent of a representative's representational power? Tentative answers have been given. Some answers have given rise to more questions. The endless questioning need not bother us for as long as we are willing and able to participate in the search for answers, because once we stop questioning and assume that a correct and permanent answer has been found, that will be the end of politics, the end of democracy, your death as a thinking individual engaged in a web of social and power relationships.

4 Person and Society

THOMAS HYLAND ERIKSEN

To say that societies function is trivial, but to say that everything in a society is functional, is absurd.

— Claude Lévi-Strauss

The person is a social product, but society is created by acting persons. In earlier chapters, this apparent paradox has been illustrated in several ways. It has also been made clear that there will always be some aspects of society which change and some aspects which remain the same, if we look at the whole system through a certain period of time. In this chapter, we draw some theoretical lessons from these themes, and also propose a model of the relationship between person and society on the one hand, and the relationship between structure and process on the other. These two dichotomies are fundamental components of the analytical framework of this book.

Social Structure and Social Organization

The totality of social institutions and status relationships makes up the social structure of society. It has been common to assume that this structure, in a certain sense, exists independently of the individuals who at any point in time happen to fill particular positions. Radcliffe-Brown expressed it like this in a famous statement:

The actual relations of Tom, Dick, and Harry or the behavior of Jack and Jill may go down in our field notebooks and may provide illustrations for a general description. But what we need for scientific purposes is an account of the form of the structure. (1952, p. 192)

Social structure may thus be perceived as the matrix of society, emptied of humans; the totality of duties, rights, division of labor, norms, social control, etc., abstracted from ongoing social life. The point of this kind of conceptualization is to develop an abstract model of a society which brings out its essential characteristics without unnecessary details and which may be used comparatively. A principal concern of Radcliffe-Brown and his contemporaries was to point out the functions of social institutions, to show how they supported and contributed to the maintenance of society as a whole. The general function of religion, for example, was held to lie in its ability to create solidarity and a sense of community, and to legitimate power differences. The chief function of the ancestral cult of the Dogon may thus be said to be that it creates societal continuity and family solidarity, that it ties actors to the land through strong normative bonds and that it indirectly prevents revolt or revolution against the social order. The function of household organisation may be said to be, in nearly every society, to create stability and to secure the continuity of society through socialisation. When external influences, such as the introduction of capitalism, change the conditions of existence for households, one might say that the original household organisation has become dysfunctional: it is no longer practical and so eventually disappears. Within a structural-functionalist mode of thought, all social institutions thus appear as functional; if they are not functional, they vanish.

In classic structural-functionalism, from Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, society was often thought of as a kind of organism, as an integrated whole of functional social institutions. Kroeber

(1952) described culture in a similar vein, by comparing it to a coral reef where new coral animals literally build upon their dead relatives. Seen as a whole, the coral reef (culture) is qualitatively different from the sum of its parts, and its form develops and changes gradually without the knowledge of the coral animals (actors).

The existence of certain social institutions was thus explained by reference to their function. Certain peoples believed in witchcraft, it was said, at least partly because the belief indirectly strengthened social integration and the stability of society—without the actors' knowledge of this function of witchcraft. In his theory of primitive religion, Durkheim therefore argued that when people believe that they worship supernatural powers, they really worship society.

Several problems have been pointed out in relation to this kind of argument. One obviously problematic aspect of structural-functionalism is the belief that a description of social structure might be tantamount to a good description of social life. If this were the case, we would have to expect people to act diligently and predictably according to a pre-established system of norms and sanctions. In fact this is not the case, as anyone who has done fieldwork knows. People break the rules, make exceptions, interpret norms in different and sometimes conflicting ways, and so on. An example could be the pattern of settlement among the transhumant reindeer-herding Sami of northern Scandinavia (Pehrson 1964). According to the Sami, a woman ought to join her husband's group at marriage (the technical term for this is virilocality). However, in practice only about half of them actually do so, and there is often a good reason for making an exception. Pehrson thus draws the conclusion that the transhumant Sami actually do not have a rule about post-marriage residence. Ladislav Holy and Milan Stuchlik (1983, p. 13) do not agree. They argue, rather, that the rule of virilocality definitely exists, since the Sami themselves say that the woman ought to join the man's group, even if the rule is often violated. This is obviously a valid point. In many societies, sexual infidelity is quite widespread, even if most of the persons in question would agree that there is a rule to the effect that such a practice is morally objectionable.

Raymond Firth (1951), a former student of Malinowski, tried to resolve this problem through proposing a distinction between social structure and social organisation. The structure, according to this perspective, is the established pattern of rules, customs, statuses, and social institutions. Social organisation, on the other hand, is defined as the dynamic aspect of structure; in other words, what people actually do: their decisions and patterns of action within the framework of the structure. This distinction is analogous to the distinction between status and role, and allows for a messier, less ordered social world than an exclusive reliance on a structural understanding would allow.

Firth's innovation represented an attempt to conceptualise social process; that is, society and social life seen as something which happens rather than something which is. This distinction does not imply that actors continuously break the rules and norms valid in their society, but rather that systems of rules do not specify exactly how people are to act. Even perfect knowledge of the Bible is certainly not adequate if we wish to understand how Christians act. The move from structure to process expressed in Firth's model has, incidentally, been characteristic of much later anthropological theorising.

Social Systems

The term 'social system' has been used a great deal here with no further definition. It can be defined as a set of social relations which are regularly actualised and thus reproduced as a system through interaction. A social system is further characterised by a (more or less) shared normative system and a functioning set of sanctions; that is, a certain degree of agreement or

enforced conformity concerning the oughts and ought-nots of interaction within the limits of the system.

Up to now, we have dealt empirically with social systems at three levels: the dyadic relationship, the household and the village or local community. Do these levels thereby represent different cultures? If an actor engages in a relationship with her husband, in another relationship with her family and in a third relationship with her village, does that make her a member of three cultures? Of course not. But

different social statuses are activated in the three cases, and the kinds of relationship engaged in may vary greatly. There are aspects of life which can only be shared with one's spouse, and there are other events (such as public rituals) which are not meaningful unless they are public. Culture may thus be understood as that which makes it possible for two or several actors to understand each other. It is not a 'thing' which one either has or does not have, and it can be relevant to talk of degrees of shared culture. Similarly, every actor is integrated, or participates, at several systemic levels in society. An adult may be a member of a nuclear family, a profession, a political grouping and a nation. One may also conceptualise one's 'levels of belonging' in more geographic, or spatial, terms: one is a member of the nuclear family, a neighbourhood, a town, a province and a nation. There are also many other possible ways of delineating systemic levels in society. These systems exist only to the extent that they are maintained through regular interaction.




Figure 4.1. Two ways of conceptualizing group membership in modern societies

The ethnographic examples of the last chapter reveal several systemic levels. Among the Fulani, the household, the kin group and the larger group assembling in the rainy season are relevant and important systemic levels which exist (or are activated) under particular circumstances. In the Caribbean village, the natal household remains an important systemic level for the male actor throughout his life. Among the Dogon and Yanomamö, on the contrary, the household, the lineage and the village seem to be the most important systemic levels. As regards many communities deeply integrated into large-scale social systems, it may be argued that the market and the state are the crucial systemic levels, although kinship and small groups remain important in such complex societies as well.

Distinctions between relevant systemic levels depends on which persons are related in which ways to which others. Put simply, it concerns which groups persons belong to, and what is the purpose of these groups. In anthropological studies, the analytical interests of the anthropologist are also important. Should one concentrate one's research efforts on the household, the kin group, the village, a network centred around a pub or an Internet chat group, a trade union, a factory or the nation-state? An obvious answer is that one might begin by finding out how the inhabitants of a society themselves relate to their different webs of relationship; what appears as most important to them, and with whom do they carry out important tasks?

It is important to be able to distinguish between social system and social structure. A social system is just as abstract as the social structure, but it refers to a different kind of phenomenon. Social systems are delineable sets of social relationships between actors, whereas social structure (usually) refers to the totality of standardised relationships in a society. Both of those concepts may, however, be conceptualised as socially created channels and frameworks for human action, which provide both opportunities and constraints.

The Boundaries of Social Systems

If we define a social system as a set of social relationships which are created and recreated through regular interaction, it makes sense to say that the boundaries of the system lie at the points where interaction decreases dramatically. In a relatively isolated village community, as among the Dogon in colonial and precolonial times, it would be appropriate to say that the relevant social system stops at the village boundary. The interaction engaged in by the inhabitants with outsiders is (traditionally) sporadic and relatively unimportant. Religion, family life, politics and production have all taken place within the limits of the village. However, concerning some activities, such as trade, the village appears as a sub-system; as a part of a larger system. Systemic boundaries are in this way not absolute, but relative to a kind of social context or a set of activities. Unless this is kept in mind, it will be difficult to delineate the boundaries of most social sub-systems in the contemporary world; in their different ways, they may link up with vast entities such as world Islam, the Internet or the global commodity market.

Society, if we think of it as an integrated whole, may also be divided analytically into various sub-systems. In the Dogon village, one such sub-system is the religious and ritual one, in which certain but not all members of society take part. Another sub-system, involving a different set of actors for different ends, would be the lineage organisation; a third would be the household, and so on. The relationship between such sub-systems is of great importance in anthropological research, since we aim at an understanding of the intrinsic connections between different social institutions and activities.

Networks

The term 'social network' has in recent years entered the everyday vocabulary of many societies. In day-to-day speech, it refers to an ego-centred set of relationships, as when people talk of 'my social network'. It may also be used to refer to a set of relationships activated for a particular end, without necessarily being organised around a single person. The analytical meaning of the term 'social network' is thus related to the meaning of social systems; generally, we may say that a network is a person-dependent and thus not very enduring social system.

The first anthropologist to use the expression social network was John Barnes, originally an Africanist, who carried out fieldwork in Bremnes, western Norway, in the early 1950s (Barnes 1990 [1954]). Since the hamlet lacked unilineal corporate groups of the kind he was accustomed to from his African research, he needed other analytical tools to grasp the mechanisms of integration. To begin with, he noted that each person in the parish belonged to several groups; the household, the hamlet, the professional group and so on. For analytical purposes, Barnes identified three kinds of social fields in Bremnes. First is the territorially delineated field, which is hierarchically organised through public administration. Second is the economic field, which consists of many mutually dependent but formally independent entities, such as fishing boats, fish oil factories, groceries and so on. These two fields have a certain stability through time, to some extent independently of the actors. The third social field Barnes delineated, however, 'had no units or boundaries; it had no coordinating organization. It was made up of the ties of friendship and acquaintance which everyone growing up in Bremnes society partly inherited and largely

built up for himself' (1990, p.72). These ties existed between social equals, and were continuously modified as actors changed their circle of acquaintances.

A main point in Barnes's study is that this kind of society lacks the stable corporations typical of African societies. An important contributing reason for the lack of corporations in Bremnes, he argued, was the bilateral kinship system: kin reckoning which includes both the mother's and the father's side.

I have my cousins and sometimes we act together; but they have their own cousins who are not mine and so on indefinitely... Each person is, as it were, in touch with a number of other people, some of whom are directly in touch with each other and some of whom are not. (Barnes 1990, p.72)

It is this kind of system of relations that Barnes proposed calling social networks. Here it should be noted that networks often have no boundaries and no clear internal organisation, since any person may consider him- or herself the centre of the network.

Barnes further holds that one of the most important differences between small communities and large-scale societies is the fact that the networks are more dense in the former than in the latter. When two people meet for the first time in a large-scale urban society, it is quite rare for them to discover that they have many common acquaintances; in small-scale societies, on the contrary, 'everybody' knows each other in many different ways—through kinship, common friends and neighbours, shared school experiences, professional life and/or intermarriage.

The network has a fleeting and impermanent character. The term is therefore most appropriate in descriptions of social fields, or sub-systems, which primarily exist by virtue of ties between concrete persons, and which therefore are transformed, or disappear, when those persons for some reason cease to maintain the ties. The network may be a more useful descriptive term than more rigid concepts, such as 'social structure' when the locus of study is a large-scale social system. Indeed, social theorists such as Manuel Castells (1996) have gone so far as to suggest that the contemporary era, 'the information age', is generally characterised by flux, instability and shifting boundaries, and that it may therefore be described as 'a network society'.

Scale

We frequently say that anthropologists have traditionally studied 'small-scale societies' as opposed to 'large-scale societies'. But what is scale? It could be seen as a measure of social complexity in a society (see for instance Barth 1978). The scale of a society can be defined as the total number of statuses necessary for the society to reproduce itself. If we compare the Yanomamö village with the Caribbean one, it becomes evident that the latter has a larger scale than the former. The Yanomamö community is small in size and relatively simple in terms of its division of labour. In the Caribbean village the division of labour is more complex: there are ties of mutual dependency between a large number of persons because of professional specialisation, and the village is intrinsically linked to systems of much larger scale (the state, foreign countries through migration, etc.). If we move on to industrial societies, the level of scale is enormous: the mutual dependency may encompass millions of persons. If some of their statuses cease to contribute to the upholding of the system, it will change: if, say, all bus drivers in the Netherlands go on strike, this will, directly or indirectly, affect the lives of most of the Dutch.

Scale may also be regarded as a measure of relative anonymity: the larger the scale, the fewer the actors of the system one knows personally. We now turn to an example indicating the possible uses of the concept of scale.

Case Noyale is a village on the south-western coast of Mauritius, an island-state in the Indian Ocean (Eriksen 1988). About 700 people live in the village, which has approximately 170 households. The main source of livelihood is fishing, but many villagers have other work. Some work at a sugar plantation nearby, some are independent farmers, some work at a hotel 5 kilometres away and so on. The village has a grocery, a few small shops, a post office and a dispensary.

In a certain sense, one may say that Case Noyale is a social system of relatively small scale. The division of labour and the specialisation in the village itself are limited, and there are few local organisations with specialised aims. Virtually all of the villagers know each other.

On the other hand, it is ultimately not very helpful to regard Case Noyale as an isolated small-scale system. About 20 percent of the adults work outside the village, and several of those who work within it (including the Catholic priest and the schoolteacher) live elsewhere. The fishermen sell their catch to an intermediary, a 'banian', who drives to and from town daily. Several of the teenagers of the village attend secondary school at Rose-Hill or Quatre-Bornes, towns which are about an hour away by bus. The inhabitants receive much of their knowledge about the outside world through radio and television; the school has state funding; the products sold in the grocery are largely imported from abroad, and so on.

From this sketch, it can be extrapolated that scale can be highly relevant in the study of agency. Scale sets limits to the scope of options for action, but simultaneously it is the product of action. In Case Noyale, the first teenager who went to secondary school became a participant in a system of larger scale than his friends were involved in. Every time someone files a court case at the District Court of Rivière Noire, he or she activates a level of scale higher than is common. To most villagers at most times, the village of Case Noyale is the relevant social system. This is where they go to primary school, work, marry and buy necessary commodities. However, Case Noyale may also be regarded as an integrated part of the nation-state of Mauritius (school, public transportation and other facilities are organised at a national level, and the fish is eventually sold at the national fish market) and even, in some respects, as a part of the global economic system, since the backbone of the Mauritian economy is the sugar industry.

In order to say anything meaningful about the scale of a society, it is necessary to investigate social relations carefully. Above all, we must identify which tasks the members of society are faced with and which options they have in carrying them out. If these tasks—subsistence, socialisation, politics, religion, and so on—depend on many actors with specialised statuses, the scale is by definition larger than would be the case in a society where nearly everybody knows nearly everything. Scale is also, as we have seen, situational in the sense that all actors move from situations of small scale to those of larger scale, and back again, on a daily basis.

Non-Localised Networks: The Internet

In *The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach*, Daniel Miller and Don Slater remark that the Internet transcends dualisms such as local/global and small scale/large scale (Miller and Slater 2000, Chapter 1). In this, they mean that online communities of, say, Trinidadians (their ethnographic focus) can be based on close interpersonal relationships even if the participants are scattered around the world (due to the extensive migration of Trinidadians). To some extent, ethnographic studies of Internet users raise problems reminiscent of those encountered by Barnes when he came to Bremnes from Southern Africa. Where were the corporate groups? he asked. Where was the gravitational point of the community? Regarding the Internet, a similar question

may be, in what sense do online communities exist? They come into existence only when people log on, quite unlike local communities, which exist in more imperative ways. An interesting issue thus concerns the degree to which Internet participation creates binding commitments similar to those created in offline settings. The Internet is a decentred, unlocalised 'network of networks' (Ulf Hannerz's term) which may seem to operate according to a different logic from other social networks.

Many studies of Internet users so far have confined themselves to online research. While this research strategy may in many ways be rewarding, anthropologists will ask research questions which require them to collect other kinds of data as well. Notably, the relationship between online activities and other social activities needs to be studied if we are going to understand the place of the Internet in people's lives. In their study, Miller and Slater have participated online with Trinidadians, made household surveys of computer use, carried out structured interviews with business people, politicians and other elite persons, hung out in cybercafes, and so on—in brief, they have employed a wide variety of methods in order to assess the impact of the Internet on Trinidadian society. Some of their findings are surprising. For example, Trinidadians do not customarily distinguish between online and offline life, between the 'virtual' and the 'real'; to them, all their activities form a seamless whole. Also, they are far from being 'deterritorialised' online; on the contrary, they tend to overcommunicate their identity as Trinidadians. The Internet actually enhances their national and, in many cases, religious identity. It also turns out to be a good medium for intimate conversations.

The newness of information technologies such as the Internet should not lead us to believe that everything about it is new. Ethnographic studies of Internet users will tend to ask similar research questions to those asked in studies of local communities or localised urban networks, and the methods employed will also tend to be similar. But it is equally important to keep in mind that information technologies such as the Internet, mobile phones and satellite television create new frameworks for communication and interaction. In a sense, as Miller and Slater say, the far/near, small scale/large scale and local/global dichotomies are dissolved; but instead, other issues arise—concerning place, commitment and, not least, the boundaries of the network. If it is difficult to delineate the boundaries of, say, Bremnes or Case Noyale, the problem of delineation is even greater here. This is the kind of question which needs to be addressed by anthropologists today, as they bring their skills in network studies and participant observation to new areas.

Group and Grid

Distinctions between small-scale and large-scale societies are still used in social anthropology, even if this kind of distinction is problematic as most actors are involved in social fields of large as well as small scale. Mauritian village life does not preclude having French penfriends or regular interaction with Australian tourists, or consuming Burmese rice, or corresponding with foreign anthropologists by e-mail;




Figure 4.2 Grid and group (Douglas 1970, p. 84)

just as engaging in the nuclear family and personal friendships remain very real possibilities for the inhabitants of Germany.

Another way of classifying societies, which concentrates on the principles of social control rather than size and complexity, has been proposed by Mary Douglas (Douglas 1970, 1978). In many of her theoretical studies in anthropology, sociology and social philosophy, she draws on a classificatory scheme that runs along two axes (Figure 4.2), which she labels 'group' and 'grid'. Along the 'group' dimension, persons and societies may be classified according to their degree of social cohesion, while the 'grid' dimension describes the degree of shared classifications or knowledge. Purely personal notions, which are not shared with others, belong below zero. Strong group indicates that other persons exert strong pressure on the individual; strong grid indicates that people are rigidly classified at the societal level, which leaves little space for individual idiosyncrasies.

One 'strong grid, strong group' society is, in Douglas's view, the Tallensi of Ghana as described by Fortes during colonialism. 'Here the public system of rights and duties equips each man with a full identity, prescribing for him what and when he eats, how he grooms his hair, how he is buried or born' (Douglas 1970, p. 87). Such societies, Douglas argues, are strictly conformist, strongly integrated and create rigid boundaries vis-à-vis outsiders. Another kind of society is the 'weak grid, strong group' one, which Douglas exemplifies by describing the situation in some Central African societies during late colonialism (the 1950s). In these societies, contradictory demands are placed on people; they must be obedient, but also strive for individual excellence. They are expected to till the land of their ancestors, but also to earn money, which can only be achieved through migration. Internal differentiation is unclear and ambiguous, unlike the strong 'ritualisation' of social relationships in the previous type.

The third societal type exemplified in Douglas (1970) is the kind she calls 'strong grid', where group cohesion is weak. This is a sort of society, she argues, which might be better described in terms of temporary networks than in terms of corporate groups; where there are no chiefs and no rigid boundaries. Nevertheless, she notes, the meanings and classifications of society are shared.

The 'strong grid' type also has another variant, which can be described as the 'big-man system', oscillating from the left to the right on the upper half of the diagram. The big man, a self-made leader in a small-scale society, tries to exert as much pressure as possible on his subjects, but as his power grows so does their discontent, and they pull him towards the right.

Where do industrial societies belong in Douglas's scheme? Admittedly, this is a simplification of her account. In reality, societies are spread out on the diagram, so that some groups or some social contexts belong, say, in the top left slot while others might be placed in the top right corner. In the view of some, industrial societies are 'weak group, weak grid': they are individualistic and anonymous, and thus others exert little social control over ego; and they are internally differentiated in such a way that boundaries between categories of persons, and between society and the outside world, are unclear. Another perspective might rather maintain that industrial societies are 'strong group' because of the power of the state in exerting pressure on its citizens. Douglas suggests, for her part, that there are remarkable similarities between 'some Londoners' and Mbuti pygmies. Both modern individualists and egalitarian hunter-gatherers may tentatively be placed close to zero on the vertical axis ('complete freedom' in Douglas's terms). A strongly integrated nation-state, such as Iceland, can perhaps be placed squarely in the top half of the diagram, while loosely integrated urban societies (Los Angeles for instance), would cluster around the vertical axis and—if social disintegration is strong—mostly in the bottom half. Rich eccentrics, vagrants and other 'outsiders', such as artists, belong largely below zero. On the other

hand, religious cults and other strongly integrated groups in modern societies, like Jehovah's Witnesses, could be firmly placed with the Tallensi in the top right area of the diagram.

Douglas's scheme can be very instructive as a tool for thinking about humans in society. It is simple, non-evolutionary and can be fruitful for investigating the relationship between cohesion and other dimensions of social life, such as cosmologies. Its central premises are Durkheimian, and Douglas states explicitly that too little sharing and too weak social control (in other words, a condition approaching zero) is tantamount to anomie and disintegration. While role analysis and models of scale and networks take the social actor as their point of departure, Douglas's work reveals a distinctly systemic approach. A possible implication of the model could be that people who are not fully integrated are pathological and that social and symbolic integration is the 'aim' towards which every society strives. Douglas emphasises that 'societies' do the classifying, and though people relate to it individually and may even create a private classificatory system, what matters sociologically is the shared system of knowledge and norms.

Society and Actor

The founder of Social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer (who also coined the term 'social structure'), proposed that social relationships ought in general to be founded on voluntary contracts between individuals. Spencer was an early proponent of a school of thought which may be called individualist, as opposed to collectivist. Individualist thought (or methodological individualism) is often associated with Max Weber, whereas collectivist thought (or methodological collectivism) is associated with Marx and Durkheim. The difference between these approaches to social life has been stated succinctly by Holy and Stuchlik (1983, p.1), who say that anthropologists try to find out either what it is that makes people do what they do, or how societies work. Most anthropologists probably hold that they do both, but there is an important difference between the perspectives. Later chapters distinguish between actor-centred and system-centred accounts, and it will become clear that the two approaches may indeed lead to different, if complementary, kinds of insight.

Actor-centred accounts, which stress choice, goal-directed action and individual idiosyncrasies, emerged in European social anthropology in the 1950s as critiques of the then dominant structural-functionalist models. The structural-functionalists regarded society as an integrated whole where the social institutions 'worked together', more or less in the same way as body parts are complementary to each other. The individual was not granted a great deal of interest, and individual agency was seen more or less as a side-effect of society's reproduction of itself.

"Can 'society' have 'needs' and 'aims'?", asked the critics rhetorically, and replied in the negative. Society is no living organism, they said; it is only the arbitrary result of myriad single acts. Further, they pointed out that it is misleading to use biological metaphors in the description of society. The sharpest critics of structural-functionalism instead emphasised that society existed largely by virtue of interaction. Norms, therefore, were to be seen as a result rather than as a cause of interaction (Barth 1966).

The structural-functionalist concept of function was also subjected to severe criticism. Already in 1936, Gregory Bateson had written that the term 'function' is an expression from mathematics which has no place in social science (Bateson 1958 [1936]). Functionalist explanation, it was later remarked (Jarvie 1968), is circular in that the premisses contain the conclusion. Since the observed facts by default have to be 'functional', all the social scientist has to do is to look for their functions.

It is a truism that social institutions are functional in the sense that they contribute to the survival of society, since they are themselves part of the society that survives. This does not, however, explain why a given society develops, say, either monotheism or a witchcraft institution, or why some societies are patrilineal whereas others are matrilineal. In other words, structural functionalism promises to explain cultural variation, but succeeds only in describing the interrelationships between institutions.

From a different perspective, Edmund Leach (1954) has pointed out that societies are by no means as stable as one would expect from a structural-functionalist viewpoint. His analysis of politics among the Kachin of upper Burma reveals a cyclical system, where the political institution in its very structure carries the germ of its own destruction. In this regard, it is far from functional. In contemporary anthropological research, which stresses change and process just as much as stability, structural-functionalism is not an option as a research strategy, but its influence continues to be felt, particularly in its emphasis on the interconnections between different institutions in society.

The Duality of Structure

Obviously, actors make decisions, and it is equally obvious that societies change. However, actors do not act entirely on their own whim: there are bound to be structural preconditions for their acts. There are phenomena which cannot be imagined as purely individual products, which are inherently collective phenomena. Religion is often mentioned in this context, as well as language. Neither can be thought of as aspects of individuals: on the contrary, religion, language and morality are social preconditions for the production of individuals. Anthropologists who stress the role of individuals in the making of society would answer that morality, language and religion certainly exist, but that they cannot help us in predicting action and that they cannot be taken for granted. They change: we must look into what people actually do, and why they do it, in order to understand what these phenomena mean and why they are maintained or transformed through time.

It may sometimes seem as though the contrast between individualist and collectivist accounts is a problem of the same order as the question of which came first, the chicken or the egg. The individual is in many regards a social product, but only individuals can create societies. What we must do therefore is to distinguish clearly between the two perspectives and try to see them as complementary. Neither individual nor society can be conceptualised without the other.

Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984) has tried to reconcile these two main dimensions of social life, agency and structure, through his general theory of structuration. The problem Giddens sets out to resolve is the same one that has been posed in various ways in earlier sections of this chapter: on the one hand, humans choose their actions deliberately and try their best to realise their goal, which is a good life (although, an anthropologist would add, there are significant cultural variations as to what is considered a good life). On the other hand, humans definitely act under pressure, which varies between people, contexts and societies and which limits their freedom of choice and to some extent determines the course of their agency.

Giddens's very general solution to the paradox can be summarised in his concept of the duality of structure. Social structure, he writes, must simultaneously be understood as the necessary conditions for action and as the cumulative result of the totality of actions. Society exists only as interaction, but at the same time society is necessary for interaction to be meaningful. This model combines the individual and the societal aspects of social life, at least at a conceptual level. The art of social research, in Giddens's view, largely consists of relating the two

levels to each other. His model, and related models (of which there are many), try to reconcile the idea of the free, voluntary act and the idea of systemic coercion.

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967) deal with many of the same problems as Giddens. Inspired by the social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz and Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, their point of departure is the fact that humans are, at birth, thrown into a pre-existing social world, and they re-create this world through their actions. In addition, Berger and Luckmann emphasise the ways in which each new act modifies the conditions for action (what Giddens calls the recursive character of action). The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said that a man cannot enter the same river twice, because both man and river would have changed in the meanwhile; Berger and Luckmann would hold that a man cannot undertake the same act twice, since the first act would change the system slightly.

The social system, or structure, according to this perspective, would consist of the process of ongoing interaction, but it also consists of frozen action. Both social institutions and material structures such as buildings and technology are products of human action. However, they take on an objective existence and appear as givens, as taken-for-granted which humans act upon: they determine conditions for agency. In this way, Berger and Luckmann argue, the institutionalisation of society takes place and society, although the product of subjective action, becomes an objective reality exerting power over the individual consciousness. Thereby they answer their own main question, namely that of how living human activity (a process) can produce a world consisting of 'things' (social structure and material objects).

Just as Kroeber's coral reef reproduces itself while slightly modifying itself through every new event, human action relates to earlier human action in the reproduction of and change to society. New acts are not mechanical repetitions of earlier acts, but at the same time they are dependent on earlier acts. The first act determines where the next begins, but not where it ends.

Berger and Luckmann's influential perspective is consistent with Marx's notion of labour and the 'freezing' of social life; he once wrote that the dead (labour) seizes the living (labour). The creative aspect of human activity is sedimented as dead material, be it a building, a tool or a convention. Social life, and the eternal becoming of society, can thereby be seen as an immanent tension between ongoing human action and the social institutions' limiting effect on the options for choice; between the solid (structure, institutions) and the fleeting (process, movement).

Social Memory and the Distribution of Knowledge

Societies can be delineated through enduring systems of interaction and through the presence of shared social and political institutions with a certain continuity through time, although neither boundaries nor continuity are ever absolute. A related feature of integration, which emphasises the cultural rather than the social, concerns knowledge and acquired skills. Whereas it was for years common to assume that the members of a society (at least a small-scale society) shared the same basic outlook and values, detailed ethnographic evidence as well as critical voices from various camps (which could for the sake of brevity be labelled Marxist, feminist, postcolonial and post-modernist) have revealed that knowledge is unevenly distributed and that members of a society do not necessarily have shared representations.

The issue concerning to what extent culture is shared within society is a complex one which has led to a lot of heated debate, some of it clearly based on misunderstandings; let us therefore initially make it clear that sharing at one level does not necessarily imply sharing at another. Societies may appear both as patterned and as chaotic, depending on the analytical perspective employed and on the empirical focus. Language, for example, is by definition shared

by the members of a linguistic community, but this certainly does not mean that everybody masters it equally well. Indeed, oratorical skills are an important source of political power in many societies. The unequal distribution of linguistic skills, and its consequences for power in society, is shown in a very simple and instructive way through the work of Basil Bernstein (1972) and William Labov (1972), two sociolinguists. Briefly, Bernstein wanted to show why working-class children in Britain generally achieved poorer school results than middle-class children. He found that the language acquired in working-class homes was less compatible with the standard version used in schools than the language spoken in middle-class homes was. The dominant code of society, that considered 'proper English', was thus identical with the sociolect of the middle class. Meanwhile Labov showed, in a study of black children in the US, that the linguistic difference between blacks and whites did not represent a lower 'cognitive complexity' among black children, but rather that their way of expressing complex statements differed from the dominant idiom in such a way as to impair them in school. The linguistic code favoured in schools, in Labov's analysis, was not 'more sophisticated' than the black sociolect, but rather a hidden mechanism for ensuring white middle-class dominance.

Key Debates in Anthropology

In the mid-1980s, Tim Ingold reports (Ingold 1996), he felt a lack of vitality regarding debate about 'the theoretical and intellectual foundations' of social anthropology. In his view, the discipline suffered from three problems: first, it had become fragmented into narrow specialisations with little overarching debate between the sub-fields. Second, there were few new academic appointments at the time, leading in turn to a paucity of fresh ideas. Third, Ingold claims, anthropologists no longer seemed to engage with major issues of wide public relevance. In order to address this problem, Ingold initiated a series of annual debates hosted by the University of Manchester, where colleagues and students from the whole country were invited. The debates, organised by the Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory (GDAT), were structured in an unusual way: Two anthropologists were asked to support a particular 'motion' and two were asked to oppose it. At the end, the audience were asked to vote for and against the 'motion'. Although this form has an ironic edge—truth is not decided through democratic voting—these polemical debates doubtless contributed to a revitalisation of the general theoretical debate in social anthropology. The six first debates (from 1988 to 1993) have been published in book form (Ingold 1996). The topics and results are as follows.

- Social anthropology is a generalizing science or it is nothing. For: 26. Against: 37. Abstentions: 8. Comment: the problem was probably the term 'science' and not the term 'generalizing'; many felt uncomfortable with the implied association with natural science.
- The concept of society is theoretically obsolete. For: 45. Against: 40. Abstentions: 10. Comment: surprisingly many felt that we can no longer use the word 'society'. On the other hand it may be theoretically obsolete and yet useful in practice, although it is far from an accurate technical term.
- Human worlds are culturally constructed. For: 41. Against: 26. Abstentions: 7. Comment: this is a take on the classic 'nature/nurture' issue—what is inborn and universal, what is cultural and variable? Most British anthropologists still seem to favour nurture, but a generation ago, they would have won even more comfortably.

- Language is the essence of culture. For: 24. Against: 47. Abstentions: 7. Comment: although a clear majority held that non-linguistic aspects of culture are essential, the result might have been very different twenty years earlier in Britain (when structuralism was influential) or today in the United States, where cognitive and linguistic anthropology remain important.
- The past is a foreign country. For: 26. Against: 14. Abstentions: 7. Comment: the proposed motion is ambiguous (it quotes the title of David Lowenthal's wonderful book, which again quotes from a novel), and the debate largely concerned whether the interpretation of past events are reminiscent of the interpretation of other cultures.
- Aesthetics is a cross-cultural category. For: 22. Against: 42. Abstentions: 4. Comment: does beauty exist (as philosophers from Plato to Kant believe), or can it be dissolved into merely cultural notions of beauty? Convincing win to the relativists here.

Social inequality is reproduced at the symbolic level through the transmission of different kinds of knowledge through socialisation. It has been customary to believe that all members of a 'primitive' small-scale society by and large obtained the same body of knowledge and skills, but anthropological research has revealed that social differentiation and political power in such societies is just as closely related to differences in knowledge and mastery of symbolic universes as in modern complex ones. Moreover, such self-reproducing patterns of difference are difficult to eradicate even if one actively tries, as has been done in social democratic societies, to ensure that every member of society has access to roughly the same body of knowledge and skills. They are intrinsic to social organisation and the division of labour, and the differences in the transmission of knowledge are connected with other social differences to which we shall return in later chapters.

There are many ways of accounting for differences in skills and knowledge within societies. Feminists have tended to follow one or both of two lines of argument: (1) women experience the world differently from men because they are women; (2) it is in the interest of patriarchy (male rule) to keep socially valuable skills away from women. Analyses inspired by Marxism tend to link the study of knowledge and skills to that of power and ideology, while social anthropologists inspired by Durkheim may relate such differences to the division of labour, which thereby contributes to the integration of society. It should be noted that the designation of 'valuable knowledge' and, more generally, the very definition of the world, is a form of power (see Bourdieu 1982). Nonetheless, values and rules of conduct are taken for granted as much by the powerful as by the powerless, and their taken-for-grantedness can contribute to explaining the maintenance of a social order which might otherwise appear as unjust—they make the social order appear natural and therefore inevitable—as well as accounting for some degree of cultural continuity.

Paul Connerton, in a study of social memory (1989), argues for a distinction between three kinds of memory: personal memory (which is to do with biography and personal experiences), cognitive memory (which relates to general knowledge about the world) and, importantly, habit-memory, which is embodied, or incorporated, rather than cognitive. Connerton argues that habit-

memory is in highly significant ways created and reproduced through bodily practices embedded in rules of etiquette, gestures, meaningful postures (such as sitting with one's legs crossed), handwriting and other acquired abilities which the actors do not normally perceive as cultural skills but rather as mere technical abilities or even 'social instincts'. He particularly emphasises rituals as enactments of embodied knowledge. Like Foucault (1979) before him, Connerton stresses the social and political implications of bodily discipline in reproducing values, 'inscribed' knowledge and social hierarchies. This kind of knowledge has arguably been understated by scholars working in diverse fields, including anthropology, where knowledge that can be verbalised tends to be privileged.

In an original attempt to explain the transmission, spread and transformations of social representations, Dan Sperber has proposed what he calls an epidemiology of representations (1985, 1989, 1996). Using an analogy from medical science, but also obviously drawing on Lévi-Strauss, Sperber stresses that representations spread in a different way from viruses, which are simply duplicated. 'For example', he writes (1989, p.127), 'it would have been very surprising if what you understand by my text were an exact reproduction of the ideas I try to express through this means'. Knowledge and skills therefore, in Sperber's analysis, change (are transformed) slightly each time they are transmitted through communication, although the actors may be unaware of this happening.

Although the mode of communication depends on a number of factors, including communications technology, the basic 'epidemic' character of knowledge transmission is, in Sperber's view, universal. Interestingly, he offers a method for the study of representations which does not presuppose direct access to the minds of the actors, by focusing on that which is public and communicated, yet enables the researcher to identify both variation and change, and—perhaps—properties of the mental make-up of the informants. The epidemiological model further seems to overcome shortcomings of some other approaches to knowledge in its ability to account for both sharing and variation, both continuity and change.

Agency Beyond Language and Self-Consciousness

Notions of choice and freedom are common in actor-centred accounts of social life. We should therefore keep in mind that far from all action is chosen in a conscious sense. Much of what we do is based on habit and convention, and in most situations it does not occur to us that we could have acted differently. In an extremely influential, but convoluted work on the organisation of society, Pierre Bourdieu (1977 [1972]; see also Ortner 1984) discusses the relationship between reflexivity or self-consciousness, action and society. Like the other theorists discussed in this section, he wishes to move beyond entrenched positions in social science and provides a critical review of positions he deems inadequate. In a discussion of interpretive anthropology (particularly the American school of ethnomethodology), he stresses that one should not 'put forward one's contribution to the science of pre-scientific representation of the social world as if it were a science of the social world' (Bourdieu 1977, p.23). And he continues:

Only by constructing the objective curves (price curves, chances of access to higher education, laws of the matrimonial market, etc.) is one able to pose the question of the mechanisms through which the relationship is established between the structures and the practices or the representations which accompany them. (1977, p.23)

In other words, for a full understanding of society, it is not enough to understand the emic categories and representations of society. Indeed, at least in this regard Bourdieu comes close to Evans-Pritchard's research programme, which consisted of studying the relationship between emic meanings and social structure.

Bourdieu's concept of culturally conditioned agency has been extremely influential. He uses the term 'habitus' (originally used by Mauss in a similar way) to describe enduring, learnt, embodied dispositions for action. The habitus is inscribed into the bodies and minds of humans as an internalised, implicit programme for action. At one point, Bourdieu defines it as 'the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisation' (1977, p.78). The habitus can also be described as embodied culture, and being prior to self-conscious reflection it sets limits to thought and chosen action. Through habitus, the socially created world appears as natural and is taken for granted. It therefore has strong ideological implications as well as cultural ones, and, we should note, it refers to a layer of social reality that lies beyond the intentional. Informants cannot describe their habitus in the course of an interview, even if they want to. Drawing on his own fieldwork as well as recent research in neuroscience, Robert Borofsky (1994) confirms Bourdieu's perspective by distinguishing between *implicit* and *explicit* knowledge. Implicit memory, which is unintentional and not conscious, cannot be reproduced verbally, but is nevertheless a form of cultural competence which informs action.

In several of his books on epistemology, Bourdieu criticises social scientists for overestimating the importance of representations and reflexivity in their comparative studies of society and culture. This cognitive, and especially linguistic, bias, Bourdieu argues, is characteristic of our occupational specialisation and tends to lead us to ignore the fact that the social world is largely made up of institutionalised practices and not by informants' statements. Other anthropologists (such as Bloch 1991) have also pointed out that the social world is under-determined by language; in other words, that there are large areas of social life and of cognition which are not only non-linguistic, but which cannot easily be 'translated' into language. The transmission of knowledge and skills, Maurice Bloch (1991) argues, consistently with Connerton, frequently takes place without recourse to language. Many cultural skills can only be explained by showing them in practice. In other words, if an over-reliance on interviews is a methodological pitfall, an overestimation of the linguistic character of the social world is an epistemological error.

We have now introduced some of the most fundamental theoretical issues of social science, including anthropology. It should be noted that after the critique of structural-functionalism in the 1960s, anthropology has made a distinctive move in two directions: first, there has been a shift from emphasis on structure to emphasis on process. Change is now seen as an inherent quality of social systems, not as an anomaly. Second, there has been a no less significant shift from the study of function to the interpretation of meaning. As an implication, anthropology has, in the eyes of many, moved away from the social sciences in the direction of the humanities. Be this as it may, it is beyond doubt that contemporary anthropologists often are cautious of positing explanatory accounts of social processes, and concentrate instead on understanding and translation.

Suggestions For Further Reading

1. Fredrik Barth: Models of Social Organization. London: Royal Anthropological Institute, Occasional Papers, no. 23 (1966).
2. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann: The Social Construction of Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1967.
3. Mary Douglas: How Institutions Think. London: Routledge 1987.
4. Anthony Giddens: Central Problems in Social Theory. London: Macmillan 1979.

5 What is Politics?

ANDREW HEYWOOD

Politics, in its broadest sense, is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live. Although politics is also an academic subject (sometimes indicated by the use of 'Politics' with a capital P), it is then clearly the study of this activity. Politics is thus inextricably linked to the phenomena of conflict and cooperation. On the one hand, the existence of rival opinions, different wants, competing needs and opposing interests guarantees disagreement about the rules under which people live. On the other hand, people recognize that, in order to influence these rules or ensure that they are upheld, they must work with others—hence Hannah Arendt's definition of political power as 'acting in concert'. This is why the heart of politics is often portrayed as a process of conflict resolution, in which rival views or competing interests are reconciled with one another. However, politics in this broad sense is better thought of as a search for conflict resolution than as its achievement, as not all conflicts are, or can be, resolved. Nevertheless, the inescapable presence of diversity (we are not all alike) and scarcity (there is never enough to go around) ensures that politics is an inevitable feature of the human condition.

Any attempt to clarify the meaning of 'politics' must never less address two major problems. The first is the mass of associations that the world has when used in everyday language; in other words, politics is a 'loaded' term. Whereas most people think of, say, economics, geography, history, and biology simply as academic subjects, few people come to politics without preconceptions. Many, for instance, automatically assume that students and teachers of politics must in some way be biased, finding it difficult to believe that the subject can be approached in an impartial and dispassionate manner. To make matters worse, politics is usually thought of as a 'dirty' word: it conjures up images of trouble, disruption and even violence on one hand, and deceit, manipulation and lies on the other. There is nothing new about such associations. As long ago as 1775, Samuel Johnson dismissed politics as 'nothing more than a means of rising in the world', while in the nineteenth century the US historian Henry Adams summed up politics as 'the systematic organization of hatreds'. Any attempt to define politics therefore entails trying to disentangle the term from such associations. Not uncommonly, this has meant attempting to rescue the term from its unsavory reputation by establishing that politics is a valuable, even laudable, activity.

The second and more intractable difficulty is that even respected authorities cannot agree what the subject is about. Politics is defined in such different ways: as the exercise of power, the exercise of authority, the making of collective decisions the allocation of scarce resources, the practice of deception and manipulation, and so on. The virtue of the definition advanced in this text, 'the making, preserving and amending of general social rules' is that it is sufficiently broad to encompass most, if not all, of the competing definitions. However, problems arise when the definition is unpacked, or when the meaning is refined. For instance, does 'politics' refer to a particular way in which rules are made, preserved or amended (that is, peacefully, by debate) or to all such processes? Similarly, is politics in all social contexts and institutions or only in certain one (that is, government and public life)?

From this perspective, politics may be treated as an 'essentially contested' concept, in this sense that the term has a number of acceptable or legitimate meaning. On the other hand, these different views may simply consist of contrasting conceptions of the same, if necessarily,

vague, concept. Whether we are dealing with rival concepts or alternative conceptions, the debate about ‘what is politics?’ is worth pursuing because it exposes some of the deepest intellectual and ideological disagreements in the academic study of the subject.

The different views of politics examined here as follows:

- Politics as the art of government
- Politics as public affairs
- Politics as compromise and consensus
- Politics as power and the distribution of resources

Politics as the Art of Government

“Politics is not a science... but an art,” Chancellor Bismarck is reputed to have told the German Reichstag. The art Bismarck had in mind was the art of government, the exercise of control within society through the making and enforcement of collective decisions. This is perhaps the classical definition of politics, developed from the original meaning of the term in Ancient Greek.

The word ‘politics’ is derived from *polis*, meaning literally city-state. Ancient Greek society was divided into a collection of independent city-states, each of which possessed its own system of government. The largest and most influential of these city-states was Athens, often portrayed as the cradle of democratic government. In this light, politics can be understood to refer to the affairs of the *polis*—in effect, what concerns the *polis*. The modern form of this definition is therefore ‘what concerns the state’. This view of politics is clearly evident in the everyday use of the term: people are said to be ‘in politics’ when they hold public office, or to be ‘entering politics’ when they seek to do so. It is also a definition that academic political science has helped to perpetuate.

In many ways, the notion that politics amounts to ‘what concerns the state’ is the traditional view of the discipline, reflected in the tendency for academic study to focus upon the personnel and machinery of government. To study politics is in essence to study government, or, more broadly, to study the exercise of authority. This view is advanced in the writings of the influential US political scientist David Easton (1979, 1981), who defined politics as the ‘authoritative allocation of values’. By this, he meant that politics encompasses the various processes through which government responds to pressures from the larger society, in particular by allocating benefits, rewards or penalties. ‘Authoritative values’ are therefore ones that are widely accepted in society, and are considered binding by the mass of citizens. In this view, politics is associated with ‘policy’; that is, with formal or authoritative decisions that establish a plan of action for the community.

However, what is striking about this definition is that it offers of a highly restricted view of politics. Politics is what takes place within a polity, a system of social organization centered upon the machinery of government. Politics is therefore practiced in cabinet rooms, legislative chambers, government departments and the like, and it is engaged in by a limited and specific group of people, notably politicians, civil servants and lobbyists. This means that most people, most institutions and most social activities can be regarded as being ‘outside’ politics. Businesses, schools and other educational institutions, community groups, families and so on, are in this sense ‘nonpolitical’, because they are not engaged in ‘running the country’. By the same token, to portray politics as an essentially state-bound activity is to ignore the increasingly important international or global influences upon modern life, such as the impact of transnational technology and multinational corporations. In this sense, this definition of politics is a hangover from the days when the nation-state could still be regarded as an independent actor in world

affairs. Moreover, there is a growing recognition that the task of managing complex societies is no longer simply carried out by the government but involves a wide range of public and private sector bodies. This is reflected in the idea that government is being replaced by 'governance'.

This definition can, however, still be narrowed even further. This is evident in the tendency to treat politics as the equivalent of party politics. In other words, the realm of 'the political' is restricted to those state actors who are consciously motivated by ideological beliefs, and who seek to advance them through membership of a formal organization such as a political party. This is the sense in which politicians are described as political, whereas civil servants are seen as 'nonpolitical', as long as they act in a neutral and professional fashion. Similarly, judges are taken to be 'nonpolitical' figures while they interpret the law impartially and in accordance with the available evidence; but they may be accused of being 'political' if their judgment is influenced by personal preferences or some other form of bias.

The link between politics and the affairs of the state also help to explain why negative or pejorative images have so often been attached to politics. This is because, in the popular mind, politics is closely associated with the activities of politicians. But brutally, politicians are often seen as power-seeking hypocrites who conceal personal ambition behind the rhetoric of public service and ideological conviction. Indeed, this perception has become more common in the modern period as intensified media exposure has more effectively brought to light examples of corruption and dishonesty, giving rise to the phenomenon of anti-politics. This rejection of the personnel and machinery of conventional political life is rooted in a view of politics as a self-serving, two-faced and unprincipled activity; clearly evident in the use of derogatory phrases such as 'office politics' and 'politicking'. Such image of politics is sometimes traced back to the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, who, in *The Prince* (1531, 1961), developed a strictly realistic account of politics that drew attention to the use by political leaders of cunning, cruelty, and manipulation.

Such a negative view of politics reflects the essentially liberal perception that, as individuals are self-interested, political power is corrupting, because it encourages those 'in power' to exploit their position for personal advantage and that at the expense of others. This is famously expressed in Lord Acton's (1834-1902) aphorism: 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. Nevertheless, few who view politics in this way doubt that political activity is an inevitable and permanent feature of social existence. However venal politicians may be, there is a general, if grudging, acceptance that they are always with us. Without some kind of mechanism for allocating authoritative values, society would simply disintegrate into a civil war of each against all, as the early social-contract theorists argued. The task is therefore not to abolish politicians and bring politics to an end, but rather to ensure that politics is conducted within a framework of checks and constraints that ensure that governmental power is not abused.

Politics as public affairs

A second and broader conception of politics moves it beyond the narrow realm of government to what is thought of as 'public life' or 'public affairs'. In other words, the distinction between 'political' and 'the nonpolitical' coincides with the division between an essentially *public* sphere of life and what can be thought of as a *private* sphere.

Such a view of politics is often traced back to the work of the famous Greek philosopher Aristotle. In *Politics*, Aristotle declared that 'man is by nature a political animal', by which he meant that it is only within a political community that human beings can live 'the good life'. From this viewpoint, then, politics is an ethical activity concerned with creating a 'just society'; it is what Aristotle called the 'master science'.

However, where should the line between ‘public’ life and ‘private’ life be drawn? The traditional distinction between the public realm and the private realm conforms to the division between the state and civil society. The institutions of the state (the apparatus of government, the courts, the police, the army, the social-security system and so forth) can be regarded as ‘public’ in the sense that they are responsible for the collective organization of community life. Moreover, they are funded at the public’s expense, out of taxation. In contrast, civil society consists of what Edmund Burke called the ‘little platoons’, institutions such as the family and kinship groups, private businesses, trade unions, clubs community groups and so on that are ‘private’ in the sense that they are set up and funded by individual citizens to satisfy their own interests, rather than those of the larger society. On the basis of this ‘public/private’ division, politics is restricted to the activities of the state itself and the responsibilities that are properly exercised by public bodies. Those areas of life that individuals can and do manage for themselves (the economic, social, domestic, personal, cultural and artistic spheres and so on) are therefore clearly ‘nonpolitical’.

An alternative ‘public/private’ divide is sometimes defined in terms of a further and more subtle distinction, namely that between ‘the political’ and ‘the personal’. Although civil society can be distinguished from the state, it nevertheless contains a range of institutions that are thought of as ‘public’ in the wider sense that they are open institutions, operating in public, to which the public has access. One of the crucial implications of this is that it broadens our notion of the political, transferring the economy in particular from the private to the public realm. A form of politics can thus be found in the workplace. Nevertheless, although this view regards institutions such as businesses, community groups, clubs and trade unions as ‘public’, it remains a restricted view of politics. According to this perspective, politics does not, and should not, infringe upon ‘personal’ affairs

and institutions. Feminist thinkers in particular have pointed out that this implies that politics effectively stops at the front door; it does not take place in the family, domestic

Public	Private
The state: apparatus of government	Civil Society: autonomous bodies: businesses, trade unions, clubs, families and so on

Public	Private
Public realm: politics, commerce, work, art, culture and so on	Personal realm: family and domestic life

Figure 5.1. Two views of the public/private divide

life, or in personal relationships. This view is illustrated, for example, by the tendency of politicians to draw a clear distinction between their professional conduct and their personal or domestic behavior. By classifying, say, cheating on their partners or treating their children badly as ‘personal’ matters, they are able to deny the political significance of such behavior on the grounds that it does not touch on their conduct of public affairs.

The view of politics as an essentially ‘public’ activity have generated both positive and negative images. In a tradition dating back to Aristotle, politics has been as a noble and enlightened activity precisely because of its ‘public’ character. This position was firmly endorsed by Hannah Arendt, who argued in *The Human Condition* (1958) that politics is the most important form of human activity because it involves interaction amongst free and equal citizens. It thus gives meaning to life and affirms their uniqueness of each individual. Theorist such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill who portrayed political participation as a good in itself have drawn similar conclusions. Rousseau argued that only through the direct and continuous participation of all citizens in political life can the state be bound to the common good, or what he

called the 'general will'. In Mill's view, involvement in 'public' affairs is educational in that it promotes the personal, moral, and intellectual development of the individual.

In sharp contrast, however, politics as public activity has also been portrayed as a form of unwanted interference. Liberal theorists in particular have exhibited a preference of civil society over the state, on the grounds that 'private' life is a realm of choice, personal freedom and individual responsibility. This is most clearly demonstrated by attempts to narrow the realm of 'the political', commonly expressed as the wish to 'keep politics out of' private activities such as business, sports, and family life. From this point of view, politics is unwholesome quite simply because it prevents people acting as they choose. For example, it may interfere with how firms conduct their business, or with how and with whom we play sports or with how we bring up our children.

Politics as compromise and consensus

The third conception relates not so much to the arena within which politics is conducted as to the way in which decisions are made. Specifically, politics is seen as a particular means of resolving conflict: that is, by compromise, conciliation and negotiation, rather than through force and naked power. This is what is implied when politics is portrayed as 'the art of possible'. Such a definition is inherent in the everyday use of the term. For instance, the description of solution to a problem as a 'political' solution implies peaceful debate and arbitration, as opposed to what is often called a 'military' solution. Once again, this view of politics has been traced back to the writings of Aristotle and in particular, to his belief that what he called 'polity' is the ideal system of government, as it is 'mixed' in the sense that it combines both aristocratic and democratic features. One of the leading modern exponents of this view is Bernard Crick. In his classic study *In Defence of Politics*, Crick offered the following definition:

Politics [is] the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. (Crick, [1962] 2000:21)

In this view, the key to politics is therefore a wide dispersal of power. Accepting that conflict is inevitable, Crick argued that when social groups and interests possess power they must be conciliated: they cannot merely be crushed. This is why he portrayed politics as 'that solution to the problem of order which chooses conciliation rather than violence ad coercion'. Such a view of politics reflects a deep commitment to liberal-rationalist principles. It is based on resolute faith in the efficacy of debate and discussion, as well as on the belief that society is characterized by consensus rather than by irreconcilable conflict. In other words, the disagreements that exist can be resolved without resort to intimidation and violence. Critics, however, point out that Crick's conception of politics is heavily biased towards the forms of politics that takes place in western pluralist democracies: in effect, he equated politics with electoral choice and party competition. As a result, his model has little to tell us about, say, one-party states or military regimes.

This view of politics has an unmistakably positive character. Politics is certainly no utopian solution (compromise means that concessions are made by all sides, leaving no one perfectly satisfied), but it is undoubtedly preferable to the alternatives: bloodshed and brutality. In this sense, politics can be seen as a civilized and civilizing force. People should be encouraged to respect politics as an activity, and should be prepared to engage in the political life of their own community. Nevertheless, a failure to understand that politics as a process of compromise and reconciliation is necessarily frustrating and difficult (because it involves listening carefully to the opinions of others) may have contributed to a growing popular disenchantment with democratic

politics across much of the developed world. As Stoker (2006:10) put it, 'Politics is designed to disappoint'; its outcomes are 'often messy, ambiguous and never final'.

Politics as power

The fourth definition of politics is both the broadest and the most radical. Rather than confining politics to a particular sphere (the government, the state or the 'public' realm) this view sees politics at work in all social activities and in every corner of human existence. As Adrian Leftwich proclaimed in *What is Politics? The Activity and Its Study* (2004), "politics is at the heart of all collective social activity, formal and informal, public and private, in *all* human groups, institutions and societies." In this sense, politics takes place at every level of social interaction; it can be found within families and amongst small groups of friends just as much as amongst nations and on the global stage. However, what is it that is distinctive about political activity. What marks off politics from any other form of social behavior?

At its broadest, politics concerns the production, distribution and use of resources in the course of social existence. Politics is, in essence, power: the ability to achieve a desired outcome, through whatever means. This notion was neatly summed up in the title of Harold Lasswell's book *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* (1936). From this perspective, politics is about diversity and conflict, but the essential ingredient is the existence of scarcity: the simple fact that, while human needs and desires are infinite, the resources available to satisfy them are always limited. Politics can therefore be seen as a struggle over scarce resources, and power can be seen as the means through which this struggle is conducted.

Advocates of this view of power include feminists and Marxists. Modern feminists have shown particular interest in the idea of 'the political'. This arises from the fact that conventional definitions of politics effectively exclude women from political life. Women have traditionally been confined to a 'private' sphere of existence, centered on the family and domestic responsibilities. In contrast, men have always dominated conventional politics and other areas of 'public' life. Radical feminists have therefore attacked the 'public/private' divide, proclaiming instead that 'the personal is the political'. This slogan neatly encapsulates the radical-feminist belief that what goes on in domestic, family and personal life is intensely political, and indeed that it is the basis of all other political struggles. Clearly, a more radical notion of politics underlies this position. This view was summed up by Kate Millett in *Sexual Politics* (1969:23), in which she defined politics as 'power structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another'. Feminists can therefore be said to be concerned with 'the politics of everyday life'. In their view, relationships within the family, between husbands and wives, and between parents and children, are every bit as political as relationships between employers and workers, or between government and citizens.

Marxists have used the term 'politics' in two senses. On one level, Marx used 'politics' in a conventional sense to refer to the apparatus of the state. In the *Communist Manifesto* ([1848] 1967) he thus referred to political power as 'merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another'. For Marx, politics, together with law and culture, are part of a 'superstructure' that is distinct from the economic 'base' that is the real foundation of social life. However, he did not see the economic 'base' and the legal and political 'superstructure' as entirely separate. He believed that the 'superstructure' arose out of, and reflected, the economic 'base'. At a deeper level, political power, in this view, is therefore rooted in the class system; as Lenin put it, 'politics is the most concentrated form of economics'. As opposed to believing that politics can be confined to the state and a narrow public sphere. Marxists can be said to believe that 'the economic is political'. From this perspective, civil society, characterized as Marxists believe is to be by class struggle, is the very heart of politics.

Views such as these portray politics in largely negative terms. Politics is, quite simply, about oppression and subjugation. Radical feminists hold that society is patriarchal, in that women are systematically subordinated and subjected to male power. Marxists traditionally argued that politics in a capitalist society is characterized by the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, these negative implications are balanced against the fact that politics is also seen as the means through which injustice and domination can be challenged. Marx, for instance, predicted that class exploitation would be overthrown by a proletarian revolution and radical feminists proclaim the need for gender relations to be reordered through a sexual revolution. However, it is also clear that when politics is portrayed as power and domination it need not be seen as an inevitable feature of social existence. Feminist look to an end of 'sexual politics' achieved through the construction of a nonsexist society, in which people will be valued according to personal worth rather than on the basis of gender. Marxists believe that 'class politics' will end with establishment of a classless communist society. This, in turn, will eventually lead to the 'withering away', bringing politics in the conventional sense also to an end.

Studying Politics—Approaches to the Study of Politics

Disagreement about the nature of political activity is matched by controversy about the nature of politics as an academic discipline. One of the most ancient spheres of intellectual enquiry, politics was originally seen as an arm of philosophy, history or law. Its central purpose was to uncover the principles upon which human society should be based. From the late nineteenth century onwards, however, this philosophical emphasis was gradually displaced by an attempt to turn politics into a scientific discipline. The high point of this development was reached in the 1950s and 1960s with an open rejection of the earlier tradition as meaningless metaphysics. Since then, however, enthusiasm for a strict science of politics has waned, and there has been a renewed recognition of the enduring importance of political values and normative theories. If the 'traditional' search for universal values acceptable to everyone has largely been abandoned, so has been the insistence that science alone provides a means of disclosing truth. The resulting discipline is today more fertile and more exciting, precisely because it embraces a range of theoretical approaches and a variety of schools of analysis.

The philosophical tradition. The origins of political analysis date back to Ancient Greece and a tradition usually referred to as 'political philosophy'. This involved a preoccupation with essentially ethical, prescriptive or normative questions, reflecting a concern with what 'should', 'ought' or 'must' be brought about, rather than with 'is'. Plato and Aristotle are usually identified as the founding fathers of this tradition. Their ideas resurfaced in the writings of medieval theorists such as Augustine (354–430) and Aquinas (1225–74). The central theme of Plato's work, for instance, was an attempt to describe the nature of the ideal society, which in his view took the form of a benign dictatorship dominated by a class of philosopher kings.

Such writings have formed the basis of what is called the 'traditional' approach to politics. This involves that analytical study of ideas and doctrines that have been central to political thought. Most commonly, it has taken the form of a history of political thought that focuses on a collection of 'major' thinkers (that spans, for instance, Plato to Marx) and a canon of 'classic' texts. This approach has the character of literary analysis: it is interested primarily in examining what major thinkers said, how they developed or justified their views, and the intellectual context within which they worked. Although such analysis may be carried out critically and scrupulously, it cannot be objective in any scientific sense, as it deals with normative questions such as 'why should I obey the state?', 'how should rewards be distributed?' and 'what should the limits of individual freedom be?'

The empirical tradition. Although it was less prominent than normative theorizing, a descriptive or empirical tradition can be traced back to the earliest days of political thought. It can be seen in Aristotle's attempt to classify constitutions, in Machiavelli's realistic account of statecraft, and in Montesquieu's sociological theory of government and law. In many ways, such writings constitute the basis of what is now called comparative government, and they give rise to an essentially institutional approach to the discipline. In the USA and the UK in particular this developed into the dominant tradition of analysis. The empirical approach to political analysis is characterized by the attempt to offer a dispassionate and impartial account of political reality. The approach is 'descriptive' in that it seeks to analyze and explain, whereas the normative approach is 'prescriptive' in the sense that it makes judgment and offers recommendations.

Descriptive political analysis acquired its philosophical underpinning from the doctrine of empiricism, which spread from the seventeenth century onwards through the work of theorists such as John Locke and David Hume (1711–1776). The doctrine of empiricism advanced the belief that experience is the only basis of knowledge, and that therefore all hypotheses and theories should be tested by a process of observation. By the nineteenth century, such ideas had developed into what became known as positivism, an intellectual movement particularly associated with the writings of Auguste Comte (1798–1857). This doctrine proclaimed that the social sciences, and, for that matter, all forms of philosophical enquiry, should adhere strictly to the methods of the natural sciences. Once science was perceived to be the only reliable means of disclosing truth, the pressure to develop a science of politics became irresistible.

The scientific tradition. The first theorist to attempt to describe politics in scientific terms was Karl Marx. Using his so-called materialist conception of history, Marx strove to uncover the driving force of historical development. This enabled him to make predictions about the future based upon 'laws' that had the same status in terms of proof as laws in the natural sciences. The vogue for scientific analysis was also taken up in the nineteenth century by mainstream analysis. In the 1870s, political science courses were introduced in the universities of Oxford, Paris, and Columbia, and by 1906 the *American Political Science Review* was being published. However, enthusiasm for a science of politics peaked in the 1950s and 1960s with the emergence, most strongly in the USA, of a form of political analysis that drew heavily upon behaviouralism. For the first time, this gave politics reliable credentials, because it provided what had previously been lacking: objective and quantifiable data against which hypotheses could be tested. Political analysts such as David Easton proclaimed that politics could adopt the methodology of the natural sciences and this gave rise to a proliferation of studies in areas best suited to the use of quantitative research methods, such as voting behavior, the behavior of legislators, and behavior of municipal politicians and lobbyists.

Behaviouralism, however, came under growing pressure from the 1960s onwards. In the first place, it was claimed that behaviouralism had significantly constrained the scope of political analysis, preventing it from going beyond what was directly observable. Although behavioral analysis undoubtedly produced, and continues to produce, invaluable insights in fields such as voting studies, a narrow obsession with quantifiable data threaten to reduce the discipline of politics to little else. More worryingly, it inclined a generation of political scientists to turn their backs upon the entire tradition of normative political thought. Concepts such as 'liberty', 'equality', 'justice', and 'rights' were sometimes discarded as being meaningless because they were not empirically verifiable entities. Dissatisfaction with behaviouralism grew as interest in normative questions revived in the 1970s, as reflected in the writings of theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick.

Moreover, the scientific credentials of behaviouralism started to be called into question. The basis of the assertion that behaviouralism is objective and reliable is the claim that it is

‘value-free’; that is, that it is not contaminated by ethical or normative beliefs. However, if the focus of analysis is observable behavior, it is difficult to do much more than describe the existing political arrangements, which implicitly means that the *status quo* is legitimized. This conservative value bias was demonstrated by the fact that ‘democracy’ was, in effect, redefined in terms of observable behavior. Thus, instead of meaning ‘popular self-government’ (literally, government *by* the people), democracy came to stand for a struggle between competing elites to win power through the mechanism of popular election. In other words, democracy came to mean what goes on in the so-called democratic political systems of the developed West.

Recent Developments

Amongst recent theoretical approaches to politics is what is called formal political theory, variously known as ‘political economy’, ‘public-choice theory’, and ‘rational-choice theory’. This approach to analysis draws heavily upon the example of economic theory in building up models based upon procedural rules, usually about the rationally self-interested behavior of the individuals involved. Most firmly established in the USA, and associated in particular with the so-called Virginia School, formal political theory provides at least a useful analytical device, which may provide insights into the actions of voters, lobbyists, bureaucrats and politicians, as well as into behavior of states within the international system. This approach has had its broadest impact on political analysis in the form of what is called institutional public-choice theory. The use of such techniques by writers such as Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson and William Niskanen, in fields such as party competition, interest-group behavior and the policy influence of bureaucrats, is discussed in later chapters. The approach has also been applied in the form of game theory, which has been developed more from the field of mathematics than economics. It entails the use of first principles to analyze puzzles about individual behavior. The best-known example in game theory is the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’.

By no means, however, has the rational-choice approach to political analysis been universally accepted. While its supporters claim that it introduces greater rigor into the discussion of political phenomena, critics have questioned its basic assumptions. It may, for instance, overestimate human rationality in that it ignores the fact that people seldom possess a clear set of preferred goals and rarely make decisions in the light of full and accurate knowledge. Furthermore, in proceeding from an abstract model of the individual, rational-choice theory pays insufficient attention to social and historical factors, failing to recognize, amongst other things, that human self-interestedness may be socially conditioned, and not merely innate. As a result, a variety of approaches have come to be adopted for the study of politics as an academic discipline.

This has made modern political analysis both richer and more diverse. To traditional normative, institutional and behavioral approaches have been added not only rational-choice theory but also a wide range of more recent ideas and themes. Feminism has, particularly since the 1970s, raised awareness of the significance of gender differences and patriarchal structures, questioning, in the process, established notions of ‘the political’. What is called ‘new institutionalism’ has shifted attention away from the formal, structural aspects of institutions to, for instance, their significance within a larger context, their actual behavior and the outcomes of the policy process. Green politics has challenged the anthropocentric (human centered) emphasis of established political and social theory and championed holistic approaches to political and social understanding. Critical theory, which is rooted in the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School, established in 1923, has extended the notion of critique to all social practices drawing on a wide range of influences, including Freud and Weber. Postmodernism has questioned the idea of absolute and universal truth and helped to spawn, amongst other things, discourse theory. Finally, a general but profoundly important shift is that political philosophy and political science are now

less likely to be seen as distinct modes of enquiry, and still less as rivals. Instead, they have come to be accepted simply as contrasting ways of disclosing political knowledge.

The Prisoners' Dilemma

Two criminals, held in separate cell, are faced with the choice of 'squealing' or 'not squealing' on one another. If only one of them confesses, but he provides evidence to convict the other, he will be released without charge, while his partner will take the whole blame and be jailed for ten years. If both criminals confess, they will each be jailed for six years. If both refuse to confess, they will only be convicted of a minor crime, and they will each receive a one-year sentence. The options are shown in the figure.

In view of the dilemma confronting them it is likely that both criminals will confess, fearing that if they do not the other will 'squeal' and they will receive maximum sentence. Ironically, the game shows that rational behavior can result in the least favourable outcome (in which the prisoners jointly serve a total of 12 years in jail). In effect, they are punished for their failure to cooperate or trust one another. However, if the game is repeated several times. It is possible that the criminals will learn that self-interest is advanced by cooperation, which will encourage both to refuse to confess.

		Prisoner B	
		Confesses	Does not confess
Prisoner A	Confesses	A : B 6 : 6	A : B 0 : 10
	Does not confess	A : B 10 : 0	A : B 1 : 1

Figure 5.2. Options in prisoners' dilemma

Can the Study of Politics Be Scientific?

Although it is widely accepted that the study of politics should be scientific in the broad sense of being rigorous and critical, some have argued, as has been pointed out, that it can be scientific in a stricter sense: that is, that it can use the methodology of the natural sciences. This claim has been advanced by Marxists and by positivist social scientists and it was central to the 'behavioral revolution' of the 1950s. The attraction of a science of politics is clear. It promises an impartial and reliable means of distinguishing 'truth' from 'falsehood', thereby giving us access to object knowledge about the political world. The key to achieving this is to distinguish between 'facts' (empirical evidence) and 'values' (normative or ethical beliefs). Facts are objective in the sense that they can be demonstrated reliably and consistently; they can be proved. Values, by contrast, are inherently subjective, a matter of opinion.

However, any attempt to construct a science of politics must confront three difficulties. The first of these is the problem of data. For better or worse, human beings are not tadpoles that can be taken into a laboratory or cells that can be observed under a microscope. We cannot get 'inside' a human being, or carry out repeatable experiments on human behavior. What we can learn about individual behavior is therefore limited and superficial. In the absence of exact data, we have no reliable means of testing our hypotheses. The only way round the problem is to ignore the thinking subject altogether by subscribing to the doctrine of determinism. One example would

be behaviorism (as opposes to behaviouralism), the school of psychology associated with John B. Watson (1878–1958 and B.F. Skinner (1904–90). This holds that human behavior can ultimately be explained in terms of conditioned reactions or reflexes. Another example is ‘dialectical materialism’, the crude forms of Marxism that dominated intellectual enquiry in the USSR.

Second, there are difficulties that stem from the existence of hidden values. The idea that models and theories of politics are entirely value-free is difficult to sustain when examined closely. Facts and values are closely intertwined that it is often impossible to prise them apart. This is because theories are invariably constructed on the basis of assumption about human nature, human society, the role of the state and so on that have hidden political and ideological implications. A conservative value bias, for example, can be identified in behaviouralism, rational-choice theories and systems theory. Similarly, feminist political theories are rooted in assumption about the nature of significance of gender divisions.

Third, there is the myth of neutrality in the social sciences. Whereas natural scientists may be able to approach their studies in an objective and impartial manner, holding no presuppositions about what they are going to discover, this is difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve in politics. However politics is defined, it addresses questions relating to the structure and functioning of the society in which we live and have grown up. Family background, social experience, economic position, personal sympathies and so on thus build into each and every one of us a set of preconceptions about politics and the world around us. This means that scientific, objectivity, in the sense of absolute impartiality or neutrality, must always remain an unachievable goal in political analysis, however rigorous our research methods may be. Perhaps the greatest threat to the accumulation of reliable knowledge thus comes not from bias as such, but from the failure to acknowledge bias, reflected in bogus claims to political neutrality.

Concepts, Models and Theories

Concepts, model and theories are the tools of political analysis. However, as with most things in politics, the analytical tools must be used with care. First, let us consider concepts. A concept is a general idea about something, usually expressed in a single word or a short phrase. A concept is more than a proper noun or the name of a thing. There is, for example, a difference between talking about a cat (a particular and unique cat) and having a concept of a ‘cat’ (the idea of a cat). The concept of a cat is not a ‘thing’ but an ‘idea’; an idea composed of the various attributes that give a cat its distinctive character: ‘a furry mammal’, ‘small’, ‘domesticated’, ‘catches rats and mice’, and so on. The concept of ‘equality’ is thus a principle or ideal. This is different from using the term to say that a runner has ‘equaled’ a world record, or that an inheritance is to be shared ‘equally’ between two brothers. In the same way, the concept of ‘presidency’ refers not only any specific president, but rather to a set of ideas about the organization of executive power.

What, then, is the value of concepts? Concepts are the tools with which we think, criticize, argue, explain and analyze. Merely perceiving the external world does not in itself give us knowledge about it. In order to make sense of the world we must, in a sense, impose meaning upon it, and this we do through the construction of concepts. Quite simply, to treat a cat as a cat, we must first have a concept of what it is. Concepts also help us to classify objects by recognizing that they have similar forms or similar properties. A cat, for instance, is a member of the class of ‘cats’. Concepts are therefore ‘general’: they can relate to a number of objects, indeed to any object that complies with the characteristics of the general idea itself. It is not exaggeration to say that our knowledge of the political world is built up through developing and refining concepts that help us make sense of that world. Concepts, in that sense, are the building blocks of human knowledge.

Nevertheless, concepts can also be slippery customers. In the first place, the political reality we seek to understand is constantly shifting and is highly complex. There is always the danger that concepts such as 'democracy', 'human rights', and 'capitalism' will be more rounded and coherent than the unshapely realities they seek to describe. Max Weber tried to overcome this problem by recognizing particular concepts as 'ideals types'. This view implies that the concepts we use are constructed by singling out certain basic or central features of the phenomenon in question, which means that other features are downgraded or ignored altogether. The concept of 'revolution' can be regarded as an ideal type in this sense, in that it draws attention to a process of fundamental and usually violent political change. It thus helps us make sense of, say, the 1789 French Revolution and the eastern European revolutions of 1989–91 by highlighting important parallels between them. The concept must nevertheless be used with care because it can also conceal vital differences, and thereby distort understanding—in this case, for example, about the ideological and social character revolution. For this reason, it is better to think of concepts or ideal types not as being 'true' or 'false' but merely as more or less 'useful'.

A further problem is that political concepts are often the subject of deep ideological controversy. Politics is, in part, a struggle over the legitimate meaning of terms and concepts. Enemies may argue, fight and even go to war, all claiming to be 'defending freedom', 'upholding democracy', or 'having justice on their side'. The problem is that words such as 'freedom', 'democracy', and 'justice' have different meanings to different people. How can we establish what is 'true' democracy, 'true' freedom, or 'true' justice? The simple answer is that we cannot. Just as with the attempt to define 'politics' above, we have to accept that there are competing versions of many political concepts. Such concepts are best regarded as 'essentially contested' concepts (Gallie, 1955/56), in that controversy about them runs so deep that no neutral or settled definition can ever be developed. In effect, a single term can represent a number of rival concepts, none of which can be accepted as its 'true' meaning. For example, it is equally legitimate to define politics as what concerns the state, as the conduct of public life, as debate and conciliation and as the distribution of power and resources.

Models and theories are broader than concepts; they compromise a range of ideas rather than a single idea. A model is usually thought of as a representation of something, usually on a smaller scale, as in the case of a doll's house or a toy aeroplane. In this sense, the purpose of the model is to resemble the original object as faithfully as possible. However, conceptual models need not in any way resemble an object. It would be absurd, for instance, to insist that a computer model of the economy should bear physical resemblance to the economy itself. Rather, conceptual models are analytical tools; their value is that they are devices through which meaning can be imposed upon what would otherwise be a bewildering and disorganized collection of facts. The simple point is that facts do not speak for themselves: they must be interpreted, and they must be organized. Models assist in the accomplishment of this task because they include a network or relationships that highlight the meaning and significance of relevant empirical data. The best way of understanding this is through an example. One of the most influential models in political analysis is the model of the political system developed by David Easton (1979, 1981). This can be represented diagrammatically.

This ambitious model sets out to explain the entire political process, as well as the function of major political actors, through the applications of what is called systems analysis. A system is an organized or complex whole, a set of interrelated and interdependent parts that form a collective entity. In the case of




Figure 5.3. The Political System

the political system, a linkage exists between what Easton calls 'inputs' and 'outputs'. Inputs into the political system consist of demands and supports from the general public. Demands can range from pressure for higher living standards, improved employment prospects and more generous welfare payments to greater protection for minority and individual rights. Supports, on the other hand, are ways in which the public contributes to political system by paying taxes, offering compliance, and being willing to participate to public life. Outputs consist of the decisions and actions of government, including the making of policy, the passing of laws, the imposition of taxes, and the allocation of public funds. Clearly, these outputs generate 'feedback', which in turn shapes further demands and supports. The key insight offered by Easton's model is that political system tends towards long-term equilibrium or political stability, as its survival depends on outputs being brought into line with inputs.

However, it is vital to remember that conceptual models are at best simplifications of the reality they seek to explain. They are merely devices for drawing out understanding; they are not reliable knowledge. In the case of Easton's model, for example, political parties and interest groups are portrayed as 'gatekeepers', the central function of which is to regulate the flow of inputs into political system. Although this may be one of their significant functions, parties and interest groups also manage public perceptions, and thereby help to shape the nature of public demands. In short, these are in reality more interesting and more complex institutions than the systems model suggests. In the same way, Easton's model is more effective in explaining how and why political systems respond to popular pressures than it is in explaining why they employ repression and coercion, as to some degree, all do.

The terms theory and model are often used interchangeably in politics. Theories and models are both conceptual constructs used as tools of political analysis. However, strictly speaking, a theory is a proposition. It offers a systematic explanation of a body of empirical data. In contrast, a model is merely an explanatory device; it is more like a hypothesis that has yet to be tested. In that sense, in politics, while theories can be said to be more or less 'true' models can only be said to be more or less 'useful'. Clearly, however, theories and models are often interlinked: broad political theories may be explained in terms of a series of models. For example, the theory of pluralism encompasses a model of the state, a model of electoral competition, a model of group politics and so on.

However, virtually all conceptual devices, theories and models contain hidden values or implicit assumptions. This is why it is difficult to construct theories that are purely empirical; values and normative beliefs invariably intrude. In the case of concepts, this is demonstrated by people's tendency to use terms as either 'hurrah! words' (for example 'democracy', 'freedom', and 'justice') or 'boo! words' (for example 'conflict', 'anarchy', 'ideology' and even 'politics'). Models and theories are also 'loaded' in the sense that they contain a range of biases. It is difficult, for example, to accept the claim that rational-choice theories are value-neutral. As they are based on the assumption that human beings are basically egoistical and self-regarding, it is perhaps not surprising that they have often pointed to policy conclusions that are politically conservative. In the same way, class theories of politics, advanced by Marxists, are based on the broadest theories about history and society and, indeed, they ultimately rest upon the validity of an entire social philosophy.




Figure 5.4. Levels of Conceptual Analysis

There is therefore a sense in which analytical devices, such as models and microtheories are constructed on the basis of broader macrotheories. These major theoretical tools of political analysis are those that address the issues of power and the role of the state pluralism, elitism, class analysis, and so on. At a still deeper level, however, many of these macrotheories reflect the assumptions and beliefs of one or other of the major ideological traditions. These traditions operate rather like what Thomas Kuhn in the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) called paradigms. A paradigm is a related set of principles, doctrines and theories that help to structure the process of intellectual enquiry. In effect, a paradigm constitutes the framework within which the search for knowledge is conducted. In economics, this can be seen in the replacement of Keynesianism by monetarism (and perhaps the subsequent shift back to neo-Keynesianism); in transport policy it is shown in the rise of Green ideas.

According to Kuhn, the natural sciences are dominated at any time by a single paradigm; science develops through a series of 'revolutions' in which an old paradigm is replaced by a new one. Political and social enquiry is, however, different, in that it is a battleground of contending and competing paradigms. These paradigms take the form of broad social philosophies, usually called political ideologies: liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, feminism and so on. Each presents its own account of social existence: each offers a particular view of the world. To portray these ideologies, as theoretical paradigms is not, of course, to say that most, if not all, political analysis is narrowly ideological in the sense that it advances the interests of a particular group or class. Rather, it merely acknowledges that political analysis is usually carried out on the basis of a particular ideological tradition. Much of academic political science, for example, has been constructed according to liberal-rationalist assumptions, and thus bears the imprint of its liberal heritage. The various levels of conceptual analysis are shown diagrammatically in Figure 5.4.

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CHAPTER 2

6

Evolution and Genetics

CONRAD KOTTAK

“Hey, it’s all in the genes.” We routinely use assumptions about genetic determination to explain, say, why tall parents have tall kids or why obesity runs in families. But just how much do genes really influence our bodies? The genetics behind some physical traits, *e.g.* blood types, are clear, but the genetic roots of other traits are less so. For example, can you crease or fold your tongue by raising its sides?

Some people easily can; some people never can; some people who never thought they could can after practicing. An apparent genetic limitation turns out to be more plastic. Human biology is plastic, but only to a degree. If you’re born with blood group O, you’ve got it for life. The same is true for hemophilia and sickle cell anemia. Fortunately, cultural (medical) solutions now exist for many genetic disorders. Can you appreciate in yourself or your family any genetic condition for which there has been a cultural (*e.g.* medical) intervention? Although modern medical advances usually are viewed favorably, some people worry that culture may be intervening too much with intrinsic biological features. Some members of the hearing impaired community, for example, spurn cochlear implants, viewing them as a threat to a deaf subculture that they hold dear. Plastic surgery, genetic screening, and the possibility of genetic engineering of infants (*e.g.* “designer babies”) concern those who imagine a future in which physical “perfection” might reduce human diversity and increase socioeconomic inequality. Even as our culture struggles with issues of medically manipulated biological plasticity, many people still question the long-term plasticity of the human genome, a process known as evolution. Most basically, evolution is the idea that all living organisms come from ancestors that were different in some way. The oft-heard statement “evolution is only a theory” suggests to the nonscientist that evolution hasn’t been proven. Scientists, however, use the term *theory* differently—to refer to an interpretive framework that helps us understand the natural world. In science, evolution is both a theory and a fact. As a *scientific theory* evolution is a central organizing principle of modern biology and anthropology. Evolution also is a fact. The following are examples of evolutionary facts: (1) All living forms come from older or previous living forms. (2) Birds arose from nonbirds; humans arose from nonhumans, and neither birds nor humans existed 250 million years ago. (3) Major ancient life forms, *e.g.* dinosaurs, are no longer around. (4) New life forms, such as viruses, are evolving right now. (5) Natural processes help us understand the origins and history of plants and animals, including humans and diseases.

What alternatives to evolution have you heard about? Are those scientific theories? Should they be taught in science classes? Do people who reject evolution still get flu shots?

Evolution

Compared with other animals, humans have uniquely varied ways—cultural and biological—of adapting to environmental stresses. Exemplifying cultural adaptation, we manipulate our artifacts and behavior in response to environmental conditions. Contemporary North Americans turn up thermostats or travel to Florida in the winter. We turn on fire hydrants,

swim, or ride in airconditioned cars from New York City to Maine to escape the summer's heat. Although such reliance on culture has increased in the course of human evolution, people haven't stopped adapting biologically. As in other species, human populations adapt genetically in response to environmental forces, and individuals react physiologically to stresses. Thus, when we work in the midday sun, sweating occurs spontaneously, cooling the skin and reducing the temperature of subsurface blood vessels.

We are ready now for a more detailed look at the principles that determine human biological adaptation, variation, and change.

During the 18th century, many scholars became interested in biological diversity, human origins, and our position within the classification of plants and animals. At that time, the commonly accepted explanation for the origin of species came from Genesis, the first book of the Bible: God had created all life during six days of Creation. According to *creationism*, biological similarities and differences originated at the Creation. Characteristics of life forms were seen as immutable; they could not change. Through calculations based on genealogies in the Bible, the biblical scholars James Ussher and John Lightfoot even claimed to trace the Creation to a very specific time: October 23, 4004 B.C., at 9 A.M. Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778) developed the first comprehensive and still influential classification, or taxonomy, of plants and animals. He grouped life forms on the basis of similarities and differences in their physical characteristics. He used traits such as the presence of a backbone to distinguish vertebrates from invertebrates and the presence of mammary glands to distinguish mammals from birds. Linnaeus viewed the differences between life forms as part of the Creator's orderly plan. Biological similarities and differences, he thought, had been established at the time of Creation and had not changed. Fossil discoveries during the 18th and 19th centuries raised doubts about creationism. Fossils showed that different kinds of life had once existed. If all life had originated at the same time, why weren't ancient species still around? Why weren't contemporary plants and animals found in the fossil record?

A modified explanation combining creationism with *catastrophism* arose to replace the original doctrine. In this view, fires, floods, and other catastrophes, including the biblical flood involving Noah's ark, had destroyed ancient species. After each destructive event, God had created again, leading to contemporary species. How did the catastrophists explain certain clear similarities between fossils and modern animals? They argued that some ancient species had managed to survive in isolated areas. For example, after the biblical flood, the progeny of the animals saved on Noah's ark spread throughout the world.

Theory and Fact

The alternative to creationism and catastrophism was *transformism*, also called **evolution**. Evolutionists believe that species arise from others through a long and gradual process of transformation, or descent with modification. Charles Darwin became the best known of the evolutionists. However, he was influenced by earlier scholars, including his own grandfather. In a book called *Zoonomia* published in 1794, Erasmus Darwin had proclaimed the common ancestry of all animal species.

Charles Darwin also was influenced by Sir Charles Lyell, the father of geology. During Darwin's famous voyage to South America aboard the *Beagle*, he read Lyell's influential book *Principles of Geology* (1837/1969), which exposed him to Lyell's principle of **uniformitarianism**. Uniformitarianism states that the present is the key to the past. Explanations for past events should be sought in the long-term action of ordinary forces that still operate today. Thus, natural forces (rainfall, soil deposition, earthquakes, and volcanic action) gradually have

built and modified geological features such as mountain ranges. The earth's structure has been transformed gradually through natural forces operating for millions of years (see Weiner 1994).

Uniformitarianism was a necessary building block for evolutionary theory. It cast serious doubt on the belief that the world was only 6,000 years old. It would take much longer for such ordinary forces as rain and wind to produce major geological changes. The longer time span also allowed enough time for the biological changes that fossil discoveries were revealing. Darwin applied the ideas of uniformitarianism and long-term transformation to living things. He argued that all life forms are ultimately related and that the number of species has increased over time.

Charles Darwin provided a theoretical framework for understanding evolution. He offered natural selection as a powerful evolutionary mechanism that could explain the origin of species, biological diversity, and similarities among related life forms. Darwin proposed a *theory of evolution* in the strict sense. A *theory* is a set of ideas formulated (by reasoning from known facts) to explain something. The main value of a theory is to promote new understanding. A theory suggests patterns, connections, and relationships that may be confirmed by new research. The *fact* of evolution (that evolution has occurred) was known earlier, for example, by Erasmus Darwin. The *theory* of evolution, through natural selection (*how* evolution occurred), was Darwin's major contribution. Actually, natural selection wasn't Darwin's unique discovery. Working independently, the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace had reached a similar conclusion (Shermer 2002). In a joint paper read to London's Linnaean Society in 1858, Darwin and Wallace made their discovery public. Darwin's book *On the Origin of Species* (1859/1958) offered much fuller documentation.

Natural selection is the process by which the life forms most fit to survive and reproduce in a given environment do so in greater numbers than others in the same population. More than survival of the fittest, natural selection is differential reproductive success. Natural selection is a natural process that leads to a result. Natural selection operates when there is competition for strategic resources (those necessary for life) such as food and space between members of the population. There is also the matter of finding mates. You can win the competition for food and space and have no mate and thus have no impact on the future of the species. For natural selection to work on a particular population, there must be variety within that population, as there always is.

The giraffe's neck can illustrate how natural selection works on variety within a population. In any group of giraffes, there is always variation in neck length. When food is adequate, the animals have no problem feeding themselves. But when there is pressure on strategic resources, so that dietary foliage is not as abundant as usual, giraffes with longer necks have an advantage. They can feed off the higher branches. If this feeding advantage permits longer-necked giraffes to survive and reproduce even slightly more effectively than shorter-necked ones, giraffes with longer necks will transmit more of their genetic material to future generations than will giraffes with shorter necks.

An incorrect alternative to this (Darwinian) explanation would be the inheritance of acquired characteristics. That is the idea that in each generation, individual giraffes strain their necks to reach just a bit higher. This straining somehow modifies their genetic material. Over generations of strain, the average neck gradually gets longer through the accumulation of small increments of neck length acquired during the lifetime of each generation of giraffes. This is not how evolution works. If it did work in this way, weightlifters could expect to produce especially muscular babies. Workouts that promise no gain without the pain apply to the physical development of individuals, not species. Instead, evolution works as the process of natural selection takes advantage of the variety that is already present in a population. That's how giraffes got their necks.

Evolution through natural selection continues today. For example, in human populations there is differential resistance to disease. One classic recent example of natural selection is the peppered moth, which can be light or dark (in either case with black speckles, thus the name “peppered”). A change in this species illustrates recent natural selection (in our own industrial age) through what has been called *industrial melanism*. Great Britain’s industrialization changed the environment to favor darker moths (those with more melanin) rather than the lighter-colored ones that were favored previously. During the 1800s, industrial pollution increased; soot coated buildings and trees, turning them a darker color. The previously typical peppered moth, which had a light color, now stood out against the dark backgrounds of sooty buildings and trees. Such light-colored moths were easily visible to their predators. Through mutations, a new strain of peppered moth, with a darker phenotype, was favored. Because these darker moths were fitter—that is, harder to detect—in polluted environments, they survived and reproduced in greater numbers than lighter moths did. We see how natural selection may favor darker moths in polluted environments and lighter-colored moths in nonindustrial or less polluted environments because of their variant abilities to merge in with their environmental colors and thus avoid predators.



A speckled peppered moth and a black one alight on a sootblackened tree. Which phenotype is favored in this environment? How could this adaptive advantage change?

Evolutionary theory is used to explain. Remember that the goal of science is to increase understanding through explanation: showing how and why the thing (or class of things) to be understood (e.g. the variation within species, the geographic distribution of species, the fossil record) depends on other things. Explanations rely on associations and theories. An association is an observed relationship between two or more variables, such as the length of a giraffe’s neck and the number of its offspring, or an increase in the frequency of dark moths as industrial pollution spreads. A theory is more general, suggesting or implying associations and attempting to explain them. A thing or event—for example, the giraffe’s long neck—is explained if it illustrates a general principle or association, such as the concept of adaptive advantage. The truth of a scientific statement (e.g. evolution because of differential reproductive success due to variation within population) is confirmed by repeated observations.



Charles Darwin

Genetics

Charles Darwin recognized that for natural selection to operate, there must be variety in the population undergoing selection. Documenting and explaining such variety among humans—human biological diversity—is one of anthropology’s major concerns. Genetics, a science that emerged after Darwin, helps us understand the causes of biological variation.

7 Early Hominins

CONRAD KOTTAK

Do you remember the “monkey bars” in your playground? How did you use them? It sure wasn’t like a monkey. The human shoulder bone, like that of the apes, is adapted for brachiation—swinging hand over hand through the trees. Monkeys, by contrast, move about on four limbs. Apes can stand and walk on two feet, as humans habitually do, but in the trees, and otherwise when climbing, apes and humans don’t leap around as monkeys do. In climbing we extend our arms and pull up. When we use “monkey bars,” we hang and move hand over hand rather than getting on top and running across, as a monkey would do. For most contemporary humans, the ability to use “monkey bars” declines long before our ability to walk. Humans have the shoulder of a brachiator because we share a distant brachiating ancestor with the apes. Bipedal locomotion, on the other hand, is the most ancient trait that makes us truly human.

Only when we lose it do we appreciate fully the supreme significance of bipedalism. I know this from personal experience. On September 11, 2005, the day before her 99th birthday, my mother broke her hip. She survived a hip replacement operation, spent a week in the hospital, then entered a rehab center, where she had to rely on staff for much of what previously she had done on her own. She couldn’t climb in and out of bed, nor could she bathe herself or attend to personal functions.

Watching my mother endure weeks of indignity, I became acutely aware of what bipedalism means to humans. Younger people with greater upper body strength often can move about independently without using their legs. Not so a very old woman who over the years had suffered several fractures (along with arthritis) affecting wrists, arms, and shoulders.

All those had been painful reminders of the aging process. None, however, was as devastating as her hip break. Unable to walk and debilitated by an infection she contracted in the hospital, my mother gradually lost her interests and her will to live. She stopped following the news, abandoning TV and any attempt to read. Her rehabilitation wasn’t succeeding; she hated relying on others for her personal functions. She died less than two months after her fall. My mother’s longevity illustrates how cultural advances (e.g. medicine, nutrition, operations) have extended the human lifespan—but only to a point. Certainly no Ice Age hominin lived for a century; however, humans today are no less bipedal than our ancestors were 5 million years ago. Bipedalism is an integral and enduring feature of human adaptation.

What Makes Us Human?

In trying to determine whether a fossil is a human ancestor, should we look for traits that make us human today? Sometimes yes; sometimes no. We do look for similarities in DNA, including mutations shared by certain lineages but not others. But what about such key human attributes as bipedal locomotion, a long period of childhood dependency, big brains, and the use of tools and language? Some of these key markers of humanity are fairly recent—or have origins that are impossible to date. And ironically, some of the physical markers that have led scientists to identify certain fossils as early hominins rather than apes are features that have been lost during subsequent human evolution.

Bipedalism

As is true of all subsequent hominins, postcranial material from *Ardipithecus*, the earliest widely accepted hominin genus (5.8–4.4 m.y.a.), indicates a capacity—albeit an imperfect one—for upright bipedal locomotion. The *Ardipithecus* pelvis appears to be transitional between one suited for arboreal climbing and one modified for bipedalism. Reliance on bipedalism—upright two-legged locomotion—is the key feature differentiating early hominins from the apes. This way of moving around eventually led to the distinctive hominin way of life. Based on African fossil discoveries, such as Ethiopia’s *Ardipithecus*, hominin bipedalism is more than five million years old. Some scientists see even earlier evidence of bipedalism in two other fossil finds—one from Chad (*Sahelanthropus tchadensis*) and one from Kenya (*Orrorin tugenensis*).

Bipedalism traditionally has been viewed as an adaptation to open grassland or savanna country, although *Ardipithecus* lived in a humid woodland habitat. Adaptation to the savanna occurred later in hominin evolution. Perhaps bipedalism developed in the woodlands but became even more adaptive in a savanna habitat. Scientists have suggested several advantages of bipedalism: the ability to see over long grass and scrub, to carry items back to a home base, and to reduce the body’s exposure to solar radiation. Studies with scale models of primates suggest that quadrupedalism exposes the body to 60 percent more solar radiation than does bipedalism. The fossil and archaeological records confirm that upright bipedal locomotion preceded stone tool manufacture and the expansion of the hominin brain. However, although early hominins could move bipedally on the ground, they also preserved enough of an apelike anatomy to make them good climbers. They could take to the trees to sleep and to escape terrestrial predators.

Ethiopian Paleontologist Discovers “Lucy’s Baby”

Anthropologists have discovered some of the earliest hominin fossils at the northern end of Africa’s Great Rift Valley. When these early hominins thrived more than three million years ago, this region was less arid than it is today. Anthropologists know this because similarly-dated remains of other animals, including hippos, crocodiles, and otters, have been found in the same geological layers.

Described here is the recent discovery by an Ethiopian paleoanthropologist of the world’s oldest child. She has been dubbed “Lucy’s baby” because she was discovered in the same general area as Lucy, a famous early hominin whose remains recently have toured museums in the United States.



At a September 2006 press conference in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian paleoanthropologist Zeresenay Alemseged displays the newly discovered skull of the oldest known hominin child. Alemseged headed the team that made the find, dating to 3.3 m.y.a.

Dubbed “Lucy’s baby,” despite having lived before that famous fossil, the child also belonged to the species *A. afarensis*. Probably a female, the child died around the age of 3.

This parentage, however, could not be, because the baby dates to an earlier geologic time than Lucy. This infant find is amazingly complete, with a full face and much more skeletal material than exists for Lucy. Like Lucy, the child is a member of *Australopithecus afarensis*, a species that many anthropologists consider ancestral to humans.

Analysis of the infant's lower body confirms bipedalism, which already had been the characteristic hominin mode of locomotion for more than a million years before *A. afarensis*. By comparing this ancient child's maturation with that of modern humans and chimps, anthropologists hope to understand the social implications of variation in the development process.

September 20, 2006—The world's oldest known child has been discovered in East Africa in an area known appropriately as the Cradle of Humanity.

The 3.3-million-year-old fossilized toddler was uncovered in north Ethiopia's badlands along the Great Rift Valley.

The skeleton, belonging to the primitive human species *Australopithecus afarensis*, is remarkable for its age and completeness...

The new find may even trump the superstar fossil of the same species: "Lucy," a 3.2-million-year-old adult female discovered nearby in 1974 that reshaped theories of human evolution.

Some experts have taken to calling the baby skeleton "Lucy's baby" because of the proximity of the discoveries, despite the fact that the baby is tens of thousands of years older.

"This is something you find once in a lifetime," said Zeresenay Alemseged of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, who led the team that made the discovery.

The child was probably female and about three years old when she died, according to the researchers.

Found in sandstone in the Dikika area, the remains include a remarkably well preserved skull, milk teeth, tiny fingers, a torso, a foot, and a kneecap no bigger than a dried pea.

Archaeologists hope that the baby skeleton, because of its completeness, can provide a wealth of details that Lucy and similar fossils couldn't.

The age of death makes the find especially useful, scientists say, providing insights into the growth and development of human ancestors.

"Visually speaking, the Dikika child is definitely more complete [than Lucy]," team member Fred Spoor of University College London (UCL) said.

"It has the complete skull, the mandible, and the whole brain case. Lucy doesn't have much of a head."

"The most impressive difference between them is that this baby has a face," Zeresenay added.

That face, no bigger than a monkey's, was spotted peering from a dusty slope in December 2000. Its smooth brow and short canine teeth identified it as a hominin, a group that encompasses humans and their ancestors...

The fossil child, who died at nursing age, offers important clues to the development of early humans...

For instance, a prolonged, dependent childhood allowed later human species to grow larger brains, which need more time to develop after birth.

"As far as we can tell, it is not yet happening [with Lucy's baby]," Spoor said.

While the adult *A. afarensis* is thought to have had a brain slightly larger than a chimpanzee's, the hominin child's brain appears to have been smaller than an average chimp brain of the same age...

The new fossil also supports the theory that *A. afarensis* walked upright on two legs, but it hints that human ancestors hadn't completely left the trees by that time.

The skeleton's apelike upper body includes two complete shoulder blades similar to a gorilla's, so it could have been better at climbing than humans are...

Louise Humphrey, a paleontologist at the Natural History Museum in London who wasn't part of Zeresenay's team, describes the find as "an extremely valuable addition to the hominin fossil record.

"The fossil also preserves parts of the skeleton not previously documented for *A. afarensis*," she added.

These included a hyoid bone in the throat area that later went on to form part of the human voice box...

How the child died is unclear, though it appears the body was rapidly covered by sand and gravel during a flood. "It was buried just after it died," Zeresenay said. "That's why we found an almost complete skeleton, so maybe [drowning] could be the cause of its demise."

Like Lucy and many other hominin fossils, the child was uncovered in the low-lying northern end of Africa's Great Rift Valley. Researchers say the region was once much less arid. Hominins shared the area's lushwoods and grasslands with extinct species of elephants, hippos, crocodiles, otters, antelopes, and other animals whose fossils have been found nearby.

For these remains to be preserved and discovered, Zeresenay says, they needed to be covered in sediments and then exposed by tectonic activity, as has happened in the Great Rift Valley.


"These deposited environments were subsequently exposed by tectonics for us to go there and find the hominins," he added.

The Ethiopian paleoanthropologist says several more years of painstaking work will be needed to remove the remaining hard sandstone encasing much of the fossil child's skeleton.

SOURCE: James Owen, "'Lucy's Baby'—World's Oldest Child—Found by Fossil Hunters." *National Geographic News*, September 20, 2006.

Brains, Skulls, and Childhood Dependency

Compared with contemporary humans, early hominins had very small brains. *Australopithecus afarensis*, a bipedal hominin that lived more than three million years ago, had a cranial capacity (430 cm^3 —cubic centimeters) that barely surpassed the chimp average (390 cm^3). The form of the *afarensis* skull also is like that of the chimpanzee, although the brain-to-body size ratio may have been larger. Brain size has increased during hominin evolution, especially with the advent of the genus *Homo*. But this increase had to overcome some obstacles. Compared with the young of other primates, human children have a long period of childhood dependency, during which their brains and skulls grow dramatically. Larger skulls demand larger birth canals, but the requirements of upright bipedalism impose limits on the expansion of the human pelvic opening. If the opening is too large, the pelvis doesn't provide sufficient support for the trunk. Locomotion suffers, and posture problems develop. If, by contrast, the birth canal is too narrow, mother and child (without the modern option of Caesarean section) may die. Natural selection has struck a balance between the structural demands of upright posture and the tendency toward increased brain size—the birth of immature and dependent children whose brains and skulls grow dramatically after birth. This shift had not yet taken place in *A. afarensis*, at least as represented by "Lucy's baby."



Reconstruction of *Australopithecus* running bipedally with a pebble tool in hand. Along with tool use and manufacture, bipedalism is a key part of being human.

Tools

Given what is known about tool use and manufacture by the great apes, it is likely that early hominins shared this ability as a homology with the apes. We'll see later that the first evidence for hominin stone tool manufacture is dated to 2.6 m.y.a. Upright bipedalism would have permitted the use of tools and weapons against predators and competitors. Bipedal locomotion also allowed early hominins to carry things, perhaps including scavenged parts of carnivore kills. We know that primates have generalized abilities to adapt through learning. It

would be amazing if early hominins, who are much more closely related to us than the apes are, didn't have even greater cultural abilities than contemporary apes have.

Teeth

One example of an early hominin trait that has been lost during subsequent human evolution is big back teeth. (Indeed a pattern of overall dental reduction has characterized human evolution.) Once they adapted to the savanna, with its gritty, tough, and fibrous vegetation, it was adaptively advantageous for early hominins to have large back teeth and thick tooth enamel. This permitted thorough chewing of tough, fibrous vegetation and mixture with salivary enzymes to permit digestion of foods that otherwise would not have been digestible. The churning, rotary motion associated with such chewing also favored reduction of the canines and first premolars (bicuspid). These front teeth are much sharper and longer in the apes than in early hominins. The apes use their sharp self-honing teeth to pierce fruits. Males also flash their big sharp canines to intimidate and impress others, including potential mates. Although bipedalism seems to have characterized the human lineage since it split from the line leading to the African apes, many other "human" features came later. Yet other early hominin features, such as large back teeth and thick enamel—which we don't have now—offer clues about who was a human ancestor back then.

Chronology of Hominin Evolution

Recall that the term *hominin* is used to designate the human line after its split from ancestral chimps. *Hominid* refers to the taxonomic family that includes humans and the African apes and their immediate ancestors. In this book *hominid* is used when there is doubt about the hominin status of the fossil. Although recent fossil discoveries have pushed the hominin lineage back to almost six million years, humans actually haven't been around too long when the age of the Earth is considered. If we compare Earth's history to a 24-hour day (with one second equaling 50,000 years),

Earth originates at midnight.
The earliest fossils were deposited at 5:45 a.m.
The first vertebrates appeared at 9:02 p.m.
The earliest mammals, at 10:45 p.m.
The earliest primates, at 11:43 p.m.
The earliest hominins, at 11:57 p.m.
And *Homo sapiens* arrives 36 seconds before midnight.
(Wolpoff 1999, p. 10)

Although the first hominins appeared late in the Miocene epoch, for the study of hominin evolution, the Pliocene (5 to 2 m.y.a.), Pleistocene (2 m.y.a. to 10,000 b.p.), and Recent (10,000 b.p. to the present) epochs are most important. Until the end of the Pliocene, the main hominin genus was *Australopithecus*, which lived in sub-Saharan Africa. By the start of the Pleistocene, *Australopithecus* had evolved into *Homo*.

Who Were the Earliest Hominins?

Recent discoveries of fossils and tools have increased our knowledge of hominid and hominin evolution. The most significant recent discoveries have been made in Africa—Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Chad. These finds come from different sites and may be the remains of individuals that lived hundreds of thousands of years apart. Furthermore, geological processes

operating over thousands or millions of years inevitably distort fossil remains. Table 7.1 summarizes the major events in hominid and hominin evolution.

Sahelanthropus tchadensis

In July 2001 anthropologists working in Central Africa—in northern Chad’s Djurab Desert—unearthed the 6-to-7-million-year-old skull of the oldest possible human ancestor yet found. This discovery consists of a nearly complete skull, two lower jaw fragments, and three teeth. It dates to the time period when humans and chimps would have been diverging from a common ancestor. “It takes us into another world, of creatures that include the common ancestor, the ancestral human and the ancestral chimp,” George Washington University paleobiologist Bernard Wood said (quoted in Gugliotta 2002). The discovery was made by a 40-member multinational team led by the French paleoanthropologist Michel Brunet.

The actual discoverer was the university undergraduate Aounta Djimdoumalbaye, who spied the skull embedded in sandstone. The new fossil was dubbed *Sahelanthropus tchadensis*, referring to the northern Sahel region of Chad where it was found. The fossil is also known as “Toumai,” a local name meaning “hope of life.”

The discovery team identified the skull as that of an adult male with a chimp-sized brain (320–380 cubic centimeters), heavy brow ridges, and a relatively flat, humanlike face. Toumai’s habitat included savanna, forests, rivers, and lakes—and abundant animal life such as elephants, antelope, horses, giraffes, hyenas, hippopotamuses, wild boars, crocodiles, fish, and rodents. The animal species enabled the team to date the site where Toumai was found (by comparison with radiometrically dated sites with similar fauna).

The discovery of Toumai moves scientists close to the time when humans and the African apes diverged from a common ancestor (Weiss 2005). As we would expect in a fossil so close to the common ancestor, Toumai blends apelike and human characteristics. Although the brain was chimp-sized, the tooth enamel was thicker than a chimp’s enamel, suggesting a diet that included not just fruits but also tougher vegetation of a sort typically found in the savanna. Also, Toumai’s snout did not protrude as far as a chimp’s, making it more humanlike, and the canine tooth was shorter than those of other apes. “The fossil is showing the first glimmerings of evolution in our direction,” according to University of California at Berkeley anthropologist Tim White (quoted in Gugliotta 2002). *Sahelanthropus* is a nearly complete, although distorted, skull. The placement of its *foramen magnum* (the “big hole” through which the spinal cord joins the brain) farther forward than in apes suggests that *Sahelanthropus* moved bipedally. Its discovery in Chad indicates that hominin evolution was not confined to East Africa’s Rift Valley. The Rift Valley’s abundant fossil record may well reflect geology, preservation, and modern exposure of fossils rather than the actual geographic distribution of species in the past.

The discovery of *Sahelanthropus* in Chad is the first proof of a more widespread distribution of early hominins.

Table 7.1. Dates and Geographic Distribution of Major Hominoid, Hominid, and Hominin Fossil Groups

Fossil Group	Dates, m.y.a.	Known Distribution
Hominoid <i>Pierolapithecus catalaunicus</i>	13	Spain
Hominid Common ancestor of hominids <i>Sahelanthropus tchadensis</i> <i>Orrorin tugenensis</i>	8? 7–6 6	East Africa Chad Kenya
Hominins <i>Ardipithecus kadabba</i> <i>Ardipithecus ramidus</i> <i>Kenyanthropus platyops</i> Australopithecines <i>A. anamensis</i> <i>A. afarensis</i> <i>A. garhi</i> Robusts <i>A. robustus</i> (aka <i>Paranthropus</i>) <i>A. boisei</i> Graciles <i>A. africanus</i>	5.8–5.5 4.4 3.5 4.2–3.9 3.8–3.0 2.5 2.6–1.2 2.0?–1.0? 2.6?–1.2 3.0?–2.0	Ethiopia Ethiopia Kenya Kenya East Africa (Laetoli, Hadar) Ethiopia East and South Africa South Africa East Africa South Africa
<i>Homo</i> <i>H. habilis</i> / <i>H. rudolfensis</i> <i>H. erectus</i> <i>Homo sapiens</i> Archaic <i>H. sapiens</i> Neandertals	2.4?–1.4? 1.9?–0.3? 0.3–present 0.3–0.28 (300,000–28,000) 0.13–0.28 (130,000–28,000)	East Africa Africa, Asia, Europe Africa, Asia, Europe Europe, Middle East, North Africa
Anatomically Modern Humans (AMHs)	0.15?–present (150,000–present)	Worldwide (after 20,000 B.P.)

Orrorin tugenensis

In January 2001 Brigitte Senut, Martin Pickford, and others reported the discovery, near the village of Tugen in Kenya's Baringo district, of possible early hominin fossils they called *Orrorin tugenensis* (Aiello and Collard 2001; Senut et al. 2001). The find consisted of 13 fossils from at least 5 individuals. The fossils include pieces of jaw with teeth, isolated upper and lower teeth, arm bones, and a finger bone. *Orrorin* appears to have been a chimp-sized creature that climbed easily and walked on two legs when on the ground. Its date of 6 million years is close to the time of the common ancestor of humans and chimps. The fossilized left femur (thigh bone) suggests upright bipedalism (walking with two feet), while the thick right humerus (upper arm bone) suggests tree-climbing skills. Animal fossils found in the same rocks indicate *Orrorin* lived in a wooded environment.

Orrorin's upper incisor, upper canine, and lower premolar are more like the teeth of a female chimpanzee than like human teeth. But other dental and skeletal features, especially bipedalism, led the discoverers to assign *Orrorin* to the hominin lineage. *Orrorin* lived after *Sahelanthropus tchadensis* but before *Ardipithecus kadabba*, discovered in Ethiopia, also in 2001, and dated to 5.8–5.5 m.y.a. The hominin status of *Ardipithecus* is more generally accepted than is that of either *Sahelanthropus tchadensis* or *Orrorin tugenensis*.

Ardipithecus

Early hominins assigned to *Ardipithecus kadabba* lived during the late Miocene, between 5.8 and 5.5 million years ago. *Ardipithecus (ramidus)* fossils were first discovered at Aramis in Ethiopia by Berhane Asfaw, Gen Suwa, and Tim White. Dating to 4.4 m.y.a., these *Ardipithecus ramidus* fossils consisted of the remains of some 17 individuals, with cranial, facial, dental, and upper limb bones. Subsequently, much older *Ardipithecus (kadabba)* fossils, dating back to 5.8 m.y.a., very near the time of the common ancestor of humans and the African apes, were found in Ethiopia. The *kadabba* find consists of 11 specimens, including a jawbone with teeth, hand and foot bones, fragments of arm bones, and a piece of collarbone. At least five individuals are represented. These creatures were apelike in size, anatomy, and habitat. They lived in a wooded area rather than the open grassland or savanna habitat where later hominins proliferated. As of this writing, because of its probable bipedalism, *Ardipithecus kadabba* is recognized as the earliest known hominin, with the *Sahelanthropus tchadensis* find from Chad, dated to 7–6 m.y.a., and *Orrorin tugenensis* from Kenya, dated to 6 m.y.a. possibly even older hominins. In October 2009, a newly reported *Ardipithecus* find—a fairly complete skeleton of *Ardipithecus ramidus*, dubbed “Ardi”—was heralded on the front page of the *New York Times* and throughout the media (Wilford 2009). Ardi (4.4 m.y.a.) replaces Lucy (3.2 m.y.a.) as the earliest known hominin skeleton. The Ethiopian discovery site lies on what is now an arid floodplain of the Awash River, 45 miles south of Hadar, where Lucy was found. Scientists infer that Ardi was female, based on its small and lightly built (gracile) skull and its small canine teeth compared with others at the site. At four feet tall and 120 pounds, Ardi stood about a foot taller and weighed twice as much as Lucy.

The *Ardipithecus* pelvis appears to be transitional between one suited for arboreal climbing and one modified for bipedal locomotion. The pelvis of later hominins such as Lucy shows nearly all the adaptations needed for full bipedalism. Although Ardi's lower pelvis remains primitive, the structure of her upper pelvis allowed her to walk on two legs with a straightened hip. Still, she probably could neither walk nor run as well as later hominins. Her feet lacked the archlike structure of later hominin feet. Ardi's apelike lower pelvis indicates retention of powerful hamstring muscles for climbing. Her hands, very long arms, and shortlegs all recall those of extinct apes, and her brain was no larger than that of a modern chimp. Based on associated animal and plant remains, *Ardipithecus* lived in a humid woodland habitat.

More than 145 teeth have been collected at the site. Their size, shape, and wear patterns suggest an omnivorous diet of plants, nuts, and small mammals. Although *Ardipithecus* probably fed both in trees and on the ground, the canines suggest less of a fruit diet than is characteristic of living apes. With reduced sexual dimorphism, *Ardipithecus* canines resemble modern human canines more than the tusk like piercing upper canines of chimps and gorillas.

The first comprehensive reports describing Ardi and related findings, the result of 17 years of study, were published on October 2, 2009, in the journal *Science*, including 11 papers by 47 authors from 10 countries. They analyzed more than 110 *Ardipithecus* specimens from at least 36 different individuals, including Ardi. The ancestral relationship of *Ardipithecus* to

Australopithecus has not been determined, but Ardi has been called a plausible ancestor for *Australopithecus* (Wilford 2009).

Kenyanthropus

Complicating the picture is another discovery, which Maeve Leakey has named *Kenyanthropus platyops*, or flat-faced “man” of Kenya. (Actually, the sex hasn’t been determined.) This 1999 fossil find—of a nearly complete skull and partial jawbone—was made by a research team led by Leakey, excavating on the western side of Lake Turkana in northern Kenya. They consider this 3.5-million-year-old find to represent an entirely new branch of the early human family tree.

Leakey views *Kenyanthropus* as showing that at least two hominin lineages existed as far back as 3.5 million years. One was the well-established fossil species *Australopithecus afarensis*, best known from the celebrated Lucy skeleton.

With the discovery of *Kenyanthropus* it would seem that Lucy and her kind weren’t alone on the African plain. The hominin family tree, once drawn with a straight trunk, now looks more like a bush, with branches leading in many directions (Wilford 2001a).



Maeve Leakey and *Kenyanthropus platyops*, which she discovered in 1999 by Lake Turkana in northern Kenya. What’s the significance of *Kenyanthropus*?

Kenyanthropus has a flattened face and small molars that are strikingly different from those of *afarensis*. Ever since its discovery in Ethiopia in 1974 by Donald Johanson, *afarensis* has been regarded as the most likely common ancestor of all subsequent hominins, including humans. With no other hominin fossils dated to the period between 3.8 million and 3.0 million years ago, this was the most reasonable conclusion scientists could draw. As a result of the *Kenyanthropus* discovery, however, the place of *afarensis* in human ancestry has been and will be debated.

Taxonomic “splitters” (those who stress diversity and divergence) will focus on the differences between *afarensis* and *Kenyanthropus* and see it as representing a new taxon (genus and/or species), as Maeve Leakey has done. Taxonomic “lumpers” will focus on the similarities between *Kenyanthropus* and *afarensis* and may try to place them both in the same taxon—probably *Australopithecus*, which is well established.

The Varied Australopithecines

Some Miocene hominins eventually evolved into a varied group of Pliocene-Pleistocene hominins known as the **australopithecines**—for which we have an abundant fossil record. This term reflects their one-time classification as members of a distinct taxonomic subfamily, the “Australopithecinae.” We now know that the various species of *Australopithecus* discussed in this chapter do not form a distinct subfamily within the order Primates, but the name “australopithecine” has stuck to describe them. Today the distinction between the australopithecines and later hominins is made on the genus level. The australopithecines are assigned to the genus *Australopithecus* (*A.*); later humans, to *Homo* (*H.*).

In the scheme followed here, *Australopithecus* had at least six species:

1. *A. anamensis* (4.2 to 3.9 m.y.a.)
2. *A. afarensis* (3.8 to 3.0 m.y.a.)
3. *A. africanus* (3.0? to 2.0? m.y.a.)
4. *A. garhi* (2.5 m.y.a.)
5. *A. robustus* (2.0? to 1.0? m.y.a.)
6. *A. boisei* (2.6? to 1.2 m.y.a.)

The dates given for each species are approximate because an organism isn't a member of one species one day and a member of another species the next day. Nor could the same dating techniques be used for all the finds. The South African australopithecine fossils (*A. africanus* and *A. robustus*), for example, come from a nonvolcanic area where radiometric dating could not be done. Dating of those fossils has been based mainly on stratigraphy. The hominin fossils from the volcanic regions of East Africa usually have radiometric dates.

Australopithecus anamensis

Ardipithecus ramidus may (or may not) have evolved into *A. anamensis*, a bipedal hominin from northern Kenya, whose fossil remains were reported first by Maeve Leakey and Alan Walker in 1995 (Leakey et al. 1995; Rice 2002). *A. Anamensis* consists of 78 fragments from two sites: Kanapoi and Allia Bay. The fossils include upper and lower jaws, cranial fragments, and the upper and lower parts of a leg bone (tibia). The Kanapoi fossils date to 4.2 m.y.a., and those at Allia Bay to 3.9 m.y.a. The molars have thick enamel, and the apelike canines are large. Based on the tibia, *anamensis* weighed about 110 pounds (50 kg.). This would have made it larger than either the earlier *Ardipithecus* or the later *A. afarensis*. Its anatomy implies that *anamensis* was bipedal. Because of its date and its location in the East African Rift Valley, *A. anamensis* may be ancestral to *A. afarensis* (3.8–3.0 m.y.a.), which usually is considered ancestral to all the later australopithecines (*garhi*, *africanus*, *robustus*, and *boisei*) as well as to *Homo*.

Australopithecus afarensis

The hominin species known as *A. afarensis* includes fossils found at two sites, Laetoli in northern Tanzania and Hadar in the Afar region of Ethiopia. Laetoli is earlier (3.8–3.6 m.y.a.). The Hadar fossils probably date to between 3.3 and 3.0 m.y.a. Thus, based on the current evidence, *A. afarensis* lived between about 3.8 and 3.0 m.y.a. Research directed by Mary Leakey was responsible for the Laetoli finds. The Hadar discoveries resulted from an international expedition directed by D. C. Johanson and M. Taieb. The two sites have yielded significant samples of early hominin fossils. There are two dozen specimens from Laetoli, and the Hadar finds include the remains of between 35 and 65 individuals. The Laetoli remains are mainly teeth and jaw fragments, along with some very



An ancient trail of hominin footprints fossilized in volcanic ash. Mary Leakey found this 230-foot (70-meter) trail at Laetoli, Tanzania, in 1979. It dates from 3.6 m.y.a. and confirms that *A. afarensis* was a striding biped.

informative fossilized footprints.

The Hadar sample includes skull fragments and postcranial material, most notably 40 percent of the complete skeleton of a tiny hominin female, dubbed “Lucy,” who lived around 3 m.y.a. Although the hominin remains at Laetoli and Hadar were deposited half a million years apart, their many resemblances explain their placement in the same species, *A. afarensis*. These fossils forced a reinterpretation of the early hominin fossil record. *A. afarensis*, although clearly a hominin, was so similar in many ways to chimps and gorillas that our common ancestry with the African apes must be very recent, certainly no more than 8 m.y.a. *Ardipithecus* and *A. anamensis* are even more apelike.




Figure 7.1. Phylogenetic Tree for African Apes, Hominids, and Hominins.

The presumed divergence date for ancestral chimps and hominins was between 6 and 8 m.y.a. Branching in later hominin evolution is also shown.

These discoveries show that hominins are much closer to the apes than the previously known fossil record had suggested. Studies of the learning abilities and biochemistry of chimps and gorillas have taught a valuable lesson about homologies that the fossil record is now confirming. The *A. afarensis* finds make this clear. The many apelike features are surprising in definite hominins that lived as recently as 3 m.y.a. Discussion of hominin fossils requires a brief review of dentition. Moving from front to back, on either side of the upper or lower jaw, humans (and apes) have two incisors, one canine, two premolars, and three molars. Our dental formula is 2.1.2.3, for a total of 8 teeth on each side, upper and lower—32 teeth in all—if we have all our “wisdom teeth” (our third molars). Now back to the australopithecines. Compared with *Homo*, *A. afarensis* had larger and sharper canine teeth that projected beyond the other teeth. The canines, however, were reduced compared with an ape’s tusklike canines. The *afarensis*’ lower premolar was pointed and projecting to sharpen the upper canine. It had one long cusp and one tiny bump that hints at the bicuspid premolar that eventually developed in hominin evolution.



On the left, two sections of a tibia (dating back 4 million years) from *A. anamensis*, a bipedal hominin from northern Kenya. The tibia is the larger bone of the lower leg. Features of these bone fragments provide evidence that *A. Anamensis* walked upright.

To the right, an *A. anamensis* lower jaw and an upper jaw fragment. The molars have thick enamel, and the apelike canines are large.




Figure 7.2. Comparison of dentition in Ape, Human, and *A. afarensis* palates.

There is, however, evidence that powerful chewing associated with savanna vegetation was entering the *A. afarensis* feeding pattern. When the coarse, gritty, fibrous vegetation of grasslands and semidesert enters the diet, the back teeth change to accommodate heavy chewing stresses. Massive back teeth, jaws, and facial and cranial structures suggest a diet demanding extensive grinding and powerful crushing. *A. afarensis* molars are large.

The lower jaw (mandible) is thick and is buttressed with a bony ridge behind the front teeth. The cheekbones are large and flare out to the side for the attachment of powerful chewing muscles. The skull of *A. afarensis* contrasts with those of later hominins. The cranial capacity of 430 cm³ (cubic centimeters) barely surpasses the chimp average (390 cm³). Below the neck, however—particularly in regard to locomotion—*A. Afarensis* was unquestionably human. Early evidence of striding bipedalism comes from Laetoli, where volcanic ash, which can be directly dated by the K/A technique, covered a trail of footprints of two or three hominins walking to a water hole. These prints leave no doubt that a small striding biped lived in Tanzania by 3.6 m.y.a. The structure of the pelvic, hip, leg, and foot bones also confirms that upright bipedalism was *A. afarensis*'s mode of locomotion. More recent finds show that bipedalism predated *A. afarensis*. *A. anamensis* (4.2 m.y.a.) was bipedal, as was the even older *Ardipithecus* (5.8–4.4 m.y.a.). Although bipedal, *A. afarensis* still contrasts in many ways with later hominins. Sexual dimorphism is especially marked. The male-female contrast in jaw size in *A. afarensis* was more marked than in the orangutan. There was a similar contrast in body size. *A. afarensis* females, such as Lucy, stood between 3 and 4 feet (0.9 and 1.2 meters) tall; males might have reached 5 feet (1.5 meters). *A. afarensis* males weighed perhaps twice as much as the females did (Wolpoff 1999). Table 7.2 summarizes data on the various australopithecines, including mid-sex body weight and brain size. Mid-sex means midway between the male average and the female average.

Table 7.2. Facts about the Australopithecines Compared with Chimps and *Homo*

Species	Dates (m.y.a.)	Known Distribution	Important Sites	Body Weight (mid-sex)	Brain Size (mid-sex) (cm ³)
Anatomically modern humans (AMHs)	195,000 to present			132 lb/60 kg	1,350
<i>Pan troglodytes</i> (chimpanzee)	Modern			93 lb/42 kg	390
<i>A. boisei</i>	2.6? to 1.2	E. Africa	Olduvai, East Turkana	86 lb/39 kg	490
<i>A. robustus</i>	2.0? to 1.0?	S. Africa	Kromdraai, Swartkrans	81 lb/37 kg	540
<i>A. africanus</i>	3.0? to 2.0?	S. Africa	Taung, Sterkfontein, Makapansgat	79 lb/36 kg	490 430
<i>A. afarensis</i>	3.8 to 3.0	E. Africa	Hadar, Laetoli	77 lb/35 kg	
<i>A. anamensis</i>	4.2 to 3.9	Kenya	Kanapoi Allia Bay	Insufficient data	No published skulls
<i>Ardipithecus</i>	5.8 to 4.4	Ethiopia	Aramis	Insufficient data	No published skulls



Illustration of female *Australopithecus afarensis* "Lucy," discovered in Ethiopia's Omo Valley in 1974.

Lucy and her kind were far from dainty. Lucy's muscle-engraved bones are much more robust than ours are. With only rudimentary tools and weapons, early hominins needed powerful and resistant bones and muscles. Lucy's arms are longer relative to her legs than are those of later hominins. Here again her proportions are more apelike than ours are. Although Lucy neither brachiated nor knuckle-walked, she was probably a much better climber than modern people are, and she spent some of her day in the trees. The *A. afarensis* fossils show that as recently as 3 m.y.a., our ancestors had a mixture of apelike and hominin features. Canines, premolars, and skulls were more apelike than most scholars had imagined would exist in such a recent ancestor. On the other hand, the molars, chewing apparatus, and cheekbones foreshadowed later hominin trends, and the pelvic and limb bones were indisputably hominin.

The hominin pattern was being built from the ground up. Hominins walk with a striding gait that consists of alternating swing and stance phases for each leg and foot. As one leg is pushed off by the big toe and goes into the swing phase, the heel of the other leg is touching the ground and entering the stance phase. Four-footed locomotors such as Old World monkeys are always supported by two limbs. Biped, by contrast, are supported by one limb at a time.

The pelvis, the lower spine, the hip joint, and the thigh bone change in accordance with the stresses of bipedal locomotion. Australopithecine pelvises are much more similar (although far from identical) to *Homo*'s than to apes' and show adaptation to bipedalism (Figure 7.4). The blades of the australopithecine pelvis (iliac blades) are shorter and broader than are those of the ape. The sacrum, which anchors the pelvis's two sidebones, is larger, as in *Homo*. With bipedalism, the pelvis forms a sort of basket that balances the weight of the trunk and supports this weight with less stress. Fossilized spinal bones (vertebrae) show that the australopithecine spine had the lower spine (lumbar) curve characteristic of *Homo*. This curvature helps transmit the weight of the upper body to the pelvis and the legs. Placement of the *foramen magnum* (the "big hole" through which the spinal cord joins the brain) farther forward in *Australopithecus* and *Homo* than in the ape also represents an adaptation to upright bipedalism (Figure 7.5)

In apes, the thigh bone (femur) extends straightdown from the hip to the knees. In *Australopithecus* and *Homo*, however, the thigh bone angles into the hip, permitting the space between the knees to be narrower than the pelvis during walking. The pelvises of the australopithecines were similar but not identical to those of *Homo*. The most significant contrast is a narrower australopithecine birth canal (Tague and Lovejoy 1986).




Figure 7.3. Comparison of *Homo sapiens* and *Pan troglodytes* (the Common Chimp).

(a) Skeleton of chimpanzee in bipedal position; (b) skeleton of modern human; (c) chimpanzee and human "bisected" and drawn to the same trunk length for comparison of limb proportions. The contrast in leg length is largely responsible for the proportional difference between humans and apes.




Figure 7.4. A Comparison of Human and Chimpanzee Pelvises.

The human pelvis has been modified to meet the demands of upright bipedalism. The blades (ilia; singular, ilium) of the human pelvis are shorter and broader than those of the ape. The sacrum, which anchors the side bones, is wider. The australopithecine pelvis is far more similar to that of *Homo* than to that of the chimpanzee, as we would expect in an upright biped.




Figure 7.5. A Comparison of the Skull and Dentition (Upper Jaw) of *Homo* and the Chimpanzee.

The foramen magnum, through which the spinal cord joins the brain, is located farther forward in *Homo* than in the ape. This permits the head to balance atop the spine with upright bipedalism. The molars and premolars of the ape form parallel rows. Human teeth, by contrast, are arranged in rounded, parabolic form. What differences do you note between human and ape canines? Canine reduction has been an important trend in hominin evolution.

Expansion of the birth canal is a trend in hominin evolution. The width of the birth canal is related to the size of the skull and brain. *A. afarensis* had a small cranial capacity. Even in later australopithecines, brain size did not exceed 600 cubic centimeters. Undoubtedly, the australopithecine skull grew after birth to accommodate a growing brain, as it does (much more) in *Homo*. However, the brains of the australopithecines expanded less than ours do. In the australopithecines, the cranial sutures (the lines where the bones of the skull eventually come together) fused relatively earlier in life. Young australopithecines must have depended on their parents and kin for nurturance and protection. Those years of childhood dependency would have provided time for observation, teaching, and learning. This may provide indirect evidence for a rudimentary cultural life.

Gracile and Robust Australopithecines

The fossils of *A. africanus* and *A. robustus* come from South Africa. In 1924, the anatomist Raymond Dart coined the term ***Australopithecus africanus*** to describe the first fossil representative of this species, the skull of a juvenile that was found accidentally in a quarry at Taung, South Africa. Radiometric dates are lacking for this nonvolcanic region, but the fossil hominins found at the five main South African sites appear (from stratigraphy) to have lived between 3 and 1 m.y.a.

There were two groups of South African australopithecines: **gracile** (*A. africanus*) and **robust** (*A. robustus*). “Gracile” indicates that members of *A. africanus* were smaller and slither, less robust, than were members of *A. robustus*. There were also very robust—*hyperrobust*—australopithecines in East Africa. In the classification scheme used here, these have been assigned to *A. boisei*. However, some scholars consider *A. robustus* and *A. boisei* to be regional variants of just one species, usually called *robustus* (sometimes given its own genus, *Paranthropus*).

The relationship between the graciles and the robusts has been debated for generations but has not been resolved. Graciles and robusts probably descend from *A. afarensis*, which itself was gracile in form, or from a South African version of *A. afarensis*. Some scholars have argued that the graciles lived before (3 to 2? m.y.a.) and were ancestral to the robusts (2? to 1? m.y.a.). Others contend that the graciles and the robusts were separate species that may have overlapped in time. (Classifying them as members of different species implies they were reproductively isolated from each other in time or space.)

The trend toward enlarged back teeth, chewing muscles, and facial buttressing, which already is noticeable in *A. afarensis*, continues in the South African australopithecines. However, the canines are reduced, and the premolars are fully bicuspid. Dental form and function changed as dietary needs shifted from cutting and slashing to chewing and grinding. The mainstay of the australopithecine diet was the vegetation of the savanna, although these early hominins also might have hunted small and slow-moving game. As well, they may have scavenged, bringing home parts of kills made by large cats and other carnivores. The ability to hunt large animals was probably an achievement of *Homo* and is discussed later.

The skulls, jaws, and teeth of the australopithecines leave no doubt that their diet was mainly vegetarian. Natural selection modifies the teeth to conform to the stresses associated with a particular diet. Massive back teeth, jaws, and associated facial and cranial structures confirm that the australopithecine diet required extensive grinding and powerful crushing.

In the South African australopithecines, both deciduous (“baby”) and permanent molars and premolars are massive, with multiple cusps. The later australopithecines had bigger back teeth than did the earlier ones. However, this evolutionary trend ended with early *Homo*, which had much smaller back teeth, reflecting a dietary change that will be described later.

Contrasts with *Homo* in the front teeth are less marked. But they are still of interest because of what they tell us about sexual dimorphism. *A. africanus*’s canines were more pointed, with larger roots, than *Homo*’s are. Still, the *A. africanus* canines were only 75 percent the size of the canines of *A.*

afarensis. Despite this canine reduction, there was just as much canine sexual dimorphism in *A. africanus* as there had been in *A. afarensis* (Wolpoff 1999). Sexual dimorphism in general was much more pronounced among the early hominins than it is among *Homo sapiens*. *A. africanus* females were about 4 feet (1.2 meters), and males 5 feet (1.5 meters), tall. The average female probably had no more than 60 percent the weight of the average male (Wolpoff 1980a). (That figure contrasts with today’s average female-to-male weight ratio of about 88 percent.)



(Left) Profile view of an *A. boisei* skull—Olduvai Hominid (OH) 5, originally called *Zinjanthropus boisei*. This skull of a young male, discovered by Mary Leakey in 1959 at Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania, dates back 1.8 million years.

(Right) Profile view of an *A. africanus* (gracile) skull (Sterkfontein 5). The cranium, discovered by Dr. Robert Broom and J. T. Robinson in April 1947, dates back to 2.4–2.9 m.y.a.

Teeth, jaw, face, and skull changed to fit a diet based on tough, gritty, fibrous grasslands vegetation. A massive face housed large upper teeth and provided a base for the attachment of powerful chewing muscles. Australopithecine cheekbones were elongated and massive structures (Figure 7.6) that anchored large chewing muscles running up the jaw. Another set of robust chewing muscles extended from the back of the jaw to the sides of the skull.

In the more robust australopithecines (*A. Robustus* in South Africa and *A. boisei* in East Africa), these muscles were strong enough to produce a *sagittal crest*, a bony ridge on the top of the skull. Such a crest forms as the bone grows. It develops from the pull of the chewing muscles as they meet at the midline of the skull. In 1985, the paleoanthropologist Alan Walker made a significant find near Lake Turkana in northern Kenya. Called the “black skull” because of the blue-black sheen it bore from the minerals surrounding it, the fossil displayed a “baffling combination of features” (Fisher 1988a). The jaw was apelike and the brain was small (as in *A. afarensis*), but there was a massive bony crest atop the skull (as in *A. boisei*). Walker and Richard Leakey (Walker’s associate on the 1985 expedition) view the black skull (dated to 2.6 m.y.a.) as a very early hyperrobust *A. boisei*. Others (e.g. Jolly and White 1995) assign the black skull to its own species, *A.aethiopicus*. The black skull shows that some of the anatomical features of the hyperrobust australopithecines (2.6?–1.0 m.y.a.) did not change very much during more than one million years. *A. boisei* survived through 1.2 m.y.a in East Africa. Compared with their predecessors, the later australopithecines tended to have larger overall size, skulls, and back teeth. They also had thicker faces, more prominent crests, and more rugged muscle markings on the skeleton. By contrast, the front teeth stayed the same size.




Figure 7.6. Skulls of Robust (Left) and Gracile (Right) Australopithecines, showing chewing muscles. Flaring cheek arches and, in some robusts, a sagittal crest supported this massive musculature. The early hominin diet—coarse, gritty vegetation of the savanna—demanded such structures. These features were most pronounced in *A. boisei*.

Brain size (measured as cranial capacity, in cubic centimeters— cm^3) increased only slightly between *A. afarensis* (430 cm^3), *A. africanus* (490 cm^3), and *A. robustus* (540 cm^3) (Wolpoff 1999). These figures can be compared with an average cranial capacity of $1,350 \text{ cm}^3$ in *Homo sapiens*. The modern range goes from less than $1,000 \text{ cm}^3$ to more than $2,000 \text{ cm}^3$ in normal adults. The cranial capacity of chimps (*Pan troglodytes*) averages 390 cm^3 . The brains of gorillas (*Gorilla gorilla*) average around 500 cm^3 , which is within the australopithecine range, but gorilla body weight is much greater.


The Australopithecines and Early *Homo*

Between 3 and 2 m.y.a., the ancestors of *Homo* became reproductively isolated from the later australopithecines, such as *A. robustus* and *A. boisei*. The earliest (very fragmentary) evidence for the genus *Homo* (2.5 m.y.a.) comes from the Chemeron formation in Kenya's Baringo Basin (Sherwood, Ward, and Hill 2002). This is a skull fragment, an isolated right temporal bone, known as the Chemeron temporal. By 2 m.y.a. the fossil sample of hominin teeth from East Africa has two clearly different sizes. One set is huge, the largest molars and premolars in hominin evolution; those teeth belonged to *A. boisei*. The other group of (smaller) teeth belonged to members of the genus *Homo*.

By 1.9 m.y.a., there is fossil evidence that different hominin groups occupied different ecological niches in Africa. One of them, *Homo*—by then *Homo erectus*—had a larger brain and a repositioned skull; it had increased the areas of the brain that regulate higher mental

functions. These were our ancestors, hominins with greater capacities for culture than the australopithecines had. *H. erectus* hunted and gathered, made sophisticated tools, and eventually displaced its cousin species, *A. boisei*. *A. boisei* of East Africa, the hyperrobust australopithecines, had mammoth back teeth. Their females had bigger back teeth than did earlier australopithecine males. *A. boisei* became ever more specialized with respect to one part of the traditional australopithecine diet, concentrating on coarse vegetation with a high grit content. We still don't know why, how, and exactly when the split between *Australopithecus* and *Homo* took place. Scholars have defended many different models, or theoretical schemes, to interpret the early hominin fossil record. Because new finds so often have forced reappraisals, most scientists are willing to modify their interpretation when given new evidence.

The model of Johanson and White (1979), who coined the term *A. afarensis*, proposes that *A. afarensis* split into two groups. One group, the



From left to right: *A. afarensis*, *A. africanus*, *A. robustus*, and *A. boisei*.

What are the main differences you notice among these four types of early hominins?



Palates of *Homo sapiens* (left) and *A. boisei* (right), a late, hyperrobust australopithecine.

In comparing them, note the australopithecine's huge molars and premolars. What other contrasts do you notice? The large back teeth represent an extreme adaptation to a diet based on coarse, gritty savanna vegetation. Reduction in tooth size during human evolution applied to the back teeth much more than to the front.

ancestors of *Homo*, became reproductively isolated from the australopithecines between 3 and 2 m.y.a. Within this group was ***Homo habilis***, a term coined by L. S. B. and Mary Leakey to describe the earliest members of the genus *Homo*. Another form of early *Homo* was *H. erectus*, which appears to have lived contemporaneously with *H. habilis* between around 1.9 and 1.4 m.y.a. (Spoor et al. 2007). Other members of *A. afarensis* evolved into the various kinds of later australopithecines (*A. africanus*, *A. robustus*, and hyperrobust *A. boisei*, the last member to become extinct).

There is good fossil evidence that *Homo* and *A. boisei* coexisted in East Africa. *A. boisei* seems to have lived in very arid areas, feeding on harder-to-chew vegetation than had any previous hominin. This diet would explain the hyperrobusts' huge back teeth, jaws, and associated areas of the face and skull.

Oldowan Tools

The simplest obviously manufactured tools were discovered in 1931 by L.S.B. and Mary Leakey at Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania. That locale gave the tools their name—Oldowan pebble tools. The oldest tools from Olduvai are about 1.8 million years old. Still older (2.6–2.0 m.y.a.) Oldowan implements have been found in Ethiopia, Congo, and Malawi.

Stone tools consist of flakes and cores. The *core* is the piece of rock, in the Oldowan case about the size of a tennis ball, from which flakes are struck. Once flakes have been removed, the core can become a tool itself. A *chopper* is a tool made by flaking the edge of such a core on one side and thus forming a cutting edge.

Oldowan pebble tools represent the world's oldest formally recognized stone tools. Core tools are not the most common Oldowan tools; flakes are. The purpose of flaking stone in the Oldowan tradition was not to create pebble tools or choppers but to create the sharp stone flakes that made up the mainstay of the Oldowan tool kit (Toth 1985). Choppers were a convenient by-product of flaking and were used as well. However, hominins most likely did not have a preconceived tool form in mind while making them. Oldowan choppers could have been used for food processing—by pounding, breaking, or bashing. Flakes probably were used mainly as cutters, for example, to dismember game carcasses. Crushed fossil animal bones indicate that stones were used to break open marrow cavities. Also, Oldowan deposits include pieces of bone or horn with scratch marks suggesting they were used to dig up tubers or insects. Oldowan core and flake tools are shown in the photos on this page. The flake tool in the lower photo is made of chert. Most Oldowan tools at Olduvai Gorge were made from basalt, which is locally more common and coarser.



Left, an Oldowan chopper core; right, an Oldowan flake tool. The purpose of flaking stone in the Oldowan tradition was not to create pebble tools or choppers but to create the sharp stone flakes that made up the mainstay of the Oldowan tool kit.

For decades anthropologists have debated the identity of the earliest stone tool makers. The first *Homo habilis* find got its name (*habilis* is Latin for “able”) for its presumed status as the first hominin tool maker. Recently the story has grown more complicated, with a discovery making it very likely that one kind of australopithecine also made and habitually used stone tools.

***A. garhi* and Early Stone Tools**

In 1999 an international team reported the discovery, in Ethiopia, of a new species of hominin, along with the earliest traces of animal butchery (Asfaw, White, and Lovejoy 1999). These new fossils, dating to 2.5 m.y.a., may be the remains of a direct human ancestor and an evolutionary link between *Australopithecus* and the genus *Homo*. At the same site was evidence that antelopes and horses had been butchered with the world’s earliest stone tools. When scientists excavated these hominin fossils, they were shocked to find a combination of unforeseen skeletal and dental features. They named the specimen ***Australopithecus garhi***. The word *garhi* means “surprise” in the Afar language. Tim White, coleader of the research team, viewed the discoveries as important for three reasons. First, they add a new potential ancestor to the human family tree. Second, they show that the thigh bone (femur) had elongated by 2.5 million years ago, a million years before the forearm shortened—to create our current human limb proportions. Third, evidence that large mammals were being butchered shows that early stone technologies were aimed at getting meat and marrow from big game. This signals a dietary revolution that eventually may have allowed an invasion of new habitats and continents (Berkleyan 1999).

In 1997 the Ethiopian archaeologist Sileshi Semaw announced he had found the world’s earliest stone tools, dating to 2.6 m.y.a., at the nearby Ethiopian site of Gona. But which human ancestor had made these tools, he wondered, and what were they used for? The 1999 discoveries by Asfaw, White, and their colleagues provided answers, identifying *A. garhi* as the best candidate for toolmaker (Berkleyan 1999).

The association, in the same area at the sametime, of *A. garhi*, animal butchery, and the earliest stone tools suggests that the australopithecines were toolmakers, with some capacity for culture. Nevertheless, cultural abilities developed exponentially with *Homo*’s appearance and expansion. With increasing reliance on hunting, tool making, and other cultural abilities, *Homo* eventually became the most efficient exploiter of the savanna niche. The last surviving members of *A. boisei* may have been forced into ever-more-marginal areas. They eventually became extinct. By 1 m.y.a., a single species of hominin, *H. erectus*, not only had rendered other hominin forms extinct but also had expanded the hominin range to Asia and Europe.

An essentially human strategy of adaptation, incorporating hunting as a fundamental ingredient of a generalized foraging economy, had emerged. Despite regional variation, it was to be the basic economy for our genus until 11,000 years ago. We turn now to the fossils, tools, and life patterns of the various forms of *Homo*.

8

Archaic Homo

CONRAD KOTTAK

Fred Flintstone was the only caveman (the only cave person, for that matter) to appear on a VH1 list of the “200 Greatest Pop Culture Icons.” He ranked number 42, between Cher and Martha Stewart. The Flintstones and their neighbors the Rubbles don’t look much like Neanderthals (which anthropologists spell Neandertal, without the *h*). Real Neanderthals had heavy browridges and slanting foreheads and lacked chins. The Flintstones and the Rubbles didn’t act much like Neanderthals either. *The Flintstones* transposed a 20th century American blue collar lifestyle back to prehistoric times—Fred and Barney worked in factories, “drove” stonecars, and used dinosaurs as construction cranes and can openers. While it is certainly ridiculous to imagine that Neanderthals used dinosaurs as tools, it is equally ridiculous to imagine dinosaurs and Neanderthals coexisting at all. Dinosaurs were extinct long before humans, hominins, or hominids ever walked the earth. Just as American popular culture never tires of calling apes “monkeys,” it can’t seem to resist mixing dinosaurs and ancient humans.

Decades after Fred first appeared on TV, Geico commercials introduced new cavemen, along with the slogan “So easy a caveman can do it.” Geico’s cavemen live in a modern world of bowling alleys, cell phones, airports, and tennis courts. They have another modern trait—a sense of outrage over the insult implied in Geico’s slogan. Should it be insulting to call someone “a Neandertal?” Their average cranial capacity, exceeding 1,400 cubic centimeters, actually was larger than the modern average. What that says about intelligence isn’t clear. One fossil in particular helped create the enduring popular stereotype of the slouching, inferior, Neandertal caveman. This was the skeleton discovered a century ago at La Chapelle-aux-Saints in southwestern France. The original assessment of this fossil created an inaccurate image of Neandertals as apelike brutes who had trouble walking upright. Closer analysis revealed that La Chapelle was an aging man whose bones were distorted by osteoarthritis. This story illustrates the danger of attempting to reach broad conclusions based upon a small sample size.

Actually, as one would expect, Neandertals were a variable population. Some fossil hominins even combine Neandertal robustness with modern features. For example, the remains of a four-year-old boy found in Portugal, dating back some 24,000 years, show mixed Neandertal and modern features. This find and others have raised the question as to whether Neandertals and anatomically modern humans could have mated. Another modern activity in which the Geico cavemen engage is dating anatomically modern women. Whether similar attractions are part of history, or are as unrealistic as Fred using a dinosaur to open a can of creamed corn, is one more subject for scientific debate.

Early Homo

At two million years ago, there is East African evidence for two distinct hominin groups: early *Homo* and *A. boisei*, the hyperrobust australopithecines, which became extinct around 1.2 m.y.a. *A. boisei* became increasingly specialized, dependent on tough, coarse, gritty, fibrous savanna vegetation. The australopithecine trend toward dental, facial, and cranial robustness continued with *A. boisei*. However, these structures were reduced as early forms of *Homo* evolved into early *H. erectus* by 1.9 m.y.a. By that date *Homo* was generalizing the subsistence quest to the hunting of large animals to supplement the gathering of vegetation and scavenging.

H. rudolfensis* and *H. habilis

In 1972, in an expedition led by Richard Leakey, Bernard Ngeneo unearthed a skull designated KNM-ER 1470. The name comes from its catalog number in the Kenya National Museum (KNM) and its discovery location (East Rudolph-ER)—east of Lake Rudolph, at a site called Koobi Fora. The 1470 skull attracted immediate attention because of its unusual combination of a large brain (775 cm³) and very large molars. Its brain size was more human than that of the australopithecine, but its molars recalled those of the hyperrobust australopithecine. Some paleoanthropologists attributed the large skull and teeth to a very large body, assuming that this had been one *big hominin*. But no postcranial remains were found with 1470, nor have they been found with any later discovery of a 1470-like specimen.



Meet two kinds of early *Homo*. On the left KNM-ER 1813. On the right KNM-ER 1470. The latter (1470) has been classified as *H. rudolfensis*.

What's the classification of 1813?

How to interpret KNM-ER 1470? On the basis of its brain size, it seemed to belong in *Homo*. On the basis of its back teeth, it seemed more like *Australopithecus*. There also are problems with dating. The best dating guess is 1.8 m.y.a., but another estimate suggests that 1470 may be as old as 2.4 m.y.a. Originally, some paleoanthropologists assigned 1470 to *H. habilis*, while others saw it as an unusual australopithecine. In 1986, it received its own species name, *Homo rudolfensis*, from the lake near which it was found. This label has stuck—although it isn't accepted by all paleoanthropologists. Those who find *H. rudolfensis* to be a valid species emphasize its contrasts with *H. habilis*. Note the contrasts in the two skulls in the photo. KNM-ER 1813, on the left, is considered *H. habilis*; KNM-ER 1470, on the right, is *H. rudolfensis*. The *habilis* skull has a more marked brow ridge and a depression behind it, whereas 1470 has a less pronounced brow ridge and a longer, flatter face. Some think that *rudolfensis* lived earlier than and is ancestral to *habilis*. Some think that *rudolfensis* and *habilis* are simply male and female members of the same species—*H. habilis*. Some think they are separate species that coexisted in time and space (from about 2.4 m.y.a. to about 1.7 m.y.a.). Some think that one or the other gave rise to *H. erectus*. The debate continues. The only sure conclusion is that several different kinds of hominin lived in Africa before and after the advent of *Homo*.

H. habilis* and *H. erectus

A team headed by L.S.B. and Mary Leakey found the first representative of *Homo habilis* (OH7—Olduvai Hominid 7) at Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania in 1960. Olduvai's oldest layer, Bed I, dates to 1.8 m.y.a. This layer has yielded both small brained *A. boisei* (average 490 cm³) fossils and *H. habilis* skulls, with cranial capacities between 600 and 700 cm³.

Another important *habilis* find was made in 1986 by Tim White of the University of California, Berkeley. OH62 is the partial skeleton of a female *H. habilis* from Olduvai Bed I. This

was the first find of an *H. habilis* skull with a significant amount of skeletal material. OH62, dating to 1.8 m.y.a., consists of parts of the skull, the right arm, and both legs. Because scientists had assumed that *H. habilis* would be taller than tiny Lucy (*A. afarensis*), OH62 was surprising because of its small size and apelike limb bones. Not only was OH62 just as tiny as Lucy (3 feet, or 0.9 meter), its arms were longer and more apelike than expected. The limb proportions suggested greater tree-climbing ability than later hominins had. *H. habilis* may still have sought occasional refuge in the trees.

The small size and primitive proportions of *H. habilis* were unexpected given what was known about early *H. erectus* in East Africa. In deposits near Lake Turkana, Kenya, Richard Leakey had uncovered two *H. erectus* skulls dating to 1.6 m.y.a. By that date, *H. erectus* (males at least) had already attained a cranial capacity of 900 cm³, along with a modern body shape and height. An amazingly complete young male *H. erectus* fossil (WT15,000) found at West Turkana in 1984 by Kimoya Kimeu, a collaborator of the Leakeys, has confirmed this. WT15,000, also known as the Nariokotome boy, was a 12-year-old male who had already reached 5 feet 5 inches (1.67 meters). He might have grown to 6 feet had he lived.

Sister species

Two recent hominin fossil finds from Ileret, Kenya (east of Lake Turkana), are very significant for two main reasons; they show that (1) *H. Habilis* and *H. erectus* overlapped in time rather than being ancestor and descendant, as had been thought; (2) sexual dimorphism in *H. erectus* was much greater than expected (see Spoor et al. 2007; Wilford 2007a).

One of these finds (KNM-ER 42703) is the upper jawbone of a 1.44-million-year-old *H. habilis*. The other (KNM-ER 42700) is the almost complete but faceless skull of a 1.55-million-year-old *H. erectus*. Their names come from their catalog numbers in the Kenya National Museum-East Rudolph, and their dates were determined from volcanic ash deposits. These Ileret finds negated the conventional view (held since the Leakeys described the first *habilis* in 1960) that *habilis* and then *erectus* evolved one after the other. Instead, they apparently split from a common ancestor prior to 2 m.y.a. Then they lived side by side in eastern Africa for perhaps half a million years. According to Maeve Leakey, one of the authors of the report (Spoor et al. 2007), the fact that they remained separate species for so long “suggests that they had their own ecological niche, thus avoiding direct competition” (quoted in Wilford 2007a, p. A6).

They lived in the same general area (an ancient lake basin), much as gorillas and chimpanzees do today. Given these finds, the fossil record for early *Homo* in East Africa can be revised as follows: *H. habilis* (1.9–1.44 m.y.a) and *H. erectus* (1.9–1.0 m.y.a). The oldest definite *H. habilis* (OH24) dates to 1.9 m.y.a. although some fossil fragments with *habilis* attributes have been dated as early as 2.33 m.y.a. The oldest *erectus* may date back to 1.9 m.y.a. as well.

What about sexual dimorphism in *H. erectus*? As the smallest *erectus* find ever, KNM-ER 42700 also may be the first female *erectus* yet found, most probably a young adult or late



A. boisei (left) and *H. habilis* (right). Both OH5 (L) and OH24 (R) were found in Bed I at Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania, and were probable contemporaries.

subadult. The small skull suggests that the range in overall body size among *H. erectus* was much greater than previously had been imagined, with greater sexual dimorphism than among chimps or contemporary humans. Human and chimp males are about 15 percent larger than females, but dimorphism is much greater in gorillas, and apparently also in *erectus*. Another possibility is that the (as yet undiscovered) *H. erectus* males that inhabited this lake basin along with this female at that time also were smaller than the typical *erectus* male.

The Significance of Hunting

The ecological niche that separated *H. erectus* from both *H. habilis* and *A. boisei* probably involved greater reliance on hunting, along with improved cultural means of adaptation, including better tools. Significant changes in technology occurred during the 200,000-year period between Bed I (1.8 m.y.a.) and Lower Bed II (1.6 m.y.a) at Olduvai.

Tool making got more sophisticated soon after the advent of *H. erectus*. Out of the crude tools in Bed I evolved better-made and more varied tools. Edges were straighter, for example, and differences in form suggest functional differentiation—that is, the tools were being made and used for different jobs, such as smashing bones or digging for tubers. The more sophisticated tools aided in hunting and gathering. With such tools, *Homo* could obtain meat on a more regular basis and dig and process tubers, roots, nuts, and seeds more efficiently. New tools that could batter, crush, and pulp coarse vegetation also reduced chewing demands. With changes in the types of foods consumed, the burden on the chewing apparatus eased.

Chewing muscles developed less, and supporting structures, such as jaws and cranial crests, also were reduced. With less chewing, jaws developed less, and so there was no place to put large teeth. The size of teeth, which form before they erupt, is under stricter genetic control than jaw size and bone size are. Natural selection began to operate against the genes that caused large teeth. In smaller jaws, large teeth now caused dental crowding, impaction, pain, sickness, fever, and sometimes death (there were no dentists). *H. erectus* back teeth are smaller, and the front teeth are relatively larger than australopithecine teeth. *H. erectus* used its front teeth to pull, twist, and grip objects. A massive ridge over the eyebrows (a superorbital torus) provided buttressing against the forces exerted in these activities. It also provided protection.

As hunting became more important, encounters with large animals increased. Individuals with stronger skulls had better-protected brains and better survival rates. Given the dangers associated with larger prey, and without sophisticated spear or arrow technology, which developed later, natural selection favored the thickening of certain areas for better protection against blows and falls. The base of the skull expanded dramatically, with a ridge of spongy bone (an occipital bun) across the back, for the attachment of massive neck muscles. The frontal and parietal (side) areas of the skull also increased, indicating expansion in those areas of the brain. Finally, average cranial capacity expanded from about 500 cm³ in the australopithecines to 1,000 cm³ in *H. erectus*, which is within the modern range of variation.



This photo shows the early (1.6 m.y.a.) *Homo erectus* WT15,000, or Nariokotome boy, found in 1984 near Lake Turkana, Kenya. This is the most complete *Homo erectus* ever found.

Out of Africa I: *H. Erectus*

Biological and cultural changes enabled *H. Erectus* to exploit a new adaptive strategy—gathering and hunting. *H. erectus* pushed the hominin range beyond Africa—to Asia and Europe. Small groups broke off from larger ones and moved a few miles away. They foraged new tracts of edible vegetation and carved out new hunting territories. Through population growth and dispersal, *H. erectus* gradually spread and changed. Hominins were following an essentially human lifestyle based on hunting and gathering. This basic pattern survived until recently in marginal areas of the world, although it is now fading rapidly. We focus in this chapter on the biological and cultural changes that led from early *Homo*, through intermediate forms, to anatomically modern humans (AMHs).

Headstrong Hominins

On the evolutionary timeline of hominin biological diversity, the anatomical contrasts between *Homo erectus* and modern humans are clear. There must have been behavioral differences as well. How did anatomy and behavior fit together in *H. erectus* populations? Noel Boaz and Russell Ciochon (2004) have proposed that several protective features of the *H. erectus* skull evolved in response to behavior, specifically interpersonal violence—fighting among those thick-skulled hominins. Ever since the discovery of the first *H. erectus* skull, scholars have been struck by the unusual cranial anatomy. The top and sides of the skull have thick, bony walls. The *H. erectus* skullcap resembles a cyclist's helmet—low and streamlined, so as to protect the brain, ears, and eyes from impact. “In contrast, we modern humans hold our enormous, easily injured, semiliquid brains in relatively thin walled bony globes. We have to buy our bicycle helmets” (Boaz and Ciochon 2004, p. 29). In other words, a cultural adaptation (plastic) has replaced a biological one (bone).

Based on these and other cranial features, Boaz and Ciochon speculate that *H. erectus* needed sturdy anatomical headgear to protect against life-threatening breaks. Even today, with modern medicine, skull fractures can be fatal. An apparently minor fracture can rip blood vessels inside the skull. Blood builds up under the skull. Such a hematoma pushing on the brain can cause a coma and, eventually, death.

For *H. erectus* this bleeding would have been much more problematic than for people with access to modern medicine. The neurological damage caused by such a hematoma can lead to partial paralysis, locomotion problems, poor hand-eye coordination, difficulties in speaking, and cognitive disruptions. Boaz and Ciochon note that “any traits that reduced the chances of cranial fracture would have given a substantial evolutionary advantage to the individuals who possessed them” (Boaz and Ciochon 2004, p. 30).

The authors contend that the blows delivered in a fight are more likely to land at eye level than on the top of the head. Although modern human skulls have some degree of eye-level bony armor, the thicker ring of bone in the *H. erectus* skull would have provided much more protection. The thick brow ridge protected the eye sockets, while bony bulges on each side of the skull shielded the sinus where blood flows into the internal jugular vein. This buttressing also protected the ear region. Finally, the bony ridge at the back of the skull protected several sinuses that carried blood within the rearmost brain lobes. The thick jaws of *H. erectus* also would have been adaptive. Today, a broken jaw makes it painful, difficult, and sometimes impossible to chew. Surgical wiring of the broken sections is required. For *H. erectus*, such a break could have been life-threatening. There was an inside thickening of the jaw, just behind the chin, to protect against breaks.

Among the dozens of *H. erectus* fossils found near Beijing, China, the anthropologist/anatomist Franz Weidenreich detected several fractures that had subsequently healed. The fact that the trauma victims survived offers confirmation of the protective value of their skulls. Boaz and Ciochon believe that the thick skulls and healed fractures of *H. erectus* provide a record of violence within the species.

This defensive armor—the anatomical headgear—was reduced once *H. Sapiens* evolved a larger, more globular, thin-walled skull. Although human violence didn't end, other means of protection, or avoidance of conflict, or both, evolved among the descendants of *H. erectus*. Boaz and Ciochon think those new protective mechanisms belong to the realm of cultural rather than biological diversity.



Homo erectus skullcaps have been likened to a bicycle helmet because of their protective properties. These three skulls show dramatic similarities despite different ages. The skull shown in the leftmost photo is a cast of skull XII from the “Peking Man” collection and dates to 670,000 to 410,000 years ago. The two other skulls are much older. Sangiran 2 from Java (middle photo) may be as old as 1.6 m.y.a., while OH9 from Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania (leftmost photo), may date back 1.4 million years.

What similarities do you note among the three skulls?

Paleolithic Tools

The stone-tool-making techniques that evolved out of the Oldowan, or pebble tool, tradition and that lasted until about 15,000 years ago are described by the term **Paleolithic** (from Greek roots meaning “old” and “stone”). The Paleolithic has three divisions: Lower (early), Middle, and Upper (late). Each part is roughly associated with a particular stage in human evolution. The Lower Paleolithic is roughly associated with *H. erectus*; the Middle Paleolithic with archaic *H. sapiens*, including the Neandertals of Western Europe and the Middle East; and the Upper Paleolithic with anatomically modern humans.

The best stone tools are made from rocks such as flint that fracture sharply and in predictable ways when hammered. Quartz, quartzite, chert, and obsidian also are suitable. Each of the three main divisions of the Paleolithic had its typical *tool-making traditions*—coherent patterns of tool manufacture. The main Lower Paleolithic tool making tradition used by *H. erectus* was the **Acheulian**, named after the French village of St. Acheul, where it was first identified.

Oldowan flaking wasn't done to make choppers (according to a predetermined form). It was done simply to produce sharp flakes. A fundamental difference shows up in the Acheulian tool-making tradition. The Acheulian technique involved chipping the core bilaterally and symmetrically. The core was converted from a round piece of rock into a flattish oval hand ax about 6 inches (15 cm) long. Its cutting edge was far superior to that of the Oldowan chopper.




Figure 8.1. Evolution in Tool Making.

*Finds at Olduvai Gorge and elsewhere show how pebble tools (the first tool at the left) evolved into the Acheulian hand ax of *H. erectus*. This drawing begins with an Oldowan pebble tool and moves through crude hand axes to fully developed Acheulian tools associated with *H. erectus*.*

The Acheulian hand ax, shaped like a tear drop, represents a predetermined shape based on a template in the mind of the toolmaker. Evidence for such a mental template in the archaeological record suggests a cognitive leap between earlier hominins and *H. erectus*.

Acheulian hand axes, routinely carried over long distances, were used in varied cutting and butchering tasks, including gutting, skinning, and dismembering animals. Analysis of their wear patterns suggests that hand axes were versatile tools used for many tasks, including wood working and vegetable preparation. Cleavers—core tools with a straight edge at one end—were used for heavy chopping and hacking at the sinews of larger animals. Stone picks, which were heavier than the hand ax, probably were used for digging. Hand axes, cleavers, and picks were heavy-duty tools, used for cutting and digging. Acheulian tool makers also used flakes, with finer edges, for light-duty tools—to make incisions and for finer work. Flakes became progressively more important in human evolution, particularly in Middle and Upper Paleolithic tool making.




Figure 8.2. Rear Views of Three Skulls of *H. erectus* and One of "Archaic" *Homo sapiens* (a Neandertal). Note the more angular shape of the *H. erectus* skulls, with the maximum breadth low down, near the base.

Source: Clifford J. Jolly and Randall White, *Physical Anthropology and Archaeology*, 5th ed., p. 271. Copyright © 1995 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

The Acheulian tradition illustrates trends in the evolution of technology: greater efficiency, manufacture of tools with predetermined forms and for specific tasks, and an increasingly complex technology. These trends became even more obvious with the advent of *H. sapiens*.

Adaptive Strategies of *H. erectus*

Interrelated changes in biology and culture have increased human adaptability—the capacity to live in and modify an ever-wider range of environments. Improved tools helped *H. erectus* increase its range. Biological changes also increased hunting efficiency. *H. erectus* had a rugged but essentially modern skeleton that permitted long-distance stalking and endurance during the hunt. The *H. erectus* body was much larger and longer-legged than those of previous hominins, permitting longer distance hunting of large prey. There is archaeological evidence of *H. erectus*'s success in hunting elephants, horses, rhinos, and giant baboons.



An Acheulian hand ax from Gesher Benot Ya'aqov, Israel, Jordan River. This site, shown here under excavation, dates back to 750,000 b.p.

Which hominin might have made the ax?

An increase in cranial capacity has been a trend in human evolution. The average *H. erectus* brain (about 1,000 cm³) doubled the australopithecine average. The capacities of *H. erectus* skulls range from 800 to 1,250 cm³, well above the modern minimum. *H. erectus* had an essentially modern, though very robust, skeleton with a brain and body closer in size to *H. sapiens* than to *Australopithecus*. Still, several anatomical contrasts, particularly in the cranium, distinguish *H. erectus* from modern humans. Compared with moderns, *H. erectus* had a lower and more sloping forehead accentuated by a large brow ridge above the eyes.

Skull bones were thicker, and, as noted, average cranial capacity was smaller. The brain case was lower and flatter than in *H. sapiens*, with spongy bone development at the lower rear of the skull. Seen from behind, the *H. erectus* skull has a broad-based angular shape that has been compared to a half inflated football and a hamburger bun.

The *H. erectus* face, teeth, and jaws were larger than those in contemporary humans but smaller than those in *Australopithecus*. The front teeth were especially large, but molar size was well below the australopithecine average. Presumably, this reduction reflected changes in diet or food processing.

Taken together, the *H. erectus* skeleton and chewing apparatus provide biological evidence of a fuller commitment to hunting and gathering, which was *Homo*'s only adaptive strategy until plant cultivation and animal domestication emerged some 10,000 to 12,000 years ago. Archaeologists have found and studied several sites of *H. erectus* activity, including cooperative hunting.

Hearths at various sites confirm that fire was part of the human adaptive kit by this time. Earlier evidence for human control over fire has been found in Israel, dating back to almost 800,000 years ago (Gugliotta 2004). Sites with even earlier claims for fire (around 1.5 m.y.a.)

include Koobi Fora, Kenya; Baringo, Kenya; and Middle Awash, Ethiopia. However, none of these early claims has unequivocal evidence for the controlled use of fire. Definitive evidence of human control of fire by 500,000 b.p. has been demonstrated at Cave of Hearths, South Africa; Montagu Cave, South Africa; Kalambo Falls, Zambia; and Kabwe in Zimbabwe. Fire provided protection against cave bears and saber-toothed tigers. It permitted *H. erectus* to occupy cave sites, including Zhoukoudian, near Beijing, in China, which has yielded the remains of more than 40 specimens of *H. erectus*. Fire widened the range of climates open to human colonization. It may have played a role in the expansion out of Africa. Its warmth enabled people to survive winter cold in temperate regions. Human control over fire offered other advantages, such as cooking, which breaks down vegetable fibers and tenderizes meat. Cooking kills parasites and makes meat more digestible, thus reducing strain on the chewing apparatus. Could language (fireside chats, perhaps) have been an additional advantage available to *H. erectus*? Archaeological evidence confirms the cooperative hunting of large animals and the manufacture of complicated tools. These activities might have been too complex to have gone on without some kind of language. Speech would have aided coordination, cooperation, and the learning of traditions, including tool making. Words, of course, aren't preserved until the advent of writing. However, given the potential for language-based communication—which even chimps and gorillas share with *H. sapiens*—and given brain size within the low *H. sapiens* range, it seems plausible to assume that *H. erectus* had rudimentary speech. *For contrary views, see Binford(1981), Fisher (1988b), and Wade (2002).*

The Evolution and Expansion of *H. erectus*

The archaeological record of *H. erectus* activities can be combined with the fossil evidence to provide a more complete picture of our Lower Paleolithic ancestors. We now consider some of the fossil data, whose geographic distribution is shown in Figure 8.3. Early *H. erectus* remains, found by Richard Leakey's team at East and West Turkana, Kenya, and dated to around 1.6 m.y.a., including the Nariokotome boy, were discussed previously.

One fairly complete skull, one large mandible, and two partial skulls—one of a young adult male (780 cm³) and one of an adolescent female (650 cm³)—were found in the 1990s at the Dmanisi site in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. They have been assigned a date of 1.7–1.77 m.y.a. There are notable similarities between the two partial skulls and that of the Nariokotome boy (1.6 m.y.a.). Chopping tools of comparable age associated with the Kenyan and Georgian fossils also are similar. The more complete and more recent (2001) skull find is more primitive, with a stronger resemblance to *H. habilis* than is the case with the other Dmanisi fossils. Primitive characteristics of this skull include its large canine teeth and small cranial capacity (Vekua, Lordkipanidze, and Rightmire 2002).

This specimen may be that of a teenage girl whose skull had not yet reached full size, but whose canines had. The simplest explanation for the anatomical diversity observed at Dmanisi is that *H. erectus* was at least as variable a species as is *H. sapiens*. The Dmanisi finds suggest a rapid spread, by 1.77 m.y.a., of early *Homo* out of Africa and into Eurasia (see Figure 8.3).




Figure 8.3. The sites of discoveries of *Homo erectus* and its probable maximum distribution.

The Dmanisi fossils are the most ancient undisputed human fossils outside Africa. How did those hominins get to Georgia? The most probable answer is in pursuit of meat. As hominins became more carnivorous, they expanded their home ranges in accordance with those of the animals they hunted. Meat-rich diets provided higher-quality protein as fuel. The australopithecines, with smaller bodies and brains, could survive mainly on plants. They probably used a limited range at the edge of forests, not too deep in or too exposed far out on the savanna. Once hominins developed stronger bodies and high protein meat diets, they could—indeed had to—spread out. They ranged farther to find meat, and this expansion eventually led them out of Africa, into Eurasia (Georgia) and eventually Asia (Wilford 2000).

More recent skeletal finds from Dmanisi suggest how this expansion might have taken place (Wilford 2007b). (Previously only skulls had been found there.) Four new fossil skeletons show that the ancient Dmanisi population combined primitive skulls and upper bodies with more advanced spines and lower limbs for greater mobility. These evolved limb proportions enabled early *Homo* to expand beyond Africa.

In 1891, the Indonesian island of Java yielded the first *H. erectus* fossil find, popularly known as “Java man.” Eugene Dubois, a Dutch army surgeon, had gone to Java to discover a transitional form between apes and humans. Of course, we now know that the transition to hominin had taken place much earlier than the *H. Erectus* period and occurred in Africa. However, Dubois’s good luck did lead him to the most ancient human fossils discovered at that time. Excavating near the village of Trinil, Dubois found parts of an *H. erectus* skull and a thigh bone.

During the 1930s and 1940s, excavations in Java uncovered additional remains. The various Indonesian *H. erectus* fossils date back at least 700,000, and perhaps as much as 1.6 million, years. Fragments of a skull and a lower jaw found in northern China at Lantian may be as old as the oldest Indonesian fossils. Other *H. erectus* remains, of uncertain date, have been found in Algeria and Morocco in North Africa. *H. erectus* remains also have been found in Upper Bed II at Olduvai, Tanzania, in association with Acheulian tools. African *H. erectus* fossils also have been found in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Africa (in addition to Kenya and Tanzania). The time span of *H. erectus* in East Africa was long. *H. erectus* fossils have been found in Bed IV at Olduvai, dating to 500,000 b.p., about the same age as the Beijing fossils, described below. The largest group of *H. erectus* fossils was found in the Zhoukoudian cave in China. The Zhoukoudian (“Peking”—now Beijing—“man”) site, excavated from the late 1920s to the late 1930s, was a major find for the human fossil record. Zhoukoudian yielded remains of tools, hearths, animal bones, and more than 40 hominins, including five skulls. The analysis of these remains led to the conclusion that the Java and Zhoukoudian fossils were examples of the same broad stage of human evolution. Today they are commonly classified together as *H. erectus*.

The four-stage photo spread below shows a reconstruction of *H. erectus* based on the Javanese find Sangiran 17, the most complete *H. erectus* skull found in Indonesia. The Zhoukoudian individuals lived more recently than did the Javanese *H. erectus*, between 670,000 and 410,000 years ago, when the climate in China was colder and moister than it is today. The inference about the climate has been made on the basis of the animal remains found with the human fossils. The people at Zhoukoudian ate venison, and seed and plant remains suggest they were both gatherers and hunters.



Meet *Homo erectus*. Sangiran 17 is the most complete *H. erectus* skull from Java.

In this process of reconstruction, a cast of the fossil (a) was rounded out with teeth, lower jaw, and chewing muscles (b). Additional soft tissues (c) and then the skin (d) were added. Given the robust features of this fossil, it is assumed to be male.

What about Europe? A cranial fragment found at Ceprano, Italy, in 1994 has been assigned a date of 800,000 b.p. Other probable *H. erectus* remains have been found in Europe, but their dates are uncertain. All are later than the Ceprano skull, and they usually are classified as late *H. erectus*, or transitional between *H. erectus* and early *H. sapiens*.

Archaic *H. sapiens*

Africa, which was center stage during the australopithecine period, is joined by Asia and Europe during the *H. erectus* and *H. sapiens* periods of hominin evolution. European fossils and tools have contributed disproportionately to our knowledge and interpretation of early (archaic) *H. sapiens*. This doesn't mean that *H. sapiens* evolved in Europe or that most early *H. sapiens* lived in Europe. Indeed, the fossil evidence suggests that *H. sapiens*, like *H. erectus* before it, originated

in Africa. *H. Sapiens* lived in Africa for more than 100,000 years before starting the settlement of Europe around 50,000 b.p. There were probably many more humans in the tropics than in Europe during the ice ages. We merely *know more* about recent human evolution in Europe because archaeology and fossil hunting—not human evolution—have been going on longer there than in Africa and Asia.

Recent discoveries, along with reinterpretation of the dating and the anatomical relevance of some earlier finds, are filling in the gap between *H. erectus* and archaic *H. sapiens*. **Archaic *H. Sapiens*** (300,000? to 28,000 b.p.) encompasses the earliest members of our species, along with the **Neandertals** (*H. sapiens neanderthalensis*—130,000 to 28,000 b.p.) of Europe and the Middle East and their Neandertal-like contemporaries in Africa and Asia. Brain size in archaic *H. sapiens* was within the modern human range. (The modern average, remember, is about 1,350 cm³.) (See table 8.1 for a summary of the major groups.) A rounding out of the braincase was associated with the increased brain size.

As Jolly and White (1995) put it, evolution was pumping more brain into the *H. sapiens* cranium—like filling a football with air.

Table 8.1. Summary of Data on *Homo* Fossil Groups

Fossil representatives of the genus Homo, compared with anatomically modern humans (AMHs) and chimps (Pan troglodytes).

Species	Dates	Known Distribution	Important Sites	Brain Size (in cm ³)
Anatomically modern humans (AMHs)	195,000 to present	Worldwide	Omo Kibish, Herto, Border Cave, Klasies River, Skhūl, Qafzeh, Cro-Magnon	1,350
Neandertals	130,000 to 28,000 b.p.	Europe, southwestern Asia	La Chapelle-aux-Saints	1,430
Archaic <i>Homo sapiens</i>	300,000 to 28,000 b.p.	Africa, Europe, Asia	Kabwe, Arago, Dali, Mount Carmel caves	1,135
<i>Homo erectus</i>	1.7 m.y.a. to 300,000 b.p.	Africa, Europe, Asia	East 1 West Turkana, Olduvai, Ileret, Dmanisi, Zhoukoudian, Java, Ceprano	900
<i>Pan troglodytes</i> (chimpanzee)	Modern	Central Africa	Gombe, Mahale	390

Ice Ages of the Pleistocene

Traditionally and correctly, the geological epoch known as the **Pleistocene** has been considered the epoch of early human life. Its subdivisions are the Lower Pleistocene (2 to 1 m.y.a.), the Middle Pleistocene (1 m.y.a. to 130,000 b.p.), and the Upper Pleistocene (130,000 to 11,000 b.p.). These subdivisions refer to the placement of geological strata containing, respectively, older, intermediate, and younger fossils. The Lower Pleistocene extends from the start of the Pleistocene to the advent of the ice ages in the Northern Hemisphere around one million years ago.

Each subdivision of the Pleistocene is associated with a particular group of hominins. Late *Australopithecus* and early *Homo* lived during the Lower Pleistocene. *Homo erectus* spanned most of the Middle Pleistocene. *Homo sapiens* appeared late in the Middle Pleistocene and was the sole hominin of the Upper Pleistocene. During the second million years of the Pleistocene, there were several ice ages, or **glacials**, major advances of continental ice sheets in Europe and North America. These periods were separated by **interglacials**, long warm periods between the major glacials. (Scientists used to think there were four main glacial advances, but the picture has grown more complex.) With each advance, the world climate cooled and continental ice sheets—massive glaciers—covered the northern parts of Europe and North America. Climates that are temperate today were arctic during the glacials.

During the interglacials, the climate warmed up and the *tundra*—the cold, treeless plain—retreated north with the ice sheets. Forests returned to areas, such as southwestern France, that once had tundra vegetation. The ice sheets advanced and receded several times during the last glacial, the *Würm* (75,000 to 12,000 b.p.). Brief periods of relative warmth during the *Würm* (and other glacials) are called *interstadials*, in contrast to the longer interglacials. Hominin fossils found in association with animals known to occur in cold or warm climates, respectively, permit us to date them to glacial or interglacial (or interstadial) periods.

H. antecessor* and *H. Heidelbergensis

In northern Spain's Atapuerca mountains, the site of Gran Dolina has yielded the remains of 780,000 year-old hominins that Spanish researchers call *H. antecessor* and see as a possible common ancestor of the Neandertals and anatomically modern humans. At the nearby cave of Sima dos Huesos a team led by Juan Luis Arsuaga has found thousands of fossils representing at least 33 hominins of all ages. Almost 300,000 years old, they may represent an early stage of Neandertal evolution (Lemonick and Dorfman 1999).

Appreciating Anthropology

Fossils in Spain Are Treasure-Trove for Scientists

Described here is one of the richest hominin fossil sites in the world, certainly the most important one in Europe. In these Spanish caves, anthropologists have found the oldest jawbone fragment in western Europe, dating to 1.2 m.y.a., along with many other hominin fossils. Human fossils have been found from the Ethiopian highlands to the Indonesian island of Java. However, the single site with the biggest deposits is located in northern Spain.

About 150 miles north of Madrid, a jeep pulls up to a clump of trees in the Sierra de Atapuerca, a collection of hills that are rich with caves. A man with a helmet and a miner's headlamp gets out. He looks more like a mountain guide than a scientist. He's Juan Luis Arsuaga, Spain's best-known paleontologist [and paleoanthropologist]. He walks into a large cave, which is marked by a pirate flag. "This is the entrance to the site that has produced the most human fossils in history," Arsuaga says. "What better way to mark it?"

The Atapuerca hills are made of what's called karstic limestone, which means they're riddled with subterranean tunnels and caverns. In the 19th century, a British mining company discovered them when it blasted through a hill to lay down a railway. At first, only animal bones were found. Then in 1976, a paleontology student found the first human remains. Since then, an abundance of human fossils and stone tools have been found.

Inside the cave, a group of scientists prepares to go even deeper underground. One of them is Rolf Quam, a paleoanthropologist from Binghamton University in New York. “In the field of human evolution, which is what I’m in, Atapuerca is a world reference site,” Quam says. “This is the richest fossil bearing deposit in the world. And every single site in Atapuerca that has been excavated has yielded human remains, which is something that is very unusual.”

Last year, the team uncovered a 1.2 million year-old jawbone fragment from a species known as *Homo antecessor*. It’s the oldest hominid fossil ever found in western Europe. Near the railway trench, another site yielded human remains of 28 individuals, dating back at least half a million years. The Spanish paleontologist believes it’s a mass grave. “This was a collective act, something a group did with its dead,” Arsuaga says.

The American member of the team says scientists are trying to solve another riddle. “Why did humans live here continually for a million years? That’s one of the big questions we’re trying to answer,” Quam asks. “What is it about the Sierra that makes it so inviting for human occupation?” One theory is that the fauna was particularly rich in the Sierra de Atapuerca hills, which lie at the confluence of several geological systems.

Others believe the abundance of caves made it a desirable place to live. But as the recent find of two more skull fragments demonstrates, there’s still a lot to be learned from what lies buried in the hills.

Source: © 2009, NPR®, News report by NPR’s Jerome Socolovsky was originally broadcast on NPR’s *Morning Edition*® on August 3, 2009.

A massive hominin jaw was discovered in 1907 in a gravel pit at Mauer near Heidelberg, Germany. Originally called “Heidelberg man” or *Homo heidelbergensis*, the jaw appears to be around 500,000 years old. The deposits that yielded this jaw also contained fossil remains of several animals, including bear, bison, deer, elephant, horse, and rhinoceros. Recently, some anthropologists have revived the species name *H. heidelbergensis* to refer to a group of fossil hominins that in this text are described as either late *H. erectus* or archaic *H. sapiens*. This group would include hominins dated (very roughly) between 700,000 and 200,000 years ago and found in different parts of the world including Europe, Africa, and Asia. Such fossils, here assigned to either *H. erectus* or archaic *H. sapiens*, would be transitional between *H. erectus* and later hominin forms such as the Neandertals and anatomically modern humans.

Besides the hominin *fossils* found in Europe, there is archaeological—including abundant stone tool—evidence for the presence and behavior of late *H. erectus* and then archaic *H. sapiens* in Europe. A recent chance discovery on England’s Suffolk seacoast shows that humans reached northern Europe 700,000 years ago (Gugliotta 2005). Several stone flakes were recovered from seashore sediment bordering the North Sea. These archaic humans crossed the Alps into northern Europe more than 200,000 years earlier than previously imagined—during an interglacial period. At that time, the fertile lowlands they inhabited were part of a land bridge connecting what is now Britain to the rest of Europe. They lived in a large delta with several rivers and a dry, mild Mediterranean climate. Various animals were among its abundant resources. It is not known whether the descendants of these settlers remained in England. The next glacial period may have been too extreme for human habitation so far back. Members of the excavating team, including

anthropologist Christopher Stringer, eventually found 32 flakes, made by striking a flint stone core with another stone. One flake had been retouched to sharpen its edges, while another was a sharpened flintstone core. The razor-sharp flakes, 1 to 2 inches long, had probably been used as knife or spearpoints.

At the site of Terra Amata, which overlooks Nice in southern France, archaeologists have documented human activity dating back some 300,000 years. Small bands of hunters and gatherers consisting of 15 to 25 people made regular visits during the late spring and early summer to Terra Amata, a sandy cove on the coast of the Mediterranean. Archaeologists determined the season of occupation by examining fossilized human excrement, which contained pollen from flowers that are known to bloom in late spring. There is evidence for 21 such visits. Four groups camped on a sand bar, 6 on the beach, and 11 on a sand dune. Archaeologists surmise that the 11 dune sites represent that number of annual visits by the same band (deLumley 1969/1976).

From a camp atop the dune, these people looked down on a river valley where animals were abundant. Bones found at Terra Amata show that their diet included red deer, young elephants, wildboars, wild mountain goats, an extinct variety of rhinoceros, and wild oxen. The Terra Amata people also hunted turtles and birds and collected oysters and mussels. Fish bones also were found at the site. The arrangement of postholes shows that these people used saplings to support temporary huts. There were hearths—sunken pits and piled stone fireplaces—within the shelters. Stonechips inside the borders of the huts show that tools were made from locally available rocks and beach pebbles. Thus, at Terra Amata, hundreds of thousands of years ago, people were already pursuing an essentially human lifestyle, one that survived in certain coastal regions into the 20th century.

Archaic *H. sapiens* lived during the last part of the *Middle Pleistocene*—during the *Mindel* (second) glacial, the interglacial that followed it, and the following *Riss* (third) glacial. The distribution of the fossils and tools of archaic *H. sapiens*, which have been found in Europe, Africa, and Asia, shows that *Homo*'s tolerance of environmental diversity had increased. For example, the Neandertals and their immediate ancestors managed to survive extreme cold in Europe. Archaic *H. Sapiens* occupied the Arago cave in southeastern France at a time when Europe was bitterly cold. The only *Riss* glacial site with facial material, Arago, was excavated in 1971. It produced a partially intact skull, two jawbones, and teeth from a dozen individuals. With an apparent date of about 200,000 b.p., the Arago fossils have mixed features that seem transitional between *H. erectus* and the Neandertals.

The Neandertals

Neandertals were first discovered in Western Europe. The first one was found in 1856 in a German valley called Neander Valley—*tal* is the German word for a valley. Scientists had trouble interpreting the discovery. It was clearly human and similar to modern Europeans in many ways, yet different enough to be considered strange and abnormal. This was, after all, 35 years before Dubois discovered the first *H. erectus* fossils in Java and almost 70 years before the first australopithecine was found in South Africa. Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*, published in 1859, had not yet appeared to offer a theory of evolution through natural selection. There was no framework for understanding human evolution. Over time, the fossil record filled in, along with evolutionary theory. There have been numerous subsequent discoveries of Neandertals in Europe and the Middle East and of archaic human fossils with similar features in Africa and Asia. The similarities and differences between Neandertals and other relatively recent hominins have become clearer. Fossils that are not Neandertals but that have similar features (such as large faces and browridges) have been found in Africa and Asia. The Kabwe skull from Zambia (130,000

b.p.), is an archaic *H. sapiens* with a Neandertal-like brow ridge. Archaic Chinese fossils with Neandertal-like features have been found at Maba and Dali. Neandertals have been found in Central Europe and the Middle East. For example, Neandertal fossils found at the Shanidar cave in northern Iraq date to around 60,000 b.p., as does a Neandertal skeleton found at Israel's Kebara cave (Shreeve 1992). At the Israeli site of Tabun on Mount Carmel, a Neandertal female skeleton was excavated in 1932. She was a contemporary of the Shanidar Neandertals, and her brow ridges, face, and teeth show typical Neandertal robustness. In 2007 Svante Pääbo and his colleagues at Germany's Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology announced their identification of Neandertal mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) in bones found at two sites in central Asia and Siberia. One of them, Teshik Tash, in Uzbekistan, previously had been seen as the easternmost limit of Neandertal territory. However, bones from the second site, the Okladnikov cave in the Altai mountains, place the Neandertals much farther (1,250 miles) east, in southern Siberia. The mtDNA sequence at these sites differs only slightly from that of European Neandertals. The Neandertals may have reached these areas around 127,000 years ago, when a warm period made Siberia more accessible than it is today (Wade 2007).



A Neandertal skeleton (right) and a modern human skeleton (left and behind) displayed at New York's American Museum of Natural History. The Neandertal skeleton, reconstructed from casts of more than 200 fossil bones, was part of the museum's 2003 exhibit titled "The First Europeans: Treasures from the Hills of Atapuerca."

Where is Atapuerca, and what kind of hominin lived there?

Cold-Adapted Neandertals

By 75,000 b.p., after an interglacial interlude, Western Europe's hominins (Neandertals, by then) again faced extreme cold as the Würm glacial began. To deal with this environment, they wore clothes, made more elaborate tools (see the photo on page 97), and hunted reindeer, mammoths, and woolly rhinos. The Neandertals were stocky, with large trunks relative to limb length—a phenotype that minimizes surface area and thus conserves heat. Another adaptation to extreme cold was the Neandertal face, which has been likened to a *H. erectus* face that has been pulled forward by the nose.

Illustrating Thomson's rule, this extension increased the distance between outside air and the arteries that carry blood to the brain and was adaptive in a cold climate. The brain is sensitive to temperature changes and must be kept warm. The massive nasal cavities of Neandertal fossils suggest long, broad noses. This would expand the area for warming and moistening air. Neandertal characteristics also include huge front teeth, broad faces, and large brow ridges, and ruggedness of the skeleton and musculature. What activities were associated with these anatomical traits? Neandertal teeth probably did many jobs later done by tools (Brace 1995; Rak 1986).

The front teeth show heavy wear, suggesting that they were used for varied purposes, including chewing animal hides to make soft winter clothing out of them. The massive Neandertal face showed the stresses of constantly using the front teeth for holding and pulling. Comparison of early and later Neandertals shows a trend toward reduction of their robust features.

Neandertal technology, a Middle Paleolithic tradition called **Mousterian**, improved considerably during the Würm glacial. Although the Neandertals are remembered more for their physiques than for their manufacturing abilities, their toolkits were sophisticated. Mousterian technology included at least 14 categories of tools designed for different jobs. The Neandertals elaborated on a revolutionary technique of flake-tool manufacture (the *Levallois* technique) invented in southern Africa around 200,000 years ago, which spread widely throughout the Old World. Uniform flakes were chipped off a specially prepared core of rock. Additional work on the flakes produced such special-purpose tools. Scrapers were used to prepare animal hides for clothing. And special tools also were designed for sawing, gouging, and piercing (Binford and Binford 1979).



Reconstruction of a Neandertal woman from skull and skeletal evidence found at Tabun in Israel. She lived about 100,000 years ago.

Tools assumed many burdens formerly placed on the anatomy. For example, tools took over jobs once done by the front teeth. Through a still imperfectly understood mechanism, facial muscles and supporting structures developed less. Smaller front teeth—perhaps because of dental crowding—were favored. The projecting face reduced, as did the brow ridge, which had provided buttressing against the forces generated when the large front teeth were used for environmental manipulation.

The Neandertals and Modern People

Generations of scientists have debated whether the Neandertals were ancestral to modern Europeans. The current prevailing view, denying this ancestry, proposes that *H. erectus* split into separate groups, one ancestral to the Neandertals, the other ancestral to *anatomically modern humans (AMHs)*, who first reached Europe around 50,000 b.p. (Early AMHs in Western Europe often are referred to as *Cro Magnon*, after the earliest fossil find of an anatomically modern human, in France's Les Eyzies region, Dordogne Valley, in 1868.) The current predominant view is that modern humans evolved in Africa and eventually colonized Europe, displacing the Neandertals there.

Consider the contrasts between the Neandertals and AMHs. Like *H. erectus* before them, the Neandertals had heavy brow ridges and slanting foreheads. However, average Neandertal cranial capacity (more than 1,400 cm³) exceeded the modern average. Neandertal jaws were large, providing support for huge front teeth, and their faces were massive. The bones and skull were generally more rugged and had greater sexual dimorphism—particularly in the face and skull—than do those of AMHs. In some Western European fossils, these contrasts between Neandertals and AMHs are accentuated—giving a stereotyped, or *classic Neandertal*, appearance. The interpretation of one fossil in particular helped create the popular stereotype of the slouching cave dweller. This was the complete human skeleton discovered in 1908 at La Chapelle-aux-Saints in southwestern France, in a layer containing the characteristic Mousterian tools made by Neandertals. It was the first Neandertal to be discovered with the whole skull, including the face, preserved.

The La Chapelle skeleton was given for study to the French paleontologist Marcellin Boule. His analysis of the fossil helped create an inaccurate stereotype of Neandertals as brutes who had trouble walking upright. Boule argued that La Chapelle's brain, although larger than the



A cast of the anatomically extreme classic Neandertal skull found at La Chapelle-aux-Saints, France.

modern average, was inferior to modern brains. Further, he suggested that the Neandertal head was slung forward like an ape's. To round out the primitive image, Boule proclaimed that the Neandertals were incapable of straightening their legs for fully erect locomotion. However, later fossil finds show that the La Chapelle fossil wasn't a typical Neandertal but an extreme one. Also, this much-publicized "classic" Neandertal turned out to be an aging man whose skeleton had been distorted by osteoarthritis. Hominins, after all, have been erect bipeds for millions of years. European Neandertals were a variable

population. Other Neandertal finds lack La Chapelle's combination of extreme features and are more acceptable ancestors for AMHs.

Neandertals could have contributed to the ancestry of modern Europeans cite certain fossils to support their view. For example, the Central European site of Mladeč (31,000 to 33,000 b.p.) has yielded remains of several hominins that combine Neandertal robustness with modern features. Wolpoff (1999) also notes modern features in the late Neandertals found at l'Hortus in France and Vindija in Croatia. The fossil remains of a four-year-old boy discovered at Largo Velho in Portugal in 1999 and dated to 24,000 b.p. also shows mixed Neandertal and modern features.

Homo Floresiensis

In 2004 news reports trumpeted the discovery of bones and tools of a group of tiny humans who inhabited Flores, an Indonesian island 370 miles east of Bali, until fairly recent times (Wade 2004; Roach 2007). Early in hominin evolution, it wasn't unusual for different species, even genera, of hominins, to live at the same time. But until the 2003-2004 discoveries on Flores, few scientists imagined that a different human species had survived through 12,000 b.p., and possibly even later. These tiny people lived, hunted, and gathered on Flores from about 95,000 b.p. until at least 13,000 b.p. One of their most surprising features is the very small skull, about 370 cm³—slightly smaller than the chimpanzee average.



Neandertal technology, a Middle Paleolithic tradition called Mousterian, improved considerably during the Würm glacial. These Mousterian flake tools were found at Gorham's Cave, Gibraltar.

A skull and several skeletons of these miniature people were found in a limestone cave on Flores by a team of Australian and Indonesian archaeologists, who assigned them to a new human species, *H. floresiensis*. (Additional specimens have been found and described subsequently; Gugliotta 2005; Roach 2007.)

The discovery of *H. floresiensis*, described as a downsized version of *H. erectus*, shows that archaic humans survived much later than had been thought. Before modern people reached Flores, which is very isolated, the island was inhabited only by a select group of animals that had managed to reach it. These animals, including *H. floresiensis*, faced unusual evolutionary forces that pushed some toward gigantism and some toward dwarfism.

The carnivorous lizards that reached Flores, perhaps on natural rafts, became giants. These Komodo dragon now are confined mainly to the nearby island of Komodo. Elephants, which are excellent swimmers, reached Flores, where they evolved to a dwarf form the size of an ox. Previous excavations by Michael Morwood, one of the discoverers of *H. floresiensis*, estimated that *H. erectus* had reached Flores by 840,000 years ago, based on crude stone tools found there. This *H. erectus* population and its descendants are assumed to have been influenced by the same evolutionary forces that reduced the size of the elephants. The first specimen of *H. floresiensis*, an adult female, was uncovered in 2003, from beneath 20 feet (6.1 meters) of silt coating the floor of the Liang Bua cave. Paleoanthropologists identified her as a very small but otherwise normal individual—a diminutive version of *H. erectus*. Because the downsizing was so extreme, smaller than that in modern human pygmies, she and her fellows were assigned to a new species. Her skeleton is estimated to date back some 18,000 years. Remains of six additional individuals found in the cave date from 95,000 to 13,000 b.p. The cave also has yielded bones of giant lizards, giant rats, pygmy elephants, fish, and birds.

H. floresiensis apparently controlled fire, and the stone tools found with them are more sophisticated than any known to have been made by *H. erectus*. Among the tools were small blades that might have been mounted on wooden shafts. Hunting elephants—probably cooperatively—and making complex tools, the Floresians may (or may not) have had some form of language. The suggestion of such cultural abilities is surprising for a hominin with a chimplike brain. The small cranium has raised some doubt that *H. floresiensis* actually made the tools. The ancestors of the anatomically modern people who colonized Australia more than 40,000 years ago may have traveled through this area, and it is possible that they made the stone tools. On the other hand, there is no evidence that modern humans reached Flores prior to 11,000 years ago. The *H. floresiensis* population of the Liang Bua cave region appears to have been wiped out by a volcanic eruption around 12,000 b.p., but they may have survived until much later elsewhere on Flores. The Ngadha people of central Flores and the Manggarai people of West Flores still tell stories about little people who lived in caves until the arrival of the Dutch traders in the 16th century (Wade 2004).

As reported in 2009, an analysis of the lower limbs and especially an almost complete left foot and parts of the right shows that *H. Floresiensis* walked upright, but possessed apelike features (Wilford 2009). The big toe, for example, was stubby, like a chimp's. The feet were large, more than seven and a half inches long, out of proportion to the short lower limbs. These proportions, similar to those of some African apes, have never before been seen in hominins. The feet were flat. The navicular bone, which helps form the arch in modern human feet, was more



The skull of *Homo floresiensis* (left; modern human, right), a miniature hominid that inhabited Middle Earth, or at least the Indonesian island of Flores, between 95,000 and 13,000 years ago.

like one in the great apes. Without a strong arch *H. Floresiensis* could have walked but not run like humans. William Jungers, the anthropologist who led the analytic team, raised the possibility that the ancestor of *H. floresiensis* was not *H. erectus*, as originally had been assumed, but possibly another, more primitive, hominin ancestor (Wilford 2009).

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9

The Origin and Spread of Modern Humans

CONRAD KOTTAK

Our choices about how, and to whom, we display aspects of ourselves say something about us not only as individuals but also as social and cultural beings. Think about your appearance right now. What does your clothing say about you—implicitly or explicitly, intentionally or unintentionally? Does your cap, shirt, or jacket display the name of your school, a brand, or a favorite sports team? Do or don't you—and why do you or don't you—have tattoos or piercings? What does facial hair, or its absence, say about you or someone else? Why is your hair long or short? Why did you choose any make up you are wearing? How about any jewelry? If you're male, why are you, or are you not, circumcised? The way that we present our bodies reflects both on (1) who and what we're trying to look like and (2) what sort of person we're trying *not* to resemble.

Body decoration is a cultural universal, as are other forms of creative expression, including the arts and language, and all say something about us. Expressive culture rests on symbolic thought. As is true generally of symbols, the relation between a symbol and what it stands for is arbitrary. Nike shoes are no more intrinsically swooshlike than Adidas are. Michigan Wolverines are no more like wolverines than Florida Gators are, and vice versa. For archaeologists, evidence for symbolic thought, as manifested materially in patterned or decorated artifacts, strongly suggests modern behavior. Consider the pigment red ochre, a natural iron oxide that modern hunter-gatherers use to create body paint for ritual occasions. Archaeologists suspect that ochre was used similarly in the past. Traces of red ochre have been found on carefully worked stone and bone artifacts, dating back 100,000 years, in South Africa's Blombos Cave. One piece has a carved crosshatch design—three straight lines with another set of three at a diagonal to them—offering the world's earliest evidence for intentional patterning with symbolic meaning.


There is abundant evidence for expressive culture, including art and music, in Europe by 35,000 years ago. At this point, humans were decorating themselves with paints and jewelry and making flutes and figurines. It's likely that linguistic ability was part of this expressive package. Linguist Merritt Ruhlen speculates that all the world's languages descend from a common one spoken 40,000 to 50,000 years ago by anatomically modern humans who originated in Africa. Did a "creative" gene emerge in Africa and fuel human colonization of the rest of the world? Although anthropologists don't have a definitive answer to this question, we do agree about the key role that expressive culture plays in human life.

Modern Humans

Anatomically modern humans (AMHs) evolved from an archaic *H. sapiens* African ancestor. Eventually, AMHs spread to other areas, including Western Europe, where they replaced, or interbred with, the Neandertals, whose robust traits eventually disappeared.

Out of Africa II

Recent Fossil and Archaeological Evidence Fossil and archaeological evidence has been accumulating to support the African origin of AMHs. A major find was announced in 2003: the 1997 discovery in an Ethiopian valley of three anatomically modern skulls—two adults and a child. When found, the fossils had been fragmented so badly that their reconstruction took several years. Tim White and Berhane Asfaw were co-leaders of the international team that made the find near the village of Herto, 140 miles northeast of Addis Ababa. All three skulls were missing the lower jaw. The skulls showed evidence of cutting and handling, suggesting they had been detached from their bodies and used—perhaps ritually—after death.




Compare these drawings of *H. erectus*, archaic *H. sapiens*, Neandertal, and AMH. What are the main differences you notice? Is the Neandertal more like *H. erectus* or AMH?

A few teeth, but no other bones, were found with the skulls, again suggesting their deliberate removal from the body. Layers of volcanic ash allowed geologists to date them to 154,000–160,000 b.p. The people represented by the skulls had lived on the shore of an ancient lake, where they hunted and fished. The skulls were found along with hippopotamus and antelope bones and some 600 tools, including blades and hand axes. Except for a few archaic characteristics, the **Herto** skulls are anatomically modern—long with broad midfaces, featuring tall, narrow nasal bones. The cranial vaults are high, falling within modern dimensions. These finds provide additional support for the view that modern humans originated in Africa and then spread into Europe and Asia (Wilford 2003).

Omo Kibish is one of several sites along the Omo River in southwestern Ethiopia. Between 1967 and 1974 Richard Leakey and his colleagues from the Kenya National Museum recovered AMH remains originally considered to be about 125,000 years old. The specimens now appear to be much older. Indeed, with an estimated date of 195,000 b.p., they appear to be the earliest AMH fossils yet found (McDougall, Brown and Fleagle 2005).

The Omo remains include two partial skulls (Omo 1 and Omo 2), four jaws, a leg bone, about 200 teeth, and several other parts. One site, Omo Kibish I, contained a nearly complete skeleton of an adult male. Middle Stone Age tools have been found in the same stratigraphic layers. Studies of the Omo 1 skull and skeleton indicate an overall modern human morphology with some



Cro-Magnon I, the skull of a 45 year-old anatomically modern human, discovered in 1868 near Les Eyzies in France's Dordogne region. Note the distinct chin.

primitive features. The Omo 2 skull is more archaic.

From sites in South Africa comes further evidence of early African AMHs. At Border Cave, a remote rock shelter in South Africa, fossil remains dating back perhaps 150,000 years are believed to be those of early modern humans. The remains of at least five AMHs have been discovered, including the nearly complete skeleton of a four- to six-month-old infant buried in a shallow grave. Excavations at Border Cave also have produced some 70,000 stone tools, along with the remains of several mammal species, including elephants, believed to have been hunted by the ancient people who lived there. A complex of South African caves near the Klasies River Mouth was occupied by a group of hunter-gatherers some 120,000 years ago. Fragmentary bones suggest how those people looked. A forehead fragment has a modern brow ridge. There is a thin-boned cranial fragment and a piece of jaw with a modern chin. The archaeological evidence suggests that these cave dwellers did coastal gathering and used Middle Stone Age stone tools.

Anatomically modern specimens, including the skull shown in Figure 9.1, have been found at Skhūl, a site on Mount Carmel in Israel. The Skhūl fossils date to 100,000 b.p. Another group of modern-looking and similarly dated (92,000 b.p.) skulls comes from the Israeli site of Qafzeh. All these skulls have a modern shape; their brain cases are higher, shorter, and rounder than Neanderthal skulls. There is a more filled-out forehead region, which rises more vertically above the brows. A marked chin is another modern feature (Note that early AMHs in Western Europe often are referred to as Cro Magnons, after the earliest fossil find of an anatomically modern human, in France's Les Eyzies region, Dordogne Valley, in 1868.)

Given these early dates from Israel, AMHs may have inhabited the Middle East before the Neanderthals did. Ofer Bar-Yosef (1987) has suggested that during the last (Würm) glacial period, which began around 75,000 years ago, Western European Neanderthals spread east and south (and into the Middle East) as part of a general south-ward expansion of cold-adapted fauna. AMHs, in turn, may have followed warmer-climate fauna south into Africa, returning to the Middle East once the Würm ended.




Figure 9.1. Skhūl V.

This anatomically modern human with some archaic features dates to 100,000 B.P. This is one of several fossils found at Skhūl, Israel.



The Cro Magnon rock shelter near Les Eyzies de-Tayac, Dordogne, France. Remains of anatomically modern humans, such as the famous fossil found here in 1868, have been found in rock shelters from France to South Africa. The Cro Magnon people lived here around 31,000 years ago.

10 The Beginnings of Filipino Society and Culture

F. LANDA JOCANO

The beginnings of Filipino culture and society will never be fully known. For while human remains and artifacts, recovered from burial and habitation sites all over the Philippines, will reveal a part of what happened in the past, they cannot tell us the whole story. Nonetheless, archaeological activity has increased in the Philippines in recent years, and we now know much more than we did even five years ago. One of the most important breakthroughs was the recovery of fossil human bones in Tabon Cave, Palawan, in 1962. This discovery had a two-fold significance. First, it marked the beginning of a more systematic investigation of early man in the Philippines. For although the tools of Pleistocene man and the bones of animals he probably hunted had been recovered before, this was the first fossil human encountered in this country. Second, the recovery of this frontal bone and the artifacts tentatively associated with it was another significant event in man's search for traces of his origin in east and southeast Asia. It is interesting to note that before the recovery of the African fossil hominids by Dart (1925), Broom (1949), and Leakey (1959), the area of east and southeast Asia was thought *to* be the "cradle of mankind." The present favoring of Africa as man's place of origin resulted from a series of notable discoveries of fossilized creatures resembling modern man in some respects and differing from him in many others.

For example, the size and shape of these creatures' teeth and the thickness of their skulls are apelike, but their other bone structures are very close to those of modern man. When we consider the widespread distribution of prehistoric men in various islands of southeast Asia in general, and in the Philippines in particular, the major question is this: By what means did these early men reach the places where their fossil remains are found today? If we are to answer this question satisfactorily, it is important to begin by considering at least in broad outline the geological history of the area. Second, since man generally acquires and develops skill and power to deal with his environment from his forebears in the course of time, it is equally important to consider, however briefly, the main steps in his emergence as a biological entity and as a tool-using and tool-making individual.

Geological Foundation

When did man first appear on earth, and when did he arrive in southeast Asia? It is difficult to say, and it is even harder to be definite about the time at which we can safely call the ancient man-like creatures *man*. In 1654 Archbishop Ussher of Ireland said that the first man, as well as the universe in which he lived, was created at nine a.m. on October 26, 4004 B.C. The discovery of remains of extinct animals, of man-like creatures, and later of early men proved, however, that man appeared on earth somewhat earlier than Archbishop Ussher suspected.

Pre-Tertiary times. From geological and paleontological studies, we know that living things appeared on earth as many as 1,500 million years ago, during the era known in geology as the Archeozoic, the era when primitive forms of life became recognizable. This era was followed by the Protozoic, when early life-forms abounded. The Protozoic is estimated to have extended from 925 to 505 million years ago. The era from which we have many fossil evidences of plant and animal life is the Paleozoic, the time when fish, amphibians, and other marine vertebrates appeared, from about 505 to 205 million years ago. The Paleozoic was followed by the Mesozoic, which witnessed the predominance of huge reptiles. Popularly, this era is known as the Age of

Reptiles, and it extended from 205 to 75 million years ago. Our most important material on the evolution of man and his culture is found in the Cenozoic era, or the age of more advanced forms of animals, about 75 to one million years ago. The Cenozoic is divided into two major periods: the Tertiary, or the Age of Mammals, and the Quaternary, or the time when modern forms of man appeared on earth.

The Tertiary. Two major events occurred during the Tertiary. First, the earth's surface underwent tremendous changes, known to geologists as land uplift. Second, mammals came to dominate the world. Before the Tertiary uplift, most of such Asiatic higher areas as the Iranian plateau, Turkestan, India, and Tibet were submerged under a sea, known geologically as the Tethys Sea. When the great uplift occurred as a result of volcanic eruptions and faulting due to erosion, this ancient sea receded and shrank into what is now the Mediterranean. The scope of this movement of land in Asia is well-documented by the Eocene sediments of the Tethys Sea found about 20,000 feet above sea level in Tibet (Fairservis 1959: 15).

One can form a good mental image of the world-wide elevation of land that resulted from this massive uplift by recalling the heights of the Alps, the Rockies, the Andes, and the Everest mountain ranges. According to geologists all were formed during the Tertiary (cf. James 1943; Krauskopf 1959).

The baseline for any discussion of our little knowledge of the appearance of life-forms in the Philippines must be drawn in the early Tertiary, at the beginning of the lower Eocene (Dickerson et al. 1928:49) about 60 million years ago. Our information on Philippine geological history before this time is scant. In fact, from the Eocene up to the Pleistocene, our understanding of what happened here geologically is fragmentary, inferential, and vague.

Dickerson and associates (1928: 78) advanced the idea that the Philippines was connected with Formosa during the early part of the Tertiary. This is evidenced by the deposition of Tertiary sediments in Baguio, the Cagayan Valley, Leyte, Panay, Bondoc Peninsula, and Mindanao. The presence of some plants and animals with continental (Himalayan) affinities in northern Luzon (Dickerson et al. 1928:169; Dickerson 1924:12ff) and their absence in the southern Philippines and other areas strongly suggest this northern connection of the Philippines with the Asian mainland. Formosa was severed from the Philippines during the Miocene period which ended about 12 million years ago.

Small islands and narrow strips of land-mass started to appear during the Miocene period. Land above the sea at this time included eastern Davao, Samar, Leyte, the eastern coast of Luzon (starting from the Bondoc Peninsula), the Sulu archipelago in the south, and portions of western Zamboanga. Western Panay, Tablas, and Masbate were narrow strips of coral reef, as were eastern Zambales and part of the Lingayen area and of the northern Ilocos coast.

Although the Philippines was separated from Formosa about this time, its southern connection with the mainland remained. It was during this period that plants and animals from regions south of the archipelago started to enter the country through the high mountain passages. But this was not a unidirectional movement. Dickerson and associates are of the opinion (1928:283) that some of the unique animals now present in northern Luzon also moved southward and entered Celebes during this period. Through the eastern high mountain-ranges connecting Mindanao with Celebes and possibly with New Guinea, tropical Australian flora, identified by Merrill (Dickerson et al. 1928:301ff.), entered Mindanao. On the western side, through the Sulu connection, Malaysian forest trees and some mammalian species moved into the area and spread. Further changes in the geographical arrangement of the Philippines and its neighboring areas occurred during the Pliocene, beginning about 12 million years ago.

The geological processes which brought about changes on the surface of the earth and facilitated variation and spread of animals and plants were not sudden occurrences. Thousands of years were required for a landscape to be notably changed, and for the differentiation of animals from their original progenitors. When we speak of such events as the elevation and erosion of mountains, the rise and fall of oceans and continents, and the fluctuation of life zones, we should remember the quality and magnitude of these events.

The Pleistocene Period

The era following the Tertiary is the *Quaternary*. It is divided into the Pleistocene and the Holocene periods. It was during the Pleistocene that man appeared and his culture began. This is one reason why the Pleistocene is considered extremely significant to students of geology and human evolution, despite its relatively short duration of about one million years.

The Pleistocene is commonly known as the Ice Age. This term is misleading if it evokes a picture of a continuous blanket of ice covering the whole world and enduring throughout the Pleistocene. This was not the case. There were periods when the land was free of ice. Even during the height of a glacial stage, although life zones were compressed, limited vegetational areas remained and land never totally disappeared.

Origins of the Ice Age. There are a number of theories which attempt to account for the emergence of the Ice Age. One of these ascribes it to changes in the orbital position of the earth, variations of sunspots, and the wavering of the earth's axis. The currently favored explanation is one that is known as the cyclic theory. This theory may be explained in the following way.

It is well known among mountain climbers that the higher one climbs, the colder the temperature becomes. Considering, then, the elevation of land after the great Tertiary uplift, it is plausible that it was the inland elevation which triggered the coming of the Ice Age. But this is only one factor in the whole process. The other important factor contributing to the occurrence of the Ice Age is that of climate.

Students of elementary geology know that climate depends upon three factors: the temperature of the area, the direction of the winds, and the availability of moisture. Now when there are cool land masses and warm oceans, evaporation over the ocean increases as a result of the temperature differential. As rain clouds move from ocean areas into the land, they precipitate their moisture. Because of the low land temperature (due to the elevation of land during the Pleistocene), this precipitation fell not as rain but as snow, thus augmenting the general coolness of the area and the accumulation of snow and ice. Glaciers were formed. As these were fed by the moisture increase and sustained by the lowering of temperatures, they became heavy and started to spread to lower areas. Melting occurred as these masses of ice and snow reached lower altitudes. The melt cooled the rivers, which in turn poured their cool contents into the oceans. In polar regions the oceans cooled rapidly, and as ice blocks were formed, sea water became frigid. Evaporation and precipitation caused dense clouds to appear over both the sea and the land, thus effectively reducing the heat from the sun. Mountain glaciers became ice sheets and moved down into much lower areas, and as the water of the world became hound up in snow and ice, sea level dropped considerably. Continental shelves became exposed; land bridges were formed. Thus we had the Ice Age. In Asia, the Sunda Shelf and the Bering Sea became land bridges of considerable importance.

At the height of each glacial stage, the cooling of the oceans again reduced the amount of evaporation. As the precipitation of moisture decreased, the glaciers which depended upon it for

growth and existence began to diminish. This set the climatic pendulum swinging the other way. Because the amount of evaporation was low, clouds also disappeared over the surface of the land, and allowed the penetration of more solar heat. The melt from the inland glaciers warmed the rivers which in turn poured their warm contents into the sea. As the sea ice melted, the volume of water increased, and as the sea level became higher, temperatures rose. The glaciers began to recede. The snow line moved upward to higher altitudes and the polar front retreated farther north and south. An interglacial stage emerged. The sea was once more wide and warm, and the climate everywhere became temperate or tropical (James 1943; Krauskopf 1959).

Effects of Pleistocene climate on the Philippines. The withdrawals and restorals of water resulting from widespread glaciation and deglaciation in the temperate zones caused the uniting and separating of island masses. In the Philippines, Mindanao was divided into five major islands during the Pleistocene period: Surigao in the east, Agusan in the east central area, Lanao in the central region, Cotabato in the south, and Zamboanga in the west. This division is inferred from the distribution of Pleistocene coralline limestones in various places in Mindanao (Dickerson, quoting Moody, 1928: 85–87). Leyte and Samar were composed of a series of small islands; Bohol was covered by shallow water, and Cebu was a string of coralline-topped islets which later united to form the present island. Panay, Negros, Tablas, and Ticao were connected. Palawan was connected with Borneo and together with the Calamianes formed a unit with a dominantly Bornean flora and fauna. Mindoro was separated from Palawan during the latter part of the Pleistocene and before Palawan became separated from Borneo.

Luzon was also divided into several islands. Bondoc Peninsula was an island separated from the Camarines provinces by a channel which joined Lamon Bay and the Sibuyan Sea. Most of Albay and Sorsogon were under water. Part of Batangas, notably Malbrigo Point, was above the sea. A body of water existed between Lingayen Gulf and Manila. Through the double process of uplifting and filling during the late Pleistocene, Zambales was joined with Luzon. Abra was attached to Ilocos Norte. The Baguio area, which was elevated during this time, was joined to other eastern islands which consisted of the Sierra Madre ranges. Cagayan Valley was still under the sea and became filled with sediments only later. The Batanes group was also connected with Luzon but was later separated during more recent volcanic eruptions.

The climatic changes which accompanied the Pleistocene period had a profound effect on the adjustment and survival of both plants and animals. Some animals, such as the woolly rhinoceros and the mammoth, retreated and advanced along with their habitats. Others unable to move or to adjust to their new environment died off.

The most interesting mammalian form affected by the fluctuation of Pleistocene climate was man. As we said earlier, it is in the Pleistocene that we first encounter the so called true types of man. Most scientists believe that man first appeared in Africa, but he is also very ancient in east and southeast Asia.

Fossil Evidence of the Evolution of Man

Before we consider how man was distributed in east and southeast Asia in response to climatic changes, we should note in passing the relationship of man to other mammalian forms. The mammals, we noted earlier, became dominant during the Tertiary period.

Man's place in nature. The class mammalia has been divided into three so-called infra-classes. The first includes the monotremes, animals which lay eggs, hatch them, and then nurse their young. The second includes those which give birth to their young alive, and then carry them for a time inside a pocket located on the belly of the mother. These are the marsupials, among

which the kangaroo of Australia is the best known. The third includes those mammals whose young are nourished prenatally through a placenta. They are called eutherian, or placental, mammals. Examples are the horse, carabao, cat, dog, monkey, ape, and man. The eutherian mammals which resemble man most closely are the monkeys and apes. However, the fact that monkeys, apes, and man have been placed in one order—the Primate Order—does not imply that one evolved from the other. Man did not descend from monkeys or apes. Man has so much in common with large apes that they must have shared a common ancestry, but it is erroneous to think that one descended from the other.

Man belongs to a group of large primates—the anthropoidea—along with the gorilla, the orangutan, and the chimpanzee. The gorilla, the orangutan, and the chimpanzee belong to the family Pongidae while man belongs to the family Hominidae, but both of these families are of the Primate Order. The family Hominidae, which is our particular concern here, is further divided into subfamilies called Australopithecinae and Homininae. Man belongs to the Homininae group, genus *Homo*, species *sapiens*.

The Australopithecines. The earliest known fossil creatures identified as definitely man-like in form are the Australopithecine of South Africa. In 1924 some laborers working in a limestone deposit in Taungs, South Africa, recovered a skull which they thought to be that of a small man. They took the discovery to Prof. Raymond Dart at the University of Witwatersrand at Johannesburg. In 1925 Dart published his study of the specimen, which he named *Australopithecus* (the “southern ape”). Although other scientists did not readily accept Dart’s conclusions, they agreed that the specimen had many man-like features. Several more skulls, teeth, and jaw fragments of the Australopithecine form have been recovered since that time, along with limb bones and hipbones. Careful analysis of these remains indicates that these were man-like creatures indeed, who walked erect.

In 1959, Dr. L.S. Leakey and his wife found in East Africa a somewhat similar skull which they named *Zinjanthropus boisei*. This man-like creature has a cranial capacity (that is, a brain size) of about 600 cc., much bigger than that of the previous finds, though still about half the average human size. The teeth of *Zinjanthropus* are large, like those of modern man, but the molars resemble those of the orangutan more closely than those of man. Whether the Australopithecine should be considered man or not remains undecided.

Java and Peking man. Much closer in appearance to modern man—though still much removed from him—are Java man and Peking man. The first skull of Java man was recovered by Eugene Dubois in 1891 in the Trinil deposits of the Solo River in central Java. Technically, Java man became known as *Pithecanthropus erectus*, the “erect apeman.” The bone structure of this species occupies an intermediate position between that of modern man and that of the apes. An examination of the reconstructed features of this Javanese fossil reveals the following characteristics: the bones of the skull are very thick; the forehead is receding, and the eyebrows are broad. The molars are almost invariably longer than they are broad, while modern human teeth have exactly the reverse proportion. There is an increase in size of the molars from front to back. There is also a space—known as the simian gap between the first molar and the canine teeth in the upper jaw, suggesting that the canine teeth interlocked as in the great apes. The palate—or the roof of the mouth—is smooth, as in apes. The brain size of Java man is midway between the great apes and modern man. The skull has a cranial capacity of 900 cc., smaller than modern man who averages 1,350 cc.; the brain size of modern apes ranges from 290 to 610 cc. The frontal lobe of the brain is much bigger than that of the apes but smaller than that of man. Further analysis of the brain suggests that Java man had the power of speech.

The thigh bones of Java man are longer, more delicate, and straighter than those of the apes, which are big, curved and short. Moreover, upright posture is indicated by the fact that the ridge (*linea aspera*) on the thigh bone is more prominent in Java man than in apes. The estimated age of Javaman, inferred from the age of the geological deposits where the bones were found, is Middle and Lower Pleistocene. In absolute terms, Java man was present in the area about 250,000 years ago.

Beginning in 1927, important discoveries were made at Chou Kou Tien village, about 40 miles from Peking, China. Ultimately the remains of more than 40 individuals were brought to light, and they were quite similar to Java man. So close were the similarities, in fact, that Le Gros Clark (1955:103) and other physical anthropologists decided to abandon the earlier name (*Sinanthropus pekinensis*) in favor of *Pithecanthropus pekinensis*, so placing Java man and Peking man in the same genus.

Although Peking man shares a number of important characteristics with Java man, he also differs in many. For example, the skull of Peking man is more advanced than that of the Java man. Peking man's eyebrow ridges are not so heavy, the forehead is slightly higher, and the side-bones of the skull are more rounded. The foramen magnum (the hole through which the spinal cord passes to the brain) is slightly more forward, suggesting a more erect posture than that of the Java man. Cranial capacity ranges from 850 cc. to 1,300 cc. and the limb bones differ very little from those of modern man.

Solo and Wadjak man. Aside from Java man, the island of Java has also yielded fossil remains of more advanced types of man. In 1931 a number of skulls were found near the Solo river, at the village of Ngandong in central Java. Although the Solo finds are advanced enough to be classified with modern types of men, they show some skeletal characteristics reminiscent of earlier forms. For example, they possess large brow ridges, sloping foreheads, and thick skulls. On the other hand, they have a cranial capacity of about 1,150 cc. to 1,300 cc. and limb bones which do not differ from those of modern men.

The other advanced form found in Java is known as Wadjak man. Two skulls of this type were discovered by Eugene Dubois in 1891 but were not reported until 1920. Structurally, Wadjak man is much more advanced than Solo man. The skulls of these individuals are small and resemble the *skulls* of the modern Australian aborigines. The cranial capacity, however, is 1,550 cc. for Wadjak I and 1,650 for Wadjak II. The brow ridges of Wadjak man are somewhat larger than those of the Australian aborigines. They have a weakly developed chin, a more developed forehead, and facial features characterized by depressed nasal root, small and flat nasal bridge, and marked alveolar prognathism (Beals and Hoijer 1965: 123).

Keilor and Talgai. In Keilor, a small village northwest of Melbourne, Australia, the skull of an individual similar to Wadjak was recovered in 1940. Keilor man has a cranial capacity of 1,593 cc. Authorities have said that Keilor man represents the type of people who moved out of Java during the period corresponding to the early postglacial of Europe. Another skull, dating from about the same period and known as Talgai man, was recovered in a site 80 miles from Brisbane. The specimen had been badly broken up except for the fairly well preserved face, and because of the bad state of the skull, exact measurements could not be made. Authorities are not agreed that Talgai man is ancestral to modern Australian aborigines (Beals and Hoijer 1965: 124; Brothwell 1960: 336–341).

Niah Cave. In 1958 skull fragments of a more advanced form of hominid were recovered at a depth of 106–110 inches in the Niah Cave, Sarawak, Borneo. By Carbon-14 dating, the age is given as 40,000 years. A tentative reconstruction and analysis of this Niah specimen indicates that

it represents a person of late immaturity and unknown sex. It has a receding forehead, shallow palate, rounded skull side bones, and a fairly deep nasal root. Statistical comparisons of skeletal measurements of the Niah man with modern Asiatic types indicate that the Tasmanian and Australian groups are closest to the Niah skull, followed by Javanese and Borneo groups (Brothwell 1960: 339). D. R. Brothwell, who made the laboratory analysis of the Niah specimen, is of the opinion that Niah man and other southeast Asian fossils did not belong to the same population. He states (1960: 340) the most reasonable supposition would appear to be that within the final Palaeolithic phase of man, there was considerable variability of physical type in South-East Asia with robust and more lightly constructed skull types present.

The first Filipino. The discovery of the Tabon skull fragment in Palawan in 1962 provided the latest fossil evidence for the wide distribution of prehistoric men in southeast Asia during the Pleistocene period. By Carbon-14 techniques apparently associated carbon remains are dated at about 22,000 years. Until detailed laboratory analysis of the fragment and other associated materials is complete, no definite morphological description is in order. An impressionistic statement, to be considered highly unauthoritative and tentative, can be made to the effect that the Palawan man is *Homo sapiens*, similar to the forms from Talgai and Niah. The recovered frontal bone shows somewhat prominent eyebrowridge and a slightly sloping forehead.

Tool Traditions of the Pleistocene

Aside from biological differences, another criterion on which we base our separation of ancient apelike men from true apes is the presence of associated cultural materials. Some authorities (Washburn 1960: 63; Clack 1961: 26; Oakley 1959: 20ff; Childe 1956: 24ff) believe that it was the use of the tools by prehuman primates which led to the appearance of modern man. They argue that as a result of climatic fluctuations during the Pleistocene period certain forested areas began to thin out, and in order to survive, animals needed “to cross open country between one area of woodland and another” (Clark 1961: 26); this gave rise to bipedal locomotion, which freed the hands for tool using and ultimately for tool making.

These activities stimulated the growth of the brain, and caused a corresponding modification of the skull structure. Moreover, successful adaptation to a new environment introduced a new way of life which resulted in changes in parts of the body, notably the teeth and bone structures. The use of the canine teeth for protection and of the large incisors for seizing and pulling food was made unnecessary by tools. In the course of time, perhaps thousands of years, these teeth became smaller and smaller owing to disuse—an anatomical drift brought about by the selection process. The consequence of these changes was “a shortening in the jaws, reduction in the ridges of bone over the eyes and a decrease in the shelf of bone in the neck area” (Washburn 1960: 69).

Comparative review of tool traditions. The earliest tools used by prehuman primates were broken pebbles, usually river stones. Many of these implements do not look like tools, but because they are found in concentrations along with a few shaped ones, and in places far from their source, they are labeled tools. A good example of these unworked pebbles found in concentration is the collection discovered by Dr. and Mrs. Leakey in Tanganyika, Africa. The site is very far from the river, and the materials, though unworked, had to be carried from gravel beds some miles away. Other African sites have yielded a similar kind of tool. In Sterkfontein, Swartkrans, and Kromdrai, chipped pebbles were found associated with bones of animals; in Olduvai, these tools were recovered in direct association with bones of man-like primates (*Australopithecines*).

Whether Java man was a tool maker is still an open question. So far no associated tools have been recovered, but tools have been found at a geological level slightly later than Java man, across the island at Patjitan. The oldest artifacts in Asia are probably the chopping tools recovered in Chou Kou Tien. These tools, made by alternate flaking on chert pebbles, were found very near the fireplace and in association with bones of Peking man and those of the animals which he might have hunted for food. Judging from these artifactual associations, Peking man was an eater of animal flesh and knew the use of fire. In fact the manner in which some of the long bones and skulls of his kind were split and opened indicates that Peking man was a cannibal who favored human brain and bone marrow.

In Europe the earliest unquestioned tool tradition is the hand ax (or core-biface), called the Abbevillian. This tradition flourished during the first interglacial period of the Lower Pleistocene. The second interglacial period saw the development of new tool industries, and by the third interglacial, which is about the middle of the Pleistocene, flake tools known as Mousterian had appeared. During this time there developed a new technique of flaking, in which carefully controlled retouching was done by removal of small secondary flakes. It was during this same period that great innovations occurred in the area—such as the use of caves for shelter, the use of bones for tools, extensive use of fire, and intentional burial of the dead. The flake-tool industry was later superseded by the blade-tool industry. The historical development of this industry is represented by such well known blade-tool types as the Chatelperronian and Aurignacian, which appear to have continued in use for about 70 thousand years; the Gravettian, which lasted about 20 thousand years; the Solutrian, which dates from 67 to about 55 thousand years ago; and the Magdalenian, which lasted about 50 thousand years.

In Africa, stone-tool industries are characterized by a number of assemblages which range from purely local developments to those bearing imprints of European influence. In North Africa, crudely worked pebbles, representing the Lower Pleistocene complex (Villafranchian), were recovered in association with bones of extinct animals. Throughout Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and the Sahara region, hand axes of both the Abbevillian and Acheulian types have been recovered. In Egypt, an African version of the English Clactonian, or flake-type tool, was encountered. In the Nile Valley, a local tool tradition has been found which developed during the latter part of the Lower Pleistocene period and is known as the Sebilian complex.

In East Africa, the oldest implements were the poorly worked pebble tools found in association with the Australopithecine. Leakey calls this the Kafuan culture complex; it is widespread in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Consisting of simple pebbles, roughly chipped to an edge on one side, this culture developed into the biface core implements known as the Oldowan culture. In Uganda, further developments occurred. Common among these local developments were flake tools similar to the Levalloisian type of Europe. In South Africa, the lower Pleistocene culture is represented by tool types of the Kafuan pebble-tool complex. This developed into a rough hand ax type, the Stellenbosch. Following close on the Stellenbosch are the Faurasmith assemblages, characterized by finer hand axes and flakes typical of the European Levalloisian form. Another South African tool tradition is represented by scrapers made from indurated shale: the Smithfield of the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. Next in line, representing the latest of the African stone-age groups is the Wilton culture, characterized by microlithic projectiles and scrapers.

As we move over to Asia, we encounter sites in India which have yielded crudely worked chopper tools similar to those in Europe and Africa, and others like those found in such neighboring countries as Burma, China, and Java. From these choppers developed hand axes of the Abbevillian and Acheulian types, associated with flakes and cores. This development in India is known as the Soanian culture. Except for the tools encountered in the Chou Kou Tien sites, our

knowledge of the Pleistocene tool tradition in China is poor. The Lower Paleolithic artifacts made by Peking man or his descendants belong to the same basic type of chopper as the Soan of India and the Anyathian of Burma. The Anyathian culture is represented by tools recovered in the Irrawaddy Valley of Upper Burma. This site yielded no hand adzes, which led Hallam Movius (1944) to propose a new Lower Paleolithic culture, the chopper/chopping-tool complex. The tools are mostly single-edged core implements and large, crude flakes, made from fossilized wood and silicified tuff.

During World War II, H. R. Van Heekeren found tools of paleolithic type in Bhan-Kao village, Thailand (Movius 1948: 404–6). These core tools were made from river pebbles and shaped into choppers by unifacial flaking along the upper surface of either one edge or two adjacent edges. In all cases the central portion was unworked and flat, and showed the original rolled and patinated crust of the pebble. In the Fingnoi valley in the same area, a variety of materials—quartzite, sandstones, and claystones—were employed by the prehistoric Thailanders to manufacture their stone implements.

In Indo-China, in Tam Hang, Haut-Laos area, stone implements have been recovered, but they are of doubtful nature and so far unclassified. In Malaya, H.D. Collings of the Raffles Museum, Singapore, discovered a site on the western side of the Perak River valley, south of Lenggong, which yielded a considerable number of Lower Paleolithic artifacts. The implements were found *in situ* in a river bed, presumably a terrace deposit, about 250 feet above sea level. Collings named this culture complex the Tampanian. The materials used for making these implements—which include choppers, chopping tools, proto-hand axes, and hand axes—are quartzite pebbles, like the Soan, Anyathian, Patjitanian, and Chou Kou Tienian (Movius 1944).

Many of the implements found in Java are large, massive, crudely worked cores. They represent the Lower Paleolithic complex of Java, known as the Patjitanian culture. Few of these core implements show signs of having been retouched. The worked edges are often irregular, owing to the removal of comparatively large secondary flakes. The large and medium-sized tools show coarse flaking. While the predominant color is brown, a dark-gray color is present on a few specimens, rare on those made of silicified tuffs.

Philippine Pleistocene tools. In the Philippines, the earliest surviving tools of ancient man consist of big, crudely worked choppers. The materials used for making these implements were flint, quartz, and chalcedony. In spite of their typological similarity to some dated tools found in Indonesia and neighboring countries, the Philippine tools have not been dated with certainty. First, most of the tools were surface finds brought to Manila by ditch diggers, farmers, and mining prospectors. Only rarely was controlled excavation of any kind made or any steps taken to do *in situ* analysis of the geological-artifactual association. Second, the archeological work carried out in the Rizal, Bulacan, and Batangas areas was almost entirely exploration and survey work, in which different sites were examined with almost no systematic digging. Surface finds were gathered, and around them was built a reconstruction of Filipino prehistory and culture. The most significant contemporary archeological work bearing on early man in the Philippines is that being carried on in Palawan by the National Museum team, headed by Robert B. Fox and Alfredo Evangelista. Because work is still in progress, interpretation of material relative to Filipino prehistory is not in order. The most that can be offered at the moment are some tentative remarks on the characteristics and chronology of the cultural materials recovered. Unless otherwise stated, this description refers to materials recovered in Tabon and neighboring caves, all in Palawan.

The earliest materials in Palawan consist of flake tools made of chert, a local material extremely common in river beds. There are few choppers made of igneous rocks and very few

pebble tools. Most of these finds were associated with bones of birds, bats, and small animals. Radiocarbon-14 analyses of associated materials indicate that the flake tool industry in Tabon Cave dates as early as 21–22 thousand years ago. This industry is found near the mouth of the cave in a hard, undisturbed brown soil. On both sides of the cave, as well as in the middle, the same tool complexes were found. Correlation of these distributions and Carbon-14 dates indicate that the cave was utilized by man for a long period of time.

In a stratigraphic layer in Duyong Cave, dated by radiocarbon techniques at $7,000 \pm 250$ years, a relatively recent period, brackish-water shells were recovered. This shows tentatively that during the period when the area was inhabited by the flake-tool-using people, the sea was very far away—as might be expected during the Pleistocene period, when the sea was at its lowest level. Although the bones of bats, birds, and other small animals may well represent the accumulated remains of the cave fauna, the formation of the area where the tools were found indicates that it would not have been inhabited by bats and swifts. It is more likely that these small bones represent the food remains of the cave's inhabitants.

Perhaps a few remarks on the method of manufacturing these early tools are appropriate. The implements recovered at Tabon are similar to those encountered in paleolithic and mesolithic sites in both Europe and Asia. We are not inclined to believe, however, that the makers of these tools were descended from people who came here directly from Europe and Asia; rather we think that these tools were made in response to local needs. Under certain circumstances and given the same kind of available materials, people all over the world react to similar situations in more or less the same way. The manner in which the tools were shaped indicates that the method employed was percussion flaking—striking a nodule or flake with another hard stone to knock pieces off. Most of the tools picked up in Rizal, Bulacan, and Batangas have one end left unflaked for the convenience of the hand in holding the implement. When firmly grasped, this crudely shaped tool could easily butcher large game, split wood, crush the skull of an enemy, or cut branches of trees.

In Tabon, there is no evidence of controlled secondary pressure flaking, although a preliminary study of the flake tools recovered there suggests that there were types broadly distinguished in terms of use, such as scrapers, cutting tools, and so forth. Although Carbon-14 dates have established a difference in age of more than 10,000 years between the earliest and the latest flake-tool industries, there appears to be no change in the basic technique of manufacture. Following close on the flake-tool tradition were various tiny stone tools. They have been ascribed to a group of people said to have come by way of land bridges and to have entered the Philippines between 10,000 and 13,000 years ago. The implements of these postulated newcomers were small and made of sharp obsidian or volcanic glass (the only known source of this material is Mount Banahaw), flint, agate, and tektite glass. However, it is doubtful—in the absence of systematic excavation and sufficient evidence—that there really was such a group of people who entered the Philippines. Our only evidence is a few pieces of tools of different orientation from previous finds. At the National Museum we think that this small tool tradition was a local development, which took place the same way that traditions of a similar type developed in Africa, in response to the needs of the resident people and in accordance with the availability of materials. Most of the implements are crudely fashioned projectiles and round blades.

This microlithic tradition was followed by round, kidney shaped tools, chipped on both sides to a rough edge. Specimens of this description have been identified with Hoabinian tools of Indo-China because of their striking similarities, and the period in which they appeared is known as the Mesolithic.

The New Stone Age

The appearance of new tool type in various parts of the Philippines during the period between 7,000 and 2,000 B.C (cf.Beyer 1947, 1948; Fox 1959) introduces another era in our culture history. Our early ancestors were required by the demands of precarious living in an uncertain 'frontier area' to make new adjustments in order to survive. Through the process of continuously readjusting to the environment they developed a more competent technology. Contact, in later years, with other peoples from the neighboring areas gave impetus to their knowledge and skills in the manufacture of basic tools. More effective implements were soon fashioned in order to meet the challenge of the habitat more successfully. Instead of fracturing large stone nodules for tools, they finally developed a way of cutting the stones, usually river pebbles, to a desired shape. The implements were carefully ground, pecked, rubbed, and polished.

Introduction

Terminology. Early authorities on Filipino prehistory and culture called this period of flaked and polished stone implements the Neolithic period. The term Neolithic is derived from two Greek words meaning "new stone" and was applied by scholars to a cultural horizon in Europe characterized by the appearance of polished stone tools. However, later discoveries in Europe led scholars to change this view and to take the presence of farming as the major criterion of the Neolithic, Beals and Hoijer have succinctly stated (1965:304): "The reason for this shift is that farming permits an entirely new way of life where as it makes little difference to a hunter whether his knives and arrow points are flaked or ground into shape." Moreover, it has now been established that in many European sites farming appeared earlier than polished stone tools (see Clark 1961: 72–73, 81ff; Beah and Hoijer 1965: 304).

In terms of associated cultural complexes, we doubt the applicability of "Neolithic" or any other such term to any particular cultural horizon in the Philippines. To quote Robert Braidwood (1959:86) of the University of Chicago, "these terms have the advantage of sounding very learned and the disadvantage of being very imprecise." There are great differences between the tool-making techniques and materials of Neolithic Europe and those of other parts of the world. This is due in part to differences in the stages of cultural development and to other ecological factors.

In this paper we shall use the term *New Stone Age* when referring to the so-called Neolithic period. *Age* refers to a space-time-cultural continuity characterized by the predominance of a particular technology. The use is highly tentative and is designed to meet our present convenience for lack of a more appropriate and precise term.

Importance of the New Stone Age. The New Stone Age is a tremendously important period in our culture history in that the development of our modern society had its immediate sources there. By learning the art of making better tools and of domesticating plants and animals, the early Filipinos were finally able to produce more than they needed for just themselves and their families. This acquisition of a surplus led to the first appearance of specialists—or semi-specialists—in the area. Evidence of this is the widespread distribution local pottery wares throughout the Philippines during the later periods. While no dramatic developments comparable in magnitude to those which brought about the rise of city states in the Middle East and Europe took place in the Philippines, the clustering of tool types and pottery wares along riverine and coastal areas suggests the existence of a more settled, self-sufficient economy. Of course, the early Filipinos supplemented agriculture with hunting and food-gathering.

The New Stone Age in the Philippines has been traditionally divided into three phases: the Early, the Middle, and the Late New Stone Age, each having diagnostic tool types and associated material cultures.

Early New Stone Age

Tool types. The first known type of implements during the New Stone Age includes roughly flaked tools with ground blades or cutting edges. This type has been called the *Bacsonian*, a type-classification derived from the name of the place where this form was first recognized and identified, the Bacson Massif of Indo-China. Older scholars call these tools *protoneoliths* (“before the neoliths” or polished stone tools). They are found mostly in Bataan, Rizal, and Bulacan provinces. The body of this tool type is not polished.

A later type of implement dating from this period includes tools with oval cross-section, whose bodies and blades are ground and polished. The technique of grinding, however, was cruder than that used during the Late New Stone Age. Axes and adzes of oval form with pointed or blunt butts began to appear in the Philippines during the period between 6,000 and 7,000 years ago and persisted as the ideal type of tool for nearly two centuries. Following the oval-shaped tools were the cylindrical “adze-chisel-gouge” type (Beyer 1948: 25). The blade of the tool in this group was narrower than “the central diameter of the body of the implement itself” (*ibid.*). The peculiar gouges belonging to this type had spoon-shaped concave blades. As Beyer describes them (1948:25), “this type is undoubtedly produced by a pointing and rounding of the two ends of the implement before the spoon-shaped depression is ground out on the blade end—the butt being left usually in its original rounded and more-or-less pointed form.”

In addition to the types of tools described above, another kind of stone implement appeared during this period. This type was represented by sharp-sided adzes. Again to quote Beyer (1948:26), this type “appears to be wholly absent on the southeast Asiatic mainland, and while it is sparsely known from the Philippines and Formosa it occurs here only in the lenticular form (with sharpened sides but with a blunt butt).”

Origins and associated culture. Older authorities believe that the people who used these early stone implements probably came from the Asian mainland and reached the Philippines by way of Indo-China, coming across the China Sea to Luzon. From there they moved to Formosa, Japan, and onward into nearby northeast Asia. Another route of this tool tradition, suggested by some scholars, originated in Manchuria and proceeded down to Japan, Formosa, and Luzon. The third movement was believed to have started from central China southward into Indo-China, then eastward into Luzon and Formosa, and northward into Korea, Japan, and Manchuria (cf. Beyer 1948: 24; Heine-Gelden 1932: 608 as quoted by Beyer).

Other technological developments which accompanied the appearance of stone implements during the Early New Stone Age cannot as yet be assessed with precision, owing largely to the fact that no habitation site belonging exclusively to this period has yet been excavated.

Beyer (1948:21) believes that no pottery was made in the Philippines during the Early New Stone Age. In part he bases this opinion on the assumption that living groups still carry on a post-paleolithic tradition, and on the fact that the Ilongot and Apayao, whom he believes (*ibid.*) to be “the most likely descendants of the Early Neolithic folk, so far as they may still survive here,” do not make pottery. This assumption, we will see below, is a doubtful one. As for the fact, other anthropologists (Jones 1912; Fox 1947) who have made closer studies of Ilongot life maintain that the Ilongot do make pottery.

Middle New Stone Age

Tool types. Numerous types of tools appeared in the islands during the period from 4,000 to about 1,000 years ago. Included in this new assemblage were the true shouldered axe—adze type, the ridged-back types, and the tanged-butt tools—the form which has been identified by some scholars as ancestral to the Hawaiian and eastern Polynesian tool types. In Duyung Cave, Palawan, moreover, the National Museum team recovered in 1963 a large stone adze and four adzes made from the hinge of a giant clam, the *Tridacna gigas*. This indicates that the manufacture of shell adzes was not after all an atoll development in the Pacific but was a part of Philippine technology as well. The Duyung cave has been dated by Carbon-14 at about 4,630 years before the present.

Toward the later part of this period, an early transitional type known as the Hoifung adze began to appear. Hoifung is the type site on the Asian mainland, near Hongkong. The similarity between the tools found in the Philippines and those recovered on the southern coast of China has led scholars to argue that the major stimuli for changes in the axe-adze forms in the Philippines came from the Hoifung-Hongkong area on the mainland. A number of axe-adze tool types, however, have been recovered here which do not occur elsewhere, an indication of local specialization rather than direct migration.

Origins and associated culture. Evidence provided by a comparative study of the tools in other areas of the Pacific strongly suggests that through a long period of time some peoples of the Pacific islands came from the Philippines. These movements however, can hardly be termed migration. In the words of Robert Suggs (1960: 65): These were not large-scale one-way voyages moving quickly across large spans of oceans and skipping many island groups—few primitive migrations may be said truly to be of that type. Rather, the ancestors of Polynesians left the coast of Asia gradually over a period of several centuries in a large number of short movements, island hopping and “coasting,” selecting the proper seasons for movement. Probably many voyagers returned to Asia only to depart again.

It was during the Middle New Stone Age that domestication of plants and animals intensified. Riverine and coastal settlements were now growing. Root-crops like gabi and yams were planted (Fox 1959:19).

Late New Stone Age

Tool types. During the period between 2,000 B.C. and 100 A.D., another recognizable tool type began to appear in many parts of the Philippines. The general characteristics of this new development may be summarized as follows: (1) the use of hard materials capable of being polished; (2) the use of new techniques of tool making, such as sawing and drilling; and (3) the appearance of well-developed, beautifully polished, rectangular and trapezoidal tools, with completely flattened sides.

Along side this development in stone tools, the use of “jade” and nephrite materials for both ornaments and tools was extensive, especially in the Batangas area. So far no local source of either jade or nephrite has been discovered in the Philippines. This led Beyer to suggest (1948: 48) that these tools were brought by a people coming probably from South China or Indo-China, much addicted to the use of nephrite as the chief material for their stone artifacts. They either brought a large supply with them or found some local source for the materials not since rediscovered. As their supply gave out, or became scarce, they gradually shifted to the use of

other stones—and began also to rework the surviving artifacts of the earlier Neolithic peoples, many of which were to be found in their locality.

On the basis of the coastal Chinese data, however, Robert Suggs suggested (1960: 67) that Beyer's work should be revised somewhat and that the Middle and Late "Neolithic" might be combined. The rectangular adze, he says, can no longer be said to be a late feature in the Philippines, for it occurs in association with early cord-impressed pottery of the Yuan Shan culture of Formosa.

Pottery. Beyer (1948) found no evidence for the manufacture of any pottery in the Philippines even during the Late New Stone Age, at least not in the "Late Neolithic" of Batangas and Rizal provinces. His general conclusion is (1948:84–85) that pottery appears to have come "from a later cultural layer, and could not have been originally associated with the Late Neolithic material."

In 1956, in a series of excavations which Robert B. Fox and Alfredo Evangelista of the National Museum made in Bato (Sorsogon) and Cagraray (Albay) caves, there was revealed an assemblage of stone tools and stone beads with pottery. In effect, these discoveries proved that "the people who lived and buried their dead in Bato Caves made pottery and used stone tools and that they possessed no iron or other metals" (Fox and Evangelista 1957: 52). This corrects the earlier claim that pottery appeared for the first time during the Iron Age.

Also in Cagraray, a stone tool-jar burial complex was encountered which showed a different orientation from that discovered in the Batanes-Babuyan islands, heretofore assumed to be representative of an early jar-burial tradition in the Philippines brought in by the migrating Hakka people from the north. The difference in the provenience of the assemblage may be interpreted as a proof of stimulus diffusion, as opposed to a hypothesis of direct contact or "waves of migration."

Other cultural elements. The Late New Stone Age people were extremely competent tool-makers. Aside from bark-cloth beaters, tools made of jade, and other products, they also made a fine type of stone implement known as *stepped adzes*. The manufacture of these tools provides an example of the sawing technique, since the cutting out of the butt is initiated by a deeply sawn groove. This is quite different from the transitional type, in which the modification or partial "stepping" of the butt is the result of a gradual shaving or grinding away beginning first at the edges and gradually working towards the raised center in an irregular or curved line (Beyer 1948: 95).

It is probable that agriculture started to become the primary source of livelihood during the Late New Stone Age, although it was still supplemented by hunting and fishing. The recovery of teeth and bones of domesticated pigs indicates that these were introduced at this time too. Dogs and other domesticated animals were also brought into the islands during this period. The first cultivation of upland rice and millet was contemporaneous with the introduction of domesticated animals. The absence however, of such great stone structures as are found at Mohenjo-daro indicates that settlements of the Philippines never reached the city-state status in pre-Spanish times, but were organized in accordance with the mode of living which centered about fishing and shifting cultivation.

Although earlier writers (Keesing and Keesing 1934: 51; Beyer 1948) have argued that the present-day compact settlements found among the peoples of the Mountain Province were introduced into northern Luzon by migrations from eastern Asia during Late Neolithic times, it is doubtful that this was the case. First, there is no good evidence that during the period between

1500 and 500 B.C. there were large, compact communities in southeast Asia. Second, communities of this type were not possible before intensive cultivation of irrigated rice. Third, it was apparently not until the Han Dynasty, about 200 B.C. to 200 A.D., that there was expansion and migration into southeast Asia. Moreover, as Fred Eggan has pointed out (1954: 330), small boatloads of migrants weren't likely to maintain large scale community patterns in a new land under pioneer conditions. It is much more probable that the large compact community structure of the Mountain Province are a relatively late development related to populational increase in a region of limited resources in land and water.

Concluding Remarks

Thus far we have outlined features of the development of Filipino culture and society during prehistoric times. Much of our knowledge of this subject we owe to the pioneers of Philippine archaeology and anthropology. Yet in looking back on the historical reconstructions of these older scholars, it seems possible to discern three assumptions: first, that the different cultural complexes encountered in the Philippines were introduced ready-made into this country by groups of people migrating from the Asian mainland; second, that these migrating people constituted independent groups, each of whom had diagnostic racial and physical characteristics and arrived in the islands at specific time periods; third, that prehistoric tool traditions in the Philippines can be correlated with physical types and cultures of living groups (for example, the Negritos or pygmoid Filipinos are associated with tiny [microlithic] tools simply because they were pygmoid in physical type).

There were undoubtedly many groups of people that reached the Philippines during prehistoric times. It is doubtful, however, that the immigrants arrived in the periodic and deliberate fashion postulated. In like manner, there are no available definitive data to show that each "wave of migrants" instituted a culturally and racially homogeneous group.

In the past, archeological artifacts have been correlated with the sociocultural tradition of the living population in order to support the assumption that there was such a homogeneous people. However, the process is tenuous and the conclusions reached are somewhat overdrawn. In the first place, the correlation has been based on typological comparisons of insufficient archeological materials.

It is worth noting how meager were the extra-Philippine materials available to our early scholars in their attempts to establish a wider range of comparison and to indicate the origin of Filipino prehistoric cultures. To date only the Formosan sequence has been established by stratigraphic excavation. It is true that Finn's Hongkong collection, against which our scholars compared Philippine materials, was excavated, but the finds were taken from non-stratigraphic deposits, just as were almost all of the Rizal-Bulacan-Batangas archeological materials. Likewise, Maglioni's Hoifung collections, on which older authorities on Filipino prehistory based so many comparative studies, were made without any excavations at all.

The second point we wish to emphasize is that we now know it is unrealistic to assert that the characteristics of any migration would still be present and definable today after several thousands of years of racial and cultural development. A case in point may be the Apayao and the Cagayan Valley Ibanag, who, according to one authority, "form our outstanding Indonesian 'A' and 'B' groups—and are also generally considered the purest survivors of the original Neolithic peoples" (Beyer 1948: 22).

Closer study of these cultural-linguistic groups shows marked range of physical and cultural characteristics, the extremes of which differ greatly from the type description. Moreover,

physical anthropological studies in Polynesia and in the United States have indicated that even in so short a period as 100 years, a group of people can differentiate considerably—both genotypically and phenotypically—from their parent racial stock. Good examples of this are the Dunker community studies in Pennsylvania and the repatriate Jews from India. In fact, American anthropologists have discovered that after 100 years the American Negroes have 20 percent white blood in them—the end result of what geneticists call “gene flow” and “genetic drift” (cf. Roberts 1955; Glass 1955).

We now doubt the usefulness of the term migration because, as a working hypothesis, it does not allow for variant social and cultural development in response to local situations. Instead, it gives the impression that all culture traits were brought into the Philippines ready-made, which is unlikely. Philippine prehistory is far too complex to be explained by waves of migration.

In view of the growing evidence recovered each year by the anthropologists of the National Museum, and other institutions, our reconstructions of Filipino prehistory and culture have to be changed. It would seem advisable, therefore, to suspend judgments as to the relationship of modern Filipinos to prehistoric cultures until we have sufficient data, and to consider these “waves of migration” as hypothetical, not historically verified.

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11

Filipino Children in Family and Society: Growing Up in a Many-People Environment

HIROMU SHIMIZU

The objective of this presentation is to report on the social environment in which children grow up in the Philippines. To be more specific, this is a report on the characteristics of the socialization process of Filipino children who are born and brought up in the many-people environment beyond the nuclear family, with complicated dyadic relations and various parenting figures. The reference materials I have used concern the Tagalog people living in the central and southern areas of the island of Luzon, but basically these findings will also apply to the group called lowland Christians.

The Family Circle Around the Child

In the Philippines, the nuclear family is the basic form of household. A closer view of the people in daily life, however, shows that the nuclear family is not a closed, isolated unit consisting of only the married couple and their unmarried children. It has frequent and intimate interactions with the families living nearby. It is not unusual to find elderly parents or elderly unmarried siblings of the household's head still living together in the same household.

Even newlywed couples frequently live in the home of the parents of either the husband or the wife. They build a new house after one or two children are born, but even then they prefer to build the house within the compound of the parent's house or in the same neighborhood. There are no set rules about whether they live with the husband's parents or the wife's parents. Statistics show that the Bisayan and Bikol groups tend to choose the wife's family and the Tagalog and Ilocano groups the husband's family. In either case, however, the choice seems to depend basically on which family offers better economic conditions, such as wealth, amount of agricultural land, housing, or job opportunities. No clear-cut differences can be observed between men and women, as the parents' estate is divided equally among brothers and sisters.

Besides children continuing to live in the parents' house or in the same compound after marriage, there are many instances of relatives living on adjoining or nearby land. When relatives live in the same neighborhood or group together in one place, there is frequent visiting and sharing of food among them. According to Murray (1973), a local kin group is formed in such a case. Three relationships are formed simultaneously in this group: *magkamag-anak* (consanguineal or affinal relations), *magkapitbahay* (neighboring relations). These combine to form organic relationship that surpasses the nuclear family, which Murray says is "somewhat like a unilineal group." To quote from his report:

"Among the Northern Tagalog as found in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, there are corporate local kin groups composed of family-households. There is no Tagalog term for such groups, but residents recognize their existence... Local kin groups are the supra familial units within which all important day-to-day, face-to-face interaction occurs (particularly for the very old and the very young)... Although component nuclear-family households are distinguishable from one another in

terms of separate roofs, interaction pattern makes this distinction less clear at all phases of the nuclear family's development... Moreover, since the children born to family-households belonging to such a local kin group tend at marriage to remain in the group, the local kin group persists over time. In this it is somewhat like a unilineal group" (pp.28, 34–35).

While Murray (1973) states that neighbors who do not have consanguineal or affinal relations are not members of this local kin group (p32), he recognizes the basis of this group as locality rather than descent (p30). Takahashi (1972), who conducted a survey in Bulacan in central Luzon, points out the importance to daily life of a neighboring household group, which is formed on the basis of kinship relations but also includes non-kin neighbors.

Although all the people in the barrio have a friendly relationship, they do not have equal relations with everyone in the community. There is a much closer relationship in every aspect of daily living among those who live within shouting distance of each other. These groups of people who have face-to-face contacts are called *kapitbahay* (neighbors). To use the words of a friend who lives in Baliwag town, *kapitbahay* are those living within a stone's throw.

In the case of my village, in various places in the paddy fields, there are several slightly raised plots of land, called *pulo* (meaning 'island'), surrounded by trees or bamboo forests where several to ten odd houses are grouped together. Not all the people living in one *pulo* are consanguineal nor affinal relatives, but the relationship in each group is a very close one. Members of the *kapitbahay* spend their time sitting together and chatting day and night and it is also the *kapitbahay* members who help in the search for a lost carabao (water buffalo). When there was a funeral, the people who were providing the utmost assistance, such as in the kitchen, were *kapitbahay* members. It is also among the *kapitbahay* members that the custom of the housewife borrowing food and daily living commodities from friends and neighbors (*humingi*) is most frequently observed. This *kapitbahay* is truly a primary group supported by feelings of solidarity and unity, and it is where social regulations in daily living are strongest" (p.166).

It is questionable whether the group that Murray calls the local kin group and Takahashi calls the neighboring household group is really a social group. This group has no membership rules or fixed boundaries and the way it is formed differs according to the situation. It may be more appropriate to call this, as Kaut (1965) does, a social grouping or a family circle of interwoven dyadic relations. Furthermore, the kind of family group having a clearly delineated framework, as reported by Murray and Takahashi, does not exist in every Tagalog region. However, since this report does not aim to present a study of Filipino social structure of analytical concepts, I only wish to point out and stress the fact that the nuclear family in this case is not a closed and isolated unit but part of a more open relationship. Some researchers point to the existence of the extended family as a group that transcends the nuclear family and its significant role in child rearing practices.

Features of Child Rearing

A newlywed couple will rarely live in isolation among complete strangers. They will usually live close to the parents of either the husband or wife, within the same house or in a small house built near the parents' house. They will begin their new life together in a place where parents, uncles and aunts, brothers and sisters, and cousins are grouped together. They will also associate with families living in the neighborhood practically as though they were relatives, even if they are not consanguineally or affinally related. When one considers the growing-up process of Filipino children within this network of close human relations, the following can be pointed out as effects of the surrounding environment.

First of all, the presence of many parenting figures, or surrogates for the mother and father, such as grandparents, uncles and aunts, and older cousins, has the most significance. The responsibility for child rearing does not rest solely on the child's parents. "As soon as the child can be carried outside the house, he generally passes from one hand to another—fondled, kissed, pinched and caressed by almost everyone". There is always someone close at hand to take care of the child when the mother has to go to work or leave the house on some errand.

Women are extremely active in Filipino society, in politics, economics, administration, education, and many other fields, and the status of women is generally high. Although the fact that society has a climate that can accept the social activity of women is a very important background factor. The fact that women can easily find someone to take over their child rearing and housework is also a major factor. Wealthy and middle-class families in the cities employ housemaids at low wages; but when women of the general populace, or women living in rural villages or smaller cities go out to work in retail business or as civil servants or teachers or when they go out to do farm work with their husbands, even they can easily find someone (such as the children's grandparents or an uncle or aunt) to take care of their children.

If a daughter becomes an unwed mother or is separated from her husband, the grandparents will become parent surrogates for the child or an uncle may become a father surrogate. Even if the family is angry at the daughter and will not speak to her, the child is fully accepted into the family and treated warmly.

The second characteristic of the child's socialization process in the Philippines is that the child is taken care of for a long period of time, owing to the fact that, as seen in the primary characteristic, there are many adults or elderly people who can become parenting figures. Even when the next child is born and the mother's attention is focused on the newborn baby, there is no lack of parenting figures to take care of the older child and therefore no need for the child to become independent immediately. If the child cannot carry out such activities as bathing, dressing, or cleansing after elimination independently, there is always someone nearby to help. Even when the child can do those things unaided, it is not unusual for someone to help anyway. Furthermore, when the child has matured to a certain degree, he or she will have to look after younger brothers and sisters, and cousins in the same way. In general, there are no rules or requirements in the Philippines regarding what the child must be able to do at a certain age. "Maturation is a leisurely process, not to be accelerated by parental encouragement or too deliberate training. The child will eventually come around to it when he understands". It is neither unusual nor embarrassing for one child to be unable to do at the age of four what another can do at the age of two. Furthermore, it is strongly believed that the longer the parents sleep with the child, the longer the child feels affection for the parents and family after growing up and the longer the child stays close to the family. Therefore, the child is not trained to sleep alone. The third characteristic is that the child has very little stress or feelings of frustration, because there were many parent surrogates to satisfy his or her desires. Even if the child's parents do not satisfy his desires, someone he can select from among the close relationships, such as the grandparents, uncles, or aunts, will realize his wishes. When the mother ignores or refuses to indulge the child's wishes, it will not be such a great psychological strain on the child. Even if the child has feelings of sorrow, anger, or rebellion, such feelings are temporary and never long lasting, and there will be no accumulation of great stress that may change the child's character. It is probably because there is so little stress of this kind that the so-called juvenile delinquency in the Philippines is rarely associated with great violence.

Observing the socialization process of the child in the Philippines, the characteristics may be described, in a word, as extremely dependent. The concept of dependency has negative connotations, such as mental or physical weakness, but in the Philippines it does not have a

negative meaning. Dependency must be understood as a relationship that begins with the recognized relationship that the child forms with the adults in the environment and eventually extends into a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship in which all the members depend on each other and help each other. At least among family members, neighbors, friends, and acquaintances, living in a relationship of mutual cooperation and assistance is an important social philosophy that does not change, no matter what age one attains, and is considered an ideal way of social life. In their discussion of dependency and the child's seeking of nurturance, which extends into habitual succoring adults. The child seeks help even when he does not need it as a bid for attention and affection. If he picks the right time, he gets it. If not, the situation is plain enough or he is there, he is called on to help. He is not so much an individual as he is a part of a family whose older members are his support and whose younger members are his responsibility. Responsibilities are not pushed on him when he reaches a certain age. Instead he grows into them, gaining the necessary skills as he participates in the day-to-day activities of the family.

From childhood he learns to enjoy being taken care of and realizes that he can make others happy by being dependent on them. There is no age when a child is expected to leave home or an age when he is expected to become fully self-reliant.

Conditions of A Good Child

The fact that the child has multiple choices besides the parents in receiving love and protection has many positive aspects. The child, however, does not receive such favors one-sidedly. The child also has to carry out the role and behavior that the adults in his environment expect of him.

In the Philippines, a child is a blessing from God and is considered proof that the family is living in the grace of God. At the same time, for the parents, the child is a form of investment and security in old age. For this reason it is generally believed that the greater the number of children and the larger the family, the happier the family will be. The government is conducting various family planning campaigns to reduce the annual population growth rate, which is close to three percent, but with very little effect. Not because Roman Catholic doctrine forbids it (the people are rarely conscious of the fact that it is forbidden) but because of the strong desire to have many children. Even if the wife attends lectures on family planning and takes an interest in birth control, it may be difficult to practice because the husband, who thinks many children to be proof of manliness, might be uncooperative or the parents, who believe a large family ideal, might be against it. The average number of children born alive per couple is presently about 5.4 (1970 census). The figure is lower in Metro Manila and other urban areas and higher in rural areas. It is not unusual to find couples with more than ten children.

The many children born in this environment have various important roles to play in family life according to their stage of maturation. When the child is still a baby, he is the center of the love and attention of the parents and other adults and is expected to provide laughter and joy through his smile and gestures. Weaning and toilet training are not as forced or early as in the United States or Japan and have even been described as permissive, but it is not important in the child's development that he become able to take care of himself. Rather, it is considered more important that the child learns to respond actively to the people surrounding him and to communicate intimately with them. Eventually, the child must take care of younger brothers and sisters and carry out such daily tasks as drawing water. Boys must eventually help with their father's work and look after domestic animals and girls must help their mothers with housework and shopping.

In the Philippines, the world of adults and the world of children are not separated and the children assume certain roles in the family that they are capable of assuming in accordance with their ages. The children learn as they help the adults in their work, by imitating what they observe or by receiving specific training. There are therefore very few tasks or activities from which the adults will exclude the children. Even at bedtime, there is no set time beyond which the children are not allowed to stay awake and they are allowed to stay up late with the adults if they wish to do so. However, the children are usually exhausted by the day's activities and will go to sleep before the adults. Even if a separation into the world of adults and the world of children were possible, in the Philippines the two worlds would exist in a relationship of interaction, super imposed over each other.

The child's growth, therefore, is not a process in which the child becomes an adult through a sequence of rites of passage, receiving a clear-cut status in each stage of development. It is, rather, one in which the child, with the exception of certain rites—such as entering elementary school or Confirmation—assumes the world of adults little by little in accordance with his physical growth and gradually enters the adult world. At the same time, he learns the values and behavior patterns of the adults.

Returning to a previous point of discussion, in a life style in which the families of relatives live close to one another and friendly relations are maintained with neighbors who are not relatives, there are many parent surrogates but there are at the same time a great number of children. The child has many choices regarding parenting figures, but at the same time the child is not the sole focus of the love and attention of each adult or elderly person. There are always several competitors, such as siblings close in age or cousins of the same age. In such complex relationships, even a child cannot always demand attention or depend unconditionally on the people in his environment:

Very early the child learns to relate at many different levels to several different adults and, if necessary, learns to manipulate situations, to weave his way through to get his own specific needs met, and his uniqueness acknowledged. He has to find a place of his own in this many people environment, or else his value may not be recognized. If one considers the complexity of the combinations of interrelationships involved; one cannot but marvel at how smoothly and rhythmically this machinery of the Filipino family can operate in spite of all odds!

In order to fulfill one's desires or objectives, one first of all must be accepted by others and maintain close and friendly relations with them. "With many people living in a close physical and social relationship, the handling of hostility is of crucial importance. A good deal of emphasis is placed on the ability to avoid potentially angry situations". Therefore, as Lynch (1973) emphasizes, the building of "smooth interpersonal relations" is indispensable for the realization of "social acceptance", the most important motivating factor in the behavior of the Filipinos.

Filipino children are indulged by many parenting figures during the early infant period, but once they reach a certain developmental state, they are taught not to be self-centered or to try and have their own way in everything, but to always be considerate of other family members and all the other people in the environment. The child is repeatedly told that other people have likes, dislikes, and desires just as he does and that if a conflict of interest should arise, he should always be the one to give in to others. The child thus learns at a relatively early stage to refrain from asserting his ego and that he should not try to push his demands through the end. The child is also taught that other people have different characters and personalities just as he has different tastes and desires, and that he should be able to get along with all types of people. In order to do this, he should be careful about his attitude and language so as not to anger, hurt, or annoy the other party. Even when he feels uncomfortable or angry, he should not let the other party detect it by

letting it show in his facial expression. So he must smile when the situation requires it even when he is not amused, and pretend to be calm even when he feels violent rage. A rebellious attitude should be avoided more than anything else and is strongly suppressed.

Thus, the social environment in which Filipino children grow up nips an aggressive attitude in the bud and orients the child's development and character formation toward getting along and cooperating with others. In other words, respecting the emotions and feelings of others, and suppressing one's own anger or displeasure for the sake of smooth interpersonal relations, is valued more than anything else. The child must learn the art of sociability in his own way and play the role of the good child.

In concrete terms this means not only that the child must not argue or fight but also that the child must avoid getting into tense situations that could lead to arguments or fights. When the child loses his temper or raises his voice in anger, such behavior is regarded as reflecting the bad character or disposition of the whole family. Even when the child is angry, he must not talk back and must always remain cool and composed and assume a friendly attitude. When he cannot do so, he can, for example, cry or use some other peaceful method of expression to show the other party or the adults in the environment how hurt or angry he is and thus try to receive their protection.

Expansion and Manipulation of Dyadic Relations

The diverse human relations that surround the child are not limited to relatives and acquaintances living in the same grounds or neighborhood. As the next baby is born and the child retreats from the center of attraction, the circle of attention with which he has frequent contacts will grow. He will gradually assume closer contacts with playmates, people in the same village (*kababaryo*), relatives living in other areas, godparents with whom he will associate through the *compadre* system, and so forth.

When one meets Filipino people, one is immediately struck by the strength of their family bonds and by the great number of relatives they seem to have. In various daily-life situations it is not unusual to be introduced to one person after another and to find that they are related. In the Philippines, the third cousins of the ego and the spouse, that is, the descendants of the siblings of the great-grandparents are usually recognized as relatives. In some instances the fourth or even more remote cousins are recognized as relatives. Since the average nuclear family size is seven to eight members, the number of relatives' swells to tremendous proportions by geometric progression. According to the calculations of one sociologist, one Filipino person will have three hundred relatives during his lifetime, even by the most modest estimates.

In actual daily life, however, it is impossible to maintain equally close relations with such a great number of relatives. The actual number with whom one can associate and maintain close and frequent contacts will be much smaller. The relatives with whom one has intimate relations are not necessarily determined by set rules, such as the degree of consanguinity, but by one's personal tastes and voluntary selection, based on how well one gets along with them, proximity of location, economic merit, and so forth. This creates what is known in social anthropology as a "personal kindred." The personal kindred is a social category consisting of an individual's circle of relatives or that range of a person's relatives accorded special cultural recognition. It is not a clearly delineated group, such as a lineage of descendants of a particular ancestor, but is an ego-centered circle of consanguineal (and affinal) relatives. The dyadic relationship of ego with each relative is not fixed and unchanging. When the individual is on bad terms with a relative, he stops associating with him regardless of the degree of consanguinity, while a distant relative becomes an important member of the circle if he lives nearby and is on friendly terms.

The kindred of the parents or the circle of relatives plays an extremely important role in the growing up and socialization of the child. Kaut (1965) calls this form of grouping that occurs freely, according to the will and tastes of the individual, the “principle of contingency” and explains it as follows:

“It is my hypothesis that social groupings—not social groups in the sense defined above—are constantly changing their boundaries and dimensions in Tagalog society as successful, unsuccessful, and accidental activation of modes of interaction create, strengthen, or weaken social bonds of obligation. Kinship and descent act mostly as points of departure rather than eliminating strictures”.

Another important factor in the development and social relations of the Filipino child is the ritual kinship called the *compadre* system. This is a system of establishing ritual parent-child relations as godparent-godchild through the baptism ceremony of the Roman Catholic religion. When a child is to be baptized, the parents ask Catholic relatives or friends to become the child’s godparents, regardless of marital status, since it is not required that godparents be married. I have been asked by friends on several occasions to become godparent, even though they know I’m not a Catholic.

In the Philippines, the religious significance of establishing a ritual parent is to have someone to assume the role of guardian, to provide guidance so that the child will grow up to be a devout Catholic. The godchild (*inaanak*) is supposed to show the godfather (*ninong*) and godmother (*ninang*) the same respect and obedience that he must show to his parents, and the godparents are expected to provide guidance and care, particularly in matters of religion. Actually, however, secular and social responsibilities seem to outweigh religious duties. For example, the godparents are expected to buy the godchild clothes for the baptism and to provide remuneration to the church and other congratulatory gifts. The godparents also continue to give gifts, such as at Christmas, and continue to look after the child in various ways.

The *compadre* system was established for the better development of the child and it plays a certain role, but actually it is the relationship between the godparents and the biological parents, centering on the child that is more important. The *compadre* system functions as a way of making more formal bond of a close friendship, or of drawing distant relatives closer together, in other words, of making certain close relations even closer. The godparents and biological parents call each other *kumpare*, in the case of men, and *kumare*, in the case of women, and maintain an extremely close association in various aspects of daily life. They constantly provide mutual assistance, such as helping each other in farm work, lending each other commodities, and sharing food. When a *compadre* relationship is formed between two families of different socio-economic statuses, it works to establish or strengthen the so-called patron-client relationship.

Furthermore, although their social significance is not as great as that of the godparents at the time of baptism, the sponsors or witnesses at the confirmation and wedding ceremonies also form ritual parent-child relations with the child and are also called *ninong*, *ninang*, *kumpare*, and *kumare*. The godparents at the baptism are not restricted to one couple, and other “godparent” figures may be chosen separately for the confirmation and wedding. The child thus has not only the relatives and neighbors but also the godparents in the *compadre* system with whom he has close relationships. The parents will be able to have at least three sets of “godparents” for one child (at baptism, confirmation and wedding) and can choose different sets of “godparents” for each child, and will thus be able to form ritual kindred relations with a large number of people. These ritual kinsfolk combine with the actual relatives, who are numerous to begin with, to make kindred relations in Filipino society unimaginably complex and intricate.

The socialization process of Filipino children growing up in such open, complicated and diverse relationships may be summarized as a process of learning the art and behavior patterns of maintaining, strengthening and extending these relationships. In the Philippines, as compared with Japan, the formation of groups based on *ba*, that is, a situational position in a given frame (see Nakane 1970), is not so strong, and the individual's personal kindred, or various circles or networks of people formed by dyadic relations, have an important function in social life. As Lynch (1973) emphasizes:

“Every individual has a social universe which is distinctively his own, constantly changing in size and content, its members playing various and often multiple role in this regard. Each such role promises, in the abstract, more or less support to the central figure, and is empowered to demand in return a greater or smaller share of his loyalty and energies. One is surrounded at every moment, in other words, by people who are potentially or in fact his allies, people he can count on to a greater or smaller degree”.

The importance of Filipino social life as well as the socialization process of children in the Philippines therefore lies in the awareness of each person that he or she is situated in interwoven diverse human relations, and particularly in the awareness that each dyadic relation must be maintained always in good terms, so that the individual can depend on it when the need arises. These relations are not fixed and unchanging once they are established, and the bond may break naturally unless the social distance of the two persons is constantly narrowed.

Such behavior patterns as *pakikisama* (concession, giving in, following the lead or suggestion of others), euphemism, the use of go-betweens, and *utang na loob* (a debt inside oneself) (sic) are indispensable methods of realizing “smooth interpersonal relations.” For behavior that departs from these accepted norms, the concept of *hiya* (the uncomfortable feeling that accompanies awareness of being in a socially unacceptable position, or performing a socially unacceptable action) acts as an inhibitory force.

12

The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Democracy

MICHAEL HERZFELD

The Self and the State

Why do some people apparently become humorless automatons as soon as they are placed behind a desk? Why do kindly friends and amiable neighbors become racists and bigots when they discover, or (more accurately) decide, that others do not “belong?” How does it come about that in societies justly famed for their hospitality and warmth, we often encounter the pettiest forms of bureaucratic indifference to human needs and sufferings, or that in democratic polities designed to benefit all citizens, whole groups of people suffer from callous neglect?

These are the questions that cluster around the theme of this book. They may be summarized more generally: how and why can political entities that celebrate the rights of individuals and small groups so often seem cruelly selective in applying those rights? Indifference to the plight of individuals and groups often coexists with democratic and egalitarian ideals.

Indifference is the rejection of common humanity. It is the denial of identity, of selfhood. We may thus suspect that its appearance in state structures arises from competing claims over the right to construct the cultural, and social self. Who “makes” the self—the citizen or the state? Can we even speak of “the state,” or is that entity in turn a construct deployed in certain manipulative individuals to legitimize their authority?

In this book, I propose to focus on representations of the instruments of state control, and more particularly on the kinds of offices and agencies that are lumped together under the generic heading of “national bureaucracy.” Most studies of bureaucracy look at how they function. In so doing, they address the success or failure of particular bureaucracies in the terms of bureaucracy itself: service of citizens’s needs, immunity to patronage, efficiency. Moreover, it is clear that in some states, bureaucrats have a relatively high degree of input into policy-making (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Diamant 1989). It is no part of my purpose to dispute the value of these goal, on the contrary, I proceed from a fundamental puzzlement: how does it come about that repression at every level from that of the totalitarian state to the petty tyrant behind a desk can call upon the same idiom of representation, the same broad definition of the person, the same evocative symbols, as those enshrined in the most indisputably democratic practices? To speak of anomie or dysfunction is a description, not an explanation.

The term “Western” in the subtitle is intentionally ironic. It enshrines a stereotype. The various countries lumped together under the rubric of “the West” conventionally celebrate certain features that separate them from the rest of the world: democracy, rational government, scientific and technological inventiveness, individualism, certain ethical and cultural commitments. One does not have to take all these claims at face value in order to appreciate how important they have been in shaping a sense of common culture for centuries. “The West” is a symbol of shared identity.

Behind the mask of commonality, however, appear enormously different legal regimes. Anglo-Saxon liberalism and German neo-Kantian authoritarianism, for example, may have radically opposed consequences, even though both lay claim to reason grounded in nature (Pollis

1987: 587–588; Bottomley and Lechte 1990: 60). “The West” acquires a variety of meanings in the hands of different actors and in response to varied international models. But that is just the irony of its predicament, and it gives us the opening that our exploration requires. The idea of a coherent, unified rationality is neither coherent nor unified in itself. I do not intend to show here what is “Western” and what is not. That is the language of absolute identities—the conceptual idiom that I have set out to criticize. Instead, I shall attempt to show when, why, and how social and political actors manage to invest such suppositious entities as “the West” with compelling significance in everyday life.

Calling oneself “Western” is a question of identity, and the bureaucratic management of identity—personal, social, and national—is what this book is about. Nationalist ideologies usually lay claim to some kind of constructed “national character.” Their bureaucracies have the task of calibrating personal and local identity to this construct. Identity is at the heart of all anthropological inquiry, and an anthropological approach to national identity is well equipped to explore the relationship between national identity and more localized models of social and cultural being.

Bureaucracy is one of those phenomena people only notice when it appears to violate its own alleged ideals, usually those concerning a person’s place in the social scheme of things. Consequently, in most industrial democracies—where the state is supposed to be a respecter of persons—people rail in quite predictable ways against the evils of bureaucracy. It does not matter that their outrage is often unjustified; what counts is their ability to draw on a predictable image of malfunction. If one could not grumble about “bureaucracy,” bureaucracy itself could not easily exist: both bureaucracy and the stereotypical complaints about it are parts of a larger universe that we might call, quite simply, the ideology and practice of accountability.

The conventions that govern talk about bureaucracy are very much like the equally conventional habit of groaning at puns. In both cases, there is a play on the discrepancy between formal or anticipated properties (precisely defined rights in the case of bureaucracy, an exact correspondence between words and meaning in the case of puns) and actual experience (the violation of personal autonomy in bureaucracy, the disruption of everyday semantics in puns). In actual practice, the charges against bureaucracy may be quite unfair, and listeners may find puns revealing and funny. But comic dismay is expected in both cases, and in both it must be freely given. The response has nothing to do with personal belief. It has everything to do with convention.

This is crucial to understanding bureaucracy as a social phenomenon. The fact that people have stereotypical expectations of bureaucratic unfairness offsets their sense of personal failure: there is safety in numbers, in being reassured that everyone knows all about bureaucrats. Rejecting the hateful formalism of bureaucracy is itself a conventional, formal act, and identifies areas of tension between official norms and more localized social values. Representations of bureaucratic evil are comforting precisely because, like the symbols studied by the ethnographers of small-scale societies, they are collective.

Not all bureaucratic encounters are dismal; for some lucky individuals, the system works every time. But their good fortune then raises a problem for the practice of social relations. In cultures that value individualism and entrepreneurship, failures to get what one wants suggest moral deficiency and demand self justification. In the industrialized societies of Western Europe and North America, no less than in remote villages in Greece or Italy, people find it necessary to explain away their inability to deal effectively with the bureaucracy. Everyone, it seems, has a bureaucratic horror story to tell, and few will challenge the conventions such stories demand. Hearers know that they will soon want to use the same stereotypical images in turn.

Clients are not the only people who tell such stories. Bureaucrats too, often seek means of exonerating themselves from blame. “Buck-passing,” which clients recognize as a symptom of some alleged bureaucratic mentality, is in fact part of the same discourse of accountability, personhood, and superior force. While disgruntled clients blame bureaucrats, the latter blame “the system,” excessively complicated laws, their immediate or more distant superiors, “the government.” While people often act as though clients and bureaucrats were separate classes of human beings, separated by some Manichean division of good from evil, they are demonstrably participants in a common symbolic struggle, using the same weapons, guided by the same conventions. Bureaucrats are citizens too; and, as one ethnographer of public policy management has observed, “the most basic goal of any bureaucrat or bureaucracy is not rational efficiency, but individual and organizational survival” (Britan 1981: 11). While some social scientists (such as Goffman 1959; Handelman 1976; Schwartzman 1989) have focused on the practical devices with which clients and bureaucrats negotiate with each other, there has been little discussion of the role in such interactions of the conventions of explanation, and especially of attacks on “the system.” This is the theme of secular theodicy.

Explaining the Evils of Bureaucracy

The concept of theodicy as I use it here is derived from Weber. Weber was interested in the various ways in which religious systems sought to explain the persistence of evil in a divinely ordered world. We need not take time here to consider his comparison of several major religious traditions, but it is worth noting that he linked the urgent need for theodicy to the idea of transcendence, the idea that a moral principle, or a deity, could transcend the specifics of time and place. In some religious systems, notably Christianity, this might take the form of salvation. The secular equivalent of salvation is the idea of a patriotic and democratic community, one that tolerates neither graft nor oppression.

European nationalism resembles religion in that both claim transcendent status. This might seem not to apply to nationalism whose frame of reference is a specific geographical and historical space. Nationalisms all claim transcendence, however, in two important senses. First, internally they claim to transcend individual and local differences, uniting all citizens in a single, unitary identity. Second, the forms of most European (and many other) nationalisms transcend even their own national concerns, in that the principle of national identity is considered to underlie and infuse the particulars of nation and country. Gellner’s (1986: 124) claim that there is nothing particularly interesting or different about specific nationalisms is less an analytic observation than a somewhat backhanded voicing of the ideology itself.

Religious theodicy asks how, if there is a truly universal deity, evil can exist in so many nooks and crannies of daily experience? Weber (1963: 138–139) links the answer to this question directly to that of transcendence: “the more the development [of religion] tends toward the conception of a transcendental unitary god who is universal, the more there arises the problem of how the extraordinary power of such a god may be reconciled with the imperfection of the world that he has created and rules over.”

It is not too fanciful, I suggest, to compare this problem with that faced by the members of many modern nation-states. In the most promising beginnings of independence may lie the seeds of a horrendous tyranny; in laws promulgated by the most benign democracies lurks the possibility of bureaucratic repression. Not all *risargimenti* turned into Fascism, not all Enlightenment philosophies led to concentration camp administrations; but in even the most liberal national democracies the bureaucratic capacity for petty tyranny remains a scandal of perception, if not of fact.

The explanation, I shall argue, lies in the confusion of expressive form with practical meaning: symbols of hope may always become instruments of despair. Weber, who clearly recognized this problem, was intensely ambivalent toward bureaucracy: a necessity for the securing of various practical freedoms, it also threatened to become a rigid “iron cage” (see Mouzelis 1968: 20–21).

For ordinary people, then, including bureaucrats bewildered by the apparent ineluctability of forces that compel them to deny their own moral judgment, some sort of explanation is needed. Such explanations are not necessarily believed by those to whom they are offered. But it is not at all clear that belief is the issue.

Where Weber posits theodicy as a way of propping up belief against the evidence of a flawed world, I suggest instead that secular theodicy, at least, serves a more pragmatic goal. It provides people with social means of coping with disappointment. The fact that others do not always challenge even the most absurd attempt at explaining failure does not prove them gullible. It may instead be the evidence of a very practical orientation, one that refuses to undermine the conventions of self-justification because virtually everyone, as I noted above, may need to draw on them in the course of a lifetime.

This helps us to dispose of the contrast that is often posited between the passive “fatalism” of oriental peoples and the action orientation of the West—a first step toward conceptually unravelling “the West” itself. Weber (1976) suggests that Calvinism, with its doctrine of predestination, was the crucial stepping-stone in the evolution from a fatalistic to an activist orientation: effort in the material world to confirm one’s status as a member of the elect replaced the more contemplative acceptance of fate that allegedly characterized oriental and primitive religions. Weber’s discussion of the role of this doctrine in the West thus did not prevent him from treating the East as excluded from the march toward rational government. He made it clear, moreover, that nationalistic self satisfaction had its roots in the idea that the elect might know themselves to be predestined for greatness (Weber 1976: 166).

This mode of explanation is still very popular in attempts to compare the industrialized West with other parts of the world. It informs, for example, a recent account of the persistence of patronage and resignation to official dictates among Middle Eastern populations (Presthus 1973). We shall discover, however, that resignation is a poor gloss on actual social practice: the invocation of fate can serve highly calculating ends. The citizen of an industrialized state who complains of bad luck in drawing an intolerant judge or tax official is not responding at all differently from the Turk of Greek who, having tried every possible avenue, must now face derision at home, at work, or in the neighborhood, and seeks to minimize this social damage. In Weber’s analysis, the use of predestination is effectively retrospective: once people had demonstrably succeeded in their industry (in both senses of that word), their heavenly destination would be plain for all to see. Their character was a part of their fate, to be revealed in the course of events throughout which they had continually to keep up the struggle for success. As we shall see, such eminently practical concerns are not in any sense the exclusive prerogative of northern European Protestants.

Thus, what marks off the condition of modernity is not doctrinal impulse, but increasing centralization and scale. The symbolic values that are activated, however, are sometimes remarkably consistent from one level of social integration to the next. The symbolic roots of Western bureaucracy are not to be sought, in the first instance, in the official forms of bureaucracy itself, although significant traces may be discovered there. They subsist above all in

popular reactions to bureaucracy—in the ways in which ordinary people actually manage and conceptualize bureaucratic relations.

There are clearly differences in the efficiency and level of integration of bureaucracy among different countries. But to attribute these differences to variations in national character or still more generically to a contrast between oriental and occidental personality types, is simply a vicarious fatalism in its own right an assertion, never demonstrated but often taken on trust, that “they” cannot escape the constraints of culture and society to the extent that “individualists” are supposedly able to do in the West. Presthus (1973: 54) portrays the Middle East in these terms: “Inshalla,” the belief that God’s will determines the course of human events, fosters a somewhat negative attitude to self-aid and innovation.” Culture, no less than biology (and perhaps implicitly because of it), is seen as destiny.

And yet that mark of differentiation is itself part of the same logic and symbolism as that of (for example) the supposedly backward peasants of the non-industrialized Mediterranean lands. The latter may in fact also treat their successes as a consequence of character, saying in effect that one is predestined to be a certain type of person. In this sense, their position is remarkably close to that of Weber’s Calvinists. They, too, are entrepreneurs. The one clear contrast lies in the far more massive scale at which collective action is possible in industrialized countries. The idea that fate subsumes character is elevated, in the modern nations to a much more broadly inclusive level, giving rise to the grim predestinations of national character and destiny.

To the extent that a Middle Eastern cultural attitude of the kind Presthus describes really exists, it is no more usefully treated as a resignation to the inevitable than Calvinist notions of predestination. Like these, it is a theodicy, useful for explaining away one’s own misfortunes or the successes of one’s competitors. If Middle Eastern attitudes do exhibit generic divergences from the values of post-Reformation northern Europe, these must be seen as a consequence rather than a cause of international inequalities. Such cultural contrasts, so judgmental in their implications and so easily evoked at the level of national entities, also subsist at more local levels, particularly between a capital city and its provinces. They spring from real experience, and from the resulting conviction that since those in authority cannot be trusted, one must seek more intimate bases of reliance. If the state has proved unable to fashion a perfect national universe, people have grounds for seeking self-exonerating explanations of their own failures to deal with bureaucratic mismanagement.

The concept of a secular theodicy is part of a larger argument in which I propose to treat nation-state bureaucracy as directly analogous to the ritual system of a religion. Both are founded on the principle of identity: the elect as an exclusive community, whose members’ individual sins cannot undermine the ultimate perfection of the ideal they all share. Both posit a direct identification between the community of believers and the unity of that ideal. This is what Weber (1963: 50) meant when he claimed that “[i]t was Moses’ great achievement to find a compromise solution of... class conflicts... and to organize the Israelite confederacy by means of an integral national god.” We may view the continual reaffirmation of transcendent identity as an effect of some bureaucratic labor. The labor itself is highly ritualistic: forms, symbols, texts, sanctions, obedience. If some bureaucrats fail to do their jobs wisely or fairly, it does not invalidate the meanings of these formal accoutrements, although it may undercut the authority of particular officials—and it certainly calls for a comprehensive theodicy. Just as anticlericalism often coexists with deep religiosity (Herzfeld 1985: 242–247), those Greeks (for example) whose experience of bureaucracy leads them to exclaim, “We have no state (*dhen ekhoume kratos*)!” are thereby affirming their desire for precisely such a source of justice in their lives.

Symbolism and the State

Much has been written by anthropologists about the symbolic aspects of the modern nation-state (for example, Binns 197–1980; Cohen 1974; Gajek 1990; Handler 1985; Kligman 1981; Linke 1985, 1986; Löfgren 1989), and I make no claim to novelty in emphasizing the symbolic aspects of government power. Such writings have been valuable in showing that symbols can be emotionally manipulated for political purposes. The danger with this approach, which derives from Durkheim's separation of the sacred from the profane, is that it often treats that distinction in highly literal, one might say ecclesiastical, terms. As Douglas (1986: 97) notes, that is an unhelpful development, for it disregards the ways in which highly charged symbols pervade areas of everyday. Elsewhere, I discuss this usage in the context of historic conservation and its bureaucratic management in a Cretan town (Herzfeld 1991), experience that are not obviously political—sacralized intrusions into profane social space.

Unobtrusive symbols, however, are often the most potent of all. Their connections with received ideas about self and body, family and foes, give them unusual potential for manipulation. They seem natural and obvious. When drawn from physical nature, they exemplify what Douglas (1970), emphasizing their surreptitious force, has called “natural symbols.” These include race, blood, and kinship. For better or for worse, such ideas have served state ideologies well. Weber (1963: 90) pointed out that bureaucracies have tolerated and even exploited popular religion to induce cohesion and obedience. The social symbolism of family and local groups, and especially the highly sacralized rhetoric of blood, has a similar utility.

In the earlier chapters, I shall provide more details about the specific forms of the symbols that nationalism shares with local level societies. The most widespread of these forms is the imagery of blood as the common substance, or essence, conferring common identity. Like all symbols, this complex can take on a wide variety of meanings, some of which may diverge radically. Indeed, symbolic ambiguity is central to my argument. Because some symbols have proved extremely durable, it is often assumed that their meanings are constant. Nothing could be further from the truth. While blood may become the basis of differentiation in general, for example, the question of whom it includes and excludes is the most important issue here. It obviously makes a great deal of difference whether one remarks of an in-law that the latter is “not a blood relative,” of an enemy state that “we shall shed their blood in revenge for ours,” or of an ethnic minority that “we should not mix their blood with ours.” These are widely separated levels. Even at the same level, however, the symbol of blood can be used both to include and to exclude. It is a device of extraordinary affect and power.

Blood is the key metaphor in representations of kinship in Europe and elsewhere. Adam Kuper (1988) has recently given us an astute account of the rise, in the nineteenth century, of an “illusory” distinction between primitive societies based on blood and kinship and modern ones based on the contract. This idea persists in the enduring distinction between tribal anarchy and bureaucratic rationality. What is so extraordinary here is that the metaphor of blood-kinship clearly suffuses the rhetoric of the state even as the latter denies its relevance. While modernity is largely defined by a commitment to rational management and immunity to family interest, the rhetoric of state is redolent with kinship metaphors. Those who serve familial interests at the expense of larger, communal ones are treated as though they were guilty of the political equivalent of incest.

There are, of course, very sound practical reasons for the desire to eradicate favoritism of any sort. My intention here is not to decry the intentions or the reasoning that underlie such impulses. The danger to democratic institutions does not, I suggest, lie in critiques of political or civic processes which is after all the stated aim of such institutions to protect. That same aim,

however, may be seriously subverted if we lose sight of the metaphorical basis of much bureaucratic rationality. The familial and bodily symbols of nationalism are not simply metaphors. They are powerful emotive magnets, and they can be, and are, deployed by capricious officials and citizens. In the hands of totalitarian regimes, they can become an instrument of mass suasion. For all the enormous intellectual labor that has gone into the creation of a primitive “other,” the collective bureaucratic self is cast in the very language and imagery that is conventionally attributed to that other. A sense of paradox arises from pious objections to the alleged “amoral familism” of Mediterranean or Latin American peasants, objections often raised by their own governments, when official rhetoric still makes the family the moral core of the citizen’s affective bond with the state.

This is not to say that such rhetoric indicates bad faith. To the contrary, it is presumably based on the assumption that the family provides an easily understood model for the loyalty and collective responsibility that citizens must feel toward the state. Just as internal strife can disrupt a family to the point of dissolution, so civil war can arise from various forms of political factionalism and subvert the most generous intentions of officials at every level. But the rhetoric of kinship, which may provide a strong basis for day-to-day solidarity when applied by disinterested officials, can also serve more sinister aims—sinister, because they consist of the special interests that they purport to deny. The rhetoric of “the common good” does not always serve the common good.

It is one of the goals of this book to show how and why this can happen. It is not my intention to brand officialdom in general, or to investigate the psychological motives of those in whom we recognize the worst of bureaucratic repression. Instead, I intend to ask how it is possible for these people to wreak such widespread damage. I shall argue that they draw on resources that are common to the symbolism of the Western nation-states and to that of long-established forms of social, cultural, and racial exclusion in everyday life. Any symbolic form, removed from its original context and given new meanings by official fiat, may easily relapse into something akin to its previous significance. It also provides members of the public with a means of conceptualizing their own disappointments and humiliations, and with an argument that, under some circumstances, may lead them to acquiesce in the humiliation of others—the social production of indifference.

In the opening chapter, I offer an argument for treating the world of the bureaucratic West within the same framework as the smaller-scale societies traditionally studied by anthropologists. Mary Douglas, to whose comprehensive work on classification and symbolism this book owes a great deal, has made a cogent case against overestimating the importance of scale and sociocultural complexity in determining the relations between institutions and the way people think (Douglas 1986: 21–30). Her argument attacks the false dichotomy between primitive and modern modes of social organization, and points out that most anthropologists today would reject the stereotype of a tribal society forever mired in unchangeable tradition.

To her argument, however, I would add a further dimension: that of the historical relationship between modern industrial societies and the local societies that they had to unite within themselves in order to constitute themselves as nation-states. In that long process of transformation, certain symbolic forms were earned forward. While their meanings often changed, they have in many cases remained extremely volatile, liable to manipulation and misprision in equal measure. Douglas treats the social basis of identity, a theme to which we shall return in Chapter Three under the heading of “iconicity,” without attending to the semantic slippage that has enabled seeming continuities of symbolic form to conceal potentially disruptive ideological changes. Earlier and modern societies, or national states and local communities, may not consider their contexts of use or the historical processes of transformation that conjoin them.

In Chapter Two, I attempt a more comprehensive delineation of indifference and its relationship to systems of classification. In pursuit of this goal, I examine three studies that all focus on change. One, an ethnographic account of a Portuguese fishing village offers the sort of evolutionary view of encroaching modernity that Douglas so rightly rejects, although its author builds on her work to show connections between the symbolism of a prebureaucratic social order and the new way of doing things. A similar contradiction appears in the second study, an ethnographic account of peasant workers in northern Italy, since the author of that study follows Weber's pessimistic account of the "disenchantment" of the modern world—a common sociological conceit in the early years of the twentieth century (see Nisbet 1973). In the Italian study however, nuanced historical analysis allows us to see the source of the continuities: they are not just formal nor are they indicative of growing conceptual complexity, but they spring from changes in the distribution of local power and the effects of outside forces. Finally, I turn to a very recent comparative account of nationalism and exclusion in Sri Lanka and Australia. This work, also a study of transformations, serves to focus attention on the fact that any ideology, no matter how consistent its formal expression, may produce radically divergent applications and interpretations.

This is crucially important, and is addressed more fully in Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Three examines the formal properties of stereotypes, both those commonly entertained about bureaucrats (the conventions of disdain) and those that appear to guide bureaucrats' own actions. In both cases, we find ourselves examining the use of conventional images for what often turn out to be far from disinterested goals. Chapters Three and Four examine the role of individuals and groups in taking seemingly transparent symbols and investing them with different meanings, some of which are derived from older or more local contexts than those ostensibly in force. In Chapter Three the focus is explicitly on stereotypes, in Chapter Four on the forms of language in general.

These chapters provoke questions about accountability. If people can shift the meanings of institutionalized forms, who is to hold them responsible? Alternatively, what devices can officials use to escape the constraints of accountability? And how do their clients cope with a world in which officials can duck their responsibilities so easily? These sets of strategies are mutually complementary, and belong to a shared symbolic order. We are back to the issue of theodicy here. Moreover, we will find that officials' dependence on a symbolism derived from local-level interests allows or compels them—according to circumstances—to depart from received interpretations of the law. It is not only the state that determines the bounds of the acceptable.

Chapter Five is an ethnographic demonstration of these points, particularly of the role of secular theodicy. Theoretical arguments about the way national bureaucracies work have not paid sufficient attention to the common ground on which bureaucratic practices and popular attitudes rest. Yet it is clear that, in the absence of such common ground, bureaucrats would feel no need to excuse their actions, nor would citizens have any hope of reversing them. In looking closely at one particular set of popular attitudes, then, I hope to say something of a more general nature about the relationship between secular theodicy and official ideology. While there are special reasons for examining the case of modern Greece in particular, the data presented in Chapter Five suggest the possibility of comparable data elsewhere—data that would help us to explore further the mutual dependence that we discover in institutional structures and individual strategies. Finally, in the closing chapter, I offer some suggestions about where such a comparative exercise might lead.

I do not claim that anthropology can or should supplant the insights of other disciplines into bureaucratic practice, nor would I expect, from the vantage point that I have sketched here, to provide a comprehensive account of bureaucratic process. I suggest, however, that anthropological sensitivity to immediate context—ethnography—helps shift the focus away from perspectives that are already, to some extent, determined by the institutional structures they were set up to examine. I have chosen to call my subject “Western” bureaucracy in part from a playful sense of irony: it is not at all clear what “the West” is, even though its existence and its association with bureaucratic rationality are often assumed. By making central such a problematical identity, I seek the sort of productive discomfort that characterizes anthropology through continual realignments of cultural and social comparison. This is an approach that offers a perspective on how people contend with the forces that try to control who they are.

13

What is Citizenship, and Why Does it Matter?

RICHARD BELLAMY

Interest in citizenship has never been higher. Politicians of all stripes stress its importance, as do church leaders, captains of industry, and every kind of campaigning group—from those supporting global causes, such as tackling world poverty, to others with a largely local focus, such as combating neighbourhood crime. Governments across the world have promoted the teaching of citizenship in schools and universities, and introduced citizenship tests for immigrants seeking to become naturalized citizens. Types of citizenship proliferate continuously, from dual and transnational citizenship, to corporate citizenship and global citizenship. Whatever the problem—be it the decline in voting, increasing numbers of teenage pregnancies, or climate change—someone has canvassed the revitalization of citizenship as part of the solution.

The sheer variety and range of these different uses of citizenship can be somewhat baffling. Historically, citizenship has been linked to the privileges of membership of a particular kind of political community—one in which those who enjoy a certain status are entitled to participate on an equal basis with their fellow citizens in making the collective decisions that regulate social life. In other words, citizenship has gone hand in hand with political participation in some form of democracy—most especially, the right to vote. The various new forms of citizenship are often put forward as alternatives to this traditional account with its narrow political focus. Yet, though justified in some respects, to expand citizenship too much, so that it comes to encompass people's rights and duties in all their dealings with others, potentially obscures its important and distinctive role as a specific kind of political relationship. Citizenship is different not only to other types of political affiliation, such as subjecthood in monarchies or dictatorships, but also to other kinds of social relationship, such as being a parent, a friend, a partner, a neighbour, a colleague, or a customer.

Over time, the nature of the democratic political community and the qualities needed to be a citizen has changed. The city states of ancient Greece, which first gave rise to the notion of citizenship, were quite different to the ancient Roman republic or the city states of Renaissance Italy, and all differed tremendously from the nation states that emerged in the late 18th and early 19th centuries and that still provide the primary context for citizenship today. In large part, the contemporary concern with citizenship can be seen as reflecting the view that we are currently witnessing a further transformation of political community, and so of citizenship, produced by the twin and related impacts of globalization and multiculturalism. In different ways, these two social processes are testing the capacity of nation states to coordinate and define the collective lives of their citizens, altering the very character of citizenship along the way.

These developments and their consequences for citizenship provide the central theme of this book. The rest of this chapter sets the scene and lays out the book's agenda. I shall start by looking at why citizenship is important and needs to be understood in political terms, then move on to a more precise definition of citizenship, and conclude by noting some of the challenges it faces—both in general, and in the specific circumstances confronting contemporary societies.

Why Political Citizenship?

Citizenship has traditionally referred to a particular set of political practices involving specific public rights and duties with respect to a given political community. Broadening its meaning to encompass human relations generally detracts from the importance of the distinctively political tasks citizens perform to shape and sustain the collective life of the community. Without doubt, the commonest and most crucial of these tasks is involvement in the democratic process—primarily by voting, but also by speaking out, campaigning in various ways, and standing for office. Whether citizens participate or not, the fact that they can do so colours how they regard their other responsibilities, such as abiding by those democratically passed laws they disagree with, paying taxes, doing military service, and so on. It also provides the most effective mechanism for them to promote their collective interests and encourage their political rulers to pursue the public's good rather than their own.

Democratic citizenship is as rare as it is important. At present, only around 120 of the world's countries, or approximately 64% of the total, are electoral democracies in the meaningful sense of voters having a realistic chance of changing the incumbent government for a set of politicians more to their taste. Indeed, a mere 22 of the world's existing democracies have been continuously democratic in this sense for a period of 50 years or more. And though the number of working democracies has steadily but slowly grown since the Second World War, voter turnout in established democracies has experienced an equally slow but steady decline. For example, turnout in the United States in the period 1945 to 2005 has decreased by 13.8% from the high of 62.8% of eligible voters in 1960 to the low of 49.0% in 1996, and in the UK, turnout has gone down by 24.2% from the high of 83.6% in 1950 to the low of 59.4% in 2001. True, as elsewhere, both countries have experienced considerable fluctuations between highs and lows over the past 60 years, depending on how contested or important voters felt the election to be, while in some countries voting levels have remained extremely robust, with Sweden, for example, experiencing a comparatively very modest low of 77.4% in 1958 and a staggering high of 91.8% in 1976. The general downward trend is nevertheless undeniable. Yet, despite citizens expressing increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic arrangements of their countries, they continue to approve of democracy itself. The World Values Survey of 2000–2002 found that 89% of respondents in the US regarded democracy as a 'good system of government' and 87% the 'best', while in the UK 87% thought it 'good' and 78% the 'best' (in Sweden it was 97% and 94% respectively). Whatever the perceived or real shortcomings of most democratic systems, therefore, most members of democratic countries seem to accept that democracy matters and that it is the prospect of influencing government policy according to reasonably fair rules and on a more or less equal basis with others that forms the distinguishing mark of the citizen. In those countries where people lack this crucial opportunity, they are at best guests and at worst mere subjects—many, getting on for 40% of the world's population, of authoritarian and oppressive regimes.

Why is being able to vote so crucial, and how does it relate to all the other qualities and benefits that are commonly associated with citizenship? All but anarchists believe that we need some sort of stable political framework to regulate social and economic life, along with various political institutions—such as a bureaucracy, legal system and courts, a police force and army—to formulate and implement the necessary regulations. At a bare minimum, this framework will seek to preserve our bodies and property from physical harm by others, and provide clear and reasonably stable conditions for all the various forms of social interaction that most individuals find to some degree unavoidable—be it travelling on the roads, buying and selling goods and labour, or marriage and co-habitation. As we shall see, many people believe that we need more than this bare minimum, but few doubt that in a society of any complexity we require at least these elements and that only a political community with properties similar to those we now associate with a state is going to provide them.

The social and moral dispositions that increasingly have come to be linked to citizenship, such as good neighbourliness, are certainly important supplements to any political framework, no matter how extensive. Rules and regulations cannot cover everything, and their being followed cannot depend on coercion alone. If people acted in a socially responsible way only because they feared being punished otherwise, it would be necessary to create a police state of totalitarian scope to preserve social order—a remedy potentially far worse than the disorder it would seek to prevent. However, we cannot simply rely on people acting well either. It is not just that some people may take advantage of the goodness of others. Humans are also fallible creatures, possessing limited knowledge and reasoning power, and with the best will in the world, are likely to err or disagree. Most complex problems raise a range of moral concerns, some of which may conflict, while the chain of cause and effect that produced them, and the likely consequences of any decisions we make to solve them, can all be very hard if not impossible to know for sure. Imagine if there was no highway code or traffic regulations and we had to coordinate with other drivers simply on the basis of us all possessing good judgement and behaving civilly and responsibly towards each other. Even if everyone acts conscientiously, there will be situations, such as blind corners or complicated interchanges, where we just lack the information to make competent judgements because it is impossible to second guess with any certainty what others might decide to do. Political regulation, say by installing traffic lights, in this and similar cases coordinates our interactions in ways that allow us to know where we stand with regard to others. In areas such as commerce, for example, that means we can enter into agreements and plan ahead with a degree of confidence.

Now any reasonably stable and efficient political framework, even one presided over by a ruthless tyrant, will provide us some of these benefits. For example, think of the increased uncertainty and insecurity suffered by many Iraqi citizens as a result of the lack of an effective political order following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. However, those possessing no great wealth, power, or influence—the vast majority of people in other words—will not be satisfied with just any framework. They will want one that applies to all—including the government—and treats everyone impartially and as equals, no matter how rich or important they may be. In particular, they will want its provisions to provide a just basis for all to enjoy freedom to pursue their lives as they choose on equal terms with everyone else, and in so far as is compatible with their having a reasonable amount of personal security through the maintenance of an appropriate degree of social and political stability. And a necessary, if not always a sufficient, condition for ensuring the laws and policies of a political community possess these characteristics is that the country is a working electoral democracy and that citizens participate in making it so. Apart from anything else, political involvement helps citizens shape what this framework should look like. People are likely to disagree about what equality, freedom, and security involve and the best policies to support them in given circumstances. Democracy offers the potential for citizens to debate on these issues on roughly equal terms and to come to some appreciation of each other's views and interests. It also promotes government that is responsive to their evolving concerns and changing conditions by giving politicians an incentive to rule in ways that reflect and advance not their own interests but those of most citizens.

The logic is simple, even if the practice often is not, if politicians consistently ignore citizens or prove incompetent, they will eventually lose office. Moreover, in a working democracy, where parties regularly alternate in power, a related incentive exists for citizens to listen to each other. Not only will very varied groups of citizens need to form alliances to build an electoral majority, often making compromises in the process, but also they will be aware that the composition of any future winning coalition is likely to shift and could exclude them. So the winners always have reason to be respectful of the needs and views of the losers.

At its best democratic citizenship comes in this way to promote a degree of equity and reciprocity among citizens. For example, suppose the electorate contains 30% who want higher pensions, 40% wanting to lower taxes, 60% desiring more roads, 30% who want more trains, 60% supporting lower carbon emissions, 30% who oppose abortion, 60% who want better-funded hospitals, 30% who desire improved schools, 20% who want more houses built, and 35% who support fox hunting. I have made up these figures, but the distribution of support across a given range of political issues is not unlike that found in most democracies. Now, note how several policies are likely to prove incompatible with each other—spending more on one thing will mean less on another, improving hospitals may mean less spending on roads or schools, and so on. Note too how it is unlikely that any person or group will find themselves consistently in the majority or the minority on all issues—the minority who support hunting, say, is unlikely to overlap entirely with the minority who oppose abortion or the minority who want more houses. So I may be in a minority so far as my views on abortion are concerned and a majority when it comes to fox hunting, in a minority on schooling and a majority on road building, and so on. And each time I will be allied with a slightly different group of people.

Meanwhile, even when people broadly agree on an issue, they may disagree strongly about which policy best resolves it. So, a majority—say 60%—may agree we need to lower carbon emissions, but still disagree about how to do so—30% may favour nuclear energy, 30% wind power, 20% measures for reducing the use of cars, 25% more green taxes, and so on. As a result, most people may in fact support very few policies that enjoy outright majority support—they will mainly be in different minorities alongside partly overlapping but often distinct groups of people. If a party wants to build a working majority, therefore, it will have to construct a coalition of minorities across a broad spectrum of issues and policies and arrange trade-offs between them. That makes it probable that most people will like some bits of the programmes of opposing parties and dislike other bits: a US voter might prefer the attitude towards abortion of most Democrats and the economic policies of most Republicans, say, and a UK voter the health policies of Labour and the EU policies of the Conservatives. They will cast their vote on the basis of a preponderance of things they like or dislike, appropriately weighted for what they regard as most important. Over time, as issues and attitudes change, party fortunes are likely to wax and wane and with them the extent to which the preferred policies of any individual voter coincide with a majority or a minority. ‘One person, one vote’ means that each person’s preferences are treated in an equitable fashion, while the need for parties to address a range of people’s views within their programmes forces citizens to practice a degree of mutual toleration and accommodation of each other’s interests and concerns.

One can imagine circumstances in which a person could enjoy an equitable political framework without being a citizen. If someone is holidaying abroad in a stable democratic state, she will generally benefit from many of the advantages of its legal system and public services in much the same way as its citizens. The laws upholding most of her civil liberties will be identical, offering her similar rights to theirs against violent assault or fraud, say, and to a fair trial in the event that she is involved in such crimes. Likewise, she shall have many of the same obligations as a citizen and will have to obey those laws that concern her, such as speed limits if she is driving a car, paying sales tax on many goods, and so on. Most of the non-legally prescribed social duties that have become associated with citizenship will also apply. If she believes a socially responsible person should pick up litter, help old ladies cross the road, avoid racist and sexist remarks, and buy only fair trade goods, then she has as much reason to abide by these norms abroad as at home. Indeed, similar considerations will lie behind her recognizing the value of following the laws of a foreign country, even though she has had no role in framing them. Likewise, to the extent the citizens of her host country are motivated by such considerations, they should act as civilly to visitors as they do towards their co-citizens. If she likes the country so much she decides to find a job and stay on for a while, then she will probably pay income tax and be protected by

employment legislation and possibly even enjoy certain social benefits. Of course, in practice a number of contingent factors can put non-citizens at a disadvantage compared to many citizens in exercising their rights—especially if they are not fluent in the local language. But these sorts of disadvantages are not the direct result of not possessing the status of a citizen. After all, naturalized citizens might be in much the same position with regard to many of them. Nor need they prevent her, as a hardworking and polite individual who is solicitous towards others, from becoming a valued pillar of the local community, respected by her neighbours. Why then be bothered with being able to vote, do jury duty, and various other tasks many citizens find onerous—especially if she may never need any of the additional rights citizens enjoy?

There are two reasons why she ought to be concerned—both of which highlight why citizenship in the political sense is important. First, unlike citizens, she does not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in this country, and if she fell foul of the authorities could be refused entry or deported. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this is a core right in an age when many people are stateless as a result of war or oppressive regimes in their countries of origin, or are driven by severe poverty to seek a better life elsewhere. But in a way it still begs the question of why she should want to become a citizen rather than simply a permanent resident. After all, most democratic countries acknowledge a humanitarian duty to help those in dire need and have established international agreements on asylum seekers to prevent individuals being turned away or returned to countries where their life would be in danger. Increasingly, there are also internationally recognized rights for long-term residents, or ‘denizens’ as they have come to be called. If she has lawfully entered the country and is a law-abiding individual, so there are no prospects of her being deported, then why not just enjoy living under its well-ordered regime? The second reason comes in here. For the qualities she likes about this country stem in large part from its democratic character. Even the quasi-citizenship status she has come to possess under international law is the product of international agreements that are promoted and reliably kept only by democratic states. And their being democracies depends in turn on at least a significant proportion of citizens within such states doing their duty and participating in the democratic process.

As I noted above, increasing numbers of citizens do not bother participating. They either feel it is pointless to do so or are happy to free-ride on the efforts of others. They are mistaken. It may well be that, as presently organized, democracy falls far short of the expectations citizens have of it, so that they feel their involvement has little or no effect. Yet that view is not so much an argument for abandoning democracy as for seeking to improve it. One need only compare life under any established democracy, imperfect though they all are, with that under any existing undemocratic regime to be aware that democracy makes a difference from which the majority of citizens draw tangible benefits. People lack self-respect, and possibly respect for others too, in a regime under which they do not have the possibility of expressing their views and being counted, no matter how benevolently and efficiently it is run. Rulers need no longer see the ruled as equals, as entitled to give an opinion and have their interests considered on the same terms as everyone else. And so they need not take them into account. Democratic citizenship changes the way power is exercised and the attitudes of citizens to each other. Because democracy gives us a share in ruling and in being ruled in the ways indicated above, citizenship allows us both to control our political leaders and to control ourselves and collaborate with our fellow citizens on a basis of equal concern and respect. By contrast, the permanent resident of my example is just a tolerated subject. She may express her views, but is not entitled to have them heard on an equal basis to citizens.

The Components of Citizenship: Towards A Definition

Citizenship, therefore, has an intrinsic link to democratic politics. It involves membership of an exclusive club—those who take the key decisions about the collective life of a given political community. And the character of that community in many ways reflects what people make it. In particular, their participation or lack of it plays an important role in determining how far, and in what ways, it treats people as equals. Three linked components of citizenship emerge from this analysis—membership of a democratic political community, the collective benefits and rights associated with membership, and participation in the community's political, economic, and social processes—all of which combine in different ways to establish a condition of civic equality.

The first component, membership or belonging, concerns who is a citizen. In the past, many have been excluded from within as well as outside the political community. Internal exclusions have included those designated as natural inferiors on racial, gender, or other grounds; or as unqualified due to a lack of property or education; or as disqualified through having committed a crime or become jobless, homeless, or mentally ill. So, in most established democracies, women obtained the vote long after the achievement of universal male suffrage, before which many workers were excluded, while prisoners often lose their right to vote, as does—by default—anyone who does not have a fixed address. Many of these internal grounds for exclusion have been dropped as baseless, though others remain live issues, as does the unequal effectiveness of the right to vote among different groups. However, much recent attention has concentrated on the external exclusions of asylum seekers and immigrants. Here, too, there have been changes towards more inclusive policies at both the domestic and international levels, though significant exclusionary measures persist or have recently been introduced. Yet, the current high levels of international migration, though not unprecedented, have been sufficiently intense and prolonged and of such global scope as to have forced a major rethink of the criteria for citizenship.

None of these criteria proves straightforward. Citizenship implies the capacity to participate in both the political and the socio-economic life of the community. Yet, the nature of that participation and the capabilities it calls for have varied over time and remain matters of debate. Citizens must also be willing to see themselves as in some sense belonging to the particular state in which they reside. At the very least, they must recognize it as a center of power entitled to regulate their behaviour, demand taxes, and so on, in return for providing them with various public goods. How far they must also identify with their fellow citizens is a different matter. A working democracy certainly requires some elements of a common civic culture: notably, broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the prevailing rules of politics and probably a common language or languages for political debate. A degree of trust and solidarity among citizens also proves important if all are to collaborate in producing the collective benefits of citizenship, rather than some attempting to free-ride on the efforts of others. The extent to which such qualities depend on citizens possessing a shared identity is a more contested, yet crucial, issue as societies become increasingly multi-cultural.

The second component, rights, has often been seen as the defining criterion of citizenship. Contemporary political philosophers have adopted two main approaches to identifying these rights. A first approach seeks to identify those rights that citizens ought to acknowledge if they are to treat each other as free individuals worthy of equal concern and respect. A second approach tries, more modestly, simply to identify the rights that are necessary if citizens are to participate in democratic decision-making on free and equal terms. Both approaches prove problematic. Even if most committed democrats broadly accept the legitimacy of one or other of these accounts of citizens' rights as being implicit in the very idea of democracy, they come to very different conclusions about the precise rights either approach might

generate. These differences largely reflect the various ideological and other divisions that form the mainstay of contemporary democratic politics. So neo-liberals are likely to regard the free market as sufficient to show individuals equality of concern and respect with regard to their social and economic rights, whereas a social democrat is more likely to wish to see a publicly supported health service and social security system too. Similarly, some people might advocate a given system of proportional representation as necessary to guarantee a citizen's equal right to vote, others view the plurality first past the post system as sufficient or even, in some respects, superior. As a result of these disagreements, the rights of citizenship have to be seen, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, as subject to the decisions of citizens themselves.

That paradox seems less acute, though, once we also note that making rights the primary consideration is in various respects too reductive. We tend to see rights as individual entitlements—they are claims individuals can make against others, including governments, to certain standards of decency in the way they are treated. However, though rights attach to individuals, they have an important collective dimension that the link with citizenship serves to highlight. What does the work in any account of rights is not the appeal to rights as such but to the arguments for why people have those rights. Most of these arguments have two elements. First, they appeal to certain goods as being important for human beings to be able to lead a life that reflects their own free choices and effort—usually the absence of coercion by others and certain material preconditions for agency, such as food, shelter and health. Second, and most importantly from our point of view, they imply that social relations should be so organized that we secure these rights on an equal basis for all. Rights are collective goods in two important senses, therefore. On the one hand, they assume that we all share an interest in certain goods as important for us to be able to shape our own lives. On the other hand, these rights can only be provided by people accepting certain civic duties that ensure they are respected, including cooperating to set up appropriate collective arrangements. For example, if we take personal security as an uncontested shared human good, then a right to this good can only be protected if all refrain from illegitimate interference with others and collaborate to establish a legal system and police force that upholds that right in a fair manner that treats all as equals. In other words, we return to the arguments establishing the priority of political citizenship canvassed earlier. For rights depend on the existence of some form of political community in which citizens seek fair terms of association to secure those goods necessary for them to pursue their lives on equal terms with others. Hence, the association of rights with the rights of democratic citizens, with citizenship itself forming the right of rights because it is the 'right to have rights'—the capacity to institutionalize the rights of citizens in an appropriately egalitarian way.

The third component, participation, comes in here. Calling citizenship the 'right to have rights' indicates how access to numerous rights depends on membership of a political community. However, many human rights activists have criticized the exclusive character of citizenship for this very reason, maintaining that rights ought to be available to all on an equal basis regardless of where you are born or happen to live. As a result, they have sometimes argued against any limits on access to citizenship. Rights should transcend the boundaries of any political community and not depend on either membership or participation. Though there is much justice in these criticisms, they are deficient in three main respects.

First, the citizens of well-run democracies enjoy a level and range of entitlements that extend beyond what most people would characterize as human rights—that is, rights that we are entitled to simply on humanitarian grounds. Of course, it could be argued with some justification that many of these countries have benefited from the indirect or direct exploitation of poorer, often non-democratic, states and various related human rights abuses, such as selling arms to their authoritarian rulers. Rectifying these abuses, though, would still allow for significant differentials in wealth between countries. For, second, rights also result from the positive activities of citizens

themselves and their contributions to the collective goods of their political community. In this respect, citizenship forms the ‘right to have rights’ in placing in citizens’ own hands the ability to decide which rights they will provide for and how. Some countries might choose to have high taxes and generous public health, education, and social security schemes, say, others to have lower taxes and less generous public provision of these goods, or more spending on culture or on police and the armed forces. Finally, none of the above rules out recognizing the ‘right to have rights’ as a human right that creates an obligation on the part of existing democratic states to aid rather than hinder democratization processes in non-democratic states, to give succour to asylum seekers and to have equitable and non-discriminatory naturalization procedures for migrant workers willing to commit to the duties of citizenship in their adopted countries.

So membership, rights, and participation go together. It is through being a member of a political community and participating on equal terms in the framing of its collective life that we enjoy rights to pursue our individual lives on fair terms with others. If we put these three components together, we come up with the following definition of citizenship:

Citizenship is a condition of civic equality. It consists of membership of a political community where all citizens can determine the terms of social cooperation on an equal basis. This status not only secures equal rights to the enjoyment of the collective goods provided by the political association but also involves equal duties to promote and sustain them—including the good of democratic citizenship itself.

The Paradox and Dilemma of Citizenship

Earlier I suggested that citizenship involves a paradox encapsulated in viewing it as the ‘right to have rights’. That paradox consists in our rights as citizens being dependent on our exercising our basic citizenship right to political participation in cooperation with our fellow citizens. For our rights derive from the collective policies we decide upon to resolve common problems, such as providing for personal security with a police force and legal system. Moreover, once in place, these policies will only operate if we continue to cooperate to maintain them through paying taxes and respecting the rights of others that follow from them. So rights involve duties—not least the duty to exercise the political rights to participate on which all our other rights depend. This paradox gives rise in its turn to a dilemma that can affect much cooperative behaviour. Namely, that we will be tempted to shirk our civic duties if we feel we can enjoy the collective goods and the rights they provide by relying on others to do their bit rather than exerting ourselves. And the more citizens act in this way, the less they will trust their fellow citizens to collaborate with them. Collective arrangements will seem increasingly unreliable, prompting people to abandon citizenship for other, more individualistic, ways of securing their interests.

This dilemma proves particularly acute if the good in question has the qualities associated with what is technically known as a ‘public good’—that is a good, such as street lighting, from which nobody can be excluded from the benefits, regardless of whether they contributed to supporting it or not. In such cases, a temptation will exist for individuals to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others. So, if the neighbours either side of my house pay for a street light, they will not be able to stop me benefiting from it even if I choose not to help them with the costs. In many respects, democracy operates as a public good of this kind and so likewise confronts the quandary of free-riding. The cost of becoming informed and casting your vote is immediate and felt directly by each individual, while the benefits are far less tangible and individualized, as are the disadvantages of not voting. You will gain from living in a democracy whether you vote or not, while any individual vote contributes very little to sustaining democratic institutions. And the shortcomings of democracy—the policies and politicians people dislike—tend to be more evident

than its virtues, which are diffuse, and in newly democratized countries, often long term. As a result, the temptation to free-ride is great.

In fact, political scientists used to be puzzled why citizens bothered to vote at all—it seemed irrational. Given the very small likelihood any one person's vote will make a difference to the election result, it hardly seems worth the effort. Even the fear that democracy may collapse should have little effect on this self-centred reasoning. As an individual, it still pays the free-rider to rely on the efforts of others. After all, if others fail to do their part, there will be little point in the free-rider doing so. In the past, it seems that citizens simply were not so narrowly instrumental in their reasoning. They appear to have valued the opportunity of expressing their views along with others. The growing fear, symbolized by the decline in voting, is that such civic-mindedness has lessened, with citizens becoming more self-interested and calculating in their attitudes not just to political participation but also to the collective goods political authorities exist to provide. They have also felt that their fellow citizens and politicians are likewise concerned only with their own interests. American national election studies, for example, reveal that over the past 40 years the majority of US citizens have come to feel that government benefits a few major interests rather than those of everyone, although the percentage has fluctuated between lows of 24% and 19% in 1974 and 1994 respectively believing it benefited all, to highs of 39% and 40% in 1984 and 2004. Likewise, a British opinion poll of 1996 revealed that a staggering 88% of respondents believed Members of Parliament served interests other than their constituents' or the country's—with 56% contending they simply served their own agenda.

This change in people's attitudes and perceptions presents a major challenge to the practice and purpose of citizenship. Most of the collective goods that citizens collaborate to support and on which their rights depend are subject to the public goods dilemma described above. Like voting, the cost of the tax I pay to support the police, roads, schools, and hospitals will seem somehow more direct and personal than the benefits I derive from these goods, and a mere drop in the ocean compared to the billions needed to pay for them. Like democracy, these goods also tend to be available to all citizens regardless of how much they pay or, indeed, whether they have paid at all. True, these goods do not have the precise quality of public goods—some degree of exclusion is possible. However, it would be both inefficient and potentially create great injustices to do so. Moreover, in numerous indirect ways we all do benefit from a good transport system, a healthy and well-educated population, and from others as well as ourselves enjoying personal security. That said, people will always be naturally inclined to wonder whether they are getting value for money or are contributing more than their fair share. Such concerns are likely to be particularly acute if people feel little sense of solidarity with each other or believe others to be untrustworthy, especially when it comes to the sort of redistributive measures needed to support most social rights. Consequently, the inducements to adopt independent, non-cooperative behaviour for more apparently secure, short-term advantages will be great—even if, as will often be the case, such decisions have the perverse long-term effect of proving more costly or less beneficial not just for the community as a whole but even for most of the defecting individuals.

This tendency has been apparent in the trend within developed democracies for wealthier citizens to contract into private arrangements in ever more areas, from education and health to pensions and even personal security, often detracting from public provision in the process. So, people have opted to send their children to private schools, taken out private health insurance, employed private security firms to police their gated neighbourhoods, and sought to pay less in taxation for public schemes. But the net result has often been that the cost of education, health, and policing has risen because a proliferation of different private insurance schemes proves less efficient, while the depleted public provision brings in its wake a number of costly social problems—a less well-educated and healthy workforce, more crime, and so on.

Governments have responded to this development in four main ways. First, they have partly marketized some of these services, in form if not always in substance. One consequence of it being either technically impossible or morally unjust to exclude people from the benefits of 'public goods' is that standard market incentives do not operate. Companies have no reason to compete for customers by offering lower prices or better products if they cannot restrict enjoyment of a good to those who have paid them for it. Governments have tried to overcome this problem by getting companies periodically to compete for the contract to supply a given public service and by trying to guarantee citizens certain rights as customers. In so doing, they have stressed the state's role as a regulator rather than necessarily as a provider of services. The aim is to guarantee that given standards and levels of provision are met, regardless of whether a public or a private contractor actually offers the service concerned. In this way, governments have tried to reassure citizens that as much attention will be paid to getting value for money and meeting their requirements as would be the case if they were buying the service on their own account. Their second response has complemented this strategy by stressing the responsibilities of citizens—especially of those who are net recipients of state support. For example, a number of states have obliged recipients of social security benefit to be available for and actively to seek work, engage in retraining, and possibly to do various forms of community service. By such measures, they have tried to reassure net contributors to the system that all are pulling their weight and so retain their allegiance to collective arrangements. Third, they have adopted an increasingly marketized approach to the very practice of electoral politics. They have conducted consumer research as to citizens' preferences and attempted to woo them through branding and advertising. Finally, they have attempted to overcome cynicism about using state power to support the public interest by depoliticizing standard-setting and the regulation of the economic and political markets alike to supposedly impartial bodies immune from self-interest, such as independent banks and the courts.

These policies have had mixed results. By and large, they have been most successful for those services that can be most fully marketized, such as some of the former public utilities like gas, electricity, and telephones, and where there are reasonably clear, technical criteria for what a good service should be and how it might be obtained. For other goods—particularly those where the imperatives for public provision are as much moral as economic, and defection into private arrangements is comparatively easy, such as health care or education—a partial withdrawal from, and a resulting attenuation of, public services has occurred in many advanced democratic states.

Meanwhile, disillusion about politics has grown. Citizens have increasingly felt politicians will do anything for their vote and once in power employ it selfishly and ineptly. Civic solidarity has decreased accordingly as inequalities have grown between social groups. While the better educated and wealthier sections of society have pushed governments and politicians to do less and less, the poorer sections, who find it harder to organize in any case, have increasingly withdrawn from politics altogether. The problem seems to be two-fold. On the one hand, citizens have adopted a more consumer-orientated and critical view of democratic politics. They have taken a more self-interested stance, assuming that others, their fellow citizens, politicians, and those in the public sector more generally, do so too. On the other hand, politicians have likewise treated citizens more like consumers and both marketized the public sector where possible and acted themselves rather like the heads of rival firms. Commentators differ as to which came first, but most accept these two developments have fuelled each other, producing increasing disillusionment with democratic politics. Instead of being viewed as a means of bringing citizens together in pursuit of those public interests from which they collectively benefit, politics has come to be seen as but an inefficient mechanism for individuals to pursue their private interests.

Globalisation has been widely perceived as further promoting both these sources of political disaffection. That many public goods, from security against crime to monetary stability, can only be obtained through international mechanisms, has added to civic disaffection and the

belief in the shortcomings of political measures. International organizations are inevitably much more distant from the citizens they serve. Size matters, and it is much harder to feel solidarity with very large and highly diverse groups with whom one has few, if any, shared cultural or other references and hardly any direct interaction. As a result, short-term individualised behaviour is much more likely. Put simply, cheating on strangers is easier than with people you meet every day and will continue to interact with into the foreseeable future. The more complex and globalised societies are, the more we all become strangers to each other. It also becomes much harder to influence or hold politicians to account. Your vote is one in millions rather than thousands, and it is more difficult to combine with others in groups sharing one's interests and concerns that are of sufficient size to influence those with power. Again, markets and weak forms of depoliticised regulation have come to be seen as more competent and impartial than collective political solutions.

The European Union (EU), the world's most developed international organisation, reflects these dilemmas and responses well. Despite having elections and a parliament, European politicians are both little trusted and scarcely known, while electoral turnout is far below that for national elections of the member states and likewise on the decline. By and large, citizens have remained tied to their national or subnational allegiances and mainly, and increasingly, view the EU in narrowly self-interested terms as either beneficial or not to their country or economic group. European political parties exist largely as voting blocks of national parties within the European Parliament, while the vast majority of trans-European civil society organizations are small, Brussels-based lobby groups, with few if any members and invariably reliant on the EU for funding. Meanwhile, the EU has increasingly sought to legitimise itself through non-political means, notably appeals to supposed 'European' values, such as rights, on the one side, and as an efficient, effective, equitable, and depoliticised economic regulator, on the other.

Developments in the EU mirror what has happened in most established democratic states, including those outside Europe, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Worries about a decline in civic attitudes and voting has produced a concern with the collapse of 'social capital'—the habit of collaborating and joining with others, summed up in Robert Putnam's observation that Americans no longer go ten pin bowling in teams but more and more 'bowl alone'. Increased immigration and growing multiculturalism are also feared to have reduced community feeling based on a common culture. As a result, governments have sought to inculcate a sense of national and civic belonging through an enhanced emphasis on citizenship education in schools and for immigrants seeking to naturalize. This teaching has usually emphasised national culture broadly conceived rather than political culture in the narrower, democratic sense. Likewise, they have increasingly claimed to have depoliticized important decisions—handing the setting of interest rates over to national banks, emphasising deference to constitutional courts in matters of protecting rights, and using independent regulators to oversee not only the former public utilities, such as gas and water, but also many other social and economic areas, such as sentencing policy. In these ways, they have tried to separate membership and rights from participation.

Yet, it is dubious that such attempts will be effective. Political communities and rights alike are constructed and sustained by the activities of citizens. People feel bound to each other and by the law only if they regard themselves as involved in shaping their relationships with each other and the state through their ability to influence the rules, policies, and politicians that govern social life. Indeed, they have good grounds for believing they are not civic equals without that capacity. So appeals to political community or rights will not of themselves create citizenship because they are the products of citizenly action through political participation. People will not feel any sense of ownership over them. The three components of citizenship stand and fall together.

Both social and economic changes and the political responses to them are challenging the very possibility of citizenship, therefore. This book explores these challenges further. We start in Chapter 2 by sketching the historical development of citizenship from the city states of ancient Greece to the nation states of the 20th century. In many respects, this history provides the resources for current thinking about citizenship. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 then examine membership, rights, and participation in turn, noting how each is being transformed in ways that are changing the character and perhaps the feasibility of citizenship today. Throughout, I stress the need to see these three elements as a package, with political participation offering the indispensable glue holding them together.

14

Reciprocity in the Lowland Philippines

MARY R. HOLLNSTEINER

While the norm of reciprocity is a universal principle of behavior, its manifestations, the emphasis placed upon it, and the power it has to influence social behavior differ from one society to the next. In the Philippines, where people are so concerned about getting along with others, reciprocity is a constant consideration, and some knowledge of its operation is essential for an understanding of Philippine society.

It seems worthwhile, therefore, to give special attention to this social principle, in order to explore its importance and its more typical manifestations. To this end I will present an analysis of pertinent data gathered in the lowland Philippines, particularly in Tulayan, Bulacan, a fishing village some 21 kilometers from Manila. This analysis will be followed by a discussion placing Philippine reciprocity in the wider context of Philippine culture and of reciprocity elsewhere.

Contractual Reciprocity

A study of reciprocity in Tulayan and similar Philippine lowland communities yields a threefold classification; namely, contractual reciprocity, quasi-contractual reciprocity, and *utang na loob* (debt of gratitude) reciprocity. Contractual reciprocity supposes a voluntary agreement between two or more people to behave toward one another in a specified way for a specified time in the future. An example of this is found in the case of a group of farmers who agree to take turns plowing one another's fields. This arrangement, known as *bolhon* in Cebuano Bisayan, has been described by Hart and given the status of a type by Udy. According to the usual terms, the farmers work jointly on one field at a time, the proprietor of the particular field acting as boss of the group. The amount of time and effort spent in each case is approximately equal. When the complete rotation of fields and corresponding work leaders has been made, the obligation of each member to all the others has been settled.

The strictly contractual nature of this system of mutual assistance is apparent, since the reciprocity arrangements are clearly established beforehand. Each participant knows exactly what is expected of him, and what he may expect of the others. He does not feel compelled to do more than any other member since it is not expected of him.

In this sense, his participation is not at the level of a general institutionalized expectation, accompanied by a diffuse sense of *noblesse oblige*. The felt obligation is narrow in scope and devoid of strong emotion. Nonetheless the weakness of affect does not mean that a shirker goes unpunished, for failure to comply with the *bolhon* contract will certainly bring censure and an unwillingness on the part of the others to help the shirker in the future. Analogous situations occur constantly in Tulayan and more urban settings, where workmen fulfill a contract and are paid in return. Upon satisfactory completion of the work, they are paid the prearranged sum and the reciprocal relationship is terminated. The term used to designate this type of debt relationship is *utang*, meaning a contractual-type debt.

To summarize: in contractual reciprocity, the reciprocal acts are equivalent, their amount and form having been explicitly agreed upon beforehand. The obligation that is felt to return a service is relatively colorless, with a minimum of affective sentiment. Fulfillment of the contract is such that there is no doubt in the mind of either party that payment has been made; repayment is unmistakable. The reciprocation terminates that particular relationship, leaving the participants in a state of equilibrium.

Quasi-Contractual Reciprocity

The second type of reciprocity, the quasi-contractual, regulates balanced exchanges where the terms of repayment are not explicitly stated before the contract is made; rather, the terms are implicit in situations which the culture recognizes and defines as calling for these terms. Reciprocity comes into play automatically without any specific prior arrangement, and repayment is made in a mechanical, almost non-affective manner. But failure to reciprocate brings censure.

The *abuloy* as found in Tulayan is an example of a quasi-contractual obligation based on money exchange. When someone in the community dies, it is customary for some members of the community, related or not, and who are not feuding with the family of the deceased, to contribute a sum of money, or *abuloy*, to the bereaved family. The family receiving the *abuloy* carefully records in a notebook kept especially for that purpose the name of the donor and the amount contributed. The reciprocal *abuloy* repayment must necessarily be deferred until someone in the donor's family dies. Then the debt engendered may be settled by the original recipient's consulting the notebook to see how much money the original donor's family contributed, giving in turn exactly the same amount. As in the case of contractual reciprocity, no interest is paid; there is no attempt to improve on the sum given by the first donor. To do so would violate the code of equivalence ascribed to the custom of *abuloy*.

Nor may this type of reciprocity, when among social equals, be paid in a manner other than by an equal contribution upon the death of someone in the original donor's family. The duration of time involved in repayment is of little importance; what is essential is that reciprocation be made when the opportunity to do so arises. In the case of the *abuloy*, the repayment situation is, of course, inevitable, provided that the first donor's family does not move out of the *barrio* before a member dies.

A distinction must be made here between the situation where *abuloy* is given to one's social equal and the one where it is given by a family of distinctly higher-status to a lower-status family. In the latter case the higher-status family, in accordance with community expectations, will normally give an amount which the lower-status family could not easily match. For the social system requires that those who have more should share their bounty with those who have less. Rather than make repayment with an embarrassingly smaller amount of money, the lower-status recipient can settle the debt by giving his family's services to the donor. Helpers are always needed to prepare the inevitable *handa*, or repast, which accompanies the wake on the first, third, and ninth nights following the death. Attendance at the prayers for the dead and at the funeral itself is always appreciated and noted by the bereaved family. Although the *abuloy* repayment by the lower-status family is not made in cash, the principle of equivalence is enforced, nevertheless. The services or public prayers rendered are acceptable substitutes, and neither party is expected to feel particularly grateful for the amount contributed in money or services since the *abuloy* is a balanced exchange relatively free of emotional charge. The *abuloy* is a quasi-contractual form of reciprocity.

Borrowing of certain household articles also involves quasi-contractual relationship. For example, a housewife runs short of rice. Perhaps a few relatives or friends have dropped in unexpectedly and she is caught without money to replenish her supply. She may buy on credit at the sari-sari store, or quickly send her daughter to a neighbor's house to borrow a *ganta* of rice. The neighbor readily provides it without any specifications as to when it should be repaid. Both lender and borrower know, however, that the rice must be repaid soon and in the same quantity and quality. Only in the event that repayment is delayed beyond a reasonable interval is there any compulsion to increase the amount returned. Again, this interest payment is not explicitly specified but both parties know it must be added. Not to do so would amount to an abuse of a favor done, bringing about strained relationships so undesirable in Philippine culture and particularly appalling when one's neighbors, who usually occupy a special place in one's affections, are involved.

This pattern of borrowing applies to numerous other articles: *ulam* (the main dish or dishes of the meal which go with rice—often called viands), extra plates, silverware, chairs, a *bolo*, a ladder, a *banca* for a holiday excursion, and other household goods. In each case the item borrowed should be returned when the borrower is through using it or should at least be handy if the lender sends someone to retrieve it some time afterward. If the item has been consumed, its substitutes should be returned in the same quantity within the next few days. The same sort of items can be lent in turn by the original borrower should the lender eventually also need extra chairs, silverware, etc. Money is usually unacceptable as a form of repayment here since the item was being lent, not sold. Even though the replacement value of the item might be provided by a money payment, the donor would be forced to the inconvenience of buying that item all over again. It is the recipient who should incur this inconvenience. Moreover, they would find it difficult to set a price since the item has already changed hands on a friendly rather than contractual basis.

Still another kind of quasi-contractual obligation is that engendered by cooperative labor projects. Pedro, a *salambao*, or fishing-raft, owner wants to build a new *salambao*. He tells his close friends and relatives that he would like to have a *lusong* or *bayanihan* (cooperative work bee) the following Sunday. His friends and relatives in turn ask their friends and relatives to attend Pedro's *lusong*. When Sunday comes, the helpers arrive at the approximate time designated and begin the heavy, unskilled labor which needs to be done. They take a break for cigarettes, coffee, beer, *ginatan*, or whatever refreshments the *lusong*-giver, Pedro, has provided. When the work is done, Pedro thanks his helpers, who now depart. Those of the helpers who are also *salambao* fishermen can rest assured that when they build their own *salambao*, Pedro will honor the debt they have just placed him in and will help them in turn. For that matter, they can expect his help in any kind of *lusong*, whether it be house-moving or building a fish trap.

Here again, no clear statement of obligation has been made by either party, yet the necessity to repay in kind when the opportunity to do so arises, is mandatory. For those who do not own a *salambao* or fishtrap or who do not expect to move their houses within a reasonable amount of time, the third type of reciprocity involving *utang na loob* is created. This will be discussed shortly.

To summarize the characteristics of quasi-contractual reciprocity, this manifestation of the norm utilizes both forms of the principle of equivalence in the return payment. In one instance, the things exchanged may be concretely different but should be equal in value, as defined by the actors in the situation. In the second, exchanges should be concretely alike, or identical in form, either with respect to the things exchanged, or to the circumstances under which they are exchanged. The payment of interest does not apply here unless the borrower has failed to return a consumption item after a reasonable amount of time. In the latter case it would appear

that an *utang na loob* relationship is created because the lender has in effect, provided an extra service at a sacrifice to himself—that of doing without the item for a long time when he might have been using it.

The terms of quasi-contractual reciprocation are agreed on implicitly, not explicitly. Nonetheless, the situation and the cultural norms bring a clear understanding of expected behavior with a minimum of affective sentiment. Accordingly, the form of the reciprocation when it occurs, is recognized as payment in full, but the obligation remains to initiate another similar exchange when the same kind of situation, culturally defined as such, arises in the future. During this interim period the status of the relationship may be described as dormant. This is in contrast to the contractual type of reciprocity, where the completion of the *bolhon*, for instance, terminates the reciprocal relationship. There remains no obligation to enter into a new contract, though the desire to do this may be a shared sentiment.

***Utang Na Loob* Reciprocity**

The third type of reciprocity, *utang na loob* reciprocity, is most consciously generated when a transfer of goods or services takes place between individuals belonging to two different groups. Since one does not ordinarily expect favors of anyone not of his own group, a service of this kind throws the norm into bold relief. Furthermore, it compels the recipient to show his gratitude properly by returning the favor with interest to be sure that he does not remain in the other's debt. It is a true gift in this sense. It is also a kind of one-upmanship. The kind of debt created in the recipient is called *utang na loob* (literally, a debt inside oneself) or sense of gratitude.

Utang na loob reciprocity is an ancient Filipino operating principle. Colin, writing in 1663, about the social obligations binding a *barangay* chief and his people makes this statement:

There was another kind of service which was not of servitude, though it appeared to be such. It was generally seen among certain persons called *cabalangay*. Whenever such persons wanted any small trifle they begged the head chief of their *barangay* for it, and he gave it to them. In return whenever he summoned them they were obliged to go to him to work in his fields or to row in his boats. Whenever a feast or banquet was given they all came together and helped furnish the *tuba*, wine or *quilan*, such being their method of services.

The modern counterpart of this diffuse mutual service may be seen in the following description of interaction in a Visayan community:

The share tenant likes a landlord who treats him paternally. Consequently, a paternal landlord is the recipient of many extra services from his tenant. The landlord in turn acts as the patron of the tenant... In many instances, a tenant's family is tied to a landlord's farm because of gratitude and debts to the landlord... The fact that a landlord always grants a tenant's request for credit and the fact that the credit is granted at a crisis period in the tenant's life binds him in endless gratitude to his benefactors.

Every Filipino is expected to possess *utang na loob*; that is, he should be aware of his obligations to those from whom he receives favors and should repay them in any acceptable manner. Since *utang na loob* invariably stems from a service rendered, even though a material gift may be involved, quantification is impossible. One cannot actually measure the repayment but can attempt to make it, nevertheless, either believing that it supersedes the original service in quality or acknowledging that the reciprocal payment is partial and requires further payment. Some services can never be repaid. Saving a person's life would be one of these; getting a steady job,

especially for an unskilled laborer at a time when employment is scarce and unskilled laborers abound, might be another.

There are, furthermore, definitely one-sided *utang na loob* relationships where a power status differential precludes the likelihood of equivalent repayment on the part of the subordinate party. In the landlord-tenant relationship, which parallels the *dato-cabalangay* relationship, cited above, the tenant knows he cannot approach anywhere near an equivalent return. As long as he fulfills his expected duties toward his landlord and shows by bringing a few dozen eggs and helping out at festive occasions that he recognizes a debt of gratitude, he may continue to expect benefits from his landlord. The tenant receives uninterrupted preferential treatment despite the fact that he never reciprocates with interest and never reverses the debt relationship.

The rice which a landlord gives a tenant during the course of their relationship serves to bind one to the other. But whereas the landlord may want to consider such rice as being loaned, the tenant will consider it as “owed” him as part of the reciprocal social relationship and wear the debt lightly.

The *utang na loob* repayment, where it is made or attempted, is undefined in the sense that it can encompass any acceptable form within the reach of the one reciprocating. In a see-sawing coordinate relationship there is an uneasiness about being on the indebted side, temporary though the position may be. This reluctance to be indebted encourages full payment with interest as soon as the opportunity presents itself. The permanent superordinate-subordinate relationship, on the other hand, is characterized by acceptance of the relative positions and a corresponding lack of uneasiness on the part of the subordinate element about reciprocation with interest. In the former case, failure to discharge one’s *utang na loob* by repaying with interest brings *hiya*, or shame, on the side of the guilty party; in the latter case, failure to recognize and admit that one has a debt is cause for *hiya*.

A word on *hiya* is called for. *Hiya* is the universal social sanction that regulates the give and take of reciprocity and, in general, all social behavior. *Hiya* may be translated as “a sense of social propriety;” as a preventive, it makes for conformity to community norms. When one violates such a norm he ordinarily feels a deep sense of shame, a realization of having failed to live up to the standards of the society. To call a Filipino *walang hiya*, or “shameless” is to wound him seriously.

Pal reports that the non-payer of a debt of gratitude on southwestern Leyte is called *way ibalus* (“one who has nothing to pay”), a derogatory term placing him in a status below that of a beggar or a dog. “A beggar prays for the good health of whoever gives him alms, and a dog barks for his master, but a *way ibalus* does not even have a prayer or a bark for his benefactor.”

By not settling an obligation when the opportunity arises, the Filipino violates a highly valued operating principle and experiences a consequent *hiya*. To avoid this painful experience, he makes every effort to repay his obligations in the manner prescribed by his culture.

Intra-Family *Utang Na Loob*

Although this paper is primarily concerned with *utang na loob* reciprocity outside the nuclear family context, mention must be made of the feeling of gratitude inherent in the Filipino family. The term *utang na loob* is also used with reference to parent-child and sibling relationships; but the emotion attached to it goes far deeper than the non-familial *utang na loob*. Children are expected to be everlastingly grateful to their parents not only for all that the latter have done for them in the process of raising them but more fundamentally for giving them life

itself. The children should recognize, in particular, that their mother risked her life to enable each child to exist. Thus, a child's *utang na loob* to its parents is immeasurable and eternal. Nothing he can do during his lifetime can make up for what they have done for him.

The same is true of the sibling relationship. The younger sibling owes *utang na loob* to all his elder siblings for the care which they have lavished on him and, in the local view, even for letting the younger ones be born by being born first. That the concept of *utang na loob* in relation to family obligations differs from *utang na loob* as used in non-familiar relationships is reflected in the disagreement regarding the use of the term when talking about the child's gratitude toward his parents; some argue that the Tagalog term is inapplicable here. A possible explanation for this disparity in views may be that the felt obligation remains on a non-verbal level. Verbalization is necessary only on the rare and critical occasion when the obligation has been flouted; at other times, mention of it would be superfluous.

The parent-child *utang na loob* relationship is complementary rather than reciprocal. For parents never develop *utang na loob* toward their children. They have a duty to rear them which is complemented by the children's obligation to respect and obey their parents and show their gratitude by taking care of them in old age. The children's obligation to the parents continues even when the parent's duties have been largely fulfilled. This complementarity breeds a special closeness among family members, imposing on them a deep-seated obligation to cling to one another. They have no choice but to help their closest relatives when the situation demands. Furthermore, whereas the parties to a non-familial *utang na loob* relationship may calculate whether or not the return payment has indeed been made with interest, this kind of thinking is foreign to the family. One does one's duties and performs one's obligations as need arises; failure to do so arouses deep bitterness and the feeling that a sacred unifying bond has been torn asunder and a family betrayed. In a situation of this kind, the accusations of "*walang utang na loob*" and "*walang hiya*" take on a meaning far more serious than they would were only non-family relations involved. The family member who has betrayed his trust in this manner is told that he does not know how to love and honor his parents or elder siblings (*hindi marunong magmahal sa mga magulang/kapatid*). Obligations to grandparents and duties toward grandchildren are extensions of one's parents' and children's roles toward their parents and children, respectively.

The complementary relationship can also be extended beyond the nuclear family to other relatives, but here selection is involved. Some reflection will remind us that the enormous network of relatives any one individual acquires through bilateral kinship virtually forces him to single out certain relatives who will be closer to him than others. This is usually determined by simple geographical proximity, traditional family preferences, or the particular attraction between two personalities. The rest of one's relatives lie outside the pale of the actual, functional segment but are always there, ready to be admitted to the inner circle should the occasion, need, or opportunity arise. The first cousin who lives in another province and is rarely visited frequently rates as an outsider, while the fourth cousin next door or in one's own household is usually a member of one's segment.

The ingroup of which the nuclear family is the core, is characterized by familiarity and ease in one another's presence. In effect, one's guard is down in the knowledge that he can be himself and not bother to adopt the oversolicitous attitude and euphemistic language characterising relationships with outgroup members. The term, *tayo-tayo lamang* ("just us"), is used to refer to this primary group. This difference in feeling and behavior toward those who are close and those who are not, illustrates a more general social valuation in the Philippines: the keen consciousness of the near, and the diffuse awareness and disregard of the far. Some friendly non-relatives may mean more to a man than the long-lost kinsman. Contrary to a popular notion,

Filipinos do not indiscriminately support relatives above all others; the near-far, ingroup-outgroup dichotomies introduce limiting factors.

Utang Na Loob in Practice

To show the principle of *utang na loob* reciprocity in operation, I shall now discuss the occasions in which *utang na loob* is incurred and then present a description of situations through which these obligations may be wholly or partially repaid. In going through the analysis, one should keep in mind the distinction made above between *utang na loob* reciprocity and complementarity.

Utang na loob reciprocity is created when a person sends a relative or friend's child through school, paying all or part of the expenses involved. In a period when education is so highly valued as the path to a prestigious white-collar or professional future, the sponsor of these studies creates a lifetime obligation in the child and his family by making possible such a prospect. Supporting an initially outgroup relative or non-family member in one's own home creates *utang na loob* on the part of the supported and his immediate relatives. The supported may work, in which case he will give much of his earnings to the supporting family. Or, he may perform services about the house which partially pay his debt. The situations so prevalent, particularly in city and town homes, of poorer relatives living in the household and acting in the capacity of servants need not dismay the non-Filipino. True, they do heavy housework, but with a difference they sit with the family at meals, meaning that they are treated as members of the family. Helping the mistress of the house with the work is part payment on their *utang na loob*. Once they gain the status of ingroup member in that household, they continue to perform these duties in accordance with the group's expectations that a member of the family must do his share in the functioning of the household. *Utang na loob* becomes a relatively unconscious consideration for one so adopted as long as he remains in the household, but it becomes consciously significant in his own family's relationship to those supporting him.

Professional services rendered free of charge or for a token fee also engender *utang na loob*. When a Filipino consults a doctor or a lawyer, he may choose him on a kinship basis, as a casual acquaintance, or merely because he has heard good reports about him. If a token fee or no fee at all is charged, particularly if the doctor has paid a home visit or if the lawyer has devoted a great deal of time to one's legal case, the patient/client gratitude is high. If he has paid the regular consultation fee, no *utang na loob* is felt by the patient/client—unless the doctor or lawyer is done far more than the regular fee calls for, for example, coming in the middle of a stormy night to sit by a patient's bedside for many hours. Pal reports that approximately 90 percent of the people in a Leyte *barrio* acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the midwife, *hilot* (masseur) and *herbolario* (traditional doctor or herbalist.) For there is a modality of generosity and pleasantness which cannot be repaid in coin.

Giving credit is another area for the creation of *utang na loob*. Even though many instances of borrowing are ostensibly of a contractual or quasi-contractual nature, the borrower still feels a strong debt of gratitude to the lender for making available the money at the time he needed it. In cases where this is so, the borrower will acknowledge an inner debt, even if he has already paid off the principal and high interest rates, because a special service was rendered beyond a strictly contractual arrangement. (The sense of gratitude is even greater when little or no interest is charged.) This tallies with Gouldner's observation that the value of the benefit and the debt developed in proportion to it vary with the intensity of need at the time. As a Leyte proverb puts it, "A debt of money can be paid and once paid, it is paid; but a debt of gratitude may be paid, but the debtor is still indebted." In accordance with the operation of *utang na loob* reciprocity, therefore, giving gifts to bank officials or persons in high positions in money-lending

institutions is not viewed by many Filipinos as immoral since these gifts are merely tokens of their gratitude. When the gifts are presented at Christmas, by definition a gift-giving time, even the most moral official finds it hard to refuse without insulting the giver, provided the gift does not go beyond proper proportions. As Marcel Mauss has written, the gift involves not only the obligation to make a return but also the obligation to receive. The Philippine bureaucracy has not generally accepted the concept of impersonal service; gift-giving and receiving for service rendered is common.

Extending further the workings of *utang na loob*, when a government official in Manila gives a person special treatment, facilitating his papers ahead of others, it becomes virtually mandatory to show one's gratitude for this service with a few pesos, or by sending special food to his house, or by taking him to dinner and perhaps a nightclub. Obviously, the line between bribery and reciprocal giving is a thin one, and it is easy for an official to rationalize bribery in terms of *utang na loob* payment.

However, the gift is usually presented after the initial service is rendered, sometimes long afterwards and at an appropriate festive occasion. To give before the service is rendered would smack of bribery, while to give shortly after the service would be crass and crude. But a decent interval assuages the conscience of most highly moral individuals because the boundary between bribery and *utang na loob* reciprocity has been rather clearly marked by the lapse in time. Indeed when an outright bribe is in the offing, the usual procedure is for the parties involved to have a meaningful conversation beforehand, each sounding out the other in euphemistic language to see what the conditions will be. If this is the case, then the source of obligation is now a quasi-contract or contract and no longer *utang na loob*.

The repugnance of many non-Filipinos and many westernized Filipinos at this "hand-out" situation is not matched by the rest of Filipino society, simply because Filipinos rarely interpret post-service gift-giving as bad. To them it is not bribery. How can the fulfillment of one's social obligations, brought about through *utang na loob*, be anything but good, reasons the average Filipino. It is the system he has learned as a member of his society; it is part of his culture.

Another occasion for the development of *utang na loob* arises when a person in a strategic position acts as an intermediary between two people or groups. In Tulayan, the individual who has connections in Manila hospitals and uses them to facilitate the admission of a Tulayan resident as a patient creates almost eternal gratitude in the family he helps. It is not easy to gain entry into crowded government hospitals or private charity wards in Manila. Even after the patient is admitted, it takes some skill to get the medicines, x-rays, blood plasma, and various tests free or at a very low rate. The poor people of Tulayan cannot afford to pay much, if anything, and so an intermediary is of tremendous help. The patient and his family will spend the rest of their lifetime repaying their *utang na loob* to their friend, the intermediary. Since hospitalization is being resorted to by Tulayan folk at a rate faster than free or low cost facilities are being made available, these opportunities for *utang na loob* creation will undoubtedly increase in frequency.

Getting a job is another operation that involves an intermediary and *utang na loob*. In a community where the great majority has not gone beyond fourth grade in school, jobs outside the area are hard to come by and highly coveted, particularly where a steady income is guaranteed. The natural increase in population, aided by the lowered infant mortality rate of the past sixty years, has put growing pressure on the limited resources of the Tulayan area. Some of the men turn elsewhere for their livelihood, flooding the already swollen ranks of unskilled laborers who hope to find work in Manila. The person through whose intercession a job is acquired becomes one's *utang na loob* creditor for life.

There are other instances in Tulayan where *utang na loob* may be developed, but they are not major occasions like those already discussed. Worthy of re-mention, however is the *lusong*, or cooperative work bee, where Pedro's inability to repay in equivalent terms those helpers who do not own a salambao and are not moving their house means a creation of *utang na loob*. The *utang na loob* developed in the loan of a jeep or *banca* or other items which cannot be repaid in kind belongs in the same category.

Although we have discussed these occasions insofar as they create *utang na loob*, one must bear in mind that they may also, in relation to different sets of persons, be occasions for reciprocation. Thus, the doctor who gives free service and medicine may be repaying a favor once done for him by the patient, someone in the patient's family, or by the person who recommended the doctor to the patient. The job-getting intermediary may be reciprocating an act performed by someone in the job seeker's ingroup.

Festive occasions provide the best opportunities for whole or partial payment of one's *utang na loob* to a maximum number of people at one time. Any family will have at least one of these a year in the form of the fiesta celebration, and probably an additional one in a baptism, birthday (a relatively recent occasion for festivity), marriage, or wake-funeral. Elections provide especially propitious opportunities.

All these festive occasions involve a large supply of food on the part of the celebrant, and each celebration of this kind provides an opportunity for *utang na loob* debtors of the host to reciprocate, at least in part, by sending food, much of it already cooked, to his house on the day of the festivities. One tries to send meat dishes and the specialties of the area—in Tuluyan prawns, large crabs, stuffed *bangus* (milkfish), pickled green vegetables, and other high prestige foods defined as fiesta fare and certain to find particular favor with the guests from other municipalities.

If one does not have much to give on these occasions, women in the debtor family will often go to the house of the creditor and help with the tremendous amount of food preparation which must be accomplished. As people sit around the table after the baptism, wedding, or final funeral prayers, equal and lower-status relatives, friends in the ingroup as well as *utang na loob* debtors help serve and run back and forth to the preparation area to refill the fast-emptying dishes. At weddings, the groom's family provides everything. Again, ingroup members and *utang na loob* debtors come to help and occasionally give presents, too. Others, particularly outgroup relatives, restrict themselves to money gifts, while non-relatives tend to give presents. At funerals these same people help with the arrangements and the food, and attend the nine-day period of prayer for the dead. This may go on year after year, until the debt is considered settled with interest. Or, in the superordinate-subordinate relationship, the partially paid-up debtor who is in good standing feels secure in asking another favor of his creditor, in effect renewing his loan. In this disparate relationship, the subordinate party maintains his good credit rating by making practical admission of the debt that he owes: through his promptness to do service and give small gifts, he pronounces himself the other man's perpetual debtor.

A particularly fruitful occasion for reciprocation is an election. Political leaders, cognizant of the social system, exploit it by deliberately cultivating *utang na loob* debts toward themselves so that when voting time comes, they can reclaim these by requesting the debtors to vote for them or for their candidate. In general, the debtor's sense of honor and propriety forces him to comply regardless of the quality of the candidate involved or his party. This is also true of elections in private groups—clubs, for example. The man who might perform the job better by efficiency standards may lose the election simply because of his opponent has a larger group of followers, among them many *utang na loob* debtors. A vote in Tulayan is considered a substantial

repayment and is the object of a great deal of competition. Voting in accordance with an *utang na loob* creditor's request can wipe out one's debt to him, unless of course, this is ruled out by the original circumstances which created that debt. (That some debts can never be fully repaid has already been mentioned.)

The functions of festive occasions, therefore, include not only the fulfillment of religious obligations, meeting family and friends, distribution of wealth, and opportunities for status climbing or reaffirming one's high status; they are also major means of repaying one's social obligations, mandatory in Philippine culture, or at least of indicating to the invited that one recognizes an existing debt relationship.

Utang Na Loob: Summary

Summarizing the nature of *utang na loob* reciprocity, one notes that it is characterized by unequal repayment with no prior agreement, explicit or implicit, on the form or quantity of the return. The only definite requirement is, in the coordinate case, the obligation to repay with interest, while in the superordinate-subordinate case, it is the recognition and admission of the debt.

When the coordinate debtor reciprocates out of *utang na loob*, he is frequently not sure just how much of the debt he has paid back. And even when he believes that he has repaid with interest, he cannot be sure the other party thinks so, too. This element of insecurity regarding the fulfillment of the debt can maintain the relationship indefinitely, or at least as long as the parties remain geographically close enough to each other to continue interacting. Because an *utang na loob* relationship is rarely terminated, the statuses of the two parties are, ideally, never equal: if they began as individuals of approximately the same socioeconomic status, the services they exchange place now one, and now the other, in the creditor's position; if they began as individuals of clearly unequal status, their service exchanges will only rarely disturb this relationship. In the former instance, where near-equals have exchanged services, they may not be sure who has emerged the creditor. In such a case, the fear of being termed "*walang utang na loob*" and "*walang hiya*" by the other party often prevents complacency about debt fulfillment and forces continued reciprocation.

Affective sentiment is at a maximum in *utang na loob* reciprocity, particularly when the debt of gratitude is so great that a lifetime is insufficient for repayment. The element of self presentation is also extremely important, for the spirit in which a service is rendered, the giving of self that is involved, lends an emotional content to the relationship that is lacking in contractual and quasi-contractual reciprocity.

Overall Summary

Three kinds of reciprocity have been distinguished: contractual, quasi-contractual, and *utang na loob*. The characteristics of each are summarized in the accompanying chart and, in all but one feature, need not be further elaborated. Calling for some additional explanation are the functioning of *hiya*, or shame, and the way in which this feeling differs from *utang na loob* itself.

Whether the reciprocity be contractual, quasi-contractual, or *utang na loob*, *hiya* is the sanction of which ensures payment. The person who fails to fulfill a contract experiences a sense of shame because he has not kept his word. Thus, the man who does not pay his *utang*, or contractual debt, to the sari-sari store owner at the end of the month, as per agreement, is *hiya*. No deeper sentiment of gratitude is involved, however. *Hiya* also dictates repayment of *utang na loob*, but here an intervening factor emerges because *hiya* in this case is more the product of a failure to

recognize one's debt of gratitude than shame at simple non-payment of it as in exchanges of a contractual or quasi-contractual nature. The family which does not cast even one of its votes for a candidate toward whom family members recognize strong *utang na loob* will be *hiya* less from its failure to vote for him than from the realization that the members have not lived up to their obligation to reciprocate in the manner and at the time expected, indeed demanded, by their creditor. Reneging on a contractual or quasi-contractual debt causes shame because the debtor has delayed or failed to make payment; in *utang na loob* reciprocity, the charge of "*walang hiya*" is leveled when the debtor has not recognized the need to repay.

Chart 14.1. Characteristics of Contractual, Quasi-contractual and *Utang na Loob* Reciprocity

FEATURES	TYPES OF RECIPROCITY			
	Contractual	Quasi-contractual	Utang na loob	
			Coordinate	Super-ordinate-subordinate
Expected Payment	Equivalent		With Interest	Partial, incomplete
Agreement on terms	Explicit as to amount and form	Implicit as to amount and form	No agreement as to amount and form	
Repayment in full	Unmistakable when made		Uncertain even when made	Not expected
Status of obligation after reciprocation	Balanced and dead	Balanced but dormant	Not balanced, alive, but shifted to other party	Not balanced alive, and still with same party
Emotions involved	Insignificant		Very significant	Significant
Source of <i>hiya</i>	Non-reciprocation		Non-recognition of debt	

Hiya, is thus distinguishable from *utang na loob*, the latter being an operating principle in Philippine society and the former the universal sanction reinforcing the desirability of feeling and honoring *utang na loob*. *Hiya* is not necessarily accompanied by *utang na loob*, but *utang na loob* is always reinforced by *hiya*. The man who is shamed because he has been scolded publicly does not recognize *utang na loob* as being involved in this situation; it simply does not apply. But when a man was hired through the personal kindness of the company president, and finds himself nonetheless joining his fellow workers in a strike, he cannot help feeling *hiya*, despite the reassurances of his co-strikers: in turning against his benefactor in this manner, he knows he has failed to recognize a primal debt of gratitude to him.

Discussion

Although some manifestations of reciprocity are peculiar to the Philippines, the principle at work is common to all societies. This norm has been the subject of considerable study and several classic treaties, among them those of Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Claude Levi-Strauss. A short review of their contributions will recall to mind the universality of reciprocity and its place in the social order.

All three writers insist that gift exchange is not so much a purely economic transaction as it is social reciprocation. Mauss makes clear that in primitive society, reciprocity plays an extremely important role which is not primarily of an economic nature but "a total social fact," that is, connected simultaneously with social, religious, economic, legal, and other aspects of the culture.

Malinowski's famous analysis of the Melanesian *kula* ring system of exchange also emphasizes the social nature of reciprocation. Long necklaces of red shell move in a clockwise direction in the area and are exchanged with bracelets of white shell moving counter-clockwise. A member of the *kula* has definite trading partners, one set living in the region north and east of him, who give him the white shell bracelets and who, in turn, receive the red necklaces. The bracelets are then exchanged with another set of trading partners to the south and east, who reciprocate with necklaces. One gift is repaid after some time by another gift, with no bartering or haggling involved.

This ritualized gift exchange serves to bind its members in a series of alliances. The items themselves have little economic value; nor are they worn as adornment. Their worth lies in the prestige they give the temporary owner, not by their mere possession, but by the consequence of their legitimate possession. For the man who owns them takes pride in recounting their history, in boasting from whom he acquired them, and in proclaiming with whom he will exchange them next. What ownership really establishes is the identity of his trading partners. The more prestigious they are, the higher is the owner's status. Bracelets and necklaces are valued, therefore, not for their substance, but for their source and destination.

To Levi-Strauss, reciprocity is a means for the transmission of goods, particularly in more primitive societies. He discusses the Kwakiutl potlatch, showing that the characteristic destruction of goods is a response to another party's having done the same. By throwing more blankets into the flames than his rival, the Kwakiutl Indian enhances his claim to the super-ordinate position, crushing his challenger. A western counterpart of this ceremony, remarks Levi-Strauss, is the Christmas gift exchange, which he terms a gigantic potlatch.

He also cites the reciprocal pouring of wine by fellow guests at small inns in southern France. Here the initially hostile situation of strangers at a table is made friendly by one man's pouring his wine into the other's glass, inducing the other to do the same for him. Obviously, neither has gained in an economic sense; what has been accomplished instead by the exchange is the breaking down of barriers and the substituting of sociabilities for strained silence.

Mauss, Malinowski, and Levi-Strauss, therefore, attest to the universality of the principle of reciprocity and agree that it creates, continues, and motivates social bonds. The data presented in this paper indicate that the norm has similar functions in the Philippines.

In a more recent statement, Alvin Gouldner has reiterated the role of reciprocity in stabilizing the social system. But, in addition, he stresses that it is normally improper to break off reciprocal relations, that is, to stop the see-saw process at any point in the cycle. Furthermore, a man lays himself open to similar blame by trying to discharge his debt too soon after it is incurred. People tend, rather to search for mechanisms to induce others to remain socially their debtors. Non-reciprocation and too-hasty reciprocation are equally reprehensible; either of these responses, if they became common behavior, would drain the social system of one potent source of its life, reciprocity.

Consider the Philippines in the light of Gouldner's observation. Two features of the *utang na loob* coordinate relationship function to perpetuate the existence of a debt. One is payment with interest, and the other, ambiguity. Practically speaking, it makes little difference whether a person, on the one hand, wants to be clear of the debt, and so returns service received with a definite addition over and above the principal or, on the other, not certain whether he has discharged his debt, keeps adding further services in hopes of turning the tables on his creditor. In either case, the social bond continues and is even strengthened.

In a society such as the Philippines, where the gap between social classes is marked, *utang na loob* reciprocity stabilizes the social system in a special manner by acting as a bridge between the separated sets. It particularizes the functional interrelationship of the upper and lower classes; that is, the rights and obligations of the upper class toward the lower class and vice versa are translated by it into a functional relationship between this upper-class person and this lower-class person. Thus, the general expectancy that the upper class will share its surplus with the lower class now becomes a particular expectancy between this landlord, for instance, and this tenant.

When the tenant takes the landlord a dozen eggs or performs services, the tenant's relatively meager gifts ensure abundant return. For in keeping with his status, the landlord reciprocates in the manner befitting a man of means. This disparity in actual worth of the gifts exchanged in this reciprocal relationship is sanctioned by the Philippine cultural value of sharing one's surplus with others. *Utang na loob* reciprocity is the operating principle which enables a person to lodge a claim on the rich man's wealth.

Worthy of further study are the ways in which reciprocity operates in a predominantly redistributive, traditional economy, and the place it assumes in a cash economy. Certainly, the long-range trend in the Philippines has been from a redistribution-dominated to a market-dominated economy, and one might speculate that as the redistributive pattern gives ground to the cash and market economy, *utang na loob* reciprocity will decline correspondingly. For both redistribution of surplus and *utang na loob* reciprocity are designed to achieve security through interdependence. Hence the cash economy and contractual reciprocity may belong together, in a functional sense, just as much as redistribution and *utang na loob* reciprocity. The testing of this hypothesis and others like it should result in explanations for the ambivalent attitude many modern Filipinos have toward *utang na loob*.

For there is an increasing resistance to the pattern of *utang na loob* reciprocity. Barefaced refusal to comply with the traditional claims of the system is not very common, but it does occur. More common are less drastic means of evasion. As cash becomes more readily available in various parts of the country, certainly in Tulayan, people who would have used the *lusong*, or *bayanihan*, method for getting a job done often prefer to hire laborers on a contract basis, pay them as agreed, and end the ties there. Not only may the work be done more efficiently, but no *utang na loob* is developed. To the man with interests outside his barrio community, repayment of an *utang na loob* debt may prove more burdensome than the original help given was worth. He tries, therefore, to avoid these relationships as far as he is able to in a small community. His urban counterpart is even more anxious to escape from this drain on his already heavily taxed resources. The person who does free himself from these binding relationships may do so at the expense of many friendships, but at the same time enhance his upward mobility.

Although avoidance of the original debt is the safest way to free oneself from *utang na loob* claims, channeling the payment into an alternate response also prevents a creditor from depleting the surplus one has built up and would prefer to use for himself. Should an *utang na loob* creditor, for example, come to borrow money, one can explain that he has invested all his surplus in a sewing machine which he is still paying for in installments, or in tuition fees for his children, or in an insurance policy. Where, as in this case, the debt is not so great, the creditor cannot really expect the debtor to go to extraordinary lengths to repay. It is true that the creditor may level the charges of "*walang utang na loob*" and "*walang hiya*" at the debtor; but since there is also a possibility that he may not, under the circumstances, the debtor is often willing to run that risk. If the debt of gratitude is extremely great, however, the debtor is expected to do

everything possible to grant the favor, even to the extent of putting a second mortgage on his sewing machine or claiming the cash surrender value on his life insurance policy.

The avoidance and channeling patterns just described are evidences that Filipinos are developing effective ways of adapting to a changing way of life. Traditional relationships of interdependence are being modified and alternative responses are being found more congruent with the new situation. Education, for example, is so highly valued that the parent who is struggling to put his children through college is not really expected to repay his debts of gratitude in the form of cash loans. The society condones payment in other equally acceptable ways. Since the amount and form of repayment of *utang na loob* are undetermined, and since one's debt may last a lifetime, a great deal of leeway is given to persons involved in the *utang na loob* relationship before the charge of "*walang hiya*" can be truthfully and effectively applied.

In some instances, the Filipino working in a factory finds himself in a new sub-culture characterized by values derived from the Western industrial world. Management rewards efficiency and places less value on personal ties. The workman who wants to succeed tries to adapt himself to the new impersonal ways, repelling the advances of relatives who seek to exploit his favorable position in the company. To excuse his action to himself and his offended relatives and friends, he appeals fatalistically to the impossibility of fighting the system. In reality, he may be delighted that the company has provided him with a convenient way of avoiding traditional relationships like *utang na loob* reciprocity. He can now devote his efforts to his promotion, secure in the knowledge that the company backs his new set of values. This kind of behavior, however, is still the exception rather than the rule. With increasing industrialization, it should become more and more common.

To say that with modernization, *utang na loob* reciprocity will assume less importance as a means of ordering economic relations is not equivalent to maintaining that the norm itself will disappear. Certainly, it will continue to serve as an economic mechanism, but not as the dominant feature of that system. This position of dominance will obtain rather in more narrowly social fields of non-economic favor-doing among friends.

15 **An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines**

ALFRED W. MCCOY

For historians of the First World, national history is often of its institutional parts—corporations, parties, unions, legislature and executive. Historians of Europe and America usually treat the family at an aspect of social history not as an institution that can direct a nation's destiny. In the Third World, by contrast, the elite family has long been a leading actor in the unfolding of the pageant. More specifically, in the Philippines, elite families can be seen as both object and subject of history, shaping and being shaped by the process of change.

Instead of treating the Philippines past solely as the interaction of state, private institutions, and popular movements, historians might well analyze its political history through the paradigm of elite families. Indeed, these families have provided a strong element of continuity to the country's economic and political history over the century past. In her survey of Philippine politics, Jean Grossholtz described the family as "the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands." She then remarked, rather pointedly, that "the communal values of the family are often in conflict with the impersonal values of the institutions of the largest society." Despite the apparent influence of family upon the wider society and its politics, more historians, both Filipino and foreign, have ignored this problem and still treat Philippine politics through its formal institutional structures. Even social scientists, despite an obligatory bow in the direction of the family, have generally failed to incorporate substantive analysis of its dynamics into their rendering of the country's social and political processes.

As often happen in the study of the Philippines, social science thus diverges from social reality. Despite the oft-cited significance of elite families in Philippine politics, historical and contemporary analysis of their role remains superficial. Instead of studying family-based oligarchies, as their Latin American colleagues have done, Philippine historians have disregarded the leading Manila families on ideological grounds and largely ignored the provincial elites. Throughout much of this century, the small coterie of professional Filipino historians, many of them self-conscious nationalists, have dismissed the country's elites as politically treasonous or socially insignificant. For Teodoro Agoncillo, the doyen of postwar historians, the educated *ilustrados* of Manila's nineteenth-century elite had committed the original sin of betraying the Revolution of 1898 and collaborating thereafter with American colonialism. Concluding his study of the revolutionary Malolos republic (1898–1901), Agoncillo describes Manila's elite, whom he calls "the haves," in language remarkable for its bitterness.

When one studies the Revolutionists first and second epochs one finds that... the middle class as a group betrayed the Revolutionary by a negative attitude: they refused to lift a finger to support the mass-movement because they did not believe it would succeed... In the second epoch, the betrayal was consummated by positive action: they now entered the government by the front door and tried to sabotage it by back door...

The betrayal in the first epoch may be forgiven, but that of the second can not. It is difficult, if not impossible, to rationale the attitude of "the haves," for when they accepted the high positions in the government they were, both from the legal and moral standpoints,

expected to be loyal to that Government. They accepted the positions but by insidious means undermined its foundation through financial manipulations or through secret understanding with the Americans. Pardo de Tavera, Arellano Paterno, Buencamino, Araneta, Legarda, and others... exemplified those who, while still in government, were already in sympathy with the American propaganda line of "benevolent assimilation."... These men, the first collaborators of the Americans, were also the first to receive the "blessings" of America and... to rise in the social and economic ladder of the country.

The nationalist historian Renato Constantino, Agoncillo's contemporary, has adopted a similarly dismissive article towards these same elite "collaborators" in his popular history of the Philippines. "Many of these individuals... prominent in the Aguinaldo government... had held other posts in the Spanish government," he noted.

Most... would again occupy good positions under the Americans. A few examples will... demonstrate the agility with which men of property and education switched their allegiance from one colonial power to another, with a short "revolutionary" career in between. T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Cayetano Arellano, Gregorio Araneta and Benito Legarda went over to the Americans...

A later generation of radical analysts, writing in the 1960s and 1970s, accepted the argument of Jose Maria Sison, founder of the new Communist Party, that the country's elites were a small, alien element—either rural feudal landholders or urban, *comprador bourgeoisie*. Sison's intellectual hegemony collapsed after 1983 when the emergence of the yellow-ribbon opposition movement of Manila's upper and middle classes challenged his portrayal of these elites as an insignificant political force. Acting on his hypothesis, the Communist Party alienated the moderate, middle-class leadership and had, by 1986, lost control of the legal opposition movement. Left criticism of the Sison analysis later emerged in the "capitalism/feudalism"—that is whether or not capitalism had taken root and developed a genuine bourgeoisie. Although the debate broke the informal ban on serious discussion of the *burgis*, it has not yet advanced far enough for research into elite family history. Lacking scholarly analysis of either individual Filipino families or family-based oligarchies, we must turn to elite biography for basic information.

Most Filipino biographies, the potential building blocks for elite-family studies, are more hagiography than history. Whether written by family, followers, or friend, their titles are often an apt index of their tone and content—*Master of his Soul: The Life of Norberto Romualdez*, published by his children; *Jose Yulo: The Selfless Statesman* by Baldomero Olivera; or *Days of Courage: The Legacy of Dr. Jose P. Laurel* by Rose Laurel Avancena and Ileana Maramag. Filipino biographers write as if death were a cleansing sacrament that somehow exempts their subjects from critical examination. Just as they have begun to compile elaborate genealogies, powerful Filipino families now enshrine their progenitors' memories in prose sentimental and sycophantic. Olivera invokes a priest who describes Jose Yulo as "a saint... a complete and perfect man." Avancena and Maramag hail Dr. Laurel's "courage born of untarnished love for his country, a love proven beyond any cavil of doubt." Maria Roces, in another such work, describes her subject, Fernando Lopez, as a "very likable man... loved by all" with "a natural gift for reaching out... to the common folk." His brother Eugenio is an entrepreneur of "the utmost professionalism" and "strong character" who created "brilliant business ventures." Such accounts fill a culturally prescribed formula for filial piety—exoneration from the charges of their enemies, silence about their cunning or corruptions, and a celebration of their contributions to the nation. The caricatures that thus emerge are devoid of sexuality, psychology, or fault, pale imitations of significant lives. While other Southeast Asian societies have produced some useful biographies and

autobiographies, the region still has little nondynastic family history that can serve as a model for future Philippine research.

Latin American Literature

In contrast to the paucity of Southeast Asian studies, Latin America offers a rich, theoretically informed literature on elite-family history that is applicable to other regions. For several decades, Latin American historians have used detailed microstudies of elite families to discover new dimensions in their national histories. As Gilberto Freyre, a pioneer in this field, once argued, “anyone studying a people’s past... will find that historical constants are more significant than ostensibly heroic episodes [and]... discover that what happened within the family.. is far more important than... often-cited events... in presidential mansions, in parliaments and large factories.” Applying this perspective to Brazil, Freyre found that its most distinctive elite families emerged in the sugar districts of the northeast during the sixteenth century fusing land, sugar, and slaves to become patriarchs of “untrammelled power” and “total fiat.” Arguing that the patriarchal family still exerts a subtle influence on the “the ethos of contemporary Brazilians,” Freyre cites the case of President Epitacio Pessoa who in the early decades of this century was known as “Tio Pita” (Uncle Pita) in recognition of his penchant for appointing male relations to the key government posts.

By the late 1970s the field of family history was so well developed in Latin America that another Brazilian historian would described the “family-based” approach to political history as a “commonplace in Brazilian history.” Similarly, an essay on the role of kinship politics in Chile’s independence movement began with the words “The importance of the family in Latin America goes unquestioned.” A decade later, Latin American historians were still unanimous in their belief that the elite family played a uniquely important political role in their region, one that required special consideration. Introducing eight essays for the *Journal of Family History*, Elizabeth Kuznesof and Robert Oppenheimer observed that “the family in Latin America is found to have been a more central and active force in shaping political, social, and economic institutions of the area than was true in Europe or the United States.” Indeed, they found that “institutions in Latin American society make much more social sense, particularly in the nineteenth century, if viewed through the lens of family relationships.”

In her writing on the Pessoa family of Paraiba State in Brazil’s northeast, historian Linda Lewin has produced some of the most refined historiographic reflections on the connections between familial and national history. Reacting to and reinforcing the weakness of the nation-state under the Old Republic (1889-1930), Brazilian families developed enormous political power. As Lewin explains in a seminal article, the “elite extended family has always loomed large in interpretations of Brazil’s historical revolution, for the absence of a strong centralizing state as well as the lack of other competing institutions has meant its importance has long been recognized.”

Lewin suggests that, at least for the Pessoa family in Paraiba, there was a striking difference in the ethos of national and provincial politics. As one of the “tightly organized oligarchical elites who controlled state parties... by virtue of their delivery of local votes to the national presidential machine,” the Pessoa family gained national influence, which further entrenched their local power in Paraiba. Brazil’s political leadership of this era was thus the product of family-based oligarchies—not parties, factions, or class-based social movements. “Without reference to the web of relationships woven by its members... it would be impossible to account for either Pessoa political control of their state or Epitacio’s exceptional national career,” writes Lewin about Brazil’s President Epitacio Pessoa. “Consequently, in many respects this book attempts to interpret Epitacio as the creation of his political family.” Demonstrating a striking

ideological flexibility, Epitacio Pessoa was “among... the world’s most distinguished diplomats” at the Versailles peace conference of 1919 and a leading liberal on the national stage in Rio. Simultaneously, however, he operated as the pragmatic “state party boss” and “political patriarch” in provincial Paraiba.

For Lewin, then, two key variables account for the extraordinary political power of Brazil’s family-based oligarchies—kinship and the state. During the colonial era, when the state was not yet well established, elite families, reinforced by patriarchy and endogamy, captured control over land and labor in the country’s productive hinterland. As the society changed during the late nineteenth century, patriarchy faded into conjugality and endogamy gave way to exogamy. But there was no “linear decline in the power of the elite family.” Indeed, a small group of these families “continued to define a political elite” and “the *parentela* continued, in the absence of a strong state and class-defined society, to offer the greatest individual security.” Despite modernization of the society, elite families in Brazil’s northeast maintained “the same landed monopoly of commercial agriculture and coercive manipulation of the rural labor force.

Surveying the scholarly literature on Brazilian state oligarchies under the Old Republic, Lewi found that the Pessoa family’s power in Paraiba sprang from a political system with three overlapping types of authority, all of which depended upon “family-based groups and networks to some extent;” (1) states such as Paraiba with a “primary dependence on the ties of family” and vertically integrated across socio-economic lines; (2) other states such as Bahia or Pernambuco, which “can be characterized as personalistic oligarchies” that dovetailed personal ties with kinship; and (3) a unique pattern of purer party governance in Rio Grande do Sul with “an impressive degree of bureaucratization in its organizational structure.”

Other Latin American historians echo and elaborate upon these themes. On the final page of his richly detailed history of Mexico’s powerful Sanchez family, Charles Harris offers an important insight into political character of leading Latin American families that seems amply illustrated in his preceding three hundred pages: “If there is one element that runs through the Sanchez Navarros’ political activities it is pragmatism, for they were prepared to work with anyone who would work with them.” In sum, Latin America’s family-based oligarchies achieved their power because, in Eric Wolf’s words, the state “yields its sovereignty to competitive groups that are allowed to function in its entrails.”

The Filipino Family

Even a cursory survey of the country’s past indicates that in the Philippines, as in many Latin American settings, a weak state and powerful political oligarchies have combined to make a familial perspective on national history relevant. The Philippines has a long history of strong families assuring social survival when the nation-state is weak. In this century, the state has collapsed, partially or wholly, at least four times in the midst of war and revolution. After independence in 1946, moreover, the Philippine central government effectively lost control over the countryside to regional politicians, some so powerful that they became known as warlords. Reinforcing their economic power and political offices with private armies, these warlords terrorized the peasantry and extracted a *de facto* regional autonomy as the price for delivering their vote banks to Manila politicians.

After generations of experience Filipinos have learned to rely upon their families for the sorts of social services that the state in many developed nations. Indeed, the state itself has recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society. In curiously loving language, Article 216 of the Philippine Civil Code states that “the family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.” In Article 219 the state admonishes its officials to respect the

family's primary responsibility for social welfare: "Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family. Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance." Similarly, in Article 2, section 12, the Philippine Constitution of 1986 makes the defense of the family a basic national principle. "The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."

Until recently the Roman Catholic Church, the nation's other leading source of power, either served the colonial state or its own institutional interests, remaining largely uninvolved in social welfare. Although the Church has developed strong social concerns since Vatican II, for most of its four centuries in the Philippines it remained an alien institution that extracted tribute and gave rituals in return.

What Church and state cannot provide, the family must. In the century past, while three empires and five republics have come and gone, the Filipino family has survived. It provides employment and capital, educates and socializes the young, assures medical care, shelters its handicapped and aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its name, honor, lands, capitals, and values to the next generation. "The most important advantage of our family system," wrote educator Conrado Benitez in the 1932 edition of his classic high-school civics text,

is that it provides for the care of minors, the sick, the incompetent, and the dependent. In European and American countries, where the family is not so pronounced a civic unit, millions of pesos are spent by governments... taking care of the insane, the indigent sick...

Thirty-five years later, a Philippine college sociology text explained the pragmatism underlying this practice: "The Filipino family... protects its members against all kinds of misfortunes since the good name of the family has to be protected." Much of the passion, power, and loyalties diffused in First World societies are focused upon family within the Philippines. It commands an individual's highest loyalty, defines life chances, and can serve as an emotional touchstone.

Once we entertain the familial aspect, its centrality to many periods and problems in Philippine history becomes obvious. Reflecting upon social constraints to national development in the 1950s, anthropologist Robert Fox described the Philippine as "an anarchy of families." Indeed, Philippine political parties usually have acted as coalitions of powerful families. Regimes can, as the Marcos era demonstrates, become tantamount to the private property of the ruling family. In the postwar period leading banks were often extensions of family capital (the Bank of Commerce was Cojuangco, while Manila Bank was Laurel). In his studies of Philippine banking, political scientist Paul Hutchcroft has found that: "There is little separation between the enterprise and the household and it is often difficult to discern larger 'segments of capital' divided along coherent sectoral lines." Similarly, the chief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Rosario Lopez, noted in a July 1992 paper that only eighty corporations among the country's top one thousand were publicly listed because most Filipino companies "are actually glorified family corporations." Noting that Filipinos seem to prefer relatives as partners and stakeholders, Lopez explained that: "There are sociocultural practices that endanger the situation, particularly the Filipino habit of having [an] extended family concept." If banks and other major corporations are often synonymous with the history of a few elite families, so labor unions, Christian denominations, and even a communist party have been dominated by single families.

In Philippine politics a family name is valuable asset. Along with their land and capital, elite families, as Jeremy Beckett argues in this volume, are often thought to transmit their character and characteristics to younger generations. Although new leaders often emerge through elections, parties and voters seem to feel that a candidate with a "good name" has an advantage. A

Laurel in Batangas, an Osmeña in Cebu, a Cojuangco in Tarlac, or a Lopez in Iloilo stands a good chance of polling strongly. Believing that an established name carries cachet and qualification, parties often favor a promising scion of an old line when selecting candidates. Along with the division of lands and jewels, families often try to apportion candidates for provincial or municipal offices among their heirs, sometimes producing intense conflicts over this intangible legacy. Just as the Cojuangco family's split in 1946–47 launched Jose Roy's long and distinguished career in Congress, so internal family battles can bear directly on the country's local and national politics. In the case of the Cojuangcos, this local battle over political legacy led Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco into a lasting alliance with Ferdinand Marcos and life-long alienation from his cousin Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, an internal dispute compounded by her marriage into another powerful political family of the same province.

In applying the Latin American literature to the Philippines, it is useful to adapt the two key variables found in most Mexican or Brazilian family histories—strong elite families and weak state. In particular, we must learn something of the character of Filipino kinship if we are to understand the influence of family upon Philippine politics. As anthropologist Roy Barton discovered in his prewar research among the highland Ifugao, the practice of bilateral descent is a central characteristic of Filipino kinship. Summarizing what he calls an "anthropological truism, Jurg Helbling explains that bilateral kinship "produces overlapping, egocentric networks," fostering societies "characterized by vagueness and ambiguity, if not by disorder." Unlike the patrilineal Chinese family, which could form unilineal kinship corporations to preserve property beyond three or four generations, Filipinos define kinship bilaterally, thus widening their social networks and narrowing their generational consciousness. Instead of learning the principle of family loyalty by severing distant male ancestors, Filipinos act as principals in ever-extending bilateral networks of real and fictive kin. "Filipino kinship system is cognatic or bilateral in form with an orientation towards ego," Argues Yasushi Kikuchi. "The Filipino type of kinship group is, therefore, a generational corporate group devoid of lineal or vertical continuity but expanded horizontally within each generation with ego as the central figure." Of course, not all ego are equal and there is often both hierarchy and leadership within this familial fluidity.

Supported by an informal ideology that legitimates the role of kinship in politics, elite Filipino families often perform a broad range of economic, social, and political functions. Not only does Filipino culture articulate strong beliefs about the family in the abstract but individuals, as both leaders and followers, are influenced by kinship concerns in making political decisions. In *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, David Wurfel explored the character of politics within a society based on bilateral kinship.

The family has long been the center of Filipino society. As in most parts of Southeast Asia kinship is essentially bilateral; that is, ancestry is traced through both mother's and father's line. Effective kinship ties are maintained with relatives of both parents. A bilateral system gives a potentially huge number of living kin. Especially as five to ten children are not uncommon today in each nuclear family of each generation.

Within these radiating bilateral networks of kin—four grandparents, several siblings, numerous aunts and uncles, dozens of godparents, scores of first-degree cousins, and hundreds of second- and third-degree cousins—an individual Filipino necessarily forges selective personal alliances to negotiate his or her way through the complexities of intrafamilial politics. Reinforcing this social fluidity, actual kinship relations often are superseded by the erratic influence of personal alliances and antipathies. Using fictive kinship, for example, an individual can elevate cousins to the status of siblings. Similarly, blood ties provide no guarantee that individuals will interact. In political terms, the word family does not simply mean household, as it is defined narrowly by demographers, nor does it mean kinship, as it is used more broadly by ethnographers.

Seeking a term that describes the political role of family, we might use kinship network, that is, a working coalition drawn from a larger group related by blood, marriage, and ritual. As elite families bring such flexible kinship ties into the political arena, elections often assume a kaleidoscopic complexity of coalition and conflict, making Filipino politics appear volatile.

Once a stable “kinship network” is formed, such familial coalitions bring some real strengths to the competition for political office and profitable investments. A kinship network has a unique capacity to create an informal political team that assigns specialized roles to its members, thereby maximizing coordination and influence. Under the postwar Republic, for example, Eugenio Lopez became a leading businessman in Manila while his younger brother Fernando was an active politician at both the provincial and national levels. In particular, the pursuit of the state’s economic largesse can depend upon the success of such teams, or kin-based coalitions, in delivering votes to a candidate for national office (senator or president). If elected, the politician will repay the investment many times over through low-cost government credit, selective enforcement of commercial regulations, or licenses for state-regulated enterprises such as logging and broadcasting.

The Weak State

Just as we must adapt the concept of the elite family to the Philippine context, so we must accommodate the particulars of the Philippine state. Since elite families and the state are engaged in a reciprocal relationship that constantly defines and redefines both, we need to place kinship networks within the larger locus of Philippine politics.

Reviewing the literature on the Philippine State selectively, two key elements seem to have contributed most directly to the formation of powerful political families—the rise of “rents” as a significant share of the nation’s economy and a simultaneous attenuation of central government control over the provinces. Probing each of these aspects, rents and a *de facto* provincial autonomy, creates a broad political and historical context for the studies of the individual families found in this volume. In so doing, however, we must be careful not to separate phenomena that seem, in the Philippine context, synergistic. Simply put, privatization of public resources strengthens a few fortunate families while weakening the state’s resources and its bureaucratic apparatus.

Within the literature on political economy, the theory of “rent seeking” best explains the economics relations between the Filipino elite and the Philippine state. As defined by economist James Buchanan, rents are created when a state gives an entrepreneur an artificial advantage by restricting “freedom of entry” into the market. When extreme restriction creates a monopoly, the consequences for the economy as a whole are decidedly negative: “No value is created in the process, indeed the monopolization involves a net destruction of value. The rents secured reflect a diversion of the value from consumers generally to the favored rent seeker, with a net loss of value in the process.” By restricting markets through regulation and awarding access to a favored few, states can spark an essentially political competition for such monopolies, a process called rent seeking. Reviewing the past half century of Philippine history from this perspective, the theory of rent seeking seems appropriate to both elite politics as it functioned under the Republic and the “crony capitalism” that flourished under the regime of Ferdinand Marcos.

The emergence of the Republic as a weak postcolonial state augmented the power of rent-seeking political families—a development that further weakened the state’s own resources. “The state, as it involved out of the colonial context, remains a weak apparatus for economic development,” explains political scientist Temario Rivera in his study of the post war economy.

“Enjoying little autonomy from dominant social classes and entrenched particularistic groups, the state is captured by... competing societal interests.”

This paradoxical relationship between a weak state and a strong society is not limited to the Philippines. Recent research on Third World politics has found that social units such as family, clan, or faction can block the state from translating its nominal authority into social action. “States are like big rocks thrown into small ponds,” write Joel Migdal; “they make wave from end to end, but they rarely catch any fish.” He argues that Third World states suffer from an underlying duality—“their unmistakable strengths in penetrating societies and their surprising weakness in effecting goal-oriented social changes.” Seeking the source of the state’s weakness, Migdal finds that social organizations such as “families, clans... tribes, patron-client dyads” continue to act as competing sources of authority. Thus, the “state leaders’ drive for predominance—their quest for uncontested social control—has stalled in many countries throughout their societies.”

Summarizing the historical processes that produced such a state in the Philippines, it can be said that Spain and United States tried to forge a strong bureaucratic apparatus based upon their own laws and social practice. Since the modern Philippine state did not evolve organically from Filipino society, it could not induce compliance through shared myth or other forms of social sanction. Denied voluntary cooperation from their Filipino subjects, the Spanish and early colonial rule. Compounding these contradictions, American colonials extended the powers of the central bureaucracy they had inherited from Spain while simultaneously experimenting with grassroots democracy in the form of local elections. In effect, the United States tried to moderate the imagined excesses of Iberian centralization by introducing the Anglo-American tradition of local autonomy. Moving from local elections in 1901, to legislative elections in 1907, and presidential elections in 1935, the Americans built electoral politics from the municipality upward, thereby entrenching provincial families in both local and national offices. To restrain the abuses and autonomy of provincial elites, Manila Americans used their Philippine Constabulary as a political police force to check abuses of the peasantry by *caciques*—a term these colonials applied to Filipino local elites with an intentional Latin American connotation. During the early years of their rule, Americans used the term *cacique* to describe the provincial elites who combined local office with landed wealth to gain extraordinary control over the countryside. Similarly, the colonial executive tried to use insular auditors to restrain rent seeking by an emerging national elite. Although it was effectively penetrated and manipulated by these elites from the outset of American rule, the colonial bureaucracy managed to maintain its influence until the Commonwealth period of the 1930s.

After independence in 1946, the new Republic inherited the colonial task of restraining both rent seeking and provincial autonomy. Unlike the colonial governors appointed by Washington, however, Philippine presidents won office with the electoral support of provincial elites and Manila’s oligarchs. As might be expected, much of the Republic’s politics revolved about the contradiction between the president’s dependence upon elite families to deliver votes and his duty to apply the laws against violence and corruption to these same supporters. These changes in the role of the executive compounded the pressures upon the bureaucracy, producing a rapid degeneration in the efficacy of this state apparatus. While the civil service had operated with integrity and efficiency under U.S. colonial rule, the postwar bureaucracy, in the words of O.D. Corpuz, was “characterized mainly by low prestige, incompetence, meager resources, and a large measure of cynical corruption.” Compounding these corrosive influences, the intrusion of partisan politics into the realms of appointments and decision making soon compromised the autonomy of the civil service. By the mid-1950s, bureaucracy suffered from a “novel weakness” and was “highly vulnerable” to attack by external parties (politicians).

Under the republic (1946–72), Philippine presidents used the state’s licensing powers as bargaining chips in their dealings with national and local elites, thereby creating benefices that favored the dominant political families. Viewed within the paradigm of rent-seeking politics, the Philippine political system was not based so much on the extraction of “surplus” from the production of new wealth but on a redistribution of existing resources and the artificial creation of rents—in effect, rewarding favored families by manipulating regulations to effect a reallocation of existing wealth. The Republic regulated a wide range of enterprises—transport, media, mining, logging, banking, manufacturing, retail trade, construction, imports, and exports—to the extent that they required “protection from competition” to remain profitable. Indeed, many entrepreneurs launched entire industries (textiles, for examples) on the assumption that their investments would be protected. While primary industries such as sugar and much of the manufacturing sectors (textiles, autos, and steel) were creations of the state’s licensing powers, provincial elites often relied upon other forms of state support. Instead of licenses per se, provincial elites required a free hand from Manila to exploit local populations, revenues, and resources, in effect, operating a benefice in the premodern sense of the term.

Starting from its role as the distributor of U.S. rehabilitation and Japanese reparation funds after World War II, the Philippine state played an increasingly important role in the economy through both its financial institutions and commercial regulations. By the late 1950s, the state role was so pronounced that an American financial consultant commented that “business is born, and flourishes or fails not so much in the marketplace as in the halls of legislature.” Under the doctrines of economic nationalism and national development, the Republic eventually extended its nominal influence into almost every sector of the economy. Although the state had broad economic powers under the law, the Republic’s record of implementing its development schemes was erratic. Elected with the support of rent-seeking political brokers, successive presidents were forced to pay off powerful politicians with local and national benefices, thereby compromising the state’s integrity and diminishing its resources. The Republic thus developed as a state with both substantial economic resources and weak bureaucratic capacity.

It is this paradoxical pairing of wealth and weakness that opened the state to predatory rent seeking by politicians. As resources drained from government coffers, the state apparatus weakened and political families gained strength. In his recent study of banking in the Philippines, Paul Hutchcroft explained the dynamics of a process that allowed the state to become “swamped by the particularistic demands of powerful oligarchic forces.”

The Philippine bureaucracy... has long been penetrated by particularistic oligarchic interests, which have a firm independent economic base... yet rely heavily upon their access to the political machinery in order to promote private accumulation... Because the state apparatus is unable to provide the calculability necessary for advanced capitalism, one finds instead a kind of rent capitalism based, ultimately, on the plunder of the state apparatus by powerful oligarchic interests.

The Republic’s weakness also led to an attenuation of state control over the countryside and a loss of its near-monopoly on armed force. As the state reached into the provinces to promote democracy and development, it found itself competing with local elites for control over the instruments of coercion. The impact of this seemingly simple change upon Philippine politics was profound. In his analysis of Third World politics, for example, Migdal identifies effective coercion as a key attribute of a strong state: “First, leaders aim to hold a monopoly over the principal means of coercion in their societies by maintaining firm control over standing armies and police forces while eliminating nonstate controlled armies, militias, and gangs.”

In the Philippines, World War II and independence coincided to allow the rise of private armies that operated beyond Manila's control. Although the tendency towards political violence was already evident in prewar elections, politicians were not heavily armed and the state retained the power to intervene effectively in the provinces. During the war, however, the collapse of central authority and the distribution of infantry weapons to anti-Japanese guerillas broke Manila's monopoly on firepower. Before 1935, the U.S. colonial state had used the Philippine Constabulary, the successor to the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, as its chief instrument of control, deploying its rifle companies to mediate between the demands of modernizing center and the countervailing centripetal pull of provincial politics. When Manila's control over the countryside weakened after 1935, and attenuated with independence in 1946, provincial politicians demanded neutralization of the Constabulary as a condition for the delivery of their vote banks to presidential candidates, thereby fostering a *de facto* local autonomy and endemic political violence.

By the mid-1960s, official crime statistics indicated a level of violence that was extraordinarily high by international standards. In 1965, the year Ferdinand Marcos was first elected president, the Philippine homicide rate was about 35 per 100,000 persons—compared to just 25 for Colombia that same year during a time of upheaval known here as “La Violencia.” The Philippine murder rate continued to climb, reaching a remarkable 42 per 100,000 persons in 1967. This violence was, however, neither random nor widespread. Statistical analysis indicates that it was integral to the electoral process. In Ilocos Sur, a province known for political violence, the murder rate ebbed to 1 to 2 in the months between elections and jumped to 30 during the November 1965 presidential campaign. Two years later, during the 1967 congressional elections, one municipality in Ilocos Sur achieved a remarkable annual homicide rate of 134 per 100,000.

The proliferation of arms and a parallel erosion of central authority allowed the rise of provincial politicians known as the warlords. Under the postwar Republic, politicians who reinforced their influence with private armies included Floro Crisologo (in Ilocos Sur), Armando Gustilo (Negros Occidental), Ramon Durano, Sr. (Cebu), Mohamad Ali Dimaporo (Lanao Del Sur), and Rafael Lacson (Negros Occidental). Although warlords were active throughout the Philippines, they were not found in every province. Powerful, semi-autonomous politicians controlled much of the Philippine countryside but only some reinforced their positions with paramilitary force in a way that made them warlords.

Looking back upon the Republic two decades later, several factors appear to have encouraged the emergence of warlordism. Private armies seem to have been more likely to appear in areas in which Manila's control was comparatively weak. Specifically, systemic political violence emerged in periods or provinces marked by some significant instability. After World War II, the combination of loose firearms and weak central control allowed warlords to emerge in many provinces. In later decades, warlordism often reemerged in regions where instability was fostered by the land frontier, protracted ethnic rivalry, or particular economic circumstance. On the frontiers, for example, local elites formed private armies to defend their extraction of natural resources through logging, mining, or fishing—the basis for wealth in many localities. Licenses for such extraction could be won formally through access to national politicians in Manila or informally by violent competition in the countryside. In these and other rural areas violence often occurred during elections when rivals competed to deliver blocs of votes for presidential candidates in the hope of winning rents as their reward.

Moreover, local politicians used armies in provinces where a key elements of production or processing was vulnerable to expropriation through armed force. To cite the most notorious example, human settlement in the province of Ilocos Sur is concentrated along a narrow coastal plain that seems almost pinched between the Cordillera and the South China Sea. Since most

transport moves along a single national highway that enters from Ilocos Norte and exits south into La Union towards Manila, paramilitary groups could monitor most of the province's commerce from a few roadside checkpoints. Although peasants produced Virginia tobacco, the province's main export, on farms scattered along this coastal plain, the processing, or redrying, of the raw leaves created another choke point for a powerful family, the Crisologos, to extract of the surplus. During the 1960s, they maintained a private army of over a hundred men and engaged in political violence that gave the province a homicide rate far higher than the national average. Anyone who tried to export tobacco from Ilocos Sur without drying it at the Crisologo factory and paying their extralegal export "tax" suffered confiscation at the family's checkpoint near the provincial boundary. By contrast, there were no comparable means by which a putative warlord could control the flow of the rice produced in the vast Central Luzon plain. The highway grid that crisscrosses the plain lacked comparable choke points, while both the production and processing of rice was widely dispersed.

Compounding this complexity, there are individual factors that lead certain provincial politicians to both adopt and abandon the use of private armies. A minor datu such as Ali Dimaporo or an ambitious peasant like Faustino Dy has very little choice but to use violence to establish his political and economic base. After securing wealth and power in a locality through armed force, provincial politicians can begin to barter votes to win both immunity from prosecution and benefices in the form of rents, cheap credit, or licenses. With his position thus legitimized, the family's founder, or his heirs, can enter a mature phase of old wealth and respectable politics. While the aging warlord usually retains an aura of ruthlessness akin to outlaw status, his children can study at Manila's elite schools, become lawyers or professionals, and marry into established families, thereby accelerating the process of legitimation that discourages the continuing use of political violence.

More than any other national leader of the Republican era, Ferdinand Marcos was a product of this provincial violence. Marcos learned politics in his father's prewar campaign for the national Assembly, and he began his own political career as a defendant charged with murdering his father's rival in their home province Ilocos Norte just after the 1935 legislative elections. Hardened by wartime experience in combat, black marketeering, and fraud, Marcos emerged as a politician who combined a statesman's vision with the violence of a provincial politician. During his second term (1969–73), he built an informal, clandestine, command structure within the armed forces to execute special operations and also cultivated close relations with provincial warlords. During the political crisis of 1971–72, he was the author of much of the terror bombing that traumatized national political life.

After his declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos's authoritarian state exhibited both a punctilious public concern for legal proprieties and regular recourse to extralegal violence. In a practice that Filipinos came to call "salvaging" loyalist factions within the Marcos-controlled military detained and tortured opponents, discarding their brutalized remains in public places. Although Marcos rapidly amassed ample wealth for entry into Manila elite, his use of their children as hostages, and later the public execution of a well-born rival, marked him as a man apart. In the end, it was his use of violence, along with economic mismanagement, that forced the national elite to turn against him.

In fashioning his mechanisms of authoritarian control, Marcos exploited the family paradigm in an attempt to remake the Philippine into his image of a "New Society." In the months following the declaration of martial law in 1972, veteran psychological warfare specialist Jose Ma. Crisol, working through the Philippine Army's Office of Civil Relations, convened an academic think tank to construct a master plan for social reform. Their report, *Towards the*

Restructuring of Filipino Values, argued that Marcos should exploit the Filipino family paradigm to purge the country of negative value.

What is recommended therefore is an expansion of the family to a larger group—the country. We should treat the country as our very own family, where the President of the Republic is the father and all the citizens as our brothers. From this new value we develop a strong sense of oneness, loyalty to the country, and a feeling of nationalism. Because all Filipinos are brothers, we become just and sincere. These will develop in us a feeling of trust such that values, such as *lamangan*, *pakitang-tao*, *bahala na*, etc., will be eliminated from our system...

Because the New Society provides us with an opportunity to grow, it is the most appropriate time to develop our very selves. The Philippines needs to be economically stable and it is only when we develop a value of self-reliance, self-discipline and a high sense of self-esteem that we could come up a progressive country...

From the contemporary value system we hope to modify it—geared towards the aims of the New Society.

Apparently acting on this report, the Marcos regime organized a massive youth organization, the Kabataang Barangay, led by his eldest daughter Imee. Under Presidential Decree No. 684, on April 1975, all youths aged fifteen to eighteen were required to join one of these groups and many were sent to remote rural camps for training through “secret rituals” that tried to instill in them a primal loyalty to the first couple. After days of intensive indoctrination, the youths would assemble in a candlelight ceremony to swear loyalty to the father and mother of the nation before larger-than-life portraits of Ferdinand and Imelda.

Although Marcos posed as a social reformer, his regime rested upon a coalition of rent-seeking families not unlike those that had dominated electoral politics before martial law. Backed by an expanding military and an influx of foreign loan capital that eventually totaled U.S. \$26 billion, Marcos effectively centralized political power in the archipelago for the first time since late 1930s, making once-autonomous provincial politicians supplicants and reducing the political process to palace intrigues. During the early years of the new regime, Marcos used his martial-law powers to punish enemies among the old oligarchy, stripping them of assets and denying them the political access needed to rebuild. Simultaneously, he provided his retinue of kin and cronies with extraordinary financial opportunities, creating unprecedented private wealth.

Instead of using his broad martial-law powers to promote development, Marcos expanded the role of rents within the economy, fostering a virtual florescence of the political corruption he had once promised to eradicate. In 1981, the business magazine *Fortune* sparked a storm of controversy with a report on this aspect of his constitutional regime, the New Republic: “Marcos’ principal achievement in 15 years in power has been to help his friends and relatives build giant conglomerates.” Three years later, economist at the University of the Philippines produced a detailed study of rents as they had operated under Marcos, listing all the 688 presidential decrees and 283 letters of instruction “which represent government intervention in the economy in one form or another.” Seeking to explain how such “massive intervention” had led to the “domination of certain private interests over the government,” the study concluded.

The issue of exclusive rights to import, export, or exploit certain areas the collection of large funds which are then privately controlled and expropriated, and the preferential treatment of certain firms in an industry for purposes of credit or credit restructuring are among the many instruments that have been utilized in the process.

Illuminating these broad trends with detailed case studies of corruption by individual cronies, Ricardo Manapat described the Marcos regime as a veritable apotheosis of rent seeking, which had divided “the whole economy... into different fiefs managed by relatives and cronies who regularly shared their earnings with the dictator.”

As a mix of regime paralysis, economic decline, and failing physical health eroded his authority after 1978, Marcos became increasingly reliant upon courtiers to deliver the blocs of provincial votes that he would need for a new mandate. Since the basis of crony wealth was accidental personal ties to the president rather than economic acumen, most, though not all, of these family-based conglomerates proved unstable. Plagued by mismanagement and corruption, these corporations collapsed with spectacular speed when the economy began to contract after 1981. As Marcos’s provincial political machinery withered, he suffered sharp reverses in the 1984 and 1986 elections, producing a crisis of legitimacy for his regime.

President Corazon Aquino came to power in February 1986 with a revolutionary mandate for change and few debts to any of the prominent political families allied with Marcos’s ruling KBL Party. Mindful of the abuses of the Marcos era, Aquino’s appointive Constitutional Commission debated an antidynastic clause at length, seeking to prevent another president from making the Palace a familial preserve. In Article 7, section 13, the 1986 Constitution bars presidential relatives from office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during tenure be appointed Members of the Constitutional Commission or the Office of Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureau or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Over time, however, political pressures forced President Aquino to compromise the spirit of this extraordinarily strict constitutional principle when she revived the legislature. In the May 1987 elections, many of the president’s relatives by blood or marriage won seats with the support of the ruling political party headed by her brother, Jose Cojuangco. Moreover, Aquino, occupying a narrowing political center between the communist left and the military right, gradually moved into an alliance with the provincial elites who had chafed under Marcos’s centralized regime. Although initially hostile to her reforms, regional politicians allied themselves with her when she reopened Congress as an assembly of elites with the authority to frame land-reform legislation. After a careful survey of the election results, the Institute for Popular Democracy concluded that: “The May 1987 elections for the Legislature... saw political clans reasserting themselves as the real source of power in Philippine electoral politics.” Indeed, 166 congressmen, or 83 percent of House membership, were from established “political clans,” as were 56 percent of the local officials elected in 1988. Paralleling this provincial restoration, Aquino returned expropriated corporations to Manila’s old economic oligarchy. Stripped of their assets and driven into exile by Marcos, the Lopez family, to cite one example, returned to Manila in 1986 and began reclaiming both its corporations and its provincial power base.

In the first hours of Fidel Ramos’s administration, the rhetoric of the new president provided an even sharper contrast between the principles and practice of family politics. In his inaugural address, delivered on 1 July 1992, Ramos launched a stinging attack on the country’s pervasive system of rent-seeking familial politics and pledged himself to reform.

We must make hard decisions. We shall have to resort to remedies close to surgery—to swift and decisive reform. (1) First, we must restore civic order... (2) Then, we must make politics serve—not the family, faction or the party—but the nation. (3) And we must restructure the entire regime of regulation and control that rewards people who do not produce at the expense

of those who do, a system that enables persons with political influence to extract wealth without effort from the economy.

Less than twenty-four hours later, however, Ramos proved the poignancy of his own social critique when he signed Executive Order No. 1 granting cement manufactures the right to import cement duty-free for three years. While President Quezon had used the potent symbolism of his Commonwealth Act No. 1 to establish the country's Department of Defense in 1935, Ramos had expended the drama of his first presidential act upon a customs decree granting a coterie of established manufactures a "stranglehold" over cement supplies. Observers noted that the order had been drafted by the incoming finance secretary, Ramon del Rosario, a Ramos confidante whose family corporation was a leading cement producer.

Seeking to apply these general observations to particular case studies, this volume's familial approach to Philippines politics carries with it a series of linked hypotheses: (a) that family-based oligarchies are, to state the obvious, a significant factor in Philippine history; (b) that relations among these elite "families" have a discernible influence on the course of Philippine politics; (c) that elite families, organized on complex patterns of bilateral kinship, bring a contradictory mix of unified kinship networks and a fissiparous, even volatile, factionalism into the political arena, and (d) that the interaction between powerful rent-seeking families and a correspondingly weak Philippine state has been synergistic.

Case Studies of Filipino Families

As noted above, the Republic's emergence as a weak postcolonial state was a necessary precondition for the rise of powerful political families. During the troubled transition to independence after World War II, the country's civil service, once an effective instrument of the colonial and Commonwealth states, became demoralized and politicized. Unrestrained by an efficient central bureaucracy, provincial politicians challenged Manila's control over the countryside while national entrepreneurs turned public wealth into private wealth. As Manila lost its near-monopoly on armed force, some politicians mobilized private armies, producing an extreme form of local autonomy in a number of provinces.

Focusing on key factors within these larger processes, the essays in this volume revolve around the twin themes of corruption in the capital and violence in the provinces. Indeed, a quick survey of the families profiled here produces a spectrum of political leadership ranging from provincial warlords like Ramon Durano to rent-seeking entrepreneurs such as the Lopez brothers. As emphasized in several of these studies, the Republic's failure to regain control over the provinces after independence in 1946 allowed provincial elites across the archipelago to assume a *de facto* autonomy. Some of these politicians formed private paramilitary units, producing such warlords as Durano, Justiniano Montano, and Mohamad Ali Dimaporo. Similarly, the systematic corruption that accompanied the executive's episodic attempts at economic development encouraged rent seeking by entrepreneurial families such as the Lopezes and Osmeñas. Despite their pedigree and erudition, families with *ilustrado* antecedents such as the Pardo de Taveras, who lived largely off old capital and their good name, suffered a protracted political eclipse until marriage or personal ties hitched their fortunes to newer families that were prospering through provincial politics and rent seeking.

It would be a mistake, however, to impose a simple dichotomy upon the complex web of postwar Philippine politics. We could identify both national entrepreneurs without a provincial base and local warlords with only tenuous ties to the capital. Most political families, however, fused local power with national access. Indeed, many found that they could not compete effectively in Manila for rents unless they could deliver, by whatever means, a substantial bloc of

votes to national politicians. Even the most violent of provincial warlords tried to win lucrative rents, either through allies in Manila or by exercise of their roles as national or provincial leaders, demonstrating an efficiency that made family a formidable force in the political arena. To cite the most prominent case, Eugenio Lopez used his commercial and legal skills to become the republic's leading rent-seeking entrepreneur. Simultaneously, his younger brother Fernando maintained the family's political base in the home province of Iloilo and used it to bolster his climb to national elective office.

Given a paradoxical pairing of the personal and the official within the term political family, it is not surprising that a remarkable variety of politicians should arise to defy any neat dichotomy or typology. Focusing on individuals instead of models or paradigms highlights the enormous variety in style and tactics found in the Philippine electoral arena. Rather than forcing this complexity into a procrustean bed of fixed categories, we have felt it best to allow our analytical framework to arise from the data. Let us illustrate this approach by taking an imaginary piece of graph paper and plotting a horizontal axis of provincial autonomy and a vertical axis of national access. As we reduce individual careers to these two variables, and then to imaginary dots, each representing a single politician, the resulting graph would probably spread randomly across the page, revealing an enormous diversity of tactics. Complicating this two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional reality, our dots would start to slip and slide across the page, reflecting changes in the character of individual families over time.

Focusing on major themes within this universe of possible tactics suggests that two elements—political violence and rent seeking—seem most significant in the history of many political families. Reflecting basic difference in landscape and livelihood, the strategy of each operates largely within a distinct domain. Under most circumstances, political violence is prevalent in the provinces and the competition for rents is concentrated in the capital. Unlike the Manila elites who operate within a culture of metropolitan civility, provincial families are forced to engage in systemic political violence either as agents or opponents. With its competition over public lands, precincts, and transportation routes, provincial politics involves a zero-sum struggle for hegemony over an electoral or commercial territory that encourages organized violence. By contrast, any aspirant for a major rent, whether financier or warlord, must compete within Manila's courier society with its complex of palace intrigues, legislative coalitions, ideological debate, and bureaucratic regulations. While the provinces have often produced warlords, national politics in Manila has, at times, promoted leaders who combine the skills of both factional broker and national statesman.

Since independence in 1946, the territorial aspect of provincial politics has encouraged the extreme form of *de facto* local autonomy known as warlordism. As the state's control over the provinces receded after independence, warlords such as Durano, Dimaporo and Montano used private armies to control localities and thereby gain a more secure tenure over elected offices. Elite families that did not mobilize their own militia still had to deal with the inherent violence of the provinces, either manipulating it, as the Lopezes have done, or confronting it like the Osmeñas. Returning to his home province in the late 1920s after years of legal studies at the University of the Philippines and Harvard, Eugenio Lopez allied himself with Iloilo City's criminals to seize control of the province's largest bus company. When Lopez later moved to Manila, he became a financier and philanthropist, assuming the aura of a cultured, cosmopolitan entrepreneur and avoiding direct involvement in political violence.

The Osmeñas of Cebu represent a contrasting case that nonetheless highlights the significance of provincial violence. As one of the first families to ascend from provincial to national prominence during the American period, the Osmeñas rarely employed violence. Soon after the U.S. Army landed in Cebu at century's turn, the family's founder, Sergio Osmeña, Sr.,

launched his political career by arranging the surrender of armed bands of former revolutionaries who were still marauding in the mountains of the interior. After his election as speaker of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, he acquired the patrician air of a national statesman. When his family's later generations came home to Cebu City from California or Manila to launch their political careers in the 1950s and 1980s they were still forced to combat the organized violence of their rivals—the Duranos, Cuencos and other local warlords. These latter-day generations of Osmeñas were able to evoke a familial aura of statesmanship and an ethos of managerial competence. Most recently, as Resil Mojares argues in his essay, the Osmeñas collective persona as modern managers, the antithesis and alternative to the province's warlords, has become central to their political revival in contemporary Cebu. If only in their opposition to their rivals' use of private armies, violence has been a significant factor in the Osmeñas careers as provincial politicians.

Although violence is their most visible aspect, all warlord families must seek rents or state revenues in some form to assure their political survival. Despite some striking differences, political families at both the provincial and national levels thus share a common involvement in rent-seeking politics, a process of turning political capital into commercial opportunity. There is an obvious economic dimension to provincial politics to generate patronage and cash during elections, even the most violent warlord requires an autonomous source of revenue to sustain his retinue and private army. Ultimately these financial imperatives breach the barriers within any putative typology that might seek to separate provincial power from national access, making rent seeking a critical adjunct to the paramilitary power of even the most autonomous of warlords.

While a flair for violence and military organization are essential in a warlord's rise, it is financial acumen that assures his longevity. After using violence to establish political dominion over Danao City in the early 1950s, Ramon Durano, the subject of Michael Cullinane's essay, delivered votes to President Carlos Garcia in exchange for Japanese reparation funds to construct the Danao industrial complex. With this independent financial base, Durano then possessed the manpower and material to survive in the unfavorable political climate that followed. Although his wealth allowed him to pose as a philanthropist and financier in his later years, Durano remained a warlord to the end, drawing upon private resources to mobilize goons for elections through the mid-1980s. Among its many enterprises, Danao City became the national center for the manufacture of firearms, called *paltik*. Durano's role as patron and protector of these local arms factories gave him access to an arsenal even after Marcos's martial-law regime confiscated nearly half a million firearms from private armies across the archipelago. Under martial law, Danao City's *paltik* industry became, through Durano's influence, a particular sort of protected industry. By banning imports of firearms after 1972 and failing to enforce the strict prohibition on their manufacture in Danao City, the Marcos regime inflated the black-market price for illegal firearms and created a rent of extraordinary value for Durano's clientele. Durano himself did not own the factories but still benefited as the patron of a high-profit industry operating exclusively in his territory. The *paltik* is thus an apt metaphor for the Janus-faced character of the Philippine warlord—a weapon of primordial violence within Danao City and a precision manufacture that commands markets in the world beyond.

Illustrating the importance of rent seeking for a warlord's long-term survival, John Sidel recounts how Justiniano Montano's failures in Manila ultimately overwhelmed his success as a provincial warlord. For nearly thirty years, Montano was Cavite's preminent leader, reinforcing his position as governor and senator with an armed retinue of extraordinary ruthlessness in a province notorious for its political violence. In the end, however, some signal failures at the national level insured Montano's eclipse as a provincial politician. In the late 1960s, the Montanos turned against President Marcos and found themselves purged from office after the declaration of martial law in 1972. Denied access to state patronage, Montano fell back on family

resources that were insufficient to sustain his political influence. Inept in the process of using public office to create private wealth, Montano had failed to build an autonomous economic base that would allow him to survive a period of alienation from the regime power. At the end of the Marcos era, Montano, despite his long dominion over a wealthy province, lacked the resources for a political revival, returning to Cavite from exile and living out his life in obscurity. Moreover, since Montano, unlike the Lopezes and Osmeñas, did not produce an effective political heir, he could not perpetuate his lineage—a key failing within the Filipino familial paradigm.

As a provincial politician in Muslim Mindanao, Mohamad Ali Dimaporo maintained a purer form of warlordism, described in G. Carter Bentley's essay, with fewer of the rent-seeking attributes of his counterparts elsewhere in the archipelago. Since he used violence to defend his constituency of Maranao Muslims against Christian settlers, Dimaporo's mobilization of a private army, known as the *Barracudas*, reinforced his political popularity among an embattled minority. Although he seemed interested in business, his political base among an impoverished minority living on a violent frontier denied him the sorts of economic opportunities available in Cavite or Cebu. Instead of manufacturing or real estate transactions, Ali engaged in logging, a simple form of rent seeking, but he made no moves towards commercial or industrial enterprises. Despite his reliance on these limited and localized rents, Dimaporo's role as a paramilitary leader at the margin of the Philippine state allowed him to survive for nearly half a century. After the declaration of martial law, Marcos used the armed forces to reduce Dimaporo's private army. But a decade later, desperate to mobilize votes for his declining regime, Marcos rearmed the *barracudas* with military weapons. In the aftermath of the "People Power" uprising of 1986, Dimaporo's reputation as a staunch Marcos ally and abusive warlord aroused the hostility of the Aquino administration. Still he retained sufficient firepower and following to weather a period of alienation from the center until he could reconcile himself with elements of the new regime. Ironically, it was his role as a leader of a cultural minority that allowed him to become the country's archetypal warlord, a form of leadership that remains more complex and multifaceted elsewhere in the archipelago. Like Montano, however, Dimaporo's relative financial failure will probably bar him from passing on substantial wealth, the basis of political power, to the next generation.

These chronicles of failure serve as an important corrective to the thrust of most of the essays in this volume. By selecting prominent politicians and recounting the stories of their inexorable rise, this collection could give the impression that all political families succeed. Over the long term, however, most seem to experience decline and defeat. Bilateral inheritance fragments property accumulated during the life of a powerful politician. Although strong leaders can leave name and money to their children, they cannot transmit the personal mix of charisma, courage, and cunning that guided their success.

At multiple levels within most of these essays, there is then an interweaving of individual biography and family history. To summarize very broadly, the underlying paradigm is familial but the narrative focus is often individual. That is, reflecting what the authors perceive to be the cultural ethos of the country, these essays describe individual actors operating within a familial context. In both politics and business, these actors seem to draw upon their kin networks to mobilize the support they need for success. Despite this familial basis for both perception and action, individual biography remains an important element of family history. Within the volatile, pressured markets of finance and politics, most competition is individual—one candidate for each political office and a single chief executive at the apex of a corporate hierarchy. Even among large families—such as the Lopezes, who count thousands of members spread over many generations—extraordinary individuals have played a seminal role in taking lineages to new plateaus of wealth and power.

Similarly, even the most dynamic individual competitor seeks to associate himself with an establish family. Rising financiers and politicians reinforce their positions by identifying with prominent ancestors. Within a society based on bilateral kinship, individuals have some flexibility in the construction of their genealogy, selecting from maternal and paternal lines to create the most advantageous lineage for public advertisement. As Jeremy Beckett explains in his discussion of the Maguindanao elite, a family name is a negotiable political asset that commands attention among voters and allegiance among followers.

Many politicians try to transform their electoral offices into lasting family assets, building what Filipino calls a “political dynasty.” Once entrenched, influential politicians often work to bequeath power and position to their children, in effect seeking to transform the public office that they have won into a private legacy for their family. For all politicians, provincial or national, office is inevitably ephemeral. But private wealth gained during their term in power, if substantial, can be passed on, giving succeeding generations the means to compete for office. Although the probability of a zero return on any investment in elections is at least 50 percent, the profits from a successful congressional campaign are so high that the risk is amply justified. Hence, the most successful politicians are those who can invest their heirs with the wealth and the good name needed to campaign effectively for office—a factor that blends the individual with the familial, the provincial with the national, and walordism with rent seeking.

In seeking the variables that account for the ability of politicians to capitalize upon the opportunities of office, one factor seems to stand out—legal skills. Although he was by all accounts a skilled corporate executive, Eugenio Lopez was educated in the law not in business or finance. Similarly, though Ramon Durano, Sr., was a quintessential warlord whose taste for violence was legendary in Cebu, he also had a sound legal education that allowed him to translate his political influence into private wealth. To cite a contrasting case, Ali Dimaporo, who was poorly educated, has failed to move beyond localized benefices to exploit the obvious opportunities for rent-seeking in Manila. In sum, he failed to use his bailiwick as a stepping stone into the national elite and thereby to gain access to economic rewards beyond the meager resources of his province. Although the Philippine state’s enforcement apparatus remains weak, its legal codes governing elections, commerce and corporations are complex and comprehensive, enveloping the whole universe of politics and business with nominally strict regulations. Through legal education, politicians learn to manipulate these regulations in their quest for rents. With this introduction to the country’s legal culture, even the most virulent warlord has the tools to succeed as a rent-seeking entrepreneur. Marcos, for example, combined these disparate elements. After a youthful career in violent provincial politics, he became a consummate constitutional lawyer in one guise and an ambitious rent-seeking politician in another. Once elected president, he used a mix of state violence and legal manipulation to acquire a vast array of rent-seeking corporations for himself and his entourage.

In terms of historiography, the essays presented here share a common attempt to write Philippine national history from the vantage of the leaders of specific “families” that have played a dominant role in national or provincial politics. Instead of using familial anecdotes to illustrate a national history marked by wars and empires, these essays, in effect, subsume these larger events within the microhistorical perspective of individual families. Through their very structure, these essays mimic the familial world view of their subjects, reducing the panorama of a national election to one family’s business opportunity or viewing a decade of dictatorship, with all of its agonies, as a personal misfortune. Although these essays move forward chronologically, and major events naturally intrude upon the lives of their subjects, the national is subordinated to the familial throughout. By following a political narrative marked by baptisms, marriages, murders, and board meetings—rather than war, revolution, or diplomacy—readers hopefully will gain an understanding of, even an empathy for, the perspective of a Filipino political family.

Although the essays in this volume share these larger concerns in one form or another, there are significant differences in emphasis. Instead of detailing the history of the Osmeña family, as he has done in his earlier biography of Sergio, Resil Mojares offers a theoretical reflection on the meaning of family identity within a system of electoral politics. Similarly, Jeremy Beckett probes the significance of a family name as a political asset in the Philippines and then illuminates this theme with a brief history of political competition among the Maguindanao. Moving from family history to political biography, several authors analyze the careers of the Republic's leading warlords. Whether peasant, lawyer, or Muslim aristocrat, provincial politicians with a flair for paramilitary mobilization used violence to gain office under the Republic, becoming, in Briam Fegan's words, entrepreneurs in violence. Although their private armies and defiance of the law made them seem autonomous, if not independent, these warlords proved, like Manila's rent seekers, remarkably vulnerable to state pressure when Marcos declared martial law.

Finally, other essays provide detailed, multigenerational studies of two of Manila's most prominent political families, the Pardo de Taveras and the Lopezes. Reflecting the distinctive character of each family, Ruby Paredes emphasizes the role of the Pardo de Tavera women and Alfred McCoy examines the career of a leading Lopez male. Starting with the career of Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera, the secretary of social welfare in the Aquino administration, Paredes provides an interior view of an elite family's ideological and material life—its struggle to maintain a lineage in the *ilustrado* traditions and its bitter internal disputes over inheritance. Although Mita's grandfather, Dr. T.H. Pardo de Tavera, founded the Philippines' first political party and dominated the country's politics for nearly a decade at century's end, Paredes turns away from the male, public realm to focus on the domestic sphere controlled by the family's strong women. Through this emphasis on the household, Paredes illuminates key issues of marriage, inheritances, and succession, implicit within the volume's other essays.

Indeed, the central event in this family history, the 1892 murder of Paz Pardo de Tavera by her husband Juan Luna, provides powerful testimony to the efficacy of this volume's familial approach to Philippine history. This murder has been excised from the nation's history and reduced to an exculpatory footnote in the biographies of Juan Luna, a brilliant painter and a Philippine national hero. Within the national story, the civic canonization of Juan Luna required the villification, even the extinction, of his wife, Paredes rediscovered the murder itself and uncovered original police reports that she has used to create a new understanding of the Filipino nationalist movement. Her essays restores the victim Paz to the national chronicle, unifies the political and the domestic, and articulates, for the first time, the way in which Filipino nationalists constructed gender under an oppressive colonialism. By retelling the old story with a new character and a new dialogue drawn from the domestic sphere, Paredes deepens and enriches our understanding of Philippine national history.

Adopting a more conventional approach, Alfred McCoy's study of the Lopez family chronicles the career of Eugenio Lopez as the most successful rent-seeking entrepreneur of the Republican era. His spectacular rise and sudden fall highlights the paramount role of public-sector manipulation in shaping the careers of even the most powerful of patriarchs.

Despite their differences of approach, the essays in this volume share a common concern with the role of family in Philippine politics and seek to open thereby a novel perspective on the study of Philippine history.

16

State and Society in the Process of Democratization

JOSE MAGADIA S.J.

The Philippine policy cases analyzed in the previous chapters are not unique in the developing world. They are empirical manifestations of the recent global phenomenon of the encounter between reinvigorated civil societies and governments struggling to reorder political institutions in a more liberalized ambit. On the one hand, the break-down of many authoritarian regimes in the 1980s led to the resurgence of democratic rule, in one or another of many versions that varied in their degrees of openness to strategies for societal demand articulation and participation. On the other hand, the various types of civilian mass movements and organizations that accompanied or facilitated the transitions have had to reconstitute themselves in the aftermath, and discover new ways of relating with the state in the liberalized political setting. As these two elements come into play in the democracies that have recently emerged or reemerged, new and often creative modes of state-society relations have arisen.

State and society actors have come together to form and implement policy, lay out plans for contingencies, bargain for redistribution of resources, provide auxiliary services, run programs for education, agree on terms of negotiation, negotiate for the settlement of disputes, and others. One finds societal organizations participating at various stages of policy making and in distinct policy areas. For instance, Colombia's *Centro de Cooperacion al Indigena* (CECOIN), an NGO, has facilitated communication between indigenous communities and public agencies, for such tasks as land titling, administration of natural resources, and the provision of technical resources (Ritchey-Vance 1991, 71ff). In Argentina, the *Movimiento Comunitario* was formed in 1987, bringing together cooperatives from several cities into a national federation community to further a governmental housing policy for self-construction and to access public funds for this purpose (Silva and Schuurman 1989, 58). In Peru, the *Centro de Estudios Para el Desarrollo y la Participacion* (CEDEP), a large organization with projects on the national and local levels, has coordinated with government in organizing rural projects for farmers in the Cajatambo region (Theunis 1992, 97). Other cases presented in the 1997 volume edited by Chalmers et al. present a similar picture.

These examples point to the pervasiveness of a new politics of interaction between state and society. For governments, this has led to a widening of perspectives in the integration of societal actors as participants in extra electoral political activities, and a shifting from a politics of co-optation to one of devolution. For societal organizations, this has expanded the repertoires of demand making, moving from a politics of protest and contention to one of influence and reform.

Significantly, the participation and influence of societal organizations are more manifested on the level of local government and in the implementation phase of policy making. This is understandable, since in many developing countries, subnational levels of government, and of the bureaucracy in particular, enjoy less access to resources and welcome all forms of external help. Complementarily, societal organizations at this level have emphasized parallel alternative project-based activities, often not incompatible with local government objectives. These have included organizations for relief and welfare provision, technology transfer, human development (self-help, education, income generation), and community organizing (cooperatives, cause-oriented and/or sector-based advocacy groups). In some cases, societal organizations have even cooperated with local governments and subnational bureaucratic offices in implementing various developmental projects.

Yet, as the Philippine cases show, it is possible for societal organizations to expand their influence up to the level of national policy making, even in a generally inhospitable context. Indeed, even as experiences of consolidation differ, the glaring and continuing socio-economic and political inequalities in many of these countries cast serious doubts on representativeness within political institutions. Worse still for the poorer sectors that together constitute the vast majorities in these countries, the hegemony of the neoliberal orientation has produced policies that have failed to adequately address basic human needs, even as they are rationalized by classical long-term trickle-down economics. While the failures of extensive state interventionism and the challenges of a more liberalized economic and political environment have taught politicians to survive, the right policy mix still has to be found, to balance the free market with social responsibility.

In the political arena, inequality is manifest in the societal organizations' lack of access to policy decision making. The split between policy deliberation and decision-making is a phenomenon shared by many of the new democracies in the developing world. Thus, if one were to just analyze policy decision making, it would seem adequate to focus mainly on the decisions and orientations of policy elite actors. These elite actors would be those who could afford to launch expensive campaigns to win seats in national policy-making bodies, who jealously hold on to these powers, who enjoy a high degree of autonomy as they are largely unaccountable to any grassroots interest, and who negotiate and bargain with each other to maximize their gains within conventional political institutions. To break into this elite domain, societal outsiders still often resort to various protest strategies which continue to be a valid, effective, and even necessary means of articulating alternative demands.

What the Philippine cases highlight is that new modes of state-society relations are possible, even on the highest level of national policy making, and even in political settings dominated by structural inequality. On the one hand, the informal consensus of recent times as to the minimum features of democracy has provided the impetus for governments to make ample room for citizens' groups which act autonomously of conventional political institutions like political parties, and which are given voice, short of voting power, in national policy-making bodies. Hence, alternative arenas for state-society interaction have arisen. On the other hand, societal organizations have correspondingly been able to employ new skills, as well as media and technology, to express their ideas and preferences, to explore new avenues of dialogue and networking, and to negotiate with government agencies and representatives. Characterized by rhetorical and communicative rationality in both substance and strategy, the new approach to government by such societal organizations has given them greater leverage in bargaining with power holders. The variation in the activities of state and society actors with regard to specific issues creates the political context for interaction.

The findings of this study suggest that for similar cases of national policy making in other emerging democracies, the extent of societal participation can be explained precisely by this conjunction of factors. Moreover, the cases also suggest the institutionalization of civil society, not so much in terms of the consolidation of societal organizations, but more in terms of the regularity of their input into political processes. Even while accepting that societal organizations have not yet become more influential in terms of substantial policy output, their acceptance within conventional political institutions as autonomous dialogue partners makes possible more substantial influence in policy making in the future.

The Democratizing State

The post authoritarian experience of the recognition, inclusion, and acceptance of autonomous societal actors as participants in political processes leads to an understanding of some

of the strengths and weaknesses of the democratizing state, vis-a-vis the new politics of interaction. Highlighted as well are the implications as to what must take place in government, if these democratizing developments are to be maintained and even expanded. These are discussed below under four headings: democracy as ideology, democratic institutions, building state capacity, and redefining the role of the state.

Democracy as Ideology. Prior to actual transition, a renewed understanding, redefinition, and reevaluation of democracy took place in many authoritarian-ruled developing countries. This is part of what Chalmers et al. (1997) speak of as political learning, undergone by those who led the opposition against authoritarian rule, and who subsequently assumed leadership roles in the new democracy. The experience of oppression and the denial of civil rights made democracy the rallying point for resistance, and the envisioned endpoint of the planned-for transitions.

Consequently during the authoritarian period, the learning was taking place when opposition leaders clarified to themselves the meaning of democracy as an overall political system, and as a set of corresponding processes, strategies, and tactics. Thus began the ideological hegemony of democracy that would subsequently lead to its becoming “the only game in town,” to use the Linz/Stepan definition of consolidation. Just as this vision and its hegemony have been sources of strength in the state’s pursuit of democratization, its ongoing review and reaffirmation are necessary for its survival and expansion.

A central feature in this ongoing evaluation is the provision for consultation mechanisms. Regardless of whether they are traditional or innovative, these mechanisms demand a heightened responsiveness to societal signals. These signals are communicated by such conventional political activities as electoral exercises, as well as less conventional ones such as mass mobilizations; they are also transmitted through different mass media that have been truly liberated from any form of state censorship. Moreover, the mechanisms call for openness to the inclusion of nontraditional actors in the determination of political outcomes.

After the authoritarian breakdown in the Philippines, for instance, the incorporation of these non traditional actors was realized in various ways: the appointment of civil society leaders to government positions, the creation of new government offices for consultation, and the general acceptance of nonstate actors as participants in policy processes. The institution of functional representation as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution was an important innovation, one of the important institutional developments that have to be not only preserved but also expanded. Such an expansion and consolidation would signal the effective institutionalization of civil society, and maximized measures for more effective societal participation which would make possible more substantive policy influence from these nonconventional political actors.

Democratic Institutions. The foregoing discussion of mechanisms for consultation and representation also form part of the continuing complementary task of establishing stable institutions that correspond to democratic ideals. In this respect, redemocratizing societies like the Philippines enjoy an advantage over brand-new democracies in that they already had much of the bureaucratic infrastructure set in place, thus easing the establishment of consultative mechanisms and contributing to their effectiveness. In addition, empirical historical models and ideals were available for easy reference in the process of democratic restoration. Such foundational institutions as elections, a constitution, a system of checks and balances among distinct and autonomous branches of government, and basic civil and human rights were speedily restored.

Accompanying the restoration of these institutions was a reopening of the state to a plurality of actors and ideas and dynamics that manifested a certain degree of systemic integrity, such that developments in one or another level or branch of government influenced developments

in others. For instance, in the cases presented, the incorporative ability of executive line agencies in the three policy areas prompted the legislature to include societal inputs in social reform issues. Relations between executive and legislative leaders and institutions were thus positive enough to maintain spaces for the participation of nonstate actors.

One of the ironies of the Philippine experience is that the intrinsic weakness of its political party system has opened the state to the new politics of interaction. In the absence of strong mass-based, ideologically distinct political parties with clear programmatic platforms, and with the consequent party switching by traditional politicians seeking to stay in power, societal organizations have been able to fill a political gap. They have been accepted by traditional elite power holders and technocrats as autonomous partners in some of the processes involved in governance. This differentiates the Philippines (as well as Brazil and Ecuador) from countries like Chile, where stronger political party systems have led to the co-optation of civil society organizations by parties and their apparent demobilization (Oxhorn 1995, 272ff; Schneider 1995, 191ff; Taylor 1998, 104ff).

Ironically, as this study has shown, this source of support for the new politics of interaction also has its downside. Indeed, one of the processes that the elite have jealously reserved to themselves is the critical phase of decision-making, which has remained closed to more direct participation by societal organizations. This is an area for further liberalization in the future. If democratization is to move on, clearer links will have to be established between societal organizations and political parties. An ideal that does not depend on short-term tactical bargains would be the development of political parties toward some form of ideological position and the programmatic strategies this will entail. This need not, however, lead to co-optation and demobilization of societal organizations, which could still maintain their autonomy if they are careful about the substance and manner of their links to such parties.

Clearer links between societal organizations and more programmatic parties could also contribute to the institutionalization of openings in government that were initiated in a seemingly ad hoc manner. For instance, the informal openings that manifested the democratization of the Philippine Congress, and other such temporary measures, might be accepted as part of regular procedures. Further democratization would then not only be facilitated; it would also be fortified by new institutions for coordinating multiple levels and actors of policy making that can offer a more efficient alternative to old and bankrupt systems such as centralized political party control or various corporatist arrangements.

Finally, these links, along with ideological development, would strengthen the representational quality of political parties. Here, one of the more recent models is Brazil's *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT, Workers' Party; cf. Keck 1992; Sandoval 1993). Should this take place in the Philippines, the participation of societal organizations would be moving beyond policy deliberation to actual and substantial influence on decision-making.

State Capacity. A third area of concern has to do with the continuing rationalization of government functions and structures. This refers to two corollary tasks that would enhance a politics of interaction: the reduction of corruption in government, and the building of state capacity for more effective, efficient, and responsive administration. Grindle (1997) has called this "good government," not referring to an expansion of the public sector but, rather, its streamlining for maximum effectiveness.

Negatively, this calls for a check on corruption; positively, this means institutional reform and human resource development within institutions. For as long as state efficiency and consistency are impaired by rent-seeking agents in government, the gains of democratization are

minimized, substantial and procedural productivity is stunted, prompt action is made difficult, and state-society interaction is strained and obstructed. To remedy this lack of efficiency, every government agency should make sure that every office designed to integrate inputs from civil society actors is utilized to the full. Also central is a rational system for the implementation and follow-up of legislation or of executive administrative directives. Limiting rhetoric is not only inadequate; it can also seriously erode the credibility of even the most progressive policy statement.

The Role of the State. To preserve and strengthen a politics of interaction, the state will have to more actively assume a supervisory role for the various subprocesses that have been enabled in new democracies. This is not a return to what Touraine (1994, 46ff) calls “the mobilizing state,” associated with various forms of centralized control (e.g. through a centralized planned economy, or through an authoritarian-based technocracy). In this mobilizing model, objectives of political integration, economic growth, and social redistribution were brought together into a single unified model designed by the state, and not negotiated by the various social partners involved in the processes. The complexity and multiplicity of forms and objectives in this model hid some major inconsistencies, sending countries into economic and political crises and exposing the model’s inherent instability.

Instead of this bankrupt model, the alternative that a politics of interaction implies moves toward reinvention, where state supervision consists in striking a balance between guardianship and enabling of autonomous subprocesses, and the maintenance of a rule of law on the one hand, and social responsibility on the other. Bradford (1994, 23) describes this in terms of vision articulation, support mobilization, and policy prioritization.

Specifically, for instance, in the context of blind neoliberal market-oriented proposals, the provision of an overall and consistent social agenda is a necessity. In the Philippine cases, for instance, President Aquino’s narrow option for political institutional restoration unnecessarily excluded a comprehensive and coherent overall social agenda. Thus in the area of social policy, her administration proceeded in an *ad hoc*, circumstance-driven manner. Her hands-off policy in agrarian reform was a glaring contrast to the involved and consistent support of the generic drugs initiative by her Health secretary, Alfredo Bengzon. This lack of consistency highlighted the absence of an integrated framework for socioeconomic reform necessary for long-term democratic survival.

Societal Organizations in the New Democracies

The other collective participant of a politics of interaction is composed of those actors identified with civil society. In this study, the relevant collective actor identified is the societal organization, whose contribution to democratization in the Philippines and in many other developing countries has proven indispensable. Clearly, the system is still in flux, as both positive and negative features of the societal organizations have at times cancelled each other out. For a politics of interaction to take fuller effect, some of the features of societal organizations that this study encountered have to be further strengthened, while others have to be downplayed, corrected, or even gradually eliminated. These are discussed in this section under two headings: positive legacies from authoritarian rule; and reformism and a strategic repertoire.

Continuities: Positive Legacies from the Authoritarian Period. Jelin (1998) speaks of new forms of interest expression that have emerged in many recently restored democracies in Latin America. She points out that these new forms of collective action coincided with opposition to authoritarian regimes. In the absence of conventional democratic institutions for demand articulation (e.g. political parties, a free press, autonomous legislatures, electoral exercises), and

in a context of state repression and nonresponsiveness, these alternative organizations were set up as fora for criticism of government, and as the main mechanism for catalyzing the transition from authoritarian rule. Here, as in many other experiences, the Philippines conforms to Latin American patterns. Confirming Jelin's observations, in the Philippines and in many other new or newly restored democracies, these organizations have proven more resilient than anticipated. In other words, societal organizations have shown that they are here to stay.

Moreover as mentioned above, in countries like the Philippines and Brazil, characterized by weak patronage-driven party systems, these societal organizations have continued to be effective alternative channels for the expression of collective demands in restored democracies, addressing themselves to the state, while acting independently of traditional political parties. These new forms of interest expression have effectively protected themselves from co-optation and subsequent demobilization.

Consequently, their continued efforts at the grassroots organizing for demand making and policy implementation have become necessary for an authentic politics of interaction, especially in expanding areas of concern, and a broadening concept of citizenship. The Philippine cases have shown how central the theme of participatory citizenship is for consolidation of democracy.

Democratic Reformist Orientation and an Expanding Strategic Repertoire. A critical societal feature that has enabled engagement was a reorientation toward reformism, involving a sacrifice of more drastic and speedy social solutions and, for some extremists, the abandonment of sweeping ideological projects of state takeover. Just as the ideological hegemony of democracy among the elite was the result of political learning from the experience of repressive authoritarianism, so, too, was the turn toward reform, which was a reaffirmation of the same renewed understanding of democracy on the part of societal actors at the grassroots.¹ The learning was an acknowledgment that long-term development cannot be achieved by coercion, and cannot compromise basic civil and human rights.

Along with this reaffirmation of such basic democratic ideals was an acceptance of democratic strategies which were likewise reformist. This meant a willingness to concentrate on more specific objectives and demands, and to adopt more minimal procedural compromises as medium-term objectives, without necessarily giving up a more substantial vision of social democracy. This also meant willingness to work with traditional elite, including those in political parties, even while safeguarding autonomy. Through these, the vibrancy of civil society can be preserved.

This is akin to what Adler and Webster (1995, 80) call "radical reform," a strategic use of power "that combines a radical vision with a strategy of reform" that keeps in mind longer-term goals as piecemeal reform victories are pursued through legal struggles. While Adler and Webster's use of radical reform is applied to the positive role of South African labor unions during a transition, the Philippine experience shows how the same strategy can be pursued in a new democracy. Confirming some of Adler and Weber's hunches (1995: 99), this study has shown that indeed the influence of societal organizations depends partly on the organizations' strength and ability to marshal their resources strategically, and take advantage of openings in the new democratic state.

The application of radical reform in the Philippine policy cases shows how clear objectives can facilitate innovation and creativity in reform-oriented societal organizations. In the case of agrarian reform, for instance, the impressive variety of strategies employed was important to CPAR's cause. Yet more significantly, it was clear to CPAR that these substrategies were centered on the reformist objective of passing a more redistributive law. All the demonstrations,

rallies, marches, signature campaigns, etc. were acknowledged as secondary to, and auxiliaries of, the main activity—programmatic demand making and advocacy before Congress.

What is important is that further innovation follows from a fundamental willingness to engage government and to participate in conventional political activities. While this does not preclude the use of protest, an expanded repertoire nevertheless communicates an openness to dialogue and discussion. On the part of societal organizations, it also calls for familiarity with policy-making institutions and processes. The case of CPAR was exemplary; but its example still has to be emulated in other policy areas.

The above discussion is linked to what Hipsher (1998, 157) describes as an institutionalization of dissent or protest in restored democracies, where societal demand makers more greatly rely “on negotiations, the electoral process, and working through government institutions and agencies.” The Philippine experience follows what Hipsher describes as the Brazilian pattern of political parties and overall political systems that are open to demand-making societal pressures, resulting in the inclusion of autonomous societal organizations in the various political processes. This openness, Hipsher (1998: 171) points out, deepens the democratization process and strengthens a democracy by incorporating, instead of marginalizing, autonomous societal pressures. Moreover, this deepening is also achieved, since links with the state and with parties function as a countercheck on societal organization, and a protection against dangers associated with their lack of clear institutional and societal accountability.² It is also possible that such links of societal organizations with a weak party system will facilitate the development of parties which would be more programmatic and less patronage- or personality-oriented.

What the Philippine cases further suggest is that such institutionalization can still combine conventional forms of collective action with activities that might even be disruptive and threatening, like mobilizations. This combination is but another manifestation of the expanded repertoire that increases the effectiveness of societal organizations and can help protect their autonomy. Katzenstein (1998, 195ff) points out that the distinction between institutional and protest politics is overdrawn. In conventional social movement theory, when a societal movement or organization shifts from street politics to more conventional forms of political activism (lob-bying, voting), a threshold is crossed from protest to institutional politics that constitutes a deradicalization. Katzenstein emphasizes that such a sharp demarcation sidesteps the need to demonstrate and explain their linkage. It tends to ignore the oft-stated reminder of the difficulty of locating where state begins and society ends. Finally, it also generalizes to the point of brushing aside more subtle variations in the experiences of different social movements.

Another Look at Democratic Consolidation

In the extensive and still growing collection of works on democratic transition and consolidation, many subtopics have been analyzed. These include popular legitimization, the institutionalization of electoral and political party systems, civilian supremacy over the military, state decentralization, judicial reform, the regularization of political processes in the different levels of government, the instilling of democratic values, social democratic reform, the reinstatement of the rule of law, the protection of economic and political freedoms and rights, the rationalization of the bureaucracy, and others. There is no doubt that each of these deserves the attention that both scholars and political leaders have already given and continue to give them. Still, however, a continuing tension owing to the unpredictability of outcomes cannot be avoided. Not only is eventual consolidation dependent on events that cannot be completely anticipated; but the final form as well of such a consolidation cannot be adequately foreseen or prepared for. The policy experiences related in this study may prove to be the beginnings of a true “thickening” of civil society (Fox 1998, 120ff), in a new reincarnation of democracy in a developing setting; but

then again, it may also be just another signal of continuing no consolidation. In the end, the results can only be borne out in time, and this study has aimed to contribute to data analysis to help social scientists understand these dynamics.

Focusing on political context and the degree of political catalysis, this work suggests a framework that is able to integrate the double concern of disaggregation and the incorporation of nongovernmental public arenas. It is able to bring into the consolidation purview such integral themes as social movements and civil society, state-society relationships, public policy processes, and interest representation.

1 Chalmers et al. (1997, 563) describe the political learning of movements on the left in terms of the traumatic experience of authoritarian repression, “the critique of left instrumentalism and vanguardism,” the emergence of multiple sites of domination, and the recognition of the weaknesses of comprehensive systemic models of social democracy and state socialism.

2 Jelin (1998, 412) points out that societal organizations identified as the “third sector” cannot be equated with civil society, since in the absence of a constituency or of a “citizenship” they do not have a built-in mechanism of accountability. As Jelin states: “They are financially accountable to those who provide funds and to their own ideology and consciousness, hopefully (but only hopefully) based on ‘good’ values, solidarity, compassion, and commitment... there is always a danger of arbitrary action, of manipulation, of lack of transparency in objectives and practices. There is also a concern with rationality and efficiency.”

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CHAPTER 5

17

The Uses of Poverty: The Poor Pay All

HERBERT GANS

Some years ago Robert K. Merton applied the notion of functional analysis to explain the continuing though maligned existence of urban political machine: If it continued to exist, perhaps it fulfilled unintended or unrecognized positive functions. Clearly it did. Merton pointed out how the political machine provided central authority to get things done when a decentralized local government could not act, humanized the services of the impersonal bureaucracy for fearful citizens, offered concrete help (rather than abstract law or justice) to the poor, and otherwise performed services needed or demanded by many people but considered unconventional or even illegal by formal public agencies.

Today, poverty is more maligned than the political machine ever yet it, too, is a persistent social phenomenon. Consequently, there be some merit in applying functional analysis to poverty, in asking whether it also has positive functions that explain its persistence. Merton defined functions as “those observed consequences [of a phenomenon] which make for the adaptation of adjustment of a givens’ system.” I shall use a slightly different definition; instead of identifying functions for an entire social system, I shall identify them for the interest groups, socioeconomic classes, and other population aggregates with shared values that “inhabit” a social system. I suspect that in a modern heterogeneous society, few phenomena are functional or dysfunctional for the society as a whole, and that most result in benefits to some groups and costs to others. Nor is any phenomenon indispensable; in most instances, one can suggest what Merton calls “functional alternatives” or equivalents for them, i.e. other social patterns or policies that achieve the same positive function but avoid the dysfunction. [In the following discussion, positive function will be abbreviated as functions and negative functions as dysfunctions. Functions and dysfunctions, in the planner’s terminology, will be described as benefits and costs.]

Associating poverty with positive functions seems at first glance to be unimaginable. Of course, the slumlord and the loan shark are commonly known to profit from the existence of poverty, but they are viewed as evil men, so their activities are classified among the dysfunctions of poverty. However, what is less often recognized, at least by the conventional wisdom, is that poverty also makes possible the existence or expansion of respectable professions and occupations, for example, penology, criminology, social work, and public health. More recently, the poor have provided jobs for professionals and para-professional “poverty warriors,” and for journalists and social scientists, this author included, who have supplied the information demanded by the revival of public interest in poverty.

Clearly then, poverty and the poor may well satisfy a number of positive functions for many non-poor groups in American society. I shall describe such functions—economic, social, and political—that seem to me significant.

The Functions of Poverty

First, the existence of poverty ensures that society’s “dirty work” is done. Every society has such work: physically dirty or dangerous, temporary, dead-end and underpaid, undignified,

and menial jobs. Society can fill these jobs by paying higher wages than for “clean” work, or it can force people who have no other choice to do the dirty work—at low wages. Poverty functions to provide a low-wage labor pool that is willing—or, unable to be unwilling to perform dirty work at low cost. Indeed, the function of the poor is so important that in some Southern states, welfare payments have been cut off during the summer months when the poor are needed to work in the fields. Moreover, much of the debate about the Negative Income Tax and the Family Assistance Plan has concerned their impact on the work incentive, by which is actually meant the incentive of the poor to do the needed dirty work if the wages therefrom are no larger than the income grant. Many economic activities that involve dirty work depend on the poor for their existence: restaurants, hospitals, parts of the garment industry, and “truck farming,” among others, could not persist in their present form without the poor.

Second, because the poor are required to work at low wages, they subsidize a variety of economic activities that benefit the affluent. For example, domestics subsidize the upper-middle and upper classes, making life easier for their employers and freeing affluent women for a variety of professional, cultural, civic, and partying activities. Similarly, because the poor pay a higher proportion of their income in property and sales taxes, among others, they subsidize many state and local governmental services that benefit more affluent groups. In addition, the poor support innovations in medical practice as patients in teaching and research hospitals and as guinea pigs in medical experiments.

Third, poverty creates jobs for a number of occupations and professions serve or “service” the poor, or protect the rest of society from them. As already noted, penology would be minuscule without the poor, as would police. Other activities and groups that flourish because of the existence of poverty are the numbers game, the sale of heroin and cheap wines and liquors, pentecostal ministers, faith healers, prostitutes, pawn shops, and the peacetime army, which recruits its enlisted men mainly from among poor.

Fourth, the poor buy goods others do not want and thus prolong the economic usefulness of such goods—day-old bread, fruit and vegetables that would otherwise have to be thrown out, secondhand clothes, and deteriorating automobiles and buildings. They also provide incomes for doctors, lawyers, teachers, and others who are too old, poorly trained, or incompetent to attract more affluent clients.

In addition to economic functions, the poor perform a number of social functions.

Fifth, the poor can be identified and punished as alleged or real deviants in order to uphold the legitimacy of conventional norms. To justify the desirability of hard work, thrift, honesty, and monogamy, for example, the defenders of these norms must be able to find people who can be accused of being lazy, spendthrift, dishonest, and promiscuous. Although there is evidence that the poor are about as moral and law-abiding as everybody else, they are more likely than middle-class transgressors to be caught and punished when they participate in deviant acts. Moreover, they lack the political and cultural power to correct the stereotypes that others hold of them and thus continue to be thought of as lazy, spendthrift, etc. by those who need living proof that moral deviance does not pay.

Sixth, and conversely, the poor offer vicarious participation to the rest of the population in the uninhibited sexual, alcoholic, and narcotic behavior in which they are alleged to participate and which, being freed from constraints of affluence, they are often thought to enjoy more than middle classes. Thus, many people, some social scientists included, believe that the poor not only are more given to uninhibited behavior (which may be true, although it is often motivated by despair more than by lack of inhibition) but derive more pleasure from it than affluent people

(which the research by Lee Rainwater, Walter Miller, and others shows to be patently untrue). However, whether the poor actually have more sex and enjoy more is irrelevant; so long as middle-class people believe this to be they can participate in it vicariously when instances are reported in fact or fictional form.

Seventh, the poor also serve a direct cultural function when culture created by or for them is adopted by the more affluent. The rich often collect artifacts from extinct folk cultures of poor people; and almost all Americans listen to the blues, Negro spirituals, and country music, which originated among the Southern poor. Recently they have enjoyed the rock styles that were born, like the Beatles, in the slums; and in the last year poetry written by ghetto children has become popular in literary circles. The poor also serve as culture heroes, particularly, of course, to the left; but the hobo, the cowboy, the hipster, and the mythical prostitute with a heart of gold have performed this function for a variety of groups.

Eight, poverty helps to guarantee the status of those who are not poor. In every hierarchical society, someone has to be at the bottom; but in American society, in which social mobility is an important goal for many and people need to know where they stand, the poor function as a reliable and relatively permanent measuring rod for status comparisons. This is particularly true for the working class, whose politics is influenced by the need to maintain status distinctions between themselves and the poor, much as the aristocracy must find ways of distinguishing itself from the nouveaux riches.

Ninth, the poor also aid the upward mobility of groups just above them in the class hierarchy. Thus, a goodly number of Americans have entered the middle class through the profits earned from the provision of goods and services in the slums, including illegal or non-respectable ones that upper-class and upper-middle-class businessmen shun because of their prestige. As a result, members of almost every immigrant group have financed their upward mobility by providing slum housing, entertainment, gambling, narcotics, etc., to later arrivals—most recently to blacks and Puerto Ricans.

Tenth, the poor help to keep the aristocracy busy, thus, justifying its continued existence. “Society” uses the poor as clients of settlement houses and beneficiaries of charity affairs; indeed, the aristocracy must have the poor to demonstrate its superiority over other elites who devote themselves to earning money.

Eleventh, the poor, being powerless, can be made to absorb the costs of change and growth in American society. During the nineteenth century, they did the backbreaking work that built the cities; today, they are pushed out of their neighborhoods to make room for “progress.” Urban renewal projects to hold middle-class taxpayers in the city and expressways to enable suburbanites to commute downtown have typically been located in poor neighborhoods, since no other group will allow itself to be displaced. For the same reason, universities, hospitals, and civic centers also expand into land occupied by the poor. The major costs of the industrialization of agriculture have been borne by the poor, who are pushed off the land without recompense; and they have paid a large share of the human cost of the growth of American power overseas, for they have provided many of the soldiers for Vietnam and other wars.

Twelfth, the poor facilitate and stabilize the American political process. Because they vote and participate in politics less than other groups, the political system is often free to ignore them. Moreover, since they can rarely support Republicans, they often provide the Democrats with a captive constituency that has no other place to go. As a result, the Democrats can count on their votes, and be more responsive to voters—for example, the white working class—who might otherwise switch to the Republicans.

Thirteenth, the role of the poor in upholding conventional norms (see fifth point, above) also has a significant political function. An economy based on the ideology of laissez-faire requires a deprived population that is allegedly unwilling to work or that can be considered inferior because it must accept charity or welfare in order to survive. Not only does the alleged deviancy of the poor reduce the moral pressure on the present political economy to eliminate poverty, but socialist alternatives can be made to look quite unattractive if those who will benefit most from them can be described as lazy, spendthrift, dishonest, and promiscuous.

The Alternatives

I have described 13 of the more important functions of poverty and the poor in American society, enough to support the functionalist thesis that poverty, like any other social phenomenon, survives in part because it is useful to society or some of its parts. This analysis is not intended to suggest that because it is often functional, poverty should exist, or that it must exist. For one thing, poverty has many more dysfunctions than functions; for another, it is possible to suggest functional alternatives.

For example, society's dirty work could be done without poverty, either by automation or by paying "dirty workers" decent wages. Nor is it necessary for the poor to subsidize the many activities they support through their low-wage jobs. This would, however, drive up the costs of these activities, which would result in higher prices to their customers and clients. Similarly, many of the professionals who flourish because of the poor could be given other roles. Social workers could provide counseling to the affluent, as they prefer to do anyway; and the police could devote themselves to traffic and organized crime. Other roles would have to be found for badly trained or incompetent professionals now relegated to serving the poor, and someone else would have to pay their salaries. Fewer penologists would be employable, however. And Pentecostal religion could probably not survive without the poor—nor would parts of the second- and third-hand-goods market: And in many cities, "used" housing that no one else wants would then have to be torn down at public expense.

Alternatives for the cultural functions of the poor could be found more easily and cheaply. Indeed, entertainers, hippies, and adolescents are already serving as the deviants needed to uphold traditional morality and as devotees of orgies to "staff" the fantasies of vicarious participation.

The status functions of the poor are another matter. In a hierarchical society, some people must be defined as inferior to everyone else with respect to a variety of attributes, but they need not be poor in the absolute sense. One could conceive of a society in which the "lower class," though last in the pecking order, receives 75 percent of the median income, rather than 15–40 percent, as is now the case. Needless to say, this would require considerable income redistribution.

The contribution the poor make to the upward mobility of the groups that provide them with goods and services could also be maintained without the poor having such low incomes. However, it is true that if the poor were more affluent, they would have access to enough capital to take over the provider role, thus competing with, and perhaps rejecting, the "outsiders." (Indeed, owing in part to anti-poverty programs, this is already happening in a number of ghettos, where white storeowners are being replaced by blacks) Similarly, if the poor were more affluent, they would make less willing clients for upper-class philanthropy, although some would still use settlement houses to achieve upward mobility, as they do now. Thus, "society" could continue to run its philanthropic activities.

The political functions of the poor would be more difficult to replace. With increased affluence, the poor would probably obtain more political power and be more active politically. With higher incomes and more political power, the poor would be likely to resist paying the costs of growth and change. Of course, it is possible to imagine urban renewal and highway projects that properly reimbursed the displaced people, but such projects could then become considerably more expensive, and many might never be built. This, in turn, would reduce the comfort and convenience of those who now benefit from urban renewal and expressways.

Finally, hippies could serve also as more deviants to justify the existing political economy—as they already do. Presumably, however, if poverty were eliminated, there would be fewer attacks on that economy.

In sum, then, many of the functions served by the poor could be replaced if poverty were eliminated, but almost always at higher costs to others, particularly to more affluent others. Consequently, a functional analysis must conclude that poverty persists not only because it fulfills a number of positive functions but also because many of the functional alternatives to poverty would be quite dysfunctional for the affluent members of society. Functional analysis thus ultimately arrives at much the same conclusion as radical sociology, except that radical thinkers treat as manifest what I describe as latent: that social phenomena that are functional for affluent or powerful groups and dysfunctional for poor or powerless ones persist; that when the elimination of such phenomena through functional alternatives would generate dysfunctions for the affluent or powerful, they will continue to persist; and that phenomena like poverty can be eliminated only when they become dysfunctional for the affluent or powerful, or when the powerless obtain enough power to change society.

Author's Postscript, July 22, 1987

Over the years, this article has been interpreted as either a direct attack on functionalism or a tongue-in-cheek satirical comment on it. Neither interpretation is true. I wrote the article for two reasons. First and foremost, I wanted to point out that there are, unfortunately, positive functions of poverty which have to be dealt with by anti-poverty policy. Second, I was trying to show that functionalism is not the inherently conservative approach which it has often been criticized, but that it can be employed in liberal radical analyses.

18

Multilateral Punishment: The Philippines in the WTO, 1995-2003

WALDEN BELLO

At the October 2002 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo proclaimed the “need to reengineer the WTO to ensure there is a level playing field” in global trade.¹ The challenge in world trade policy, she said, was to ensure that “the rules of trading are not stopped in favor of developed countries, on the one hand, but practice protectionism against developing countries, on the other.”²

Like her recognition of the destructive consequences of “unbridled globalization”, Arroyo’s calling attention to the inequities fostered by what came to be known as the GATT-WTO (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-World Trade Organization) regime was long overdue. Back in 1994, during the great national debate on ratification of the Uruguay Round agreement establishing the WTO, she served as the point person in the Senate leading the charge of the Ramos administration to ratify the global treaty. Then, she argued the orthodox view that the agreement and the WTO made up a multilateral set of rules or institutions “that would eliminate unequal power relations from global trade and provide smaller countries equal standing with the big trading powers.”

But by the time she recognized that the WTO was riddled with double standards, the Philippines had been exposed to the ravages of both free trade and monopolistic competition, two contradictory principles that were nevertheless fused in the WTO. As a 2001 Department of Agriculture study admitted, despite its entry into the WTO six years earlier, the Philippines remained a “center of poverty and stagnant productivity.”³ Yet the government could not complain that it did not have advance warning of the consequences of joining the WTO. During the debate on ratification, civil-society representatives had argued that the nineteen separate agreements that comprised the Uruguay Round were skewed against the interests of countries like the Philippines.⁴

Among other things, critics of the Uruguay Round asserted the following:

- In signing on to the GATT-WTO, the Philippines essentially gave up the ability to use trade policy as a mechanism for industrialization. This was because the Agreement banned quantitative restrictions or quotas on imports, bound or reduced existing industrial tariffs and made raising tariffs practically impossible except under import surges, and outlawed trade-related investment restrictions. Among the trade policy instruments used by earlier industrializers that were banned by the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) were trade-balancing mechanisms, which tied the value of a foreign investor’s imports of raw materials and components to the value of his/her exports of the finished commodity, and “local content” regulations, which mandated that a certain percentage of the components that went into the making of a product be sourced locally.
- The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), with its rigid provisions penalizing the unauthorized use of technology, would make “industrialization by imitation” very difficult, if not impossible. A key factor in the economic takeoff of industrial late-comers like the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea, was their relatively

easy access to cutting-edge technology. But what was technological diffusion from the point of view of late industrializers was “piracy” from that of the industrial leaders. Critics claimed that not only was TRIPS anti-development but also contrary to the spirit of free trade that was supposed to animate the WTO, it actually reinforced monopoly with such draconian provisions as the generalized minimum patent protection of twenty years, the increase in the duration of protection for semiconductors or computer chips, draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights, and the placing of the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents.

The TRIPS agreement, critics added, also opened up the way for corporations to patent life or living organisms as well as privatize knowledge developed over centuries by communities via the modification of genetic material. The gene-rich Philippines would be a big loser in this game, as would most of the rest of the South. Already, they warned, patents had been filed in the North on processes for transforming *nata de coco*, a versatile coconut by-product, for industrial use, and extracting the medicinal elements of *lagundi*, an ubiquitous Philippine plant.

The most controversial agreement, however, was the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). Critics charged that the AOA was the antithesis of free trade, that it simply functioned to legitimize the high levels of protection and subsidization of the agricultural markets of the European Union and the United States while opening up the markets of developing countries to monopolistic competition between the two agricultural superpowers. Death by dumping would be the fate of the Philippines under the AOA, they said, and faulted pro-AOA, pro-WTO advocates who seemed oblivious to the monopolistic structure of world agricultural trade in their quest to make Philippine agriculture more efficient via free trade.

In the wake of ratifying the WTO, the Philippines, opponents of ratification said, would have to change at least forty of its laws and regulations and promise to enact new ones. What also became clear was that at some point, it would have to amend its constitution since, in signing on to the WTO agreement, it would also have to initial the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which committed it to providing “national treatment” or non-discriminatory treatment to foreign service providers. Section 11, Article 12 of the 1986 Constitution limits foreign ownership of key utilities (water and sewage, electricity transmission and distribution, telecommunications, and public transport) to no more than 40 percent of equity. Also, Section 11 of Article 16 limits foreign ownership of advertising agencies to 30 percent while Section 14 of Article 12 reserves the practice of licensed professions—for instance, law, medicine, nursing, accounting, engineering, customs brokerage, and architecture—to Filipino citizens. Not surprisingly, those seeking full alignment of Philippine law with the WTO have had as a key objective the elimination of the ownership provisions of the current constitution.

Hardly had the ink dried on the Philippines’ signature on the WTO accord when the drive to make Philippine legislation WTO-consistent began. Pressure came from the developed countries that stood to benefit from the WTO, particularly from the United States. The dynamics of this process were illustrated in two agreements: TRIPS and TRIMs.

Making the Philippines WTO-Consistent

Restricting Technological Diffusion

By the time of its ratification of the WTO, the Philippines’ intellectual property regime, based as it was on that of the United States, was relatively comprehensive, protecting as it did patents (since 1947), trademarks (since 1947), and copyrights (since 1972).⁵ In addition, the government was signatory to a number of key international agreements including the Paris

Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Budapest Treaty on International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, the Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, and the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.⁶ Nevertheless, the Philippines was quick to promise that it would amend existing laws “to align with the WTO TRIPS agreement.” Specifically, the government promised to “align existing laws on patents, trademarks, and copyrights with TRIPS,” “enact new laws on the protection of plant varieties, geographical indications, layout designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information,” and “strengthen enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs).”⁷

Under strong prodding from the US, the government delivered. Indeed, a US Agency for International Development (USAID) Program called AGILE (Accelerating Growth, Investment, and Liberalization with Equity) practically wrote the key TRIPS-related legislation and shepherded it through Congress. Among AGILE’s accomplishments were the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act 8293) and the Electronic Commerce Act (Republic Act, 8792).⁸ The Intellectual Property Code passed in 1997 made Philippine legislation WTO-consistent while the Electronic Commerce Act (Republic Act 8792) extended IPR protection to the Internet in 2000.⁹ In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed into law Republic Act 9150, “An Act Providing for the Protection of Layout Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits” specifying the provisions of the Intellectual Property Code to the information industry.

The US was not, however, satisfied with the WTO alignment process, with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) complaining that “legislation implementing fully the WTO TRIPS agreement commitments has been slow to develop,” pointing out that the Philippines still had to enact laws “to provide IPR protection to plant varieties as required by the WTO TRIPS obligations that became mandatory for the Philippines on January 1, 2000.”¹⁰

The USAID-funded AGILE again stepped into the breach. AGILE consultants drafted the plant-variety protection bill in 1999 for the Department of Agriculture. The bill followed the contours of the UPOV (French acronym for the Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties) Convention, which was founded primarily to protect the intellectual property rights of Northern breeders over new plant varieties, particularly industrial crops and ornamental plants.¹¹ This bill eventually became the Philippine Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act (Republic Act 9168), which was signed into law on June 7, 2002.

USAID funding for the drafting of an UPOV-type bill was not surprising since promoting adaptations of the UPOV convention was universally a way of averting the potentially dangerous implications for corporate rights of countries taking seriously Article 27.3 (b) of the TRIPS agreement, which allowed them to protect plant varieties through an “effective sui generis system.” As one analysis notes, universalizing UPOV-type intellectual property rights systems creates “uniform market conditions for trans-national corporations in developing countries,” establishing “an environment that assures a return on investments through an intellectual property rights regime that privileges industrial breeders, does not recognize farmers’ contributions in plant variety development, and provides equal treatment to foreign nationals—all of which are among the key features of the PVP Law.”¹²

The US kept up the pressure on all fronts, including the judicial. In 2001, in what a USTR report called “a notable achievement,” the Supreme Court speeded up the prosecution of intellectual piracy by establishing ex parte authority in civil cases involving IPR infringement, with forty-eight courts designated to handle IPR-related cases.¹³

Still unsatisfied with the pace of government movement on TRIPS, the US, citing reports from US distributors of “high levels of pirated optical discs” placed the Philippines on the dreaded Priority Watch List under Section 301 of the US Trade Law.¹⁴ This was a move that preceded bilateral retaliatory sanctions—which were themselves illegal under the WTO.

Yet the difficulties of enforcement, even under threat of massive sanctions, stemmed from contradictions inherent in TRIPS itself. Contrary to the WTO’s free trade rhetoric, TRIPS is an effort to control the market and reinforce monopoly under conditions of high market demand. As one account put it, intellectual property violators “are basically harmless... And in a developing country like the Philippines, they are welcomed by the majority of cash-strapped consumers. The most important sign of their acceptability to society: their products sell, and sell better than the original. They are in fact considered as allies of the poor—an economic leveler—because they make things affordable to all.”¹⁵

Eliminating Trade Policy as a Mechanism for Industrialization

Prior to the WTO, developing countries routinely used trade policy, notably the use of quotas and high tariffs, as a key mechanism for industrialization. The use of trade policy for industrialization purposes in the Philippines was sketchy and incoherent, and implementation was very spotty. And yet, this already weak legislation and enforcement framework was still seen as threatening by foreign trans-nationals. TRIMs provided the mechanism to get rid of it, and, as in the case with TRIPS, it was the United States Trade Representative that acted as the WTO’s enforcer for TRIMs. Two industries were immediately affected by the Philippines’ ratifying the WTO agreement: the auto industry and the soap and detergent industry.

Local content and trade balancing requirements had been used to build up an indigenous auto industry. Under the Motor Vehicle Development Program, participants were required to generate, through exports, a certain percentage of foreign exchange needed for import requirements as well as to source a progressively larger portion of the content of a vehicle in the Philippines. As in Malaysia, though not as successfully, TRIMs were designed to discourage trans-national corporations from simply making the country an assembly point for imported components and force them to build up or stimulate the development of components and parts suppliers that would eventually become the core of an integrated industry. Nationally, as in Malaysia, too, the automobile trans-national corporations (TNCs) hated local content policies as they interfered in the regional and international trade among their subsidiaries. Among other things, practices such as transfer pricing to get around taxes and other government levies were disrupted.

The Philippines notified the WTO of its TRIMs in the automobile industry in 1995, enabling it to avail of the five-year transitional period to phase out these measures, which would end on January 1, 2000. In October 1999, however, the government asked for a five-year extension for phasing out the TRIMs from the WTO. “After extensive consultations on the issue,” noted a USTR report, “the United States and the Philippines agreed in November 2001 that the Philippines will discontinue all local content and exchange balancing requirements by July 1, 2003.”¹⁶

The US also pushed the Philippines to get rid of TRIMs in the soap and detergent industry. US trans-national corporations like Procter & Gamble and Colgate-Palmolive complained about Executive Order 259 (1987), which required manufacturers to use a minimum of 60 percent of raw materials that do not endanger the environment and prohibited the import of laundry soap and detergents containing less than 60 percent of such raw materials. As the USTR

noted, the law had been passed to support the creation of the coconut-processing industry by promoting the use of coconut-based surface active agents of local origin. It noted approvingly that “the Philippine Department of Justice in Opinion 88 (1999), stated that Executive Order 259 conflicts with the country’s obligations under the WTO TRIMs agreement. Since then, the EO (Executive Order) has not been enforced.”¹⁷

The USTR enumerated other TRIMs that had to be removed in order to make Philippine legislation WTO-consistent: investment incentives legislation requiring a higher export performance for foreign-owned enterprises (70 percent of production to be exported) than for Philippine-owned companies (50 percent); an executive order requiring pharmaceutical firms to purchase semi-synthetic antibiotics from a specified local company unless they could demonstrate that the landed cost of imports is at least 20 percent less than that produced by the local firm; Letter of Instruction 1387, which required mining firms to prioritize sale of copper concentrates to the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Company; trade-balancing requirements for firms, applying for approval of projects under the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation program; and retail trade legislation passed in 2000 requiring foreign retailers, for the first ten years after the bill’s enactment, to source a fixed percentage of their inventory in the Philippines.¹⁸

By the beginning of 2003, most of Philippine legislation had been made WTO-consistent. The process has been painful and the price high. Owing to the alignment of Philippine laws with WTO rules, which benefit mainly big northern trans-nationals, the broad-based diffusion of technology necessary for self-sustaining industrialization has been restricted. The TRIPS regime represents what United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) describes as a “pre-mature strengthening of the intellectual property system... that favors monopolistically controlled innovation over broad-based diffusion.”¹⁹ And its likely consequence would be to limit the possibility of an “imitative path of technological development” based on methods such as reverse engineering, the adaptation of foreign technology to local conditions, and the improvement of existing innovations.²⁰ This anti-industrial bias of the TRIPS regime has been supplemented by the realignment of legislation to accord with the TRIMs regime, which practically eliminates the use of trade policy for national industrial development.

Even as national industrialization is dosed off by TRIPS and TRIMs, this tropical country’s rich trove of genetic resources has been rendered vulnerable to biopiracy by the realignment of our patent laws as they apply to agriculture and nature. These consequences were pointed out during the ratification debate, but were ignored by legislators eager not to offend the United States.

The AOA and the Demise of Philippine Agriculture

For the Philippines, the Agreement on Agriculture was the most important agreement in the WTO. The reason was that the country’s agricultural sector continued to employ nearly half of the labor force and contributed more than 20 percent of gross domestic product. However, as one paper asserts, when “all economic activities related to agro-processing and supply of non-farm agricultural inputs are included, the agricultural sector broadly defined accounts for about two-thirds of the labor force and 40 percent of GDP [gross domestic product].”²¹

Agriculture thus plays “a strategic role in the country’s overall economic development through its strong growth linkage... as a source of food and raw material supply for the rest of the economy, and as a source of demand for non-agricultural inputs and consumer goods and services.”²²

During the national debate on WTO ratification, the government based its pro-WTO stance on the argument that free trade would increase the efficiency of Philippine agriculture. This was not a case of agricultural liberalization forced on reluctant technocrats as in other developing countries. The neo-liberal technocrats that began to dominate state economic agencies during the Aquino and Ramos administrations wanted to liberalize agriculture. Indeed, the two administrations pushed a comprehensive liberalization program (Executive Order 470) that embraced both industry and agriculture.

Agricultural liberalization, however, lagged behind owing to resistance from farmers—big, medium, and small. Indeed, the Magna Carta for Small Farmers passed in 1991 was seen as a far-reaching attempt to consolidate protection by providing for the banning of imports of commodities that were deemed to be produced locally in sufficient quantity. In this context, subjecting the country's agricultural sector to the discipline of the WTO's AOA was seen as a key instrument to destroy agricultural protectionism.

Moreover, entry into the world of the Agreement on Agriculture would make Philippine agriculture more productive by promoting the cultivation of high-value-added (HVA) agricultural commodities like broccoli and cut flowers. With HVAs regarded as the “export winners” that would increase Philippine share of world markets,²³ agricultural technocrats saw the trade liberalization that came with WTO membership as leading to the gradual phasing out of much rice and corn production which involved most of the rural workforce. The Medium-Term Agricultural Development Plan of the Ramos administration prepared with possible entry into the WTO in mind—envisaged limiting rice and corn production to 1.9 million hectares and freeing up some 3.1 million hectares currently planted to rice and corn for raising cattle and cultivating commercial crops.²⁴

To secure popular support for the ratification of GATT, the government projected that the AOA regime would, among other things:²⁵

- create 500,000 new agricultural jobs annually
- increase annual agricultural export earnings by Php3.4 billion annually, thus improving the balance of trade in agricultural products
- increase the annual gross value added of agriculture by Php60 billion

To ease transition pains, Congress appropriated Php128 billion, to be released at some Php32 billion annually, to improve agricultural infrastructure and create “safety nets”.

With ratification, the government moved to make Philippine legislation consistent with the WTO. The Magna Carta for Small Farmers was repealed. Comprehensive legislation, Republic Act 8178, was enacted ending quotas and transforming them to tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The TRQ system covered fifteen tariff lines of “sensitive” agricultural imports, including live animals, fresh and chilled beef, pork, poultry meat, goat meat, potatoes, coffee, corn, and sugar. For these commodities, the Philippines was required to provide “minimum access” at low tariffs to a volume equivalent to 3 percent of domestic consumption in the first year of WTO implementation rising to 5 percent on the tenth year. Beyond the quota, imports would be taxed at a much higher rate. For corn, for instance, using the agreed-upon period of 1986-88 as the basis for calculating domestic consumption, the minimum access volume (MAV) allowed to come in at a low tariff of 35 percent would be 65,000 MT in 1995, rising to 227,000 in 2004.²⁶ Beyond the MAV, the tariff rate rose to 65 percent.

Under Annex 5 of the AOA, countries were allowed to retain a quota on “a primary agricultural product that is the predominant staple traditional diet.”²⁷ In the case of the Philippines, this was rice. The country was nevertheless required to increase the quota from one percent of

domestic consumption on the first year to 4 percent on the tenth year, or from 30,000 MT in 1995 to 227,000 MT in 2004.²⁸

As in the case with the other agreements comprising the WTO, the US served as the Geneva-based body's local enforcer, watching Philippine legislative and implementation processes with an eagle eye. This process could be quite intrusive and went beyond the scope of the letter of the AOA. For instance, the US intervened in the issuing of licenses to importers for pork and poultry met, accusing the Philippine government of allocating "a vast majority of import licenses to domestic producers who had no interest in importing."²⁹ When the Philippines balked, the US threatened to suspend the preferential tariffs for Philippine exports covered by the Generalized System of Preferences. The Philippines gave in and after a memorandum of understanding detailing its concessions was issued in 1998, according to a USTR report, the review of the Philippines' eligibility to receive preferential access under the General System of Preferences was terminated.³⁰

By the end of the decade, not only had the promised benefits of AOA membership failed to materialize, but Philippine agriculture was in the throes of crisis.³¹ Contrary to the output projected by Ramon Clarete and pro-ratification technocrats that joining the AOA would spur agricultural output to grow to Php50 billion by 2002, in fact the country's agricultural production only reached Php12 billion.³² Far from increasing by 500,000 a year, employment in agriculture actually dropped from 11.29 million in 1994 to 10.85 million in 2001.³³

Agricultural exports like coconut products were supposed to rise with WTO membership, but the value of exports registered no significant movement, rising from \$1.9 billion in 1993 to \$2.3 billion in 1997, then declining to \$1.9 billion in 2000. On the other hand, massive importation, the big fear of GATT critics, became a reality, with the value of imports almost doubling from \$1.6 billion in 1993 to \$3.1 billion in 1997 and registering \$2.7 billion in 2000. The status of the Philippines as a net food-importing country was consolidated, with the agricultural trade balance moving from a surplus of \$292 million in 1993 to a deficit of \$764 million in 1997 and 794 million in 2002.³⁴ Key sectors of Philippine agriculture were in a bad state by the end of the decade.

The Crisis of Rice Production

Rice production in the country was in crisis owing to a number of factors, including failure of effective government support programs. However, the government's policy of resolving short-term "supply crises" by massive imports could not but have the effect of further discouraging increased rice production. The rice exception under Annex 5 limited the Philippines to import a volume that was only one percent of domestic consumption in 1995 rising to 4 percent by 2005. In fact, the government, citing necessity, imported amounts far beyond the quota, with imports shooting up from 263,000 MT in 1995 to 2.1 million MT in 1998, 836,999 MT in 1999, and 639,000 MT in 2000.³⁵

Such massive volumes kept the price of rice low, making it unattractive for farmers to increase production. Average farm-gate prices of rice from 1997 to 2001 grew at a "measly 0.89 annually."³⁶ Not surprisingly, total rice production increased marginally in the late 1990s and came to an average of 1.9 per annum for the whole decade—far below the rates registered in the Philippines' two key rice suppliers: 3.0 percent per annum in the case of Thailand and 4.5 percent in the case of Vietnam.³⁷ In other words, massive above-quota imports were contributing to the continuing erosion of the rice sector, in turn making rice importation more and more a permanent fixture of the agrarian economy.

Neo-liberal technocrats, the Asian Development Bank, and the WTO took advantage of this situation to press for the elimination of the rice quota, which the Philippines could still take advantage of after 2005 under Annex 5 of the AOA. At a tariff rate of 100 percent, which was being considered by House Bill 339—the so called Rice Safety Nets Act—the price of imported rice would be the same as that of locally produced rice. However, it would provide little protection to local rice producers since, as one study pointed out, the rate would be insufficient to negate the potential convenience and advantage of sourcing products from one single source abroad than incurring costs attendant to consolidating and building stocks from many [local] suppliers and farmers.”³⁸ In other words, many costs and uncertainties would be eliminated by relying on one or a few foreign suppliers than on many local suppliers.

At a tariff rate of 50 percent, which some quarters at the Department of Agriculture were considering, the tariff rate would allow imported rice, at 2002 relative prices, to be priced at Php11 to Php12 a kilo, which would be lower than the Php14 per kilo that was the lowest price of domestic rice.³⁹

Yet these considerations to eliminate the rice quota and move to tariffs were made with the current AOA in mind. The controversial “Harbinson Draft” (named after its author WTO Agricultural Negotiations Chairman Stuart Harbinson) that served as the negotiating paper for further agricultural liberalization under the AOA prior to the Cancun ministerial proposed to slash developing-country tariffs above 120 percent by 40 percent, and those between 20 percent and 120 percent by 33 percent. Tariffication of rice in conjunction with the WTO’s adoption of the Harbinson proposal or variations of it coming from the European Union and the US would definitely lead to an even graver crisis of the country’s rice sector.

With very little sympathy for their plight from a neo-liberal technocracy and with tremendous pressures coming from different quarters for liberalization, the fate of the two million farmers involved in rice production—some 20 percent of the agricultural workforce—was highly uncertain.

Corn: In Terminal Condition?

The plight of the corn sector was equally grim. The main corn production area in the Philippines is Mindanao, and the cost of corn from Mindanao in Manila is less than the landed cost of foreign corn by Php2 per kilo.⁴⁰ As with rice, the corn sector, which had long been neglected by government, has been opened up to international competition that it was ill-prepared to meet. Unlike rice, however, corn imports were not subject to quota restrictions. A minimum access volume starting from 3 percent of domestic consumption in 1995 to 5 percent in 2004 would be taxed at a low tariff of 35 percent. Beyond that, the AOA still allowed corn to come in with no volume limitation, though the tariff rate would be increased to 100 percent.

How much protection these arrangements gave was open to question. An Oxfam Great Britain study in 1996 claimed that imports from the US, the world’s largest corn exporter, could be available at a price 20 percent below the current domestic price by the end of the ‘90s. It went on to note that by “the year 2004, the price gap may have widened to 39 percent, as tariffs are scaled down under the Uruguay Round agreement.”⁴¹

From practically zero imports in 1993 and 1994, corn coming into the Philippines shot up to 208,000 MT in 1995 to 558,000 MT in 1996, 462,120 MT in 1998, and 446,430 MT in 2000. The government appeared to be quite liberal in managing the MAV for corn. According to one report, a significant portion of the volume of corn that came in above the MAV of 135,000 MT in 1996 appeared to have come in at the 35 percent tariff rate rather than the 100 percent rate, thanks

to an administrative order allowing expansion of the MAV limit during “shortages”.⁴² This stemmed from the growing strength of an alliance between foreign corn exporters and local end-users, such as feed millers and livestock raisers, that had a great deal of interest in lower-priced corn imports.

Among the factors depressing the price of corn was cheap American corn coming in under the Public Law (PL) 480 program of the United States, which sought external markets for its corn by giving foreign governments long-term low-interest export credits to import US agricultural commodities, including soybean, rice, and corn. Public Law 480 was one of several dumping devices that were legitimate under the AOA. An average of \$20 million of US agricultural commodities has arrived under the program since 1997, with the figure rising to \$40 million in 2001.⁴³ In 2002, \$2 million worth of corn was brought in under the program,⁴⁴ causing local growers to protest that PL-480 yellow corn imports were particularly harmful, in terms of depressing local prices, if they arrive during the corn harvest.⁴⁵

Not surprisingly, Mindanao was being ravaged by the new import-biased agro-trade regime. Already, the limited trade liberalization of the late ‘80s was plunging corn production into crisis prior to the AOA. As Kevin Watkins of Oxfam noted after a field trip to Mindanao, “increasing imports of corn have been associated with a marked decrease in domestic corn production, and in the area planted in South Cotabato, where most of Mindanao’s corn is produced, there was a 15 percent decrease in production last year.”⁴⁶

The trend appears to have accelerated after the country’s adherence to the AOA. After a trip to Bukidnon in 1996, Charmaine Ramos, an analyst with the Management and Organizational Development for Empowerment (MODE), reported: “I found out that the southern part of the province is steadily being converted from corn to sugar”.⁴⁷ Several years later, Aileen Kwa, an analyst for Focus on the Global South claimed that corn farmers in “Mindanao have been wiped out. It is not an uncommon sight to see farmers there leaving their corn to rot in the fields as the domestic corn prices have dropped to levels [at which] they have not been able to compete.”⁴⁸ This observation was supported by macro data. While production remained stagnant, land devoted to corn across the country contracted sharply from 3,14,300 hectares in 1993 to 2,510,300 hectares in 2000...⁴⁹

The government admitted during the GATT-WTO ratification debate, that traditional corn and rice farmers would be among the losers under the AOA regime, with some 45,000 among them displaced annually. This would be among the 350,000 agricultural producers that were estimated to be displaced annually, according to Department of Agriculture estimates.⁵⁰ However, the growth of employment in selected export and high-value-added crops that was supposed to be a fallout of the WTO would translate into a net gain of 500,000 a year. But these estimates were highly questionable. According to the secretary of agriculture at the time of the WTO ratification debate, the 45,000 corn farmers slated for displacement would be absorbed by the silage growing industry that would service the cattle-growing industry stimulated by the WTO regime.⁵¹ Yet, cattle raising turned out to be a very disappointing industry in the next few years, stunted by a very liberal beef and “carabeef” import regime put in place to comply with the AOA itself. Cattle production barely moved, registering 213,000 MT in 1995 and 261,000 in 2001.⁵²

Charmaine Ramos underlines the depressing reality for corn farmers: “Only farmers with relatively bigger farm lots are able to shift easily. Small farmers are forced to lease their lands simply because they have no means to finance the capital requirements of shifting to high value crops.”⁵³ Kevin Watkins offered an explanation for this trend:

“The argument that displaced food staple producers will simply shift to the production of commercial crops has a somewhat surreal quality. The high capital costs of entry into commercial food markets and the importance of infrastructure, which is non-existent in the more marginal areas from which people will be displaced, means most of the benefits from commercial agriculture will accrue to more prosperous producers.”⁵⁴

The “more realistic scenario” for corn producers under the AOA regime was “more intensive poverty, displacement, and migration to urban center.”⁵⁵ Indeed, during the hearing on the WTO conducted by the House of Representatives’ Special Committee on Globalization, the one sector that the Department of Agriculture was willing to recognize as having suffered from entry into the AOA was corn.⁵⁶

The Assault on the Meat, Poultry, and Vegetable Industries

The negative impact of trade liberalization under the WTO regime went beyond traditional crops like rice, corn, and sugar to encompass higher value-added products like pork, poultry, and vegetables.

Massive importation of chicken parts, especially from the United States, nearly killed the industry after pressure from Washington resulted in liberal issuance of import licenses, with chicken parts imports rising by 101 percent in 1998 and 201 percent in 1999. The import price of chicken in early 2000 came to Php25.83 per kilo, which was 50 percent lower than the average farm-gate price of Php53.17 per kilo price of local chicken.⁵⁷

The passage of a Safeguards Law gave chicken farmers some breathing space, but not much chicken-leg quarters in 2003 were still being imported with a landed cost of Php57 per kilo, below the farm-gate price of Php64 per kilo.⁵⁸

Compounding the woes of local industry was liberalization of the importation of frozen beef, which consumers saw as a substitute for both chicken and pork. Imports of cheap beef and “carabeef” were reported to have grown five-fold between 1993 and 1998, a trend that threatened to accelerate when an executive order withdrew beef imports from coverage under MAV.⁵⁹

Cheap imports as well as other factors stemming from the Asian financial crisis led to the shutting down of two of the country’s big poultry integrators, some 30 commercial farms, each producing 100,000 heads of cattle, and five cooperatives in 1997.⁶⁰

Poultry growers were joined in 2003 by hog producers in their threat to “mount a food blockade through their refusal to sell their poultry and livestock.”⁶¹ The hog raisers claimed that looser food imports under the AOA regime brought a yearly reduction of Php5 to Php10 per kilo in the farm-gate price for pork, a figure which shot up to Php14 to Php17 in 2002. This translated to a 50 percent decline in price in just one year.⁶² Data supported the claims of local producers of a sudden and massive surge in imports owing to trade liberalization. Pork imports rose from less than 1,000 MT in 1993 to 7000 MT in 1997 to 15,790 MT in 2000.⁶³ In 2002, imports were expected to hit almost 47 million kilos, up by 43 percent from the 2001 figure of 33 million KG.⁶⁴

Vegetable producers were supposed to be among the gainers from AOA-led trade liberalization. Indeed, the AOA was expected to shift producers from cultivating rice and corn to producing high-value-added crops such as broccoli, lettuce, carrots, and cauliflower. Trade liberalization, in fact, hit a growing industry and hit it hard. From only 10,000 KG in 1999, the volume of imported fresh vegetables rose to 1.1 million KG in 2000 and 2 million KG in 2002.⁶⁵

Combined with smuggled fresh vegetables, the influx resulted in imported lettuce, for instance, selling at only Php90 per kilo compared to local lettuce, which was retailing at Php200 per kilo.

Contributing to this massive differential was the application of 7 percent tariff on imported vegetables in accordance with Executive Order 470, a much lower rate than the 40 percent tariff that the Philippines committed under the WTO. Even with a 40 percent rate, however, imported produce would still enjoy a price advantage over local produce.

If Mindanao, the country's corn bowl, was threatened by maize imports, the country's salad bowl, Benguet, was endangered by the foreign vegetable invasion. According to one report,

Vegetable products in Benguet have lost Php2 billion in failed transactions between July and August 2002 because of the dumping of at least a million KGS of vegetables from China, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. The deluge of KGS of imported vegetables (whether smuggled or not) in the markets of Benguet, Mt. Province, the Cordilleras, Pangasinan, Central and Northern Luzon, and Metro Manila pose considerable risk and bring gross disadvantage to the nation's small vegetable growers.⁶⁷

The report went on to warn that Php6 billion would be lost yearly and "ten of thousands of growers will be displaced if the unabated influx of foreign vegetables continues."⁶⁸

Keeping Out Philippine Tuna and Bananas

In becoming a member of the WTO, the Philippines entered the worst of all possible worlds: even as it opened up its agricultural markets to foreign products, key foreign markets continued to remain closed to Philippine exports.

The US, for instance, brazenly kept playing up its double-standards game. Administrative Order 25, which required meat importers to obtain additional safety certification, was put on hold in 2002, a year after it was issued, following a US threat to file a complaint with the WTO.⁶⁹ Meantime, the US itself issued a new directive requiring certification by a Philippine government agency that beef and pork exports meet some processing standards.⁷⁰

Particularly disturbing were new market access restrictions imposed by the agricultural superpowers in defiance of WTO rules. The tuna industry was threatened with severe dislocation when the US and Europe slapped high tariffs on tuna imports. While allowing duty-free imports of tuna from the Andean communities, the US slapped tariffs ranging from 6.5 percent to 30 percent on Philippine tuna imports. The EU allowed preferential tariffs for its former colonies (the so-called ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] countries) while slapping a 24 percent duty on Philippine tuna. Export earnings from canned tuna fell precipitously from \$130 million in 1998 to \$64 million in 2001.⁷¹

With the US accounting for 38 percent of its tuna exports and the EU for 15 percent, these brazen protectionist moves posed a serious threat to the viability of the Philippine tuna industry. The Department of Trade and Industry estimated possible losses from the discriminatory treatment in the US market alone could amount to \$50 million dollars a year.⁷²

The government hailed an EU decision to lower the tariff on Philippine canned tuna exports, but it was hardly significant once one read the fine print. As Business World reported, "the 12 percent levy applies only to a specific amount of tuna imports called the tariff rate quota. This TRQ will be shared by the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Of the quota, the

Philippines will get 9,000 MT while Thailand will account for 13,000 MT, and Indonesia will get 2,750 MT.”⁷³

Even Australia, an ally of the Philippines in the so-called Cairns Group, a grouping of developed and developing agro-exporting countries, beat up on the Philippines by invoking sanitary and phytosanitary standards, a standard Washington tactic. In mid-2002, after years of being petitioned to admit Philippine Cavendish bananas, the Australian government decided against the import. The reason given was the risk of the Philippine banana carrying pests and diseases that could ruin the Australian banana industry. And yet, the Philippine bananas had been shipped since the ‘60s to countries with high quarantine standards, including Japan and New Zealand.

The real reason was a strong lobby from the Australian banana industry. The Australian industry produced 20 tons of bananas per hectare, compared to the Philippines, which turned out 50 tons per hectare, a difference that led to a marked disparity in price: \$0.60 for each kilo of Australian bananas compared to \$0.20 per kilo for Philippine bananas.⁷⁴

The Abdication of the State

Eight years after the Philippines entered the WTO, there is now widespread acknowledgment that its agricultural sector was unprepared for adherence to the AOA. Indeed, few would now dispute the contention of critics that trade liberalization combined with government neglect of agricultural development has proved to be a deadly formula.

Neo-classical specialists in Philippine agriculture have been caught between an ideological propensity for liberalization and a recognition—though grudging—that protectionism is not the main problem of Philippine agriculture. In fact, economist Ramon Clarete, one of the prime intellectual managers of the Philippines’ entry into the AOA, admitted, prior to entry in to the WTO, that the agricultural sector had “the lowest effective tariff protection in the economy with food items having an even lower effective protection than the rest of agriculture.”⁷⁵ Effective protection in the 1970s and much of the ‘80s for agricultural products ranged from 5 to 9 percent, while effective rates of protection for the manufacturing sector ranged from 44 to 79 percent.⁷⁶ Effective rates of protection for manufacturing and agriculture tended to even out by the mid-1990s owing to tariff reforms, but this was largely due to manufacturing tariffs being brought down.

Not agricultural protectionism but problems relating to “a weak technology base, price distortions, weak property rights structure, constraints on land market operations, insufficient public support services, and poor governance” were identified by a team of neo-classical economists as the main bottle necks to greater agricultural productivity.⁷⁷ Though they could not spell out the problem owing to the anti-state bias of their ideology, what these economists were, in effect, saying was that it was lack of effective, comprehensive, and coordinated government intervention in agriculture that lay at the root of the anemic state of Philippine agriculture.

The virtual abdication of government from agriculture is indicated by the fact that while most of the workforce was employed in agriculture and the sector contributed about 21.5 percent of gross value added, the budget allocation for agriculture in 2001 was only Php12.8 billion or 3.4 percent of government spending.⁷⁸ Of the annual budgetary appropriations, less than 40 percent “have been historically allocated for productivity-enhancing expenditures such as irrigation, research and development, fishery extension, and other support services.”⁷⁹ Research and development expenditures, at 0.27 percent of gross value added by agriculture, was far below the one percent benchmark.⁸⁰

Not surprisingly, only 1.34 million hectares out of 4.66 million hectares of irrigable land was actually irrigated. Only 17 percent of the Philippine road network was paved, compared to the 82 percent in Thailand and 75 percent in Malaysia. Crop yield across the board was anemic, with the average yield in rice of 2.87 MT per hectare way below average yields in China, Vietnam, and Thailand.⁸¹

Confronted with governments that played an aggressive, activist role in protecting and promoting their agriculture not only in the US and the EU but in the neighboring Asian countries as well, the Philippines was ill-equipped to enter the AOA.

To prevent the agricultural sector from becoming a roadblock to the ratification of the WTO agreement, the Ramos administration promised to appropriate and release funds for agricultural modernization and safety nets. The fund promised—called the Department of Agriculture Action Plan—totaled Php128 billion, to be released at the rate of Php32 billion annually.⁸² The figure included “Php27 billion for the improvement of irrigation facilities, Php8 billion for the construction of farm-to-market roads, Php762 million for the improvement of post-harvest facilities, and Php64 million for the installation of grain centers.”⁸³

However, according to one agricultural expert, only 44 percent of the Php32 billion promised for 1995 was appropriated. Of this amount, funding for new projects—i.e., projects begun after ratification of the WTO agreement—amounted to the exceedingly small sum of Php2.8 billion. In 1996, the proposed Php32 billion was reduced to Php14.6 billion, of which the funding for new projects was, at Php2.2 billion, even lower than the 1995 figure.⁸⁴ Seven years later, the Department of Agriculture admitted that only 50 percent of the proposed Department of Agriculture Action Plan had been released.⁸⁵

The failure of the safety net program was supposed to be addressed by the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) passed in 1998 which provided for comprehensive government assistance covering such areas as irrigation, post-harvest facilities, credit and financing, and research and development. But, as one report noted, “despite having a legislated annual budgetary allocation, AFMA was not able to take off the ground as government could not even meet the annual budgetary needs of the Department of Agriculture.”⁸⁶ What limited amounts were appropriated of the original proposed Php35 billion safety net program, some charged, were largely diverted to urban projects such as flyovers during the Ramos period.⁸⁷

During the ratification debate, pro-WTO advocates promoted the vision that the AOA would create a situation where the Philippines would fill production niches in which it would have the “comparative advantage” such as the cultivation of high-value-added export crops such as cutflowers, asparagus, broccoli, and snow peas. These advocates, such as then-Secretary of Agriculture Roberto Sebastian, did not do their homework.

The shift to high value “non-traditional agricultural exports” (NTAEs) requires investment that is simply not within the reach of small producers. For instance, in the case of cutflowers, data from Ecuador reveals an average initial capital investment of \$200,000 per hectare. Annual input costs are also high, with the costs of agrochemicals alone coming to over \$18,900 per hectare.⁸⁸ In the case of snow peas, broccoli, and cauliflower, annual production costs, according to data from Guatemala, comes to \$3,145, \$1,096, and \$971 per hectare respectively, compared to \$219 per hectare for corn.⁸⁹

Moreover, competitive advantage in these crops can only be achieved through significant outlays in technological support and research and development. As many analysts have pointed

out, NTAE cultivation is biased against small-scale producers because “many traditional crops require considerable technological sophistication, relative to traditional production, as they are either new to the region, require special care at harvest because of their perishability, or are being produced to meet the more demanding cosmetic quality standards of foreign consumers.”⁹⁰

Without massive government financial support, there is simply no way that the Philippines could manage significant increases in the production of high-value crops, much less attain comparative advantage in producing them.

Not surprisingly, Philippine agriculture entered the worst of all worlds in the mid-1990s: massive trade liberalization amidst a continuing lack of effective support from government. Despite their grudging recognition of the fact that comprehensive state support was the *sine qua non* of agriculture’s survival, the neo-classical economists and technocrats who had gained control of the strategic heights of the economic bureaucracy in the ‘80s and ‘90s supported the WTO liberalization drive. In many cases, in fact, as in case of vegetable and meat imports, they supported deeper cuts in tariffs than was required under AOA rules. Unilateral liberalization, in their view, was still the best route to optimum welfare.

This was, however, an increasingly isolated position. Even a bastion of neo-classical economics, the International Food Policy Research Institute, admitted that “without reform of agricultural trade barriers in industrialized countries, import liberalization in the developing world will perpetuate unfair competition.”⁹¹

The AOA: Institutionalizing Monopolistic Competition

The prosperity for all that was promised by the GATT-WTO Accord was premised on the idea that liberalization would be universally undertaken. In the case of agriculture, however, for all intents and purposes, liberalization was unilateral—developing countries were opening up their markets while the developed countries retained their heavy structures of protection amidst superficial and cosmetic liberalization. This was the main problem with the AOA: that, contrary to its claim that it opened up global markets to free trade, in fact, it was a regime that regulated the competition among two heavily subsidized monopolistic agricultural superpowers—the European Union and the United States—for third-country markets. Perhaps convinced by neo-classical doctrine that unilateral liberalization would still result in greater welfare gains than a pragmatic trade policy based on reciprocal liberalization, the technocrats refused to acknowledge how truly dangerous for Philippine agriculture the global trading system was. A close study of the genesis of the AOA and its provisions would probably have helped them to gain an appreciation of the hard economic *realpolitik* that informed the agreement.

Briefly, prior to the Uruguay Round, agriculture was *de facto* outside GATT discipline, mainly because the US had sought in the 1950s a waiver from Article 11 of GATT, which prohibited quantitative restrictions on imports. With the US threatening to leave the GATT unless it was allowed to maintain protective mechanisms for sugar, dairy products, and other agricultural commodities, Washington was given a “non-time-bound waiver” on other agricultural products.⁹² This led to the GATT’s lax enforcement on other agricultural producers for fear of being accused of having double standards.

The US and other agricultural powers not only ignored Article 11 but they also exploited Article 16, which exempted agricultural products from GATT’s ban on subsidies. One effect of these moves was the transformation of the EU from being a net food importer into a net food exporter in the 1970s. By the beginning of the Uruguay Round in the mid-’80s, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had evolved into what was described as “a complex web of

prices and sales guarantees, subsidies, and other support measures that largely insulated farmers' incomes from market forces."⁹³

With domestic prices set considerably above world prices and no controls on production, European farmers expanded production. The mounting surpluses could only be disposed of through exports, sparking competition with the previously dominant subsidized US farmers for third-country markets. The competition between the agricultural superpowers turned fierce, but it was not so much their subsidized farmers that suffered. The victims were largely farmers in the South, such as the small-scale cattle growers of West Africa and South Africa, who were driven to ruin by low-priced EU exports of subsidized beef.

With state subsidies mounting to support the bitter competition for third-country markets, the EU and US gradually came to realize that continuing along the same path could only lead to a no-win situation for both. By the late '80s, for instance, close to 80 percent of the EU's budget was going to support agricultural programs, and the US had inaugurated a whole new set of expensive programs such as the Export Enhancement Program, to win back markets, such as the North African wheat market, from the EU.⁹⁴

This mutual realization of the need for rules in the struggle for third-country markets is what led the EU and the US to press for inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay Round. In fact, it was just the EU and the US that negotiated the so-called Blair House Accord in 1992 and 1993. The accord then was promptly tossed to other GATT members by the two superpowers in 1994 as the proposed AOA on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Rather than seriously promoting a mechanism to advance free trade, the two agro-superpowers resorted to the rhetoric of free trade and offered minor concessions to liberalization in order to institutionalize a system of monopolistic competition, with each seeking advantage at the margins.

How did the AOA achieve this?

First, it institutionalized the heavy subsidization of Northern agriculture, though it provided for "domestic support"—quantified into a comprehensive measure called the "aggregate measure of support"—to be reduced by 20 percent over a six-year period.

Second, it institutionalized export subsidies while making the slight concession that they would be reduced over a six-year period by 21 percent in volume terms and 36 percent in total cash value, with no commitments for further reduction at the end of the six-year period.

Third, it institutionalized and exempted from cuts direct income subsidies for farmers on the specious grounds that these had "no, or at the most minimal, trade-distorting effects on production."⁹⁵ These included so-called Green Box or Blue Box measures such as "land set-aside" programs in the EU which entitled farmers to subsidies if they withdrew 15 percent of their land from cultivation. They also included so-called deficiency payments in the US, which was a direct income subsidy that was stable because it was the same in good or bad crop years. Deficiency payments in the US were projected to average \$5.1 billion a year between 1996 and 2002.⁹⁶

The truth of the matter is that direct income payments to European and American farmers are anything but decoupled from production, since without them agriculture would scarcely remain profitable. Deficiency payments, for instance, make up between one-fifth and one-third of US farm incomes.⁹⁷ In other words, in enshrining the notion of decoupled payments as untouchable subsidies in the Green Box, the US and the EU were, as one analyst put it, "taking away direct support of markets and replacing it with direct subsidization of Northern farmers."⁹⁸

Fourth, it exempted from cuts export credit and low-interest concessional aid programs such as the US' PL-480 Title One Program and the Export Credit Guarantee Program that were mainly aimed at carving out markets abroad. The PL-480 Title One Program gives a developing country thirty years to repay a loan to buy a US commodity like rice at a one percent interest rate and a five-year grace period.⁹⁹ The Export Guarantee Program guarantees payments to US banks on loans contracted by foreign banks for the purchase of US agricultural commodities.¹⁰⁰

In contrast to this massive subsidization in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, farmers in many developing countries have had little financial support. In the words of Philippine negotiators in Geneva, the essence of the complex section on subsidies was that “the heavily subsidizing developed countries can retain up to 80 percent of their trade-distorting subsidies while developing countries which had not applied trade-distorting support measures can subsidize no more than 10 percent of the total value of their agricultural production.”¹⁰¹ Certainly, in the case of the Philippines, overall subsidization was, at 4 percent, way below the 10 percent maximum, with government market price support for rice and corn coming to only 5 percent and one percent, respectively, of the total value of production in the two commodities.¹⁰²

In fact, developing countries like the Philippines have been penalized by policies that have brought about the “negative subsidization” of their agricultural sector.¹⁰³ One study estimated that for eighteen developing countries, “taxation” or the transfer of value from agricultural production as subsidies to other sectors of the economy, amounted to an average of 30 percent of the value of production from 1960 to 1984.¹⁰⁴

The institutionalization of various mechanisms of subsidization was one reason for the lack of any progress to curb the tremendous negative impact of Northern agriculture on global markets in the seven years since the AOA came into force in 1995. Another key reason was what came to be known as “dirty tariffication”—that is, converting tariffs and non-tariff barriers or quotas into high initial tariff rates.

Tariff rates were bound at their equivalents in the 1986-88 base period, which were quite high relative to levels in 1995 when the AOA took effect. In the case of the US, for instance, between 1992 and 1996, simple average tariffs rose from 5.7 percent to 8.5 percent for agriculture and livestock production, 6.6 to 10.0 percent for food products, and 14.6 to 104.4 percent for tobacco products.¹⁰⁵ The manipulation of tariffication to achieve the same impact as quotas was especially evident in the case of tobacco products, where the US levied an *ad valorem* duty of 350 percent for above minimum access imports of food products.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, a study conducted by the UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) of the tariffication process showed that the EU's final bindings for the year 2000 were almost two-thirds above the actual tariff equivalent for 1989-1993, while those for the US were three-quarters higher.¹⁰⁷

Another mechanism used to limit actual market access to developing country imports was selective tariff reductions, or keeping tariffs high on sensitive products and reducing tariffs on less sensitive products. This practice was possible since the 36 percent tariff reduction required by AOA was an average, unweighted reduction, with the only constraint being a 15 percent cut on each tariff line. So countries tended to reduce existing low tariffs on non-sensitive products by significant amounts while reducing only slightly the existing high tariffs if the product was of trade importance. Thus, the US reduced the existing low 6 percent tariff on common wheat by 55 percent while limiting the cut on the existing tariff of 134.7 percent on white sugar, a sensitive commodity, to 15 percent.¹⁰⁸

With such a skewed agreement, it hardly came as a surprise that overall protection and subsidization of agriculture in the OECD countries increased in the first decade of the AOA. The total amount of agricultural subsidies provided by the OECD's thirty member-governments rose from \$182 billion in 1995 to \$280 billion in 1997, about \$315 billion in 2001, and an estimated \$318 billion in 2002.¹⁰⁹ According to Oxfam International, the EU and the US were spending \$9-10 billion more on subsidies than they did a decade earlier.¹¹⁰ Subsidies accounted for 40 percent of the value of agricultural production in the EU and 25 percent in the US.¹¹¹ While smallholders in the developing world had to survive on less than \$400 a year, American and European farmers were receiving respectively an average of \$21,000 and \$16,000 a year in subsidies.¹¹² There was no way to describe this except as socialist agriculture!

It was however, socialism for rich farmers. According to the OECD, two-thirds of US crop supports went to only 10 percent of cotton, grain, and oilseed growers.¹¹³ Oxfam calculated that in the US, the largest 7 percent of farms received 50 percent of government subsidies, while 60 percent of US farmers received no subsidies at all.¹¹⁴

Not surprisingly, the pressures to overproduce and thus to look for new markets likewise increased. A 1997 report to the EU farm ministers projected the surplus of wheat to rise from 2.7 million MT to 45 million MT by 2005, and total cereal surplus to shoot up to 58 million MT.¹¹⁵ The solution to this condition of subsidized overproduction, said EU agriculture Minister Franz Fischler, was intensified efforts to export grain.¹¹⁶

Continuing subsidization has also deepened US agriculture's dependence on massive exporting. Admitting that "one out of every three farm acres in America is dedicated to exports," then-US trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky contended in 1997 that "given the limitations inherent in US demand-led growth, we must find new markets for American agriculture. We must open new markets to support the increasingly productive US agricultural sector."¹¹⁷

The Philippines' structural consolidation as a food-importing country was thus paralleled globally during the latter half of the '90s. A Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) study of fourteen countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America found that the levels of their food imports in 1995-98 exceeded those in 1990-94. Import surges in various sectors led to reports of "import competing industries facing consequential difficulties." Producers expressed the fear that "without adequate market production, accompanied by development programs, many more domestic products would be displaced, or undermined sharply, leading to a transformation of domestic diets and to increased dependence on imported foods."¹¹⁸ The FAO study acknowledged that while developing countries' share in world food exports increased from 30 percent in 1970 to 37 percent in 1997, their food imports increased much more, from 28 percent to 37 percent over the same period.¹¹⁹ As Aileen Kwa has noted, these figures indicated that many countries "are turning from being net food exporters to net food importers."¹²⁰

By 2003, it would be fair to say, the Philippine government, while putting a brave face and publicly hoping for fundamental change in the WTO, had become completely disillusioned with the system and especially the agricultural powers that ran the AOA. As noted above, a "rebalancing/countervailing mechanism" advanced by the Philippines that would allow developing countries to raise tariffs on crops subsidized by the rich countries by amounts calibrated to the levels of subsidization was not even mentioned in the Harbinson draft. This was not surprising given the fact that, as an exasperated Philippine negotiator noted, in earlier meetings of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, "the major blocs (US, EU, Japan, etc.) have refrained from engaging US and our developing-country allies in floor debate on the proposal."¹²¹

The WTO: Blind to Development and Non-Transparency

The bitter reality that the whole WTO agreement and not just the AOA was an instrument that benefited the few gainers of globalization at the expense of the majority was experienced and resented all throughout the developing world. Also leading to the developing countries' disillusionment with the GATT-WTO was the fate of the measures applied during the Uruguay Round that were supposed to respond to the special conditions of developing countries. Besides the AOA, there were two key agreements which promoters of the WTO claimed were specifically designed to meet the needs of the South: the special ministerial agreement approved in Marrakech in April 1994, which decreed that special compensatory measures would be taken to counteract the negative effects of trade liberalization on the net food-importing developing countries; and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which mandated that the system of quotas on developing-country exports of textiles and garments to the North would be dismantled over ten years.

The special ministerial decision taken at Marrakech to provide assistance to "net food-importing countries" to offset the reduction of subsidies that would make food imports more expensive for the "net food-importing countries" has never been implemented. Though world crude oil prices more than doubled in 1995-1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) scotched any idea of offsetting aid by arguing that "the price increase was not due to the agreement on agriculture, and besides there was never any agreement anyway on who would be responsible for providing the assistance."¹²²

The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing committed the developed countries to bring under WTO discipline all textile and garment imports over four stages, ending on January 1, 2005. A key feature was supposed to be the lifting of quotas on imports restricted under the multifiber agreement (MFA) and similar schemes which had been used to contain penetration of developed-country markets by cheap clothing and textile imports from the Third World. However, developed countries retained the right to choose which product lines to liberalize and when, so that they first brought mainly unrestricted products into the WTO discipline and postponed dealing with restricted products until much later. Thus, in the first phase, all restricted products continued to be under quota, as only items where imports were not considered threatening—like felt hats or yarn of carded fine animal hair—were included in the developed countries' notifications. Indeed, the notifications for the coverage of products for liberalization on January 1, 1998, showed that "even at the second stage of implementation only a very small proportion" of restricted products would see their quotas lifted.¹²³ An Oxfam 2002 report claimed that the EU and the US had eliminated only a quarter of the textiles and garments quotas they were required to remove under the agreement.¹²⁴

Given this trend, John Whalley notes that "the belief is now widely held in the developing world that in 2004, while the MFA may disappear, it may well be replaced by a series of other trade instruments, possibly substantial increases in anti-dumping duties."¹²⁵

Non-Transparency and the Seattle Collapse

The growing resentment of the developing countries extended to the processes of decision making itself, which were non-transparent, informal, and dominated by the big trading powers. Indeed, one of the key reasons for the collapse of the WTO ministerial in Seattle in December 1999 was the absence of transparent decision making. Stories abound of ministers from developing countries complaining of being lost at the Seattle Convention Center, looking for a "Green Room" where key decisions would be made, not knowing that the Green Room did not refer to a real room at the convention center but to an exclusive process of decision making.

During the WTO ratification process in 1994, partisans of the new trade organization portrayed it as a one country-one vote organization where the United States would actually have the same vote as Rwanda. In truth, the WTO is not governed democratically via a one country-one vote system like the UN General Assembly or through a gross unequal system of weighted voting like the World Bank or the IMF. While according to its constitution it is a one country-one vote system, the process that reigns in the World Trade Organization is “consensus”, one that it took over from the old GATT, where the last time a vote was taken in 1959.

Consensus, in practice, is a process whereby the big trading countries impose their consensus on the less powerful countries. As C. Fred Bergstein, a prominent partisan of globalization who heads the Institute of International Economics, put it during US Senate hearings on the ratification of the GATT-WTO agreement in 1994, the WTO “does not work by voting. It works by a consensus arrangement which, to tell the truth, is managed by four—the Quads: the United States, Japan, European Union, and Canada... Those countries have to agree if any major steps are going to be made. But no votes.”¹²⁶

Though the Ministerial and the General Council are theoretically the highest decision-making bodies of the WTO, decisions are arrived at not in formal places but in non-transparent backroom sessions known as the “Green Room,” after the color of the Director General’s room at the WTO headquarters in Geneva.

Non-transparency and lack of real democratic decision making was one of the reasons behind the now famous revolt of the developing countries at the Seattle Convention Center that played a central role in the collapse of the Third Ministerial in Seattle in December 2001. With surprising frankness, at a press conference in Seattle, shortly after the ministerial collapse, then-US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky described the dynamics and consequences of the Green Room: “The process... was a rather exclusionary one. All the meetings were held between 20 and 30 key countries... And this meant 100 countries, 100, were never in the room... [T]his led to extraordinarily bad feeling that they were left out of the process and that the results even at Singapore had been dictated to them by the 25 to 30 countries who were in the room.”¹²⁷

Barshefsky admitted that “the WTO has outgrown the processes appropriate to an earlier time. An increasing and necessary view, generally shared among the members, was that we needed a process which had a greater degree of internal transparency and inclusion to accommodate a larger and more diverse membership.” This was backed up by UK Secretary of State Stephen Byers who stated that the “WTO will not be able to continue in its present form. There has to be fundamental and radical change in order for it to meet the needs and aspirations of all 134 of its members.”¹²⁸

These expressions of concern by two key officials of the trade superpowers did not, however, result in any reforms after Seattle. The Green Room process was, for instance, defended thus by a key adviser to Director General Mike Moore: “One of the myths about Seattle is that there were no Africans and hardly any developing countries in the Green Room. In fact, there were six Africans and a majority from developing countries. Moreover, any deal reached in the Green Room must still be approved by all WTO members.”¹²⁹ Moore himself told developing-country delegates at the UNCTAD X meeting in Bangkok in February 2000, eight weeks after Seattle, that the Consensus/Green Room system was “non-negotiable”.¹³⁰

Doha: The Low Point

Moving into the Fourth Ministerial slated for Doha, Qatar, in late 2001, the big trade superpowers were determined to avoid a repetition of the Seattle collapse. Not surprisingly, lack

of transparency marked the run-up to and the proceedings of the Fourth Ministerial in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001.

The proposed draft declaration for the ministerial meeting was a product of the sort of non-transparent tactics that the big trading powers resorted to. In the run-up to Doha, most of the developing countries were pretty much united around the position that the Ministerial would have to focus on implementation issues and on reviews of key WTO agreements, not on launching a new round of trade liberalization.

But when the draft declaration came out a few weeks before Doha, the emphasis was not on dealing with implementation issues, but on an alleged consensus on opening up negotiations on the issues of competition, investment policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation that were the priorities of the minority of rich and powerful trading countries. “Despite clearly stated positions that the developing countries are unwilling to go into a new round until past implementation and decision making are addressed,” noted Kwa, who followed the process closely, “the draft declaration favorably positioned the launching of a comprehensive new round with an open agenda.”¹³¹

The draft, which was authored by the chair of the General Council, was a product of consultations with all WTO members. In actual fact, the key consultations were conducted among an inner circle of about 20-25 participants—the so-called Green Room process that effectively excludes most of the members of the WTO. In the run-up to Qatar, this exclusive process held two “mini-ministerials” one in Mexico at the end of August and another in Singapore on October 13-14. How one got invited to these meetings was very murky. Kwa cites the case of one ambassador from a transition economy who was promised an invitation to a Green Room meeting by the WTO secretariat but never got one. Then there was the case of an African ambassador who wanted to attend the Singapore mini-ministerial. When he approached the WTO secretariat for an invitation, he was told that they were not hosting the meeting. When he tried the Singapore mission in Geneva, the response was that they were simply coordinating the meeting and were not in a position to send out invitations.¹³²

The Doha ministerial from November 9-14, 2001, took place amidst conditions that were already unfavorable from the point of view of developing-country interests. The September 11 events provided a heaven-sent opportunity for US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy to step up the pressure on the developing countries to agree to the launching of a new trade round, invoking the rationale that it was necessary to counter a global downturn that had been worsened by the terrorist actions. The location was also unfavorable, Qatar being a monarchy where dissent could be easily controlled. The WTO secretariat’s authority over who would be granted visas to enter Qatar for the ministerial allowed it to radically limit the number of legitimate non-government organizations (NGOs) that could be present to about sixty, thus preventing that explosive interaction of developing-country resentment and massive street protest that took place in Seattle.

Still, these factors would not have been sufficient to bring about an unfavorable outcome for developing countries. Tactics mattered, and here the developing countries were clearly outmaneuvered in Doha. Among these tactics the following must be highlighted:¹³³

- Pushing the highly unbalanced draft declaration and presenting it to the ministerial as a “clean text” on which there allegedly was consensus, thus restricting the arena of substantive discussion and making it difficult for developing countries to register fundamental objections without seeming “obstructionist.”

- Pitting officials from the capitals against their negotiators based in Geneva, with the latter being characterized as “recalcitrant” or “narrow.”
- Employing direct threats, as the United States did when it warned Haiti and the Dominican Republic to cease opposition to its position on government procurement or risk cancellation of their preferential trade arrangements.
- Buying off countries with goodies, as the European Union did when, in return for their agreeing to the final declaration, it assured countries in the ACP group that the WTO would respect the so-called ACP Waiver that would allow them to export their agricultural commodities to Europe at preferential terms relative to other developing countries. Pakistan, a stalwart among developing countries in Geneva, was notably quiet at Doha. Apparently, this had something to do with the US granting Pakistan a massive aid package of grants, loans, and debt reduction owing to its special status in the US war against terrorism. Nigeria had taken the step of issuing an official communiqué denouncing the draft declaration before Doha, but came out loudly supporting it on November 14—a flip-flop that is difficult to separate from the US’ coming up with the promise of a big economic and military aid package in the interim.
- Reinstating the infamous “Green Room” on November 13 and 14, when some twenty handpicked countries were isolated from the rest and “delegated” by the WTO secretariat and the big powers to come up with the final declaration. These countries were not picked by a democratic process, and efforts by some developing-country representatives to insert themselves into this select group were rebuffed, some gently, others quite explicitly, as was the case with a delegate from Uganda.
- Finally, pressuring the developing countries by telling them that they would bear the onus for causing the collapse of another ministerial, the collapse of the WTO, and the deepening of the global recession that would allegedly be the consequence of these two events.

Some accounts of the Doha process claimed that Doha represented a victory of sorts for the developing countries in that they managed to get a declaration that recognized the urgency of addressing their concerns in implementation issues and special and differential treatment as well as placed public health concerns over intellectual property rights. In fact, from the point of view of process, Doha was a low point in the GATT-WTO’s history of backroom intimidation, threats, bribery, and non-transparency. There are no records of the actual decision-making process in Doha because the formal sessions of the ministerial—which is where decision making is made in a democratic system—were, as in Seattle, reserved for speeches, and the real decisions took place in informal groupings whose meeting places kept shifting and were not known to all. There being no records, there is little accountability, and the principals in any deals can deny that they engaged in questionable behavior.

This non-transparent process resulted in practically sidelining the developing countries’ demand that the WTO focus on implementation issues and placing on center stage the top agenda of the big trading power the eventual launching of a new set of trade negotiations that would bring into WTO jurisdiction the non-trade areas of investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. Bergsten, the free-trade partisan who heads the Institute of International Economics in Washington D.C., once compared the WTO and trade liberalization to a bicycle: “it only stays up by moving forward.” Doha set the WTO upright once more, but it was still wobbly, and this was because a great deal of resentment lingered among developing countries from the whole non-transparent process of bamboozling them into accepting a declaration running counter to their interests.

From Doha to Cancun

The centerpiece of the Doha Declaration was the decision, subject to “explicit consensus” of all WTO members, to begin negotiations on the “New Issues” of investment, government procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation. The first three being non trade issues, the declaration was seen by many developing countries as providing momentum for a massive expansion of the authority of the WTO.

The propaganda of Northern governments, especially of the British government, was that the Doha Round would be one that would incorporate development concerns into the trade agenda. Much of the established press—and many Northern NGOs—pointed to Article 6 of the declaration, which upheld public health concerns over intellectual property rights, as indicating that the WTO could become a development-friendly institution.

In eighteen months leading up to the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in Mexico in mid-September 2003, the agenda of the trade superpowers included concluding a new AOA initiating preliminary negotiations on the so-called new issues, launching of negotiations on industrial tariffs, and substantial progress in negotiations on services.

The hope was that at Cancun, the negotiations in the different trade and trade-related areas would come together in a new WTO agreement that would be as far-reaching as the Uruguay Round. It would be around that would give the faltering globalization process a surge forward.

Between Doha and Cancun, however, there was barely any movement in any of the negotiating areas.

Not surprisingly, agriculture was the Gordian knot.

Even before Doha, negotiations had already begun for a new AOA. By the beginning of 2002, however, the talks were getting nowhere, with both the United States and the European Union competing to stymie the talks. Saying that “[W]e want to be selling our beef and our corn and our beans to people around the world who need to eat,” President Bush signed into law on May 13, 2002, a legislation giving US farming interests \$190 billion in subsidies over the next ten years. The report increased certain subsidies by 80 percent; raised price supports for wheat, cotton, soybeans, rice, and cotton; and created new subsidies for items like lentils, peanuts, and milk.¹³⁴

Equally defiant was the European Union. In October 2002, French President Jacques Chirac and German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder agreed that there would be no cut in EU agricultural subsidies during their talk on EU enlargement. Indeed, the overall amount of subsidies will increase until 2006, and from 2007 to 2013, spending will be frozen at 2006 levels.¹³⁵ “The deal spells out clearly that EU dumping is going to continue till at least 2013,” noted one analyst.¹³⁶

Disagreements on agriculture between the US and the EU had been central to unraveling the Third Ministerial of the WTO in Seattle in December 1999. Some fancy rewording on the question of subsidies demanded by the EU saved the Fourth Ministerial in Doha, Qatar, from the same fate.¹³⁷ But by the beginning of 2003, so little progress had been registered that many negotiators raised the specter that the impasse would unravel concurrent negotiations in other areas like industrial tariffs, services, and the so-called new issues of investment, competition, and

government procurement, leading to a Seattle-like outcome for the fifth ministerial, which was due to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in mid-September 2003.

The draft negotiating document prepared by WTO farm negotiations chairman Stuart Harbinson produced a stalemate at the so-called Tokyo Mini-ministerial on February 14-16, which was one of several restricted sessions designed to gain a rough consensus in key trade areas before Cancun.¹³⁸ Japanese Minister of Agriculture Tadamori Oshima rejected the paper's proposals for minimum cuts of between 25 and 45 percent and average reductions of 40 to 60 percent on all farm tariffs over five years.¹³⁹ The EU also attacked the Harbinson proposal as "unbalanced" for proposing that "trade-distorting" subsidies be cut by 60 percent over five years and that export subsidies be phased out entirely over nine years.¹⁴⁰ Both Japan and the EU denounced the paper as ensuring that the US would be the only victor in the negotiations.

In the fight between the agro-export giants, the concerns of developing countries were conveniently lost. As Kwa points out, the Harbinson text does not address their fear that EU and US subsidies will now mostly be shifted to the so-called Green Box, a listing of exempted subsidies that include the massive direct payments to farming interests that directly or indirectly distort trade.¹⁴¹

The Harbinson text also completely ignored proposals put forward by Argentina and the Philippines (both of which were not invited to the Tokyo meeting) for "rebalancing/ countervailing mechanisms" that would allow developing countries to raise tariffs on crops subsidized by the developed countries by amounts proportionate to the subsidies.¹⁴² Instead, for developing countries, tariffs greater than 120 percent were to be slashed by 40 percent, while those between 20 and 120 percent would be decreased by 33 percent, with no linkage to the subsidies maintained by the wealthy agro-exporters.

The draft also contained no meaningful recommendations that would apply the principle of "special and differential treatment" to the developing countries, giving their agricultural sectors significant protection for structural reasons—owing to their different level and conditions of agricultural development.¹⁴³ True, the Harbinson draft proposed that developing countries might classify some staple products as "strategic" and have them subjected to lower tariff cuts than other commodities. However, the proposal was vague, the number of products that could qualify as strategic was unclear, and positive impact would be limited as products would still be subject to an average tariff cut of 10 percent.¹⁴⁴ As Kwa noted, the strategic products proposal was "no more than wool being pulled over the eyes of trade negotiators and Ministers. It is fictitious fig leaf offered to entice the less WTO-savvy decision makers in the developing world."¹⁴⁵

In essence, the Harbinson draft proposed to change some of the terms of monopolistic competition among the EU, US, Australia, and Canada while accelerating the removal of the protective barriers of the developing country markets they are fighting over.

Agricultural negotiations remained effectively stalemated all the way up to the Cancun negotiations. The situation was much the same in other areas. One of the few positive items in the Doha Ministerial Declaration was the clear statement that "the TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health."¹⁴⁶ The US, however, squandered a lot of goodwill in the next few months by maintaining its position that only in the case of drugs for three epidemics—HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—should patent rights be loosened and that the import of cheap generic drugs by countries with no drug-manufacturing capacity should be limited to the least developed countries. With the Doha declaration on their side, the developing countries rejected the US position, leading to a stalemate until the very eve of Cancun, when a compromise agreement was forged. However, the compromise agreement was

denounced by many as loaded with such restrictions as to make the import of cheap drugs a very cumbersome process and thus defeat the objective of the Doha provision. US trade policy came to be seen by developing countries as being hostage to the big pharmaceutical lobby.

On the New Issues—investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation—the EU continued to make the commencement of negotiations a central point of its Cancun agenda. But, if anything, the developing countries were even more adamant that the Singapore issues be dropped from the negotiations. The new-issues question threatened, in fact, to derail the ministerial because there was widespread disagreement that the Doha ministerial, in fact, launched negotiations in these areas. According to the chairman's statement that accompanied the Doha Declaration, whether or not negotiations will begin in these areas would depend on the "explicit consensus" of all WTO member states at the Cancun summit.¹⁴⁷

In two negotiating areas of great interest to developing countries, there was absolutely no movement. These were the issues of Special and Differential Treatment and Implementation. On the latter, it might be of interest that when Lamy, EU trade commissioner, met with NGO representatives in Bangkok in mid-March 2003, he tried to shift the blame to the developing countries, whom he accused of not being able to agree on what were the two or three top priorities regarding implementation that needed to be tackled.¹⁴⁸

If Cancun was going to be salvaged, observers warned, this would have to be done by resorting to non-transparency Doha-style. And indeed there were indications that as Cancun neared, negotiations were shifting to informal mode and going "underground." In fact, in a statement that was extraordinary for its candor, New Zealand Ambassador Timothy Groser warned developing countries "not to push for greater transparency in the decision-making process." With a membership of 146, Groser warned that "if every decision-making process were to involve the entire membership, the process would go nowhere. Efforts to attain internal transparency would be counterproductive and would push the negotiating process underground."¹⁴⁹ An astute observer of the Geneva process, in fact, warned, "the process already seems to have gone underground, since it is entirely in the control of the DG/Harbinson team, and the chair of the General Council, in alliance with the major players"¹⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, resentment mounted among the developing countries.

While the US and the EU wrangled over the issue of how much export subsidies should be reduced and over the formulas for reducing agricultural tariffs, several developing countries, led by Brazil, India, South Africa, and China, got together on August 20, 2003, to form the Group of 20 (G-20), which demanded "substantial cuts on trade-distorting domestic support, substantial increase in market access, and elimination of export subsidies."¹⁵¹

Another, larger grouping of thirty-two developing countries formed around the demand for "special products" that would be exempted from tariff reductions and "special safeguard mechanisms" against the highly subsidized agricultural exports from the developed countries.

Still another, and even larger, group of countries, which eventually came to be known as the G-90, was forming around opposition to the start of negotiations on the new issues without the explicit consensus of all WTO member countries.

Collapse in Cancun

The proposed ministerial declaration in the last week of August offered little in the way of meeting the developing countries' demands for substantial cuts in levels of government support for farming interests. Instead, it presented a detailed framework for discussion on the Singapore

issues. Thus, as the Cancun Ministerial opened on September 10, a show down was in the offing between the US-EU group that had dominated WTO discussions and the new developing country formations. The flashpoint was an unexpected one, and that was the question of cotton subsidies being given to European and US producers which had contributed to a collapse of international prices. US producers were offloading cotton on world markets at between 20 percent and 55 percent of the cost of production, leading to a severe crisis of West African and Central African cotton farmers.¹⁵² Four African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali—demanded compensation of between \$250 million and \$1 billion annually and the unilateral elimination of cotton subsidies.¹⁵³

Roundly rejected by the developing countries, the draft declaration was revised and issued on the afternoon of September 13. Known as the “Derbez Text”—after the Ministerial Chairman, Mexican Foreign Affairs Minister Luis Derbez—the revised declaration proposed nothing substantive on cotton subsidies, some slight revisions in market access, and kept two of the original new issues-government procurement and trade facilitation.

The new-market access sweeteners could have split the G-20 coalition, designed as they were to win over large agro-exporters like Brazil but were detrimental to India and others seeking protection of their agriculture. “However,” notes one account, “Brazil showed leadership and instead of settling for short-term benefits in market access joined forces with India to keep the alliance together...”¹⁵⁴ But the final Green Room meeting of some thirty countries on September 14 was not even able to get to agriculture. The discussion started on the New Issues. Japan and South Korea declared themselves unwilling to drop investment and competition policy from the negotiations. G-90 members from Asia and Africa fiercely rejected the inclusion of any issue, many of them angered by the declaration’s S-inspired suggestion that African cotton exporters should diversify away from cotton. At that point, Derbez brought down the gavel to end the mini-ministerial, declaring that the necessary consensus for the ministerial to proceed was absent. Despite efforts by US Trade Negotiator Robert Zoellick to pin the blame on developing countries and EU Trade Minister Lamy to assign it to the “medieval” decision-making rules, most of the press, including the western press, saw the EU-US inflexibility on agriculture and the EU’s unrelenting push on the New Issues as shouldering most of the blame.¹⁵⁵

The Philippines on the Road to Cancun

As the Cancun ministerial approached, there was a widespread sense in Philippine government circles that the Philippines had lost badly with its entry into the WTO. Not only had nothing been gained, not only were key sectors of the economy dislocated, but revenues had been lost-revenues which would have gone to plug the government’s worsening budget deficit. According to the tariff Commission WTO-related tariff cuts lowered tariff collections from Php83 billion in 1997 to Php81.2 billion in 1999 to Php72.96 billion in 2001 and Php59.5 billion in 2002.¹⁵⁶ The difference between the collection rates in 1997 and 2002 came to Php23.6 billion, which came to over 10 percent of the Php210 billion deficit for 2002.

But despite the disillusionment with the WTO, the government was ill prepared for the approaching Cancun ministerial. Arroyo’s statement at the October summit of APEC in Mexico decrying the unfair trade rules of the WTO and her more recent rhetoric against “unbridled globalization” were long overdue. Yet, despite the acknowledgment of the WTO’s anti-development thrust, the administration appeared bereft of a strategy on how to protect the country from its consequences.

The country badly needed a multi-pronged, coordinated strategy for the negotiations in agriculture, services and industrial tariffs, and to meet the threat of a new round of liberalization that the trading powers threatened to launch in Cancun.

This was not for lack of activity among Philippine negotiators in Geneva. In agriculture, Philippine negotiators worked to reject the Harbinson draft. In a paper submitted to a special session of the WTO's Committee on Agriculture on March 31, 2003, the Philippine delegation faulted the draft for its "fixation on market access alone" neglecting substantive reform in the areas of domestic support and export competition. "Flexibilities" or special provisions demanded by the South, the paper said, were hardly addressed by the draft but they were more than ever necessary. "[C]an developing countries, even with these flexibilities, ever exceed even an iota of the billions that the major contributors continue to pour into the cesspool of market and production distortions? What South-South trade can we talk about in the future when the North would have eaten up all of the South under these conditions?"¹⁵⁷

Dissatisfaction did not, however, translate into a clear negotiating stance. On the critical question of trade in rice, rice farmers were in the dark on whether the Philippines was asking for an extension of its right to subject rice to quantitative restrictions under Annex 5 of the Agreement. With the government unable to deliver on its promise to "prepare the rice sector for global competition," and with rice farmers left with nothing else to hold on to, the extension of the country's right to subject rice to quotas was a clear demand of the sector.

Privately and sometimes publicly, officials of the Department of Agriculture said that the Philippines was pushing hard for a recognition of the principle of "special and differential treatment," the formal adoption of which would allow the government much more leeway in limiting agricultural imports than is allowed by current AOA rules under the principle that the Philippines' underdeveloped agricultural sector should not be subject to the same rules as agriculture in the developed economies. But would the Philippines be resolute in pushing for its innovative proposal of a rebalancing/countervailing mechanism—a "special safe-guard mechanism," in WTO parlance—that would allow developing countries to raise tariffs proportionate to the level of subsidies maintained by the rich countries? This was unclear even to high-level officials in the bureaucracy, who worried that the secretary of agriculture, Luis Lorenzo Jr., had an inadequate grasp of the issues. The joke making the rounds among Geneva negotiators was that Lorenzo, hearing of the "Singapore issues," asked what problems Singapore had with the WTO.

More seriously, observers were worried that the Philippines might be restricted by the negotiating position of the Cairns Group, a grouping of developed and developing agro-exporting countries dominated by Australia and New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand were mainly interested in dismantling the agricultural subsidy system of the European Union while tolerating that of the United States. Pushing for protection of the developing-country agricultural systems under the principle of special and differential treatment was not a priority for Australia and New Zealand. In fact, Australia chose to interpret special and differential treatment mainly in terms of developing countries being able to provide their agriculture with a minimum amount of subsidies, which they cannot afford, and not in terms of restrictions placed on access to their markets, which Philippine farmers were demanding.

In fact, farmers groups were asking: why do we continue to voluntarily tie our hands by remaining in the rich-country-dominated Cairns Group?

Another critical area were negotiations on services under the GATS. In early 2003, governments had already begun the process of asking other governments for the service sectors

they want opened up, and those requested would have to respond soon. A leaked report revealed the breathtaking range of services that the EU wanted the Philippines to open up completely or substantially—a long list that included legal services, accounting and bookkeeping, telecommunications, construction and engineering services, maritime transport, and environmental services.¹⁵⁸ What was the government's response to there quests of the EU, US, and other governments? What areas was it offering to liberalize? As the Stop the New Round Coalition (SNR!C) put it:

“Citizens should not be kept in the dark about these negotiations. They must at least be informed of what other countries are demanding, what with all the service-sector employees that could be displaced by foreign competition in an economy already suffering from persistent high unemployment and underemployment.”¹⁵⁹

An even greater concern was that GATS was really an investment agreement masquerading as a trade agreement, one that would override not only existing laws governing foreign investment but the Constitution itself. In fact, current moves to amend the Constitution coincided with this dangerous enterprise of denationalizing through GATS control of land, natural resources, and public services such as water, energy, health, education, and other public services.

The New Issues was another source of worry. Geneva negotiators were against incorporating them into the WTO agenda, but the Manila leadership's position was unclear in early 2003. Next to agriculture, the EU-US push to incorporate investment, government procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation in the WTO mandate was the galvanizing issue for Philippine civil society. Such negotiations would result in a vast expansion of the WTO's powers to non-trade areas. By extending “rational treatment” to foreign investors, a new agreement, critics feared, would lead to the near-total loss of national control over investment and deprive government of its ability to conduct industrial policy and undertake strategic planning.

As the SNR! asked:

“Will the Philippine government take a stand, draw a line on the sand, and work with other developing countries to stop this grant of vast new powers to the WTO? Will it stand by India and other developing countries that hold that, in accordance with the statement of the Chairman of the Doha Ministerial, there is as yet no agreement to launch negotiations in the “new issues”? Or will the Philippines side with the EU, the US, and other developed countries that claim that there is already consensus on launching negotiations?”

Trade liberalization, to use Bergsten's image, is like a bicycle: it collapses if it does not move forward. Which is why the New Issues question was seen as so critical by Philippine civil society: its resolution would mean either that the WTO, with all its institutionalized inequalities, became even more powerful by extending its jurisdiction to new areas of human endeavor, or that the WTO retreated, thus creating the space for countries to follow strategies of economic development that are congenial to their needs.

In the absence of government leadership, civil society stepped into the breach prior to Cancun. Two groupings played particularly salient roles: the Fair Trade Alliance (FTA) and the Stop the New Round! (SNR!). The latter proposed a government-civil society strategy for the Cancun meeting, the three key points of which were:

- Opposition to a new round of WTO trade negotiations

- Opposition to further WTO trade and trade-related liberalization
- Opposition to the incorporation of the New Issues” of investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation into the WTO agenda.

In addition, it advanced the following demands:

- In agriculture, unilateral extension of the quantitative restrictions on rice imports and formulation of an independent stand in the agricultural negotiations from the Cairns Group, the centerpiece of which would be the withholding of Philippine approval from any revised agreement that did not give it the right to restrict market access in key crops, the right to make food security and food self-sufficiency central principles of its agricultural trade policy, and the sovereign right to determine its agricultural and food policy.
- Opposition to the extension of WTO jurisdiction to fisheries as part of a strategy of conserving and developing fisheries primarily to meet domestic needs, and working for a fisheries policy that restricts trade and foreign investment damaging to fisher folk livelihoods and destructive of marine ecosystems.
- Freezing negotiations in services on grounds that GATS subverts the Constitution and foreign investment laws.
- Freezing of negotiations on industrial tariffs on the grounds that this is a mechanism for dumping cheap industrial goods imports, leading to job loss and greater poverty in developing countries. This step must be taken within the broader context of an industrial and development framework to be developed after a comprehensive study carried out in collaboration with the concerned sectors. Only within a framework that provided for the necessary supporting mechanisms would trade instruments bring about comprehensive, solid, and lasting economic transformation.
- Opposition to the drive of the US and other developed countries to undermine the Doha Declaration provision allowing developing-country governments to override the TRIPS agreement in the interests of public health, stop all efforts to extend patents to life and traditional knowledge, and prevent monopoly of technological diffusion by transnational corporations.
- Working with other developing countries to prevent the launching of a new round of trade liberalization in Cancun by standing firm on the chairman’s statement that there is as yet no authority to begin negotiations on the New Issues and refusing to provide the explicit consensus required to begin negotiations on investment, competition policy, and government procurement.
- Coordinating work in defending Philippine national interests in the WTO negotiations with negotiations in other multilateral areas, particularly in the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area).¹⁶¹

Grassroots pressure exerted by SNR!C, FTA, and other such formations was instrumental in solidifying Philippine resistance to a ministerial dominated by a developed-country agenda. After being tight-lipped about its negotiating stance, the government announced in late August that it would “push for the scrapping of subsidies given by foreign governments to their farmers. It will also seek better Philippine access to cheap medicines from abroad, as well as exemptions to tariff cuts for essential products like rice.”¹⁶² The government also announced that it opposed the opening of its services and further liberalization of its investment policies. On the New Issues, then-Trade Secretary Manuel Roxas III said that the Philippines would resist its inclusion into the

WTO agenda. “We shall continue to uphold each country’s right to determine what is of interest to US and not to surrender its determination to external bodies such as the WTO.”¹⁶³

On the external front, Geneva negotiators enlisted the Philippines as a founding member of the G-20, a grouping formed to demand radical cuts in the subsidization of Northern farming interests. Philippine negotiators, along with their Indonesian counterparts, took the lead role in an alliance of fifteen—eventually thirty-two—countries to press for the exemption of “special agricultural products” (SPs) essential to food security from liberalization and for the establishment of “special safeguard mechanisms” (SSMs) such as tariff increases that would match the levels of subsidization in developed countries. Labeling the SPs and SSMs as a “defensive shield” Assistant Agriculture Secretary Segfredo Serrano, a key mover, said that they would give “developing countries more flexibility than ordinary tariff lines.”¹⁶⁴

While Department of Trade and Industry negotiators were confident in Roxas taking a strong stand, Department of Agriculture negotiators were not that confident in Secretary Lorenzo’s holding the line. Calling on NGO representatives present in Cancun to help them, they held a special meeting with Lorenzo at his Cancun hotel late in the evening of September 11 to impress on him the necessity of supporting the Philippine position on SSMs and SPs.

The Philippines was included in the “expanded” Green Room meetings that decided the fate of the ministerial on September 13-14. By all accounts, Roxas and Lorenzo, who regarded themselves as rivals, stood by the developing-country positions. Shortly after the collapse of the ministerial, Roxas claimed he was “elated” at the result.¹⁶⁵ Lorenzo, a neophyte at WTO matters just a few days before, agreed. Upon his return to the Philippines, Lorenzo said, “It was a resounding success for developing countries, especially the Philippine delegation, which was a consistent voice in all deliberations, battling for agricultural reform in the WTO.”¹⁶⁶

Cancun was a milestone in the Philippine government’s retreat from neoliberal policies, one dictated by the evident consequences they had wrought on the country and propelled by the strong pressure from the grassroots. Cancun was the central event in a general reversal of policy. Executive Order 264, issued shortly after Cancun, reversed the twelve-year-old unilateral liberalization program. On the agricultural front, Executive Order 197, issued in April 2003, increased the tariffs on vegetables from 7 percent to 25 percent; Executive Order 264 froze the tariff reduction program for a number of agricultural and fishery products, and the bound tariff for sugar was raised from 65 percent to 80 percent.

But was it a retreat from neoliberal philosophy? This was much less evident, at least from Roxas’s summation of the government’s strategy. “My view is that a liberalized economy is a desirable end-state,” he told the press. “And it is important how we get there. It is important we get there alive, robust, and healthy.”¹⁶⁷

Notes

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 24. Charmaine Ramos, "Discussion Points: Trends and Prospects in the Cereals and Grains Sector of the Philippines" (lecture delivered at the KSP Study Session on the Medium-Term Development Plan, St. Vincent Seminary, Quezon City, May 6, 1996).
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 26. Department of Agriculture, *Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Agricultural Minimum Access Volume (MAY)*, Manila, 1996.
 27. World Trade Organization, *The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts* (WTO: Geneva, 1995), 66.
 28. Department of Agriculture, *ibid.* During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the quota for rice for the first year was set at a different figure: 59,000 MT.
 29. United States Trade Representative, *2000 National Trade Estimates* (Washington, DC: USTR, 2000), 330.
 30. Ibid., 328.
 31. Why was there such a contrast between the rosy predictions and the dismal outcomes? A story told by Riza Bernabe, a senior researcher of the Philippine Peasant Institute, is illuminating. After recounting the promises of gains in jobs, exports, and agricultural production that would come with adherence to the AOA, she was approached at a recent conference by Dr. Ramon Clarete, the DA consultant who was the source of these claims during the WTO ratification debate. Clarete expressed surprise that people still remembered his erroneous projections. This confirmed Bernabe and others' suspicions that in order to win the ratification debate, the projections were manufactured by Clarete, who went on to become the Chief of Party of USAID's Agile Program. Personal communication, June 4, 2003.
 32. Riza Bernabe, senior researcher at the Philippine Peasant Institute, quoted in "Accounting of Farmers' WTO Safety Net Sought," *Business World*, September 18, 2003, 6.
 33. *Selected Agricultural Statistics, 1998, 2002* (Quezon City: Department of Agriculture, 1998, 2002).
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 39. Riza Bernabe, "Rice Trade Liberalization: Endangering Food Security," *Farm News and Views* (First Quarter 2002), 13.
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19 **The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago**

B.R. RODIL

The Indigenous People in the Philippines

Introduction

The indigenous peoples in the Philippines, now also known officially as indigenous cultural communities (ICC), are said to constitute 10 percent of the estimated total national population of 65 million. They are more popularly referred to as cultural minorities.

Once the masters of their own lives, now the majority of them are poor and landless. In the old days, many of them lived in the plains. But as a result of population pressures and resettlement programs from among the majority, they have to move to the forest areas. Now, their forests are devastated and their cultures are threatened. And so, they have learned to fight for survival. Their voices reverberate from North to South, from the Cordillera to the Lumads to the Muslims (or Bangsa Moro or simply Moro) of Mindanao and Sulu. They demand recognition of their right to self-determination; they demand respect for and protection of their ancestral domains, of their cultures, of their very lives. Within the last 20 years, one group after another of the ICCs have launched their struggles for self-determination, upholding as the most crucial issue their fundamental human right to their ancestral domain.

Interpretation on the meaning of “self-determination” differs. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) consistently takes it to mean independence for the Bangsa Moro from the clutches of Filipino colonialism, although its leader agreed to reduce this to regional autonomy in the Tripoli Agreement of December 1976. Advocates in the Cordillera and among the Lumad, however, emphasize their demand for genuine autonomy. But what they all have in common is the conscious realization that their collective happiness must come principally from their own efforts, not from State.

Who Are The Indigenous Cultural Communities?

Created in 1957, the Commission on National Integration (CNI) made an official listing of the National Cultural Minorities (NCM). [See Table 19.1] Note that Luzon and the Visayas have 19 groups, and Mindanao has 27 which can be further subdivided into 10 Moro and 17 Lumad [from the origin of the name “Lumad”]. In the 1960 census, four years after the establishment of CNI, the NCMs numbered 2,887,526 or approximately 10 percent of the national population. The matter of names and number is not a settled issue in the Philippines, which will explain their existence of such names as Kulaman in Mindanao which is just another denomination for Manobo in that part of Davao del Sur and two other places in Cotabato called Kulaman, and the addition of more later on. The census itself has never been consistent in its denominations.

It is generally known that the Moro people are made up of 13 ethnolinguistic groups. An explanation is in order why the list shows only 10. Two of these groups are to be found in Palawan, namely, Palawani and Molbog (Melebugnon or Molbuganon). A third, the Kalagan in Davao del Sur are partly Muslim and partly not. Finally, the Badjaw are generally not Muslims but because of their identification within the realm of the ancient Sulu sultanate, they have often regarded as part of the Islamic scene in the Sulu archipelago.

The present majority-minority situation is a product of western colonialism that has been carried over to the present. In the time of Spanish colonialism, it was more an unintended product of colonial order. In the time of the Americans, it was the result both of colonial order and colonial design. When the republic of the Philippines assumed sovereign authority, the various administrations not only carried over whatever the Americans had left behind, they also institutionalized the status of cultural minority within Philippine society. In this section, we seek to retrace our steps and see how the whole process came about. We start with a broad picture of our current linguistic situation.

Current Linguistic Situation

Inhabiting an archipelago of 7,100 islands which are divided into three broad geographic zones called Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, the Philippine population is, according to a linguistic expert, linguistically diverse, distributed, conservatively speaking, into between 100 to 150 languages. However, the expert clarifies, “one should not exaggerate this diversity, since the vast majority of the Filipinos at present are speakers of one of the eight ‘major languages’—Tagalog, Cebuano, Hiligaynon, Waray, Bikol, Iloko, Kapampangan, and Pangasinan—while 3 percent of the population comprise the speakers of the rest of these languages—the so-called ‘minor languages’—most of whom are pagans or Muslims.”² Of the eight, five, namely, Tagalog, Bikol, Iloko, Kapampangan, and Pangasinan inhabit the Luzon area, and three, namely, Cebuano, Hiligaynon and Waray belong to the Visayan region.

The linguistic diversity is not, however, reflected in their skin. Complexion-wise, the majority of the Filipino natives are Malay brown; a much smaller percentage are dark like the Negritos or Aeta of Luzon, the Batak of Palawan and the Mamanwa of Mindanao. Linguistic studies have further reduced this diversity with their common conclusion that all Philippine languages “belong to the Austronesian language family,” also known as Malayo-Polynesian.³ Some of these languages are mutually intelligible, but most are not.

Table 19.1. CNI Official Listing of National Cultural Minorities¹

Luzon-Visayas	Mindanao-Sulu	
1. Aeta	1. Ata or Ataas	1. Badjaw
2. Apayaw or Isneg	2. Bagobo & Guiangga	2. Maguindanao
3. Mangyan	3. Mamanwa	3. Iranun, Ilanun
4. Bontok	4. Mangguangan	4. Kalibugan
5. Dumagat	5. Mandaya	5. Maranao
6. Ifugao	6. Banwa-on	6. Pullun Mapun
7. Ilongot	7. Bilaan	7. Samal
8. Inibaloi, Ibaloi	8. Bukidnon	8. Sangil
9. Kalinga	9. Dulangan	9. Tausug
10. Kankanai	10. Kalagan	10. Yakan
11. Kanuy, Kene	11. Kulaman	
12. Molbuganon	12. Manobo	
13. Palawano	13. Subanon	
14. Batak	14. Tagabili	
15. Remontado	15. Tagakaolo	
16. Sulod	16. Talaandig	
17. Tagbanua	17. Tiruray	
18. Tinggian, or Itneg		
19. Todayag		






Figure 19.1. Mindanao-Sulu: Population Distribution of the Muslim Communities by Municipality, 1980 Census



LEGEND:



Maps Prepared by:

RUDY B. RODIL
Commissioner-At-Large
First District
Lanao del Norte
July 1988
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Figure 19.2. Mindanao-Sulu: Population Distribution of the Lumad Cultural Communities by Municipality, 1980 Census

Social Situation at Spanish Contact

Using the situation at the end of the Spanish regime as a frame of reference, the various communities in the Philippine Archipelago may roughly be divided into two broad groupings, those who were colonized, and those who were not. Those who were colonized generally belong to the barangay communities which composed the eight major groups cited above. And those who were not may further be subdivided into those who fought and were not subjugated, and those who successfully evaded contact with Spanish forces thereby escaping colonialization. Either way they remained free throughout the period of Spanish colonialization. The first sub-group consisted of the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu and the Igorot of the Cordillera. The second sub-group were those who are presently known as Tribal Filipinos. By an ironic twist of history it was the unconquered and uncolonized who were later to become the cultural minorities of the 20th century. But before we go into the broad details of how this happened, let us first look at their social situation at the time of Spanish contact. We start with the barangays, to be followed by the Muslims, then by those which have been characterized by Dr. William Henry Scott, a well known scholar of Philippine history, as the warrior societies, the petty plutocracies and the classless societies.

The Barangay Communities

The barangays which were basically clan communities were associated with coastal settlements, or those found at the mouths and banks of rivers, or were simply lowland communities, who a long time past brought themselves from the other islands of the Malay archipelago and Indonesia. They rode in sailing vessels with that name, also known as *balanghai* or *balangay*, and landed in different parts of islands. A famous Philippine author has a description of a Tagalog barangay: “The Tagalogs, having beached their barangays, retained their clan organization, each clan settling down by itself apart from the others, so that the name ‘barangay’ came to be applied to the kinship group and its village. Each barangay, consisting of several families acknowledging a common origin, was ruled by a patriarchal head or *datu*, who led its people in war and settled their disputes according to the traditions handed down from their ancestors. Not all in the clan village had the same social status. There were those who were equals of the datu in all respects save authority; there were the wellborn (*maharlika*), bound to their lord by kinship and personal fealty, owing him aid in war and counsel in peace, but in all else free, possessing land and chattels of their own. There were the *timaua*, who did not have the noble blood of the *maharlika* but were, like them, free. The rest were *alipin*, less than free. Some were serfs, *aliping namamahay* (literally, housekeeping dependents), owning house and personal property, but tilling the land of the datu or the wellborn for a share of the crop, and bound to the soil. Others, *aliping sagigilid*, (household dependents), were chattel slaves, captures in war or reduced to bondage according to Malay custom for failing to pay a debt.”⁴

Each barangay averaged from 30 to 100 families, was self-sustaining and independent from the others. Exceptions were trading centers like Cebu and Manila, latter having been reported to have 1,000 families at Spanish contact.

It is relatively easy to determine the traditional habitat of the various language groups. They have lived there since time immemorial down to the present day. The Ilocanos occupy the area up north in Luzon, now aptly named Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur. Next to them southward are the Pangasinans, inhabitants of the province of the same name, and then the Kapampangans who are residents of Pampanga. The Tagalog region begins from Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bulacan and Bataan and goes all the way down to the boundary of the Bicol peninsula where we have Manila which has always been the central part of it, Rizal, Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Quezon. The entire southeast stretch call the Bicol region is the land of the Bicolanos.

In the Visayas, the Hiligaynons live in the island of Panay, the Cebuanos or Sugbuanon, as they traditionally call themselves, in the Island of Cebu, and the Waray in the Island of Samar and in the northern part of Leyte. The Cebuano sphere of linguistic influence goes as far as the neighboring Visayan Islands like Siquijor, Bohol, and Southern Leyte and Northern and Eastern Mindanao.

The Islamized Communities

The Muslim principalities were considered to be the most developed communities in the entire archipelago, having reached the level of centrally organized life. Leading the group was the Sultanate of Sulu whose sultanate began as early as 1450. Though independent of each other at the time of Spanish contact the principalities of Maguindanao and Buayan were united by Sultan Kudarat in 1619 into the Maguindanao Sultanate.

The Islamized communities are traditional inhabitants of the southern portion of Mindanao, central Mindanao, the islands of Basilan and the Sulu archipelago, and Southern Palawan.

Islam first arrived in the Sulu archipelago towards the end of the 13th century, estimated to be in 1280 A.D., brought by a certain Tuan Masha'ika who apparently got married there and thus established the first Islamic community. Masha'ika was followed by a Muslim missionary named Karim ul-Makhdum around the second half of the 14th century. With Rajah Baginda who came at the beginning of the 15th century was introduced the political element in the Islamization process. It was his son-in-law, Abubakar, whom he had designated as his successor, who started the Sulu sultanate.⁵ We do not know what level of social development the people of Sulu have reached in the 13th century. What we do know is that in 1417, a Sulu leader named Paduka Pahal led a trade expedition of 340 people in China. They were said to have "presented a letter of gold with the characters engraved upon, and offered pearls, precious stones, tortoise shell and other articles."

Islam came to Maguindanao with a certain Sharif Awliya from Johore around 1460. He is said to have married there, had a daughter and left. He was followed by Sharif Maraja, also from Johore, who stayed in the Slangan area and married the daughter of Awliya. Around 1515, Sharif Kabungsuwan arrived with many men at the Slangan area, roughly where Malabang is now. He is generally credited with having established the Islamic community in Maguindanao, and expanded through political and family alliances with the ruling families.⁶

Maranao tradition speaks of a certain Sharif Alawi who landed in the present Misamis Oriental in northern Mindanao; his preaching there was said to have eventually spread to Lanao and Bukidnon. There is hardly any evidence of this in the latter, however, except in some border towns adjacent to Lanao del Sur. From the southern end, Islam came through marriage alliances with Muslim Iranun and Maguindanao datus, specifically around the area of Butig and Malabag.⁷

Islam in Manila was a relative newcomer at the same time of the Spaniards' arrival. There were reportedly 10 or 12 chiefs in the Manila Bay area, each the acknowledge leader in his town, and one of them was the greatest and was obeyed by all.⁸

How did Islam come to the islands? It came with a trade in a rather roundabout way. After the death of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) in 632 A.D., a general expansion movement followed. Through military conquests, the Islamic world turned empire with dominance established in the Middle east, North Africa, Spain, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. The

expansion movement likewise tool towards Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, made possible either by and through Muslim merchants or missionaries of both. It was through the latter that the Malayo-Indonesian region and Mindanao and Sulu were Islamized.⁹

The trade route which led to the Islamization of Mindanao and Sulu was the one that linked Arabia overland through Central Asia and hence overseas to India, China, Southeast Asia and Africa, especially in the period starting from the beginning of the 9th century.

Overseas travel at the time was directly influenced by monsoon winds and merchants had to establish trade stations along their route where they tarried for long period of time. In the course of these stays, merchants-missionaries would marry into the local population thereby creating and establishing Muslim communities.

It was in this way that the Islamization process was generally facilitated and hastened in such places as Malacca, Pahang, Trengganu, Kedah, Java, and others. By 1450, Malacca had become a leading center of Islam in the Malay archipelago. It was from the Malay archipelago that Mindanao and Sulu were Islamized. The establishment of Muslim trading communities in such places as Mindoro, Batangas, and Manila in the northern Philippines came from the same direction, more specifically from Borneo.

The combination of trade and Islamization presumably created the necessary conditions that enabled the Sulu, and later, the Maguindanao, to advance way ahead of the other indigenous inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago.

To what extent did Islam revolutionize the recipient communities? Before the advent of Islam in the Philippine archipelago, no community was reported to be monotheist. *Diwata* and *anito* were essential features of their belief system. Animists, they are called by social scientists nowadays. Believing that “There is no other god but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet,” Islam was the first to bring monotheism to the Philippines. The next was Christianity which was close to two centuries later.

In the course of its historical development, the Islamic world was able to develop a social system distinctly its own, in consonance with the doctrine revealed in the Qur’an and also embodied in the *Hadith* or *Sunnah* (tradition) of the Prophet. Such institutions as the caliphate, the emirate and the sultanate are part of this development.

The religion and the social system brought by Islam were radical departures from the animism prevalent among the many lowland peoples of the archipelago. Further, the stimulus provided by the Muslim traders combined to push the Islamized communities far ahead of the others. They traded actively with peoples of the other islands within the archipelago, and also with other Southeast Asian countries, including China.

The Warrior Societies

Like the barangays, the warrior communities were also kinship bound. Dr. Scott who has done extensive studies on the matter calls them warrior communities because they were “characterized by a distinct warrior class, in which membership is won by personal achievements, entails privilege, duty and prescribed norms of conduct, and is requisite for community leadership.” He adds that “the major occasion for exercising military skill among these societies is during raids called *mangayaw* into unallied territory, but individual attacks are made by stealth or as opportunity presents itself, including suicidal one-man forays.”¹⁰ Speaking of their sources of livelihood, Dr. Scott says that “all societies with warrior chiefs live by swidden farming, although

the Kalingas have adopted terraced pond-fields in the recent past. Braves clear their own fields like everybody else – for which reason mangayaw raids tend to be seasonal – except among dependents and so qualify as a sort of ‘parasite class.’ Agricultural surplus is produced by increasing labor force through polygyny, sons-in-law, dependents by blood or debt, or slaves. Their heirloom wealth necessary for high social status consists of imports like porcelain, brassware and beads, or local manufactures like weapons and goldwork. It is accumulated mainly through brideprice, wergeld and legal fees, and is thus more likely to be the result of personal power than the cause.”¹¹ Among those falling within this category were the Manobo, the Mandaya, the Bagobo, the Tagakaolo, the B’laan, and the Subanon of Mindanao; also, the Isneg, the Kalingas, and the Tinguian of the Cordillera.

The Petty Plutocracies

The petty plutocracies are confined only to the Cordillera central in northern Luzon, more specifically to the Ifugao, Bontoc, Kankanay and Ibaloy. They were describes as such because “they are,” Dr. Scott says, “dominated socially and politically by a recognized class of rich men who attain membership through birthright, property and the performance of specified ceremonies; and ‘petty’ because their authority is localized, being extended by neither absentee landlordism nor territorial subjugation.”¹²

The Classless Communities

The classless communities, Dr. Scott claims, are so characterized “because they distinguish no class or group which exerts authority or advantage over the classes or groups by virtue of ascribed or acclaimed status.”¹³ Very good examples of these were the Ilongot of Northern Luzon, the Katalangan of Isabela, the Ikalahan of Nueva Viscaya, the Mangyans of Mindoro (now known to be divided into six distinct language groups namely, Iraya, Alangan, Tadyawan, Hanunoo, Buhid, Tawbuid and Batangan), the Batak of Palawan, the Tiruray of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat in Mindanao, the Sulod of Panay, and the Negritos who are known by different names (generally Aeta, Eta, or Ita to the Tagalog¹⁴; Baluga, Alta or Dumagat to the Tagalog of Baler¹⁵; Atta to the Ibanag in Cagayan¹⁶; Agta among the Isneg¹⁷; *Pugut* meaning black or very dark colored to the Ilocano¹⁸; also, kulot or curly to the Ilocano neighbors in Abra¹⁹; Ata and Magahat in the island of Negros in the Visayas²⁰; Ata in Davao, and Mamanwa in Agusan-Surigao). What must be stressed because it is taken for granted by so many people is the fact that the Negritos have traditionally inhabited practically the entire stretch of the Philippine archipelago, from Cagayan southward along the entire stretch of the Sierra Madre to Camarines Norte; also in Zambales in West Central Luzon; in Panay and Negros in the Visayas; and Agusan-Surigao and Davao in Mindanao.²¹

According to Dr. Scott, ‘all these societies either farm swiddens or hunt and gather forest products for their sustenance—or, in the case of some of the Dumagats, live off fish and turtles.’²² None of them had any concept of landownership. To them, said Dr. Scott, “the land itself is the property of supernatural personalities whose permission must be ritually secured for safe and fruitful use, and, similarly, wild forest products or game are either the possessions of, or under the protection of, spirits whose prerogatives must be recognized by ritual or even token payments in kind. The products of the land, however, are owned by those who grow them, and may be alienated or loaned. Fish and game taken in group enterprises are divided equally among the participants and their dependents, or according to an agreed schedule which recognizes division of labor, risk, or leadership.”²³ None of them, too, adds Dr. Scott, had “traditional means of dealing with aliens at a political level, although the formalization of chieftaincy has been a frequent response to contacts with more powerful groups.”²⁴

The Spanish Contribution

Colonization, also known as Christianization though not necessarily Hispanization was the main contribution of Spain to the minoritization process. There is no need to go into the details here. Suffice it to say that the main victims of the colonial order were the barangay communities of the eight major language groups cited earlier, and at the end of the Spanish regime, they have all acquired a common identity out of their common colonial experience. Not all inhabitants of the archipelago were subjugated.

In 1898, at the collapse of the colonial regime, the entire population could be divided into two broad categories, those who were conquered and colonized and those who were not. Those who were conquered became the Christians, they paid tributes, they served as corvee labor, they served as soldiers and militias, and so on. It was they, too, who repeatedly rebelled—more than 200 cases were recorded in 333 years. It was they who gave birth to the Filipino nation and the Republic of the Philippines. Those who were not conquered may be further subdivided into two groups. One would be those who fought back and were successfully in maintaining their independence throughout the period of Spanish presence. These were the proud Moros of Mindanao and Sulu and the Igorots of the Cordillera. The indigenous peoples of the Cordillera in northern Luzon are known today to be composed of the following, in alphabetical order: Bontoc, Ibaloi and Kankanaey, Ifugao, Ikalahan or Kalangoya; Isneg, Kalinga, Kankanai or Applai, and Tinguian. The others were those who kept out of Spanish reach, thereby remaining free. They were the warrior societies and the classless groups.

Where then is the Spanish contribution? It may have been unintended but it was in creating the conditions for the various barangay communities to discover a common identity in being Christians and subjects of Spanish colonialism, and find a common cause in their struggles to eliminate the unjust colonial order. The result was more than eloquent in form of the Filipino nation and the Republic of the Philippines in 1898. Their population was estimated to be nearly seven million,²⁵ thus making them the majority population. The non-Christians, on the other hand, who were not identified as Filipinos, neither by the Americans nor by themselves, were placed at approximately one-eighth of the total population.²⁶

The American Share in the Process

American contribution may be categorized as two-fold, in the sphere of labeling, and in providing political or administrative structures.

First they called the Philippine Islands part of their Insular Possessions. Which to them was legitimately accomplished through the Treaty of Paris in December 1898 whereby Spain ceded the entire Philippine Archipelago to the American government in exchange for 20 million dollars legalized. There was never any question on whether Spain could claim legitimate sovereignty over peoples and territories which were never conquered, least of all colonized. Acknowledgement, too, of the *de facto* status of the Republic of the Philippines was never shown.

Then as they proceeded to impose their colonial power with military might—which took until 1907 in Luzon and the Visayas due to the intensity of Filipino armed opposition; and up to 1916 in Moroland because the Moros fought tooth and nail to keep them out; instances of Lumad and Igorot resistance made themselves felt, too—they also refused to acknowledge the legitimate existence of the Republic of the Philippines, or of the Maguindanao and Sulu Sultanates which were states in their own right. What they insisted on was that there was no such things as a Filipino nation, only scattered and disunited tribal groups. Armed opposition were neatly labeled

as cases of insurrection against legitimate American government, or plain piracy or simple banditry.

The population of the Islands were then placed in two neatly labeled compartments: “civilized” and “wild” or “Christian” and “non-Christian.” Mr. Dean Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission, recounted that when civil government was established, “I was put in general executive control of matters pertaining to the non-Christian tribes.” He expressed his discomfort at the term “non-Christian.” Apparently, he has been in search of a single word with which to collectively designate “the peoples, other than the civilized and Christianized peoples commonly known as Filipinos, which inhabit the Philippines.” He said “they cannot be called pagan because some of them are Mohammedan, while others seem to have no form of religious worship. They cannot be called wild, for some of them are quite as gentle, and as highly civilized, as are their Christian neighbors. The one characteristic which they have in common is their refusal to accept the Christian faith, and their adherence to their ancient religious beliefs, or their lack of such beliefs as the case may be. I am therefore, forced to employ the term “non-Christian” in designating them, although I fully recognize its awkwardness.”²⁷

If Mr. Worcester felt any initial awkwardness, the hesitancy soon disappeared in official documents, judging from the consistency of usage. “Civilized” and “Christians” were spontaneously interchanged in official documents ; so were “non-Christian” and “wild” Within a few months after the establishment of the civil government, the Philippine Commission created the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes under the Department of the Interior headed by Mr. Worcester himself. “This bureau is charged with the duty of conducting systematic investigations in order to ascertain the name of each tribe, the limits of the territory which it occupies, the approximate number of individuals which compose it, their social organization and their languages, beliefs, manners, and customs, with special view to learning the most practical way of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity. This bureau has the further duty of investigating and reporting upon the practical operation of old legislation with reference to non-Christian peoples.”²⁸ Within two years of its creation, the office was renamed the Ethnological Survey for the Philippine Islands. Both were headed by Dr. David P. Barrows.²⁹

Not long after, Dr. David P. Barrows published an article entitled “History of the Population”, in Volume I of the 1903 Census. The article had two major sections, one on the “Civilized or Christian Tribes,” another on “Non-Christian Tribes”. He also categorically described the “Bicol, Cagayan, Ilocano, Pampangan, Pangasinan, Tagalog, Visayan and Zambran” as “the civilized or Christian tribes.”³⁰ All tables of Volume II, the statistical portion, which had Christian and non-Christian population consistently used the phrase “classified as civilized and wild” in the title.³¹

It will be recalled that these peoples who had been labeled were the ones who by sheer acts of courage or through evasion successfully remained free from Spanish colonialism. Now, by the simple act of official labeling, the American colonial government transformed the symbolic glory of retaining their freedom into a stigma and a marked disadvantage.

These labels later made their appearance in very important laws like those affecting ownership and distribution of land and the disposition of natural resources. They also became the excuse for special government measures. While regular provinces and municipalities were formalized or established for the “civilized”, special laws and special administrative machineries were created for the “non-Christians.”

One after the other the Philippine Commission enacted special laws. For a general application among non-Christians, it passed the Special Government Act which would be

made applicable to “the five provinces of Benguet, Nueva Vizcaya, Lepanto-Bontoc, Palawan and Mindoro,” and the Township Government Act to “all settlements of non-Christian tribes throughout the Philippines except those of the Moro Province.” For the Moros, it passed Act No. 787 creating the Moro Province in 1903. For the Lumad of Agusan and Bukidnon, “an Act was passed” in August 1907 “carving the province of Agusan out of territory which had previously belonged to Surigao and Misamis and organizing it under the Special Provincial Government Act. “Bukidnon was integrated into it. Then, in August, 1908, “the Mountain Province was established in Northern Luzon. At the same time that the Ifugao territory was separated from Nueva Vizcaya there was added to the latter province the Ilongot territory previously divided between Isabela, Tayabas, Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan.”³²

To ensure that proper cooperation was given by the local population, the colonial government also had local males enlisted in the Philippine Constabulary. Mr. Worcester told us: “Whenever practicable it is highly desirable to police the wildman’s country with wild men, and this has proved far easier than was anticipated. The Bontoc Igorots make good, and the Ifugaos most excellent, constabulary soldiers. They are faithful, efficient, absolutely loyal and implicitly obedient... Benguet Igorots and Kalingas are now being enlisted as constabulary soldiers, and from the very outset the people of many of the non-Christian tribes of the islands have been used as policemen in their own territory.”³³ The Constabulary in Mindanao had its own Moro Company, too.³⁴

Aside from the operation of the Moro Province some special arrangements were also made with the Sultan of Sulu. The first was the Bates agreement in 1899 wherein the Sultan acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States government, and his capacity as the spiritual head of Islam in his realm was in turn recognized by the United States government. Having become uncomfortable with the continuing exercise by traditional Moro leaders, chief among them was the Sultan of Sulu, of lead roles in the resolution of conflicts among their people, the American government insisted that the Sultan sign the Memorandum Agreement Between the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and the Sultan of Sulu – the second arrangement. The main provision of the document was the Sultan of Sulu’s ratification and confirmation, “without any reservation or limitation whatsoever” of his recognition of the sovereignty of the United States of America. He remained the titular head of the Islamic church in the Sulu Archipelago. Signing for the government was Frank Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.³⁵

Another special feature of the Moro Province was the creation of the Tribal Wards and the Tribal Ward Courts. The Act No. 39 provided for “the division of non-Christian Tribes into tribal wards and for the appointment by district governors... of a headman for each ward, who shall be the datu or chief of the people of that locality, giving to this headman power to appoint deputies. The district governor is given power to enact ordinances for the government of the wards within his jurisdiction... the district governor is also given jurisdiction to try cases involving the violation of these ordinances and it is made the duty of the headman to report from time to time violations of order as they occur and generally to keep peace in his bailiwick, for which he is paid a small salary and allowed to wear a gorgeous badge of office.”³⁶ The tribal ward courts came not long after.

The justification for the creation of tribal ward courts which would apply the general laws of the colonial government “with some modifications to suit local conditions,” was that “the customary laws of the Moros and non-Christians were either non-existent or so vague and whimsical as to be impracticable of administration in courts of justice... In short, insufficient for purposes of a sound judicial system.”³⁷

These special structures, usually politico-military in character, were generally designed to be a transition stage in the amalgamation of the non-Christians into the mainstream of civilian government. Or, put in another way, their assimilation with the seven million Christian Filipinos. In 1914, the Moro Province was abolished and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu which had jurisdiction not only over the former Moro Province but also over the special province of Agusan.

Passed by the US Congress, the Jones Act of 1916 replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. Part of the government reorganization that followed was the creation of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (1917-1936)—not the same entity as that headed by Dr. Barrows—which would “have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants of the territory represented on the Legislature by appointive Senators and Representatives.” This territory included the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and the Mountain Province on the Island of Luzon. Another slight reorganization took place in February 1920. The national legislature “abolished the government of the Department, placing the seven provinces directly under the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes, and extending to that territory the jurisdiction of all bureaus and offices.”³⁸ This structures lasted until 1936.

Commonwealth Act No. 75 (24 October 1936) abolished the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. All powers of the Bureau were conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior. Also, the position of Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu was created with the rank and salary of Undersecretary of the Department of the Interior.

One major distinguishing feature in the policy for the Moro people developed under the Commonwealth was the shift from the policy of attraction, with the toleration of differences and privileges which he regarded as a basic weakness in previous government policy, to that of complete equality before the law. What this meant in the concrete was that “from this time on”, Quezon told his Secretary of the Interior, “you should instruct the governors and municipal presidents in the provinces composing the territory under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu to deal directly with the people instead of with the *datus*, sultans, leaders or *caciques*.”³⁹

After the grant of independence in 1946, specifically during the first decade of the Republic and prior to the establishment of the CNI, three measures were instituted which affected the indigenous peoples of Mindanao. There was the abolition of Department of the Interior through Executive Order No.383 (1950); the creation of the Office of Local Government thru Executive Order No. 392 (1951) to supervise over special provinces, including those under the department of Mindanao and Sulu, and four years later, on 20 April 1955, Republic Act (RA) 1205, which transformed these Special Provinces into regular provinces, thereby inaugurating, too, the exercise of universal suffrage.⁴⁰ Earlier top officials were appointed rather than elected.

The next structure was the CNI created in 1957 by RA No. 1888. As a departure from colonial times, the law institutionalized for the first time the status of the non-Christian tribes as national Cultural Minorities. But this was not all. Colonialism continued. A quick scrutiny of the policy statement reveals an almost word for word reproduction of that of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes of 1917, one more solid proof of a wholesale carry over from colonial times. Which means, in short, that the administrations until time had not seen the need for a new policy. The CNI remained in existence until 1975.

For a while, Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) took over the role of looking after the affairs of the Cultural Communities. The story of the PANAMIN is a colorful one by itself, and rather controversial, which unfortunately we cannot accommodate here for lack of space. The name Cultural Communities was introduced in the 1973 Constitution, replacing

National Cultural Minorities. PANAMIN's odyssey ended with the fall of President Marcos from power.

Later we should see the coming into being of such offices as the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities, to be quickly split into the Office of Muslim Affairs and the Office of Northern Cultural Communities and the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities. The 1987 Constitution not only adopted a change of name, this time, Indigenous Cultural Communities, it also established, subject to certain procedures, the autonomous regions for the Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao. With this, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was put in place in 1989. That of the Cordillera did not materialize because, said the Supreme Court, only one province voted to be part of it. We can end the history of structures here. We must hasten to stress, however, that structures and labels constitute only one aspect of the story of minoritization. The more fatal aspect was that of legalized land dispossession, initiated and nurtured in colonial times, and sustained until the present.

Regalian Doctrine VS. Ancestral Domain

Constituting the core of the Philippine land property system, the regalian doctrine has been and is still enshrined in the Philippine Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987. With it, the state declares itself the sole owner of what is called state domain and reserves the right to classify it for purposes proper disposition to its citizens. Thus, lands classified as alienable and disposable may be owned privately, and titled to themselves, by individuals or corporations; and lands, forests areas, bodies of water, and so on which are described as inalienable and non-disposable are state-owned and are not open to private ownership. They may, however, be leased for a specific period.

The Republic of the Philippine inherited the regalia doctrine from Spain, as it also adopted hook, line and sinker all laws affecting land and other natural resources enacted and implemented by the American colonizers. These constitute one of the biggest chunks of institutions carried over from colonial times.

It is said that Spain's discovery of the Philippine archipelago gave the Spanish crown, as was the practice among the European expansionists in the 15th and 16th centuries, possessory rights over the islands. Since the King stood for the Spanish State, it was understood that his dominion was also state dominion, and the King or the State reserves the right and authority to dispose of lands therein to its subjects and in accordance within its laws.

The regalian doctrine is regarded as a legal fiction because no such law ever existed. In any case, it was on the basis of this authority that the Spanish crown handed down a law in 1894 commanding its subjects in the Philippine colony to register their lands. It was presumably on the basis of this authority that Spain ceded the entire Philippine archipelago to the US through the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898. Whether this cession was legitimate or not was entirely a matter of opinion. To leave no doubt about it, the Americans employed armed might extensively to extract acquiescence from resisting indigenous inhabitants.

To the US government, the Treaty of Paris and the subsequent treaty of 7 November 1900, which added portions of Philippine territory overlooked earlier, effected a transfer of title of ownership, or of sovereign rights over the entirety of the Philippine archipelago. This fact explains why the Philippine Islands along with other Pacific Islands have been referred to in American textbooks as their Insular Possessions. This was unmistakably contained in the Philippine Bill of 1902 or more formally, Public Act No. 235 passed by the US Congress on 1 July 1902, an organic law, which served as the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands until the

enactment of the Jones Law of 1916. From here, the leap of the Philippine Constitution of 1935, then to 1973, then to 1987 came as a matter of course.

To what extent did the regalian doctrine contribute to the minoritization of the indigenous communities? To the extent that the state took away the lands that should properly belong to these communities. How extensive is the indigenous territory involved? Or how much of the Philippine archipelago was uncolonized by the Spaniards? An early assessment made by Mr. Worcester about the extent of Philippine territory inhabited by the so-called non-Christian Tribes gives us a fairly good idea about the size of uncolonized lands in the early years of the American colonial regime. He wrote: “there today remains a very extensive territory amounting to about one-half of the total land area, which is populated by non-Christian peoples so far as it is populated at all. Such peoples make up approximately an eighth of the entire population.”⁴¹

To ensure unchallenged exercise of the state authority to dispose of state domain or public lands, the Philippine Commission enacted a law, six months after the passage of the Land Registration Act, which took away from indigenous leaders, *datus* or chiefs their authority to dispose of lands within their respective jurisdictions. Clearly self-explanatory, Act No. 718 of 1903 was entitled “An Act making void land grants from Moro sultans or *datus* or from chiefs of non-Christian tribes when made without government authority or consent.” It was now illegal for any indigenous leader to dispose of lands to any member of his community, regardless of whether or not this had been their practice since time immemorial.

The Land Registration Act No. 496 was passed by the Philippine Commission on 6 November 1902. This institutionalizes the Torrens system in the country, first introduced in South Australia as the Real Property Act of 1857-1858.⁴² This law mandated and provided for the guidelines for the registration and titling of privately-owned lands, whether by individual persons or by corporations. The word “corporation” leaves no room for the indigenous concept of private communal property. Forest lands, bodies of water and so on which used to be sources of daily food and other needs for the indigenous communities were no longer indigenous territories; they have become state-owned and could only be made use of with the consent of the government. The strength of the Torrens system is further reinforced by the provisions of the public land laws which happens to be patently discriminatory against indigenous communities, as the next section will show.

Discriminatory Provisions of Public Land Laws and other Laws Affecting Land

First, it must be reiterated, for emphasis, that the US acquisition of sovereignty over the Philippine archipelago did not carry with it the recognition of the communal ancestral domains of the indigenous communities. Neither did it recognize that of the Moro, least of all the legitimacy of their sultanates, nor that of any other community for that matter.

Second, the Philippine Commission passed a law (Act No. 718) on 4 April 1903, six months after the passage of the land registration act, making void “land grants from Moro sultans or *datus* or from chiefs of non-Christian tribes when made without governmental authority or consent.” Section 82 of Public Act No. 926 which was amended by Act No. 2874 by the Senate and House of Representatives on 29 November 1919 in accordance with the provisions of the Jones law, continues to carry the almost exact wordings of said law, reiterating further the legitimacy of the transfer of sovereign authority from Spain to the US, and the illegality of indigenous claims. This same provision is still in effect to this day (1993).⁴³

Third, the land registration Act No. 496 of 6 November 1902, requires the registration of lands occupied by private persons or corporations, and the application for registration of title, says

Section 21, “shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant.” The very matter of registration was not only totally alien to the indigenous communities, most of them would have been unable to comply, illiterate that they were, even if by some miracle they acquired the desire to register. Also, what would they register? There was no room for registration of communal lands. As a young Filipino lawyer recently pointed out, “under the present property law, communal ownership is a mere fiction of the mind; it is unregistrable and deserves no legal protection.”⁴⁴

Fourth, the Public Land Act No. 926 of 7 October 1903, passed by the Philippine Commission allowed individuals to acquire homesteads not exceeding 16 hectares each, and corporations 1,024 hectares each of, “unoccupied, unreserved, unappropriated agricultural public lands” as stated by Section 1. Nothing was said about the unique customs of the indigenous communities.

Fifth, Public Land Act No. 926, amended through Act no. 2874 by the Senate and the House of Representatives on 29 November 1919 in accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law, provided that the 16 hectares allowed earlier to individuals was increased to 24, but the non-Christian was allowed an area (Sec.22) “which shall not exceed 10 hectares” with very stringent conditions, that is, “It shall be an essential condition that the applicant for the permit cultivate and improve the land, and if such cultivation has not begun within six months from and after the date on which the permit is granted, the permit shall *ipso facto* be cancelled. The permit shall be a term of five years. If at the expiration of this term or any time thereafter, the holder of the permit shall apply for a homestead under the provisions of this chapter, including the portions for which a permit was granted to him, he shall have the priority, otherwise the land shall be again open to disposition at the expiration of the five years.”

“For each permit, the sum of five pesos shall be paid which may be done in annual installments.”

Sixth, Commonwealth Act No. 41, as amended on 7 November 1936, withdrew the privilege earlier granted to the settlers of owning more than one homestead at 24 hectares each and reverted to only one not exceeding 16 hectares. But the non-Christians who were earlier allowed a maximum of 10 hectares were now permitted only four hectares!

Resettlement Programs

By operation of law, not only did the indigenous communities find themselves squatters in their own lands. Worse, if they happened to be inhabitants of provinces which had been opened to resettlements like Cagayan Valley, Isabela, Nueva Viscaya, Nueva Ecija, Mindoro, Palawan, Negros, Mindanao, and so on, they would have seen their lands, as they really did see them, being occupied by streams of settlers from other parts of the country. Aside from dispossessing them, the new development literally reduced them to the status of numerical minorities. From being inhabitants of the plain, they now have become dwellers of forest areas, or midlands and uplands.

In the wake of the settlers, or sometimes ahead of them, came the rich and the powerful in the form of extensive plantations, pasture leases or cattle ranches, mining concerns, logging operations, and rattan concessions. The government, too, added its bits: development projects like irrigation dams, hydroelectric plants, geothermal plants, highways and so on. Now that most of them have become upland dwellers, a new law came into existence in 1975, Presidential Decree 705 or the revised Forestry Code providing, among others, that lands not covered by paper titles which are over 18 percent in slope or less than 250 hectares are considered permanently public.⁴⁵ The section 69 of the same decree declares it unlawful to do *kaingin* or practice swidden

agriculture without permit. Penalty is up to two years imprisonment or a fine not to exceed P20,000.

In the end, after more, than three centuries of relative freedom and stability during the Spanish period, many indigenous communities found themselves, in less than half a century of American rule and in an even shorter period of the Philippine Republic, rapidly displaced and permanently dispossessed—legally! Although the 1987 Charter claims to uphold and protect ancestral lands, Congress has yet to pass an enabling act to put the Constitutional intention into effect.⁴⁶ The last Congress failed to approve the Senate and House bills on ancestral lands.

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The Indigenous Cultural Communities' Situation in Mindanao-Sulu

Introduction

The indigenous cultural communities in Mindanao and Sulu regard themselves as the real owners of the greater part of the region. The others were those indigenous inhabitants who constituted the Christian converts during the Spanish period. Twentieth century migrants from the northern islands, however, have challenged this claim. Now except for four provinces and a few other towns for the Muslims, and about eight or 10 towns for the Lumad, they have become numerical minorities in their ancient territory. Pressed to their limits, deprived of land and dignity, decisions have been made to take their survival into their own hands. In 1972, the MNLF launched its revolutionary war of independence for the Bangsa Moro. In mid-1986, Lumad Mindanaw initiated and led the Lumad struggle for self-determination. This, however, is not armed and is expressly for self-determination within the Republic of the Philippines.

The story of the 13 Moro ethnolinguistic groups and the 18 Lumad Tribes of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan. The story of their dispossession, disenfranchisement, and fight for survival, as seen from their own eyes.

Individually, they may consist of more than 30 distinct linguistic groups, but recent studies have shown that they actually have much in common, linguistically, and folk-lore wise. One research has arrived at the conclusion that the Manobo language is actually the parent language of 18 others, referred to as the Manobo sub-family of languages, found in Mindanao mainland, Camiguin Island, and Cagayancillo Island in the Sulu Sea.¹

Common origin stories also abound among the Muslims and the Lumad. Among the Kalibugan of Titay, Zamboanga del Sur, they speak of two brothers as their ancestors, both Subanon. Dumalandan was converted to Islam while, Gumabon-gabon was not. Among the Subanon of Lapuyan, also in Zamboanga del Sur, they talk of four brothers as their ancestors. Tabunaway was the ancestor of the Maguindanao; Dumalandan the Maranao; Mili-rilid of the Tiruray, and Gumabon-gabon of the Subanon.

The Manobo of Cotobato and the Maguindanao say the brothers Tabunaway and Mamalu are their common ancestors, although they differ on which of the two was converted to Islam. In the Manobo version, it was Tabunaway.² The Manobo version further states that they share the same ancestor with the Ilyanun, the Matigsalug, the Talaandig and the Maranao.³

In the Tiruray tradition, the same brothers Tabunaway and Mamalu are acknowledged as their ancestors.⁴

Another version says that Tiruray, the Manobo, the B'laan, the T'boli, the Subanon and the Maguindanao have common origins. "The inhabitants of Slangan, Maguindanao, Katitwan, and those of the other settlements of the valley were pagans and were very similar to the present Tirurays in language and worships. Those who adopted the new religion remained in the rich lowlands of the valley, but those who refused fled to the mountains and have stayed away ever since. Those who wavered in accepting the new terms of submission and who were later suffered to stay in the neighboring hills were called Tiruray. Those who refused to submit, fled to more distant places, and kept up their enmity and oppositions were called Manobos. The pagans who are thus spoken of as related to the Moros of Mindanao in origin, besides the above, are the B'laan, the Tagabili and Subanon."⁵

The Higaunon and the Maranao also speak of a common ancestry in their folklore especially in the border areas of Bukidnon and Lanao. This seems more pronounced in the Bukidnon folklore.⁶

The Kalagan belong to the same tribe as the Tagakaolo.⁷

Traditional Indigenous Territory

Historically, "Moro" refers to the 13 Islamized ethnolinguistic groups enumerated earlier. The name has been much disliked by the Muslims for many years, coming as it did from their Spanish enemies who for more than three centuries subjected them to constant attacks aiming to colonize them. However, since the MNLF bannered it in its struggle, it has acquired a new meaning and has become a source of pride for its users. It is also used interchangeably with "Bangsa Moro" (Moro nation or Moro people).

Lumad is a Cebuano Bisayan word meaning indigenous which has become the collective name for the 19 ethnolinguistic groups which follow, in alphabetical order: Ata, Bagobo, Banwaon, B'laan, Bukidnon, Dibabawon, Higaunon, Kalagan, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Mangguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Subanon, Tagakaolo, T'boli, Tiruray, Ubo. Representatives from 15 of the 18 tribes agreed to adopt a common name in a Congress in June 1986 which also established Lumad Mindanaw. This is the first time that these tribes have agreed to a common name for themselves, distinct from the Moros and different from the Christian majority. Lumad Mindanaw's main objective is to achieve self-determination for their member tribes. The choice of a Cebuano word—Cebuano is the language of the natives of Cebu in the Visayas – was a bit ironic but it was deemed to be most appropriate considering that the various Lumad tribes do not have any other common language except Cebuano.

In the 22 provinces and 16 cities which constitute the entirety of Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago, Palawan excluded, the Moros are traditional inhabitants of a territory now found within 15 provinces and seven cities. The Lumad for their part are traditional occupants of a territory encompasses within 17 provinces and 14 cities. The indigenous Christians, on the other hand, were traditionally found in nine provinces and four cities, mostly in northern and eastern

Mindanao. We include here, in passing, the Chabacanos who came to Zamboanga sometime in the 18th century.

Basis of Indigenous Claim of Territory

There is incontrovertible evidence that the above-mentioned indigenous peoples have been living continuously without interruptions in their places of habitation at least since 1596 until 1898. By incontrovertible evidence, we refer to the fact that all three major categories enjoy three characteristics in their occupancy. First, they were the first to arrive there. In instances where a group may have come later, as in the case of the Moros among the Subanon in the Zamboanga peninsula, consent was obtained from the first occupant. The late arrival of the Chabacanos did not cause any disturbance or displacement among the local occupants. Second, among the various groups it was the clan, not necessarily the ethnolinguistic group, that had a tradition of communal ownership and control of their territory, although it is worth noting that individual ethnolinguistic groupings tended to live in contiguous areas. Lastly, their occupancy was continuous and without interruption at least until 1898. There were no significant developments then, no reported large-scale displacement or dispossession of indigenous population. These three characteristic features constitute the foundation of the current concepts of ancestral domain among the various ethnolinguistic groups.

The case of the Moro people is different in that aside from being traditional occupants of their ancestral territory, they also enjoyed the advantage of having been part of one sultanate or another. These were *de facto* States which exercised jurisdiction over both Muslims and non-Muslims. Hence, Moro territory was both ancestral and state territory.

The First Foreign Intrusion: The Spanish Challenge

The Spanish colonizers represented the first serious challenge to Moro dominance not only in Mindanao but also the entire archipelago. Armed clashes between them began from the very first year of Spanish presence in 1565. The Moros contested their colonial ambition up to 1898. Part of the overall Spanish strategy in Mindanao was establish bases there, especially in areas where Moro influence was weakest. Mainly through missionary efforts, Spain succeeded as early as the first half of the 17th century in establishing footholds in the eastern, northern and western parts of Mindanao. The total number of Christians, 191,493 in 1892 who were largely converts from the indigenous population, represents the success of the Spanish in putting a large portion of Mindanao within their jurisdiction. Did this affect the state of indigenous occupancy? In a very real sense, no. The visible change was in the expansion of Spanish state domain and the contraction of Moro, either Maguindanao or Sulu sultanate jurisdiction. Needless to say, this formed part of the Spanish basis for claiming the entire archipelago and ceding the same to the United States in 1898.

Resettlement Programs of the Government

The real displacement process started during the American colonial period. Between the years 1903 and 1935, colonial government records estimated between 15,000 to 20,000 Moro died as a consequence of Moro resistance to the American presence. Some of the recorded battles in Sulu, particularly the battles of Bud Dajo in 1906 and Bud Bagsak in 1912 were actual massacres, one sided battles that they were. Next to the actual destruction of the lives of the people, it can be said that as great a damage, if not more, was done by the resettlement programs. These wreaked havoc on the Lumad and Moro ancestral domains on such an unprecedented scale that they literally overturned the lives of the indigenous peoples. A broad account will show that the government, colonial or otherwise, most somehow bear the responsibility for this turn of events.

Initiated by the American colonial government as early as 1912, it was sustained and intensified during the Commonwealth period and picked up momentum in the post-World War II years. Altogether, there were a number of resettlement programs.

Severe drought in Sulu and Zamboanga and grasshopper infestation in Davao in 1911-1912 adversely affected rice supply in the Moro Province and this gave General John Pershing, who was then Governor of the Province, the excuse to call “for the importation for homesteaders from the overpopulated Philippine areas”.⁸ The campaign for settlers into the first agricultural colony in the Cotabato Valley started in earnest in Cebu where corn has been the staple food. Knowing the Cebuano weakness for corn, their staple food in Cebu, the American colonial government paraded around Cebu a cornstalk, 13 feet tall, propped up with a bamboo stick, to convince the people of the fertility and productivity of the soil. But in addition to being farmers, the volunteers also had to be skilled in *arnis*, an indigenous form of martial arts. Fifty persons responded. The government provided initial capital and some farm tools on loan basis. They were also assured of eventually owning homesteads. Thus was born the first agricultural colony at the Cotabato Valley. Its specific aim was to produce cereals or rice and corn.⁹

The year 1913 saw the passage by the Philippine Commission of Act No. 2254 creating agricultural colonies aimed, officially, at enhancing the rice production effort already started in the Cotabato Valley. Specific sites selected were Pikit, Silik, Ginatilan, Peidu Pulangi and Pagalungan, the very heart of Maguindanao dominion in the upper Cotabato Valley, and Glan at the southernmost coast of the present South Cotabato province. In its supposed attempt to integrate the various sectors of the population, distinct population groups were purposely mixed in the colonial sites. In Colony No. 2, for example, composed of Manaulana, Pamalian, Silik, Tapodok and Langayen, Cebuano settlers and Maguindanao natives lived together. Strangely, the settlers were allotted 16 hectares each while the Maguindanao were given only eight hectares each.¹⁰

There were American soldiers married to Filipinas who did not wish to return to the United States. They were provided for through Act 2280 with the opening the following year of the Momungan Agricultural Colony in what is now Balo-I, Lanao del Norte. There were signs that this project ultimately failed when in 1927 the governor opened the area for sale or lease to anyone under the terms of the Public Land Act.¹¹

Unable to further finance the opening of more colonies, the Manila government passed Act 2206 in 1919 which authorized Provincial Boards to manage colonies themselves at their expense. Lamitan in Basilan was thus opened by the Zamboanga province, Tawi-Tawi by Sulu, Marilog by Bukidnon, and Salunayan and Maganoy by Cotabato between 1919 and 1926.¹²

No significant government resettlements were organized until 1935. Settlers nevertheless migrated either on their own or through the Interisland Migration Division of the Bureau of Labor. As a result, aside from already existing settlement areas like those in Cotabato Valley, or Lamitan in Basilan and Labangan in Zamboanga, and Momungan in Lanao, we also see several in Davao, specifically in the towns of Kapalong, Guiangga, Tagum, Lupon and Baganga; also in Cabadbaran, Butuan and Buenavista in Agusan, and Kapatagan Valley in Lanao.¹³

The next big initiative was the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act or Act No. 4197 of 12 February 1935 which aimed at sending settlers to any part of the country but which special reference to Mindanao, that is, as a solution to the Mindanao problem as their peace and order problem with the Moros was called.¹⁴ But before any implementation could be attempted, the

Commonwealth government came into existence and it decided to concentrate on opening interprovincial roads instead.¹⁵

The National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) created by Commonwealth Act No. 441 in 1939 introduced new dimensions into resettlement. Aside from the usual objectives, there was the item providing military trainees an opportunity to own farms upon completion of their military training. The Japanese menace was strongly felt in the Philippines at this time and this particular offer was an attempt by the government to strengthen national security. Under the NSLA, three major resettlement areas were opened in the country; Mallig Plains in Isabela, and two in Cotabato, namely, Koronadal Valley made up of Lagao, Tupi, Marbel and Polomok and Ala (now spelled Allah) Valley consisting of Banga, Norallah and Surallah. By the time NLSA was abolished in 1950, a total of 8300 families had been resettled.¹⁶

The Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) of 1949 was meant to increase rice and corn production but was also involved in resettlement. It was responsible for opening Buluan in Cotabato, and Maramag and Wao at the Bukidnon-Lanao Border.¹⁷

Before the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) came into existence in 1954, the short-lived Land Settlement Development Administration (LASEDECO) took over NLSA and RCPA. It was able to open Tacurong, Isulan, Bagumbayan, part of Buluan, Sultan sa Barongis and Ampatuan, all in Cotabato,¹⁸

NARRA administered a total of 23 resettlement areas, nine were in Mindanao, one in Palawan; five in the Visayas, one on Mindoro, seven in mainland Luzon.¹⁹

A product of the Land Reform Code, Land Authority took over from NARRA in 1963. For the first time, resettlement became a part of the land reform program. The creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform in 1971 also brought about the existence of the Bureau of Resettlement whose function was to implement the program of resettlement.²⁰

Moreover, the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), a special program of the government to counter the upsurge of the Huk rebellion – a brain-child of Ramon Magsaysay, then Secretary of National Defense under President Elpidio Quirino – must also be mentioned. This program was responsible for opening resettlement areas for surrendered or captured Huks (insurgents) in such areas as Isabela, Quezon, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato and Maguindanao. Those in Mindanao were carved out in the heart of Magindanao and Maranao ancestral territories.²¹

The formal resettlement programs spawned the spontaneous influx of migrants who came on their own. It is estimated that more people came this way than through organized channels.

To be able to appreciate the process of displacement among the indigenous groups, one can do a comparative study of the population balance in the provinces of Cotabato, Zamboanga, and Bukidnon over several census years.

Population Shifts Resulting from Resettlements

As a result of the heavy influx of settlers from Luzon and the Visayas, the existing balance of population among the indigenous Moro, Lumad and Christian inhabitants underwent serious changes. An examination of the population shifts, based on the censuses of 1918, 1939 and 1970, in the empire province of Cotabato, clearly indicates the process by which the indigenous population gave way to the migrants. Add to this the cases of Zamboanga and Bukidnon and one

will readily see how imbalances in the population led to imbalances in the distribution of political power as well as of cultivable lands and other natural and economic resources. These three give us concrete glimpses into the pattern of events in the entire region. The sole exceptions were those places which did not become resettlement areas.

Cotabato has been the traditional center of the Magindanao Sultanate. Aside from the Magindanaoan, its Moro population also include Iranun and Sangil. It is also the traditional habitat of several Lumad tribes like the Manobo, the Tiruray, the Dulangan (Manobo), the Ubo, the T'boli and the B'laan. It is, at the same time, the focus of very heavy stream of settlers from the north. As a matter of fact, it was no accident that the American colonial government made it the site of the first agricultural colonies. It had all the markings of a present day counter-insurgency operation which at that time was Moro armed resistance to American rule.

Zamboanga was also the traditional habitat of the Maguindanaoan where the Sultanate dominated the original Subanon inhabitants, especially in the southern portions. Sama, known as Lutao during the Spanish period, Iranun, Tausug and Subanon converts to Islam known as Kalibugan composed the other Moro populations. Aside from its indigenous Christian population who were converts during the many years of Spanish missionary effort and the few Chabacanos who were Ternateños brought in from the Moluccas Islands during the 17th century, the bulk of its Christian population came from numerous migrations in the twentieth century.

Bukidnon had been the traditional territory of the Manobo and the Bukidnon (also known as Talaandig and/or Higaunon). Its having been integrated into the special province of Agusan was an affirmation of the dominance of the Lumad population there during the first decade of the twentieth century. Its handful of Moro population are generally Maranaos to be found in the towns, especially Talakag, bordering Lanao del Sur. The census also registered a heavy inflow of migrants, mostly from the Visayas.

The Case of Cotabato

In 1918, what used to be known as the empire province of Cotabato (now subdivided into Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao) had a total of 171,978 inhabitants distributed in 36 municipalities and municipal districts. The 1939 census registered a total population of 298,935 distributed in 33 towns. And, finally the 1970 figures showed a total population of 1,602,117. The fantastic leaps in population increase cannot be explained by natural growth, only by the rapidity of the migration process. How did this affect the balance of population?

In 1918, the Muslims were the majority in 20 towns, the Lumad in 5, and the migrants in none. Not much change was revealed in the 1939 census; the Muslims continued to be the majority in 20 towns, the Lumad increased to nine as a result of political subdivisions, and the migrants had three. The 1970 figures indicated an unbelievable leap. Now, the Muslims had only 10 towns to their name; not a single one was left to the Lumad— although it showed 31 towns with Lumad population of less than 10 percent, and the migrants now dominated in 38 towns.

The history of population shift in Cotabato was reflected throughout Mindanao, revealing a pattern consistently unfavorable to the indigenous population. Total Islamized population was placed at 39.29 percent in 1903; this was down to 20.17 percent in 1975. Lumad population was 22.11 percent in 1903; it fell to 6.86 percent in 1975. More specifically, what particular areas had Muslim majority? Or Lumad majority? By the census of 1980, the Muslims had only five provinces and 13 towns in other provinces. And the Lumad had only seven towns.

The Role of Big Business in the Displacement Process

Mindanao teemed with natural wealth. Both American military commanders and government administrators saw this very early in their stay in Mindanao. No less than Leonard Wood (1903-1906), the first governor of the Moro Province and John Pershing, his successor, acknowledged this. Wood, as matter of fact, was recorded as having remarked that “it is difficult to imagine a richer country or one out of which more can be made than the island of Mindanao.”²²

Both officials tried to influence amendments to the existing land laws in order to induce investors into the region. The American dominated Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce tried, not once but twice, “to have Mindanao and the adjacent islands become territory of the United States.”²³ In 1926, a U.S Congressman introduced a bill seeking the separation of Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the Philippines. This was part of a larger effort to transform the region into a huge rubber plantation.²⁴ The great number of investors in Davao, both individual and corporate planters, the most famous of which being the Japanese corporations which transformed Davao into an abaca province represents the most visible example of large-scale efforts during the colonial period to cash in on the region’s natural resources.²⁵

During the post-World War era, timber concessions may have delivered the penultimate blow to the already precarious indigenous hold over their ancestral territory. Logging became widespread in the region in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As a result of resettlement, indigenous populations naturally receded from their habitat in the plains upward into the forest areas. Logging caught up with them there, too. In 1979 alone, there were 164 logging concessionaries, mostly corporate, in Mindanao with a total concession area of 5,029,340 hectares, virtually leaving no room in the forest for the tribal people. It should be pointed out that the region’s total commercial forest was estimated to be 3.92 million hectares!²⁶ To ensure smooth operations, logging companies were known to have hired indigenous datu as chief forest concession guards.

Pasture lands covered also by 25-year leases come as poor second to logging with 296 lessees in 1972 to 1973 for a total of 179,001.6 hectares.²⁷

How have these affected the indigenous peoples? No less than the Philippine Constabulary Chief brigadier General Eduardo Garcia reported to the 1971 Senate Committee investigating the deteriorating peace and order conditions in Cotobato that the “grant of forest concessions without previous provisions or measures undertaken to protect the rights of cultural minorities. And other inhabitants within the forest concession areas is one of the principal causes of dissatisfaction among the cultural minorities.”²⁸ A Maguindanao datu from Cotobato, Congressman Salipada Pendatun, cited the same government failure to “provide precautionary measures in the grant of concessions and pasture leases as contributory to the problem.”²⁹

Contradiction between Government Development Projects and Indigenous Interests

As a result of the government’s attempt to reduce the country’s dependence on imported oil, both administrations from President Marcos to Aquino have undertaken energy development projects tapping both water and geothermal resources. Famous among these projects, made so by determined indigenous opposition to them, were the Chico Dam project in the Cordillera, the Agus Hydroelectric projects along the Agus River in Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, the Pulangi River projects and the Lake Sebu dam project, all of which are located in the heart of the territories of indigenous cultural communities. And now, there is the Mt. Apo Geothermal project

Consequences Upon the Lumad and the Moro of the State System of Landownership and Land Use

It is important to note here that no Lumad ethno-linguistic group has ever reached the level of a centralized socio-political system such as that attained by the Moro people. At the turn of the century, the communities were mostly clan-size, and they were mostly dependent on swidden farms, hunting and gathering for their livelihood, and not much has changed since. This would therefore explain the high vulnerability of the Lumad communities to external intrusion. The net effect of successful external intrusions was that individual communities ceased to be masters in their own ancestral lands and of their own lives; they had lost their self-determination. How do they feel about this? Let us hear from them and from the people who have worked with them or have done extensive studies about them.

Recorded in the Santa Cruz Mission Report of 1973 were these accounts by a Maguindanao and a B'laan (South Cotabato). The Maguindanao said: "I want to tell you what I am feeling. Many years ago, the Christians came here to our place, They made many promises and encouraged us to join them, to unite and cooperate with them. They paid money to the Datu and they claimed our land. I hope you understand. Our lands are all sold or mortgaged to Christians. Now we do not have any land on which to work."

The B'laan added: "I want to tell you about our people as they were before the settlers came. We are the largest number of people then. We lived in the wide plains of Allah and Koronadal Valleys. It is true that we were not educated but then we were happy; we made our own lives, we lived in our own way.

"Then the settlers came, our lives became unhappy. We ran to the mountains because we were afraid of settlers. Even today, the B'laan people are scared of the government officials. Our lands were taken away because of our ignorance. Now we are suffering. We have been forced to live in the Roxas and General Santos mountain ranges. Now we have only a few hectares of flat land to grow our food. And even with this little land, the government is running after us and they tell us that land is not ours. It is the government's. They say the lands belong to the forestry. They will put us to jail. Truly we do not think that we are part of the government."

The Senate Committee on National Minorities reported in 1963: "Among the provinces visited, the most pressing land problems were reported in the provinces of Davao, Cotabato, Bukidnon and the island of Basilan.

"Natives in these provinces complained that they were being driven away by influential persons and big companies' who have been awarded rights to lands which have long been occupied and improved by the members of the cultural minorities."³⁰

A Tiruray from Nangi, Upi, Maguindanao, had a similar story to tell: "Years ago, our ancestors inhabited the land now called Awang, a few kilometers away from Cotabato City. Settlers came waving in front of them a piece of paper called land title. They (our ancestors) did not understand it. Like most of us now, they were illiterate. But they did not want trouble and the mountains were still vast and unoccupied. And so, they fled up, bringing their families along and leaving precarious and sacred roots behind... We have nowhere else to go now. The time has come for us to stop running and assert our land right to the legacy of our ancestors. If they want land titles, we will apply for it [sic]. Since we are illiterate, God knows how we will do it. That is why we are trying our best to learn many things around us. By then, we will no longer be deceived and lowland Christians can be stopped from further encroaching on our land."³¹

Dr. Stuart Schlegel who took down this account made additional observations: “The Tiruray’s accommodation of the increasing number of lowlanders from elsewhere, the settlers’ acquisition of the ancestral lands, as well as the entry of logging corporations in the area were the beginning of the loss of Tiruray lands, and eventually, the loss of their livelihood. When the settlers came, they only cultivated a parcel of Tiruray land. Today, the Tiruray can only cultivate a small portion of the settlers’ lands.

“Since most of the farm lands are now owned by the settlers, the landless Tiruray hire themselves as tenants of the lands...”³²

Dr. E. Arsenio Manuel who did extensive work on the people he called Manuvu’ shared his equally revealing observations: “Just at the time that the Manuvu’ people were achieving tribal consciousness and unity (late 50’s), other forces were at work that were going to shape their destiny. These outside forces can be identified as coming from three sources: the government, private organizations and individuals. The pressure from the City Government of Davao to bring people under its wings is much felt in its tax collecting activities, and threats from the police. Private organizations, mainly logging companies, ranchers, and religious groups are penetrating deep into the interior since after the 1950’s. With the construction of loggers’ roads, the opening up of central Mindanao to settlement has come to pass. Christian land seekers and adventurers have come from three directions: from the north on the Bukidnon side, from the west on the Cotabato side, and from the south on the Davao and Cotabato side....”³³

Zeroing in on the effects of government laws, Dr. Manuel continues: “Actual abridgement of customary practices has come from another direction, the national laws. The cutting of trees so necessary in making a clearing is against forestry laws, the enforcement of which is performed by forest rangers or guards. Logging companies, to protect their interests have taken the initiative of employing guards who are deputized to enforce the forest laws. So enforcement of the same runs counter to native practices so basic to the economy system of the Manuvu’. The datos are helpless in this respect.”³⁴

Many Christian land seekers who usually followed the path of the loggers purchased tribal lands for a pittance. The datos, even if they were able to control the membership of barrio councils in their areas, could do nothing to annul such sales which normally were contrary to tribal laws.³⁵

Tribal land is not the only casualty in the displacement process. Even native ways, laws and institutions tend to be replaced by new ones.³⁶

The Moro fared only slightly better than the Lumad in that they were able to retain more territory in their hands by comparison. But as the figures will indicate, they, too, despite longer experience in centralized leadership, lost substantial territory.

To sum up, where once the Lumad exercised control over a substantial territorial area encompassed in the present day’s 17 provinces, now they only constitute, according to the 1980 census, the majority in only seven municipalities. And where once the Moros had jurisdictional control over an area covered in the present day’s 15 provinces and seven cities, now they are left with only five provinces and 13 municipalities.

Present Status and Gains of the Lumad Struggle

Among the Lumad, much work has been done to influence recent legislations that would benefit them and the cultural communities as a whole. The process has also strengthened people's organizations.

For the first time in Philippine constitutional history, the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines carried a sympathetic acknowledgment of the unique character of the tribal peoples of the country in a single provision, as follows: "The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies."³⁷

The nationwide protests against the dictatorship of the Marcos regime affected the Lumad. The reverberations of the bitter Cordillera fight against the Chico dam project was felt in Mindanao. The T'boli, for instance, had to contend with the Lake Sebu dam project. The Manobos of Bukidnon had to bear the terrible prospects of one day seeing the water overflowing the banks of the Pulangi river into their fields as a result of the Pulangi river dam project in the heart of Bukidnon.

Thus, when President Marcos was thrown out of power and President Corazon Aquino was installed, a Constitutional Commission was created to draft a new democratic Constitution. The various Lumad organizations took active part in the public consultations held during the drafting of the Charter. Lumad-Mindanao was an active member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Body for the Campaign on the Inclusion of National Minority Peoples Rights in the Constitution.³⁸ When it was established in 1986, it was made up of 78 local and regional Lumad organizations.

It was mainly through their joint initiative, as well as other groups advocating indigenous people's rights, supported by sympathetic advocates in the Constitutional Commission that the 1987 Constitution incorporated vital provisions directly addressed to the Bangsa Moro and tribal communities all over the country.

Two significant sections may be cited here as examples of legal provisions that are considerably closer to that sought by the Lumads representing a radical departure from the afforested provisions of the Constitution of 1973. Article XII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution states: "The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being."

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." The other provision is Article XIV Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports), Section 17, as follows: "The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies."³⁹

For the Tiruray group which alone was included in the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, the gains are to be found, for the moment, in the provisions of the Organic Act. For example, the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao carries one full article on Ancestral Domain. At the same time, Tribal customary laws shall at last be codified and become part of the law of the land.

The names “Lumad” and “Bangsa Moro” have at last been accepted in the legal dictionary of the country.⁴⁰ Along with this, an exemption from agrarian reform was granted by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (Chapter II, Sec. 9) “to ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community.”

These gains must, however, be placed within realistic perspective. It is true that they represent a substantial advance from the provision of the 1973 Constitutional. But whether or not they can deliver what the indigenous people really want is another matter. Within the same Charter may be found, for example, a provision that can easily nullify the intention of the state recognition of ancestral lands. Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony), clearly states that “all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.” This nullifying effect has been concretely illustrated in the definition of ancestral domain and ancestral lands in the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Sec. 1, Article XI) where the beautifully packaged definition of ancestral domain in the first part of the paragraph is neatly cut down in the latter part of the same paragraph, just as soon as the State asserts its possessory right.⁴¹

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The Journey Towards Moro Self-Determination

Introduction

Aside from their being Muslims, the Moro people are especially proud of other accomplishments in history. First, long before the Spanish colonizers arrived in the Philippine archipelago, they had enjoyed a high level of centralized social system as exemplified by the Sulu Sultanate which dated back to 1450, and the Maguindanao Sultanate which although born only in 1619 was preceded by the two powerful principalities of Maguindanao and Buayan at the Pulangi valley. And two, by their singular success in maintaining their freedom against repeated Spanish attempts to subjugate them for three hundred thirty three years.

Triumph of Western Colonialism

But like the rest of the inhabitants of the archipelago, they, too, were victims of the machinations of two colonial powers at the turn of the century. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris, or, with one stroke of the pen, figuratively speaking, all inhabitants of the islands without exception -the Moros no less -became colonial subjects of the United States of America. Subsequent American moves were designed to clear away all forms of opposition to the assertion of American rights of possession and the establishment of American colonial rule. In the case of the Moro people, the direction was toward assimilation with the general body politic which in this instance was oriented around the Filipino identity.

Thus began a radical turn in Moro life which quickly cleared the way for their minoritization. Moro leaders' recognition and acknowledgement of American sovereignty shifted centers of authority from them to American officials and institutions. Control over land and its disposition became the sole prerogative of the state authority. Private property prevailed over communal ownership, and usufruct lost its institutional base. Police power became the exclusive domain of police institutions, more specifically the Philippine Constabulary.

Moro Resistance

There was widespread armed resistance against the American presence during the first fifteen years, despite compromises by their leaders, notably the Sultan of Sulu, Datu Piang of Maguindanao and Datu Mandi of Zamboanga. Between 1903 to 1936, Moro lives lost from the fighting were estimated by the Americans to be between 15,000 to 20,000. In the words of an American officer, "no one dreamed that the Constabulary was to engage in hundreds of "cotta" (fort) fights and to quell twenty-six uprisings of sufficient seriousness to be listed as 'campaigns' before it turned over the task of establishing law and order, still uncompleted, to the Philippine Army in 1936. Most notorious or most famous of the encounters, depending on one's point of

view, were the battles of Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak in Sulu, the struggle of Datu Ali in Magindanao, and the Lake town campaigns in Lanao.

American success in arms was effectively balanced with equally determined efforts in civil affairs, more specifically, tapping the datus for key roles- in colonial government, educating their children, and exposure programs for the more obstinate datus to make them more cooperative in the more subtle ways.

Datu Participation in Colonial Government

Formerly prime minister to the Sultan of Sulu, Hadji Butu was chosen Special Assistant to the American Governor of the Moro Province in 1904. He was Senator representing Mindanao and Sulu from 1915 to 1920. Acknowledged as a top leader of the Maguindanaos in the Cotabato Valley, Datu Piang started his service as third member of the Provincial Board of Cotabato in 1915, then became a member of the House of Representatives in, 1916 representing Cotabato. A ranking datu in Lanao, Datu Benito represented Lanao in the same House. Other datus served in various capacities a good number of them starting as third member of their respective provincial boards. These personalities all actively supported the educational program of the Americans.²

Education, A Tool of Pacification

American officials never underestimated the efficacy of education as a conquest. A military veteran of the Mindanao campaigns, Col. Harold H. Elarth, made this observation, "With the older generation held in check by armed force and the younger being trained in these schools, civilization and a semblance of law and order began to spread over Moroland."³ General Arthur McArthur who for a while in 1901 headed American troops in the Philippines felt that there was "nothing in the department of administration that can contribute more in behalf of pacification than the immediate institutions of a comprehensive system of education" and saw education as "so closely allied to the exercise of military force in these islands." Thus, while tapping Moro leaders for important roles in the colonial government, special arrangements were made to enable sons and daughters of these leaders to obtain education.

The case of Sulu is instructive. A girls' dormitory managed by a Christian Filipino matron and financed by American ladies in New York was established in 1916 in Jolo. This contributed substantially in breaking down Moro prejudice against sending their daughters to school. The pupils were selected from the leading Tausug families, among them Princess Indataas, the daughter of Datu Tambuyong, one of the principal datus of the Sulu Sultanate; Princess Intan, the sister of Datu Tahil. Even then, Datu Tambuyong played safe; he required the American authorities to sign a long document which promised that his daughter would not be allowed to dance or talk with men, among others. The support given by the leading datus certainly made the dormitory a great success. At the same time, it inspired some of the girls to become teachers.

American success among the general Moro population may be gauged from the enrolment figures themselves. In 1900, we are told that, "in the Moro areas of Mindanao, some 25 schools were opened the first year with more than 2,000 pupils attending." In the school at Jolo, very few of the 200 pupils were Moros because their parents suspected that "American schools would try to convert their children from Islam to Christianity."

Three years after, "52 schools are now in operation in the Moro province... with a total enrollment of 2,114, of which number 1,289 are boys and 825 are girls. Of the students enrolled, 1764 are Christians, 240 are Mohammedans and 110 pagan Bagobos."⁷

In 1906, Act No. 167 (20 June 1906) on compulsory education for children of school age, not less than 7 and not older than 13 years old, was implemented in the Moro Province.

In 1913, 1,825 Moros and 525 pagans were enrolled in the public schools of the Moro Province. In 1918, the enrollment of the Moros in the five provinces (of Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Lanao, Davao) had increased to 8,421 and pagan pupils to 3,129.⁸

By 1919 the Director of Public Education boasted that “six of the highest ranking Mohammedan princesses of the Sultanate of Sulu were teaching in the public schools, one of them a niece of the Sultan.”⁹

Exposure Tours

Inviting independent-minded Moro leaders into exposing themselves as “high civilization” was called education trips designed to soften resistance to colonial policy. Usually selected to receive these invitations were Moro datus and other headmen who were loud in their objections to political and or social union with Christian Filipinos. Datu Alamada and Datu Ampatuan of Cotabato were two of those datus who, as a result of these trips, were transformed into avid supporters of colonial policy. Datu Alamada, in particular, was reportedly insistent in his requests for schools, homestead surveys, and colony organization for his people.¹⁰

These devices, among others, proved to be most effective in redirecting the proud Moro spirit from active armed resistance to acquiescence. Like all others in the same category throughout the islands, Moro loss is twofold. They lost control of their own destiny and resources. They became a people, neatly labeled, first as wild or non-Christian Tribes in American times, then, through R.A. 1888 in 1957, as national cultural minorities who were to be prepared towards eventual integration with the mainstream of the Philippine body politic. They ceased to exercise their right to self-determination. How did they feel about this situation?

Early Moves Towards Recovery of Self-Determination

When armed resistance died down, Moro leaders in what appeared to be early experiments in parliamentary struggle, continued to articulate and revive the issue of self-determination.

In 1921, for example, 52 Moro datus and five Americans -four of whom were residents of Sulu and one had served there for many years and intended to be one-addressed a petition to the President of the United States requesting that should independence be granted to the northern provinces of the Philippines, it is the desire of the people of Sulu that Sulu Archipelago [sic] be made permanent American territory of the United States of America, that law and order be maintained by American troops, and finally, that “we, the people of Sulu guarantee that we ourselves will maintain law and order in the event our territory is made a part of the American nation.”¹¹

This was a curious petition because while there was expressed resistance to becoming assimilated with the Philippines, there was at the same time an even more manifest desire to become integrated into the United States of America. Of course, the presence of five American signatures renders the petition suspect. But not quite so, if placed within the perspective of a subsequent document from Lanao.

A similar petition was sent to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935 by 120 Maranao datus of Lanao lead by Hadji Bogabong. Like those in Sulu, these expressly sought to remain under the tutelage of the American government if and when this would grant independence to the Philippines.¹²

Freedom Through Congress?

As early as 1961, four years after the creation of the Commission of National Integration (CNI), Representative Ombra Amilbansa of Sulu filed a bill seeking the separation of the Archipelago of Sulu from the Republic of the Philippines. As to be expected, the bill did not prosper. But a message was delivered that not all was well in the Moro front.

Movement for Muslim Independence

Six years later, or in early 1968, the Moros hit the headlines again. The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), headed by Datu Udtog Matalam, acknowledged among the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu as the venerable Maguindanao patriarch of the Cotabato Valley issued a manifesto declaring their desire for independence from the Republic of the Philippines of Muslim inhabited areas like Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga, Zamboanga City, Basilan City, Lanao, Sulu, Palawan and other adjoining areas, islands and sea, and announcing their intention to establish an Islamic State. Their reasons? They made it clear that integration into the Philippine body politic was impossible. The Philippine government had been implementing a policy of isolation and dispersal of Muslim communities which had been detrimental to the Muslims and Islam. It was the duty of the Muslims to wage a Jihad physically or spiritually to change their situation. Islam is a communal religion and a way of life that requires a definite territory for the exercise of its tenets and teachings and for the proper observance of its Shariah and *adat* laws. Shortly after, Muslim was changed to Mindanao in the name of the organization in an apparent attempt to accommodate the non-Muslims.

It was not long before rumors of secret military training camps filled the national newspapers. In the early part of 1970, MIM had allegedly become so powerful that Datu Udtog Matalam, Jr., then a mayor of the town of Pikit, reportedly boasted at a peace conference that the MIM could wipe out Christian towns, including Cotabato City, if they wanted to.

“Christian” Countermoves

The next year was going to be a local election year and seven politicians, some of them mayors in North Cotabato, and popularly known as the Magic 7, organized the Ilaga, a paramilitary organization that became known for its uncompromising anti-Muslim sentiments. It was composed initially, as reported in the media, of Ilonggo (natives of Panay) underworld characters. The founders, too, were all Ilonggos. “Ilaga” means “rat” but the Muslims preferred to call it the “Ilongo Landgrabbing Association.”

The years 1969 to 1972, prior to martial law, was a period of indiscriminate encounters between Muslims and Christians. But 1971 was the peak year of the pre-martial law Mindanao crisis. It was local election year and the increasing incidents of indiscriminate violence had pushed Christian politicians to consolidate forces, meaning ensuring Christian control of local positions. Hardly a day passed without bloodshed on either side.

The physical pattern of events showed the spread of conflict from North Cotabato to Lanao del Sur, from Cotabato to Lanao del Norte, and from Cotabato to Zamboanga del Sur. It did not overrun all the towns. As a matter of fact, it was highly selective. It confined itself to those

places with a significant proportion of Muslim and Christian populations, and to those towns where rivalry between Muslim and Christian politicians was most intense. The general atmosphere of disorder opened plenty of room for bandits. Personal scores were settled. Military officers and men took their sides. Politicians secured themselves. The general masses, both Muslims and Christians, were caught in the crossfire.

The most shocking event in North Cotabato was the massacre of 70 Muslims, men, women and children in a mosque at Manili, Carmen on 19 June 1971. The Muslims were gathered there for a peace conference. Once inside the mosque, they were machine-gunned and bombed. It shocked the whole nation but nobody was held accountable. It also added a religious dimension to the conflict. That was not going to be the last mosque to be desecrated.

Another tragic event was the Tacub massacre on 22 November 1971. Three truckloads of Maranao voters were on their way to Marawi, Lanao del Sur late in the afternoon of that day after voting at the special elections in the town of Magsaysay, Lanao del Norte. At the military checkpoint in Tacub, Kauswagan, they were stopped, ordered to alight and lie face flat down on the ground, and were searched for weapons. It was while the search was going on that a shot rang out and immediately the army troopers at the checkpoint fired their guns, including a 50 caliber machinegun. Those who were not hit and had scampered for safety found only death in the hands of civilians which included women, young boys, with white bands tied around their heads who mercilessly pounced on them with axes, bolos, knives, etc. Thirty five were killed at the scene, 54 were wounded. The 14 troopers who were later charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder with robbery were acquitted allegedly for lack of sufficient evidence. From January 1 to December 31, 1971, a local newspaper in Iligan City¹³ had documented for Lanao del Norte alone a total of 89 incidents.

So severe was the violence that President Ferdinand Marcos cited the state of chaos in Mindanao as one of two reasons for declaring martial law on 21 September 1972. The other was the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People's Army.

MNLF Launches War of Bangsa Moro National Liberation

The MIM faded into the background after President Marcos spoke to Udtog Matalam. But after the declaration of Martial Law, it was finally confirmed that there was indeed military training given to batches of Moro youths both abroad and locally. Within two months after the declaration of martial rule, in November 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front-Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF-BMA) launched a series of coordinated attacks on military outposts and announced to the world the struggle for independence of the Bangsa Moro. It declared the entirety of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago and Palawan as the ancestral homeland of the Bangsa Moro. Its battle cry: "Victory or to the graveyard!"

From the last months of 1972 to December 1976, large-scale fighting raged in Moroland. No one knew the score of the dead, the wounded and the displaced. No one, not even the military, kept any record or if they did, this was never made known. A publication,¹⁴ made an estimate of deaths, injured, and displaced in the Cotabato provinces, Lanao provinces, Sulu & Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga provinces from 1969 to the first quarter of 1976 and it came out with the following combined total: Deaths - 35,000 to 60,000; Injured - 31,000 to 54,000, and Displaced - 260,000 to 350,000.

The OIC Mediates RP-MNLF Negotiation

Through the intervention of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Philippine Government and the MNLF agreed to meet at the negotiating table. The framework of the talks: the problem is a domestic one and must be resolved within the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

The first formal talks, which failed, took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1975. The failure, according to Dr. Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, was partly attributable to the complexity of the question, but certainly also due to the disproportionate demand put forward by the rebel faction headed by Mr. Nur Misuari. To insist on a prior public declaration agreeing to the creation of an autonomous region, with a separate government and army, as a condition for the success of those talks, we believe, cannot be accepted by any sovereign government worthy of its name.”¹⁵ Another was attempted in Tripoli, Libya in December 1976. This resulted to the Tripoli Agreement which established an autonomous region for the Muslims of Southern Philippines, or more specifically in the 13 provinces of Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan. There were disagreements on how the document should be implemented. The government said there was going to be a plebiscite to determine which of the 13 provinces would be willing or unwilling to be part of the autonomous region. The government proceeded with its own interpretation and emerged with the two autonomous regions (Region IX and Region XII), each with five provinces. The three provinces of Palawan, South Cotabato and Davao del Sur opted not to be part of the autonomy. The MNLF never accepted the government position and eventually reverted to its secessionist stance. This was the situation when President Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency.

1987 Constitution Provides for Regional Autonomy in Muslim Mindanao

A new ceasefire was entered into by the government and the MNLF. A new round of talks took place which ended in a deadlock. But while the negotiations went on, a new charter was being drafted by the Constitutional Commission. The 1987 Constitution provided for the specific steps for the establishment of an autonomous region, including the enactment of an organic act for the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The MNLF consistently stood against accepting the terms of the new Constitution and took no part in the institution of the new autonomous region.

The new Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao currently in place covers only the four provinces of Magindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. They were the only ones that decided to join the autonomy out of the 13 provinces and nine cities which took part in the plebiscite to determine which of them would want to be part of the autonomous region.

Prospects of the Bangsa Moro Struggle

It is not possible to discuss the prospect of the Bangsa Moro struggle without at least mentioning the split within the ranks of the Bangsa Moro revolutionaries.

The first signs of factionalism showed in late 1977 when, said a prolific foreign author on Moro affairs, “word was received from Jeddah that Nur Misuari had been ousted as MNLF central Committee Chairman by Hashim Salamat (a Maguindanao) because (1) he was veering away from Islam and following Communist methodologies and objectives; (2) he was arrogant, secretive and autocratic; and (3) he had lost the confidence of the MNLF rank-and-file.”¹⁶ The first external sign was the emergence of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), “a largely Maranao faction,” said the same author.”¹⁷ More definite signs emerged later. In the early

80s, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) came to the surface, identified with Hashim Salamat. And not long after, another one came into the open, the MNLF-Reformist Group, led by Dimas Pundato, a Maranao. So there are now three factions and the leadership of each one comes from one of the three major Moro ethnolinguistic groups, the Tausug of Sulu, the Magindanao based in Maguindanao, and the Maranao of Lanao del Sur- Lanao del Norte in North Central Mindanao. The OIC has continued to recognize the MNLF as the legitimate representative of the Bangsa Moro, and the government of President Corazon Aquino acknowledged this by negotiating with the MNLF in 1986 to 1987 despite protests from the other factions. The rift continues to this day. The present administration of President Fidel V. Ramos has so far expressed its desire to talk with all factions, not just one.

The cease fire agreed upon between President Aquino and MNLF chairman Nur Misuari remains in effect to the present. But the political settlement that the MNLF desires is still a dream. The quest for self-determination somehow continues.

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Among the Lumad: The Case of Mt. Apo and Datu Inong Awe

Introduction

Acknowledged as the chieftain of the Bagobo tribe in Davao, Datu Inong Awe was well over 90 years old when he led a Bagobo tribal delegation to Manila to protest against the planned drilling of geothermal wells at the Mt. Apo area by the Philippine National Oil Company(PNOC). He died the year after, when PNOC was just warming up.

Weighed down with foreign debts, payment for which constitutes close to fifty percent of the national budget, the Philippine government has been incessantly searching for every possible source of natural energy, be it oil or geothermal. This is the task of the PNOC. And Mt. Apo offers vast geothermal resources.

Apo Sadawa

A dormant volcano, Mt. Apo in Bagobo folk tradition has been the home of Mandarangan, chief of the Bagobo war gods, also called “the God of the Sky for men.”¹ Tribal historians also claim that the human race sprang from the couple Toglai and Toglison who lived in the same mountain.² Apo Sandawa to the Bagobos, Mt. Apo is a sacred mountain. But PNOC saw only the vast store of geothermal energy held in its belly, awaiting to be tapped for modern requirements.

In the Long Line of Fighting Leaders

Datu Inong Awe belonged to the long line of fighting leaders. His father was cousin to Datu Tongkaling, the acknowledged Bagobo datu of Sibulan community east of Mt. Apo when the American colonizers came.³ Between 1905 and the second world war, these same colonizers allowed Japanese corporations to open up large tracts of land in Davao into huge and profitable abaca plantations. Some 600 Japanese plantation workers perished in Bagobo hands between 1918 and 1938 when they ruthlessly expanded their abaca plantations into Bagobo tribal lands.⁴ Several of their own warriors, called *bagani*, died in the hands of the Japanese soldiers during the second world war. But it seems their fight did not end with the departure of the last of the Japanese Imperial Army. Now, their enemy is, acting in the name of the national government, which in turn is acting in the name of national development.

Geothermal Potential of Mt. Apo

Much has transpired since that initial show of opposition led by Datu Inong Awe. Since Mt. Apo is the tallest mountain in the Philippines (2,954 meters above sea level) and is the habitat of the monkey-eating eagle (Philippine eagle), it was declared a national park together with the surrounding area totaling 72,814 hectares by executive proclamation on 9 May 1936. In the early 80s, it was also listed as a Heritage Site by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is also registered in the United Nation’s list of National parks and Equivalent Reserves.⁵

Early Attempts to Explore the Mountain

Since 1983, the PNOC had tried in vain to obtain permits to explore energy potentials of Mt. Apo. The Revised Forestry Code clearly provides that “National parks shall not be subject to exploitation and other activities of a commercial nature.” With unusual persistence, PNOC was finally able in 1987 to secure an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) from the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC), now the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB). This was followed by a two-year exploration period, despite opposition from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which proved beyond doubt the existence of the vast power potential of the mountain. The PNOC reportedly plans to dig a total of 170 wells as part of the ten-year power development program of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The wells will in turn supply steam to four power plants. The target is to produce 220 megawatts of electricity.

In the overall perspective of the power development program of NAPOCOR, its ultimate aim is for geothermal energy to constitute 27.4% of the nation’s power needs by the turn of the century.⁶

Stemming Tide of Tribal Opposition

In attempt to stem the tide of growing tribal opposition, both the NAPOCOR and the PNOC have reportedly “agreed to set up an Environmental and Tribal Welfare Trust Fund.” Also involved are the DENR, the Cotabato Tribal Consultative Council, and the Local Government units of Cotabato. One centavo per kilowatt-hour of the net sales of NAPOCOR’s generated power will be plowed back into this Fund, as well as, 20 percent of the royalty share of the local government units and the fund components of the annual environmental management funds of NAPOCOR and PNOC. The Fund will be administered by the Multi-Sectoral Management Group.⁷

More Opposition

Early in February 1992, news leaked out that the PNOC was set to start full scale drilling operations. The unconcealed entry into the Mt. Apo area of hundreds of Army troopers was more than eloquent proof of the seriousness of their intentions. On February 27, 1992 about 8,000 demonstrators marched through the main streets of Kidapawan to protest the resumption of operations of the controversial Mt. Apo Geothermal Power Project and the alleged militarization of the project site. Bishop Pueblos of the Kidapawan Prelature and Congressman Andolana of Cotabato joined hands with the protestors. Participants from many areas in North Cotabato were stopped at various checkpoints set up by the police and military and asked to get off from their vehicles for inspection of bags and presentation of residence certificates.⁸

Not only did the demonstrators roundly reject the February 12 Memorandum of Agreement which allowed the PNOC to resume its road-building and geothermal well drilling operations, they also accused the government of militarizing the area not only because of the presence of army soldiers but also for the formation of paramilitary units from among the tribal peoples.⁹

This was not the first local demonstration to protest the construction of geothermal plants at Mt. Apo. This is in fact only one of several, starting from the one led Datu Inong Awe. Nor does it promise to be the last.

Other Related Issues

Issues raised were not confined to matters directly related to ancestral domain; militarization is another. Moreover, ecological concern has increased since environmental destruction around the Mt. Apo area is bound to affect the lives of the people both Lumad and settlers inhabiting the vicinity. But all these concerns have been framed within the fundamental tribal right to their ancestral lands and the ongoing Lumad movement for self-determination led by Lumad-Mindanao.

Dyandi: Defend Mt. Apo to the Last Drop

Opposition has come not only from the Bagobos of Davao. The Mt. Apo area and its environs, encompassing portions of Davao City, Davao del Sur and Cotabato, is the traditional homeland of several ethnolinguistic groups like the Bagobos, the Tahabawa, the, Jangan, the Ata on the Davao City side,¹⁰ the Kalagan and the Tagakaolo farther away in Davao del Sur and the Manobos in Cotabato. As early as April 1989, an alliance of the various tribal groups have been established, and this has been sealed with a *dyandi* or blood compact where the participants, 21 tribal leaders in all vowed to defend Apo Sandawa to the last drop of their blood. Does this indicate a bloody turn in the opposition? Not necessarily. It was clear to the participants that they

must exhaust all peaceful means. Their vow meant a readiness to set up barricades against the project or to bodily prevent the PNOC people from entering the project site. But there was the unmistakable hint to resort to arms when pushed too far.¹¹ They stated their position emphatically in Christian terms so that the people in the government would understand: “Apo Sandawa is like your church to us. If you were a Christian, a priest or a Catholic, would you allow a hole to be bored into your church?”¹²

Pamaas, The Counter-ritual

But PNOC cannot be accused of leaving any stones unturned. If the opposition had its *dyandi*, the pros had their *pamaas*, a propitiatory rite to appease Apo Sandawa and rid the geothermal project of evil spirits and curses which might interfere with its implementation. This, in fact, was specifically stipulated in the Environmental Certificate of Clearance (ECC) issued by DENR to the PNOC. And so, on 10 March 1992, an 84-year old Manobo presided over a *pamaas* at Lake Agko, held purposely to dispel the solemn vow of the *dyandi* performers nearly two years ago. Mr. Monico, Jacob, head of PNOC, and Mr. Pablo Malixi, head of NAPOCOR, and 10 other officials attended the said ritual. As part of the ritual, these officials were conferred the rank of datu and other tribal titles. Then, two Manobo datu, under the guidance of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), handed over to the officials a map of the 701-hectare Mt. Apo geothermal reservation, an act relinquishing tribal rights over the area to the government. In exchange, the Manobo community which is also identified with the Cotabato Tribal Consultative Council that took part in the *pamaas* was reportedly promised jobs inside the power plant site and a tribal fund that would come from plant operations.¹³

Tribe vs. Tribe

Barely a month later, on 17 April 1992, opposing tribal groups figured in a near encounter when pro-PNOC Manobo tribesmen declared a *pangayaw* (tribal war or headhunting) against the oppositionists who set up camp near the project site.¹⁴

Panipas, Preparation for Armed Confrontation

Exactly a month after this or on 17 May 1992, the oppositionist *magani* or warriors headed by Bagobo Datu Tulalang Maway, 85, and a participant of the original *dyandi*, held another ritual, called *kanduli* or *panipas* in Bagobo, at the peak of Mt. Apo. Traditionally, this ritual was done before warriors went to battle. They prayed to Mandarangan, the Bagobo god of war, and asked for his blessings. Now, they were prepared for armed confrontation. They stressed though that violence would only be resorted to if they were attacked first.¹⁵

NPA Enters Scene

Meanwhile, the New People’s Army had entered into the scene. The government responded not only by sending in the police units and Army regulars (more than five battalions was reported as early as March and about a thousand more in mid-July) but also by organizing local tribal militia, reportedly 500 strong, all deployed within and around the project site. As of July, 1992, a government agency placed a P40,000.00 reward for the head of Datu Tulalang, now the oldest living Bagobo *magani*.¹⁶

President Ramos Makes Presence Felt; Favors Mt. Apo Geothermal Project

On 24 January 1993, a national newspaper reported an important event related to Mt. Apo. It says: "President Ramos yesterday lauded the formal signing of the memorandum of agreement among local officials and tribal leaders which provides for the continuation of the construction of the Mount Apo geothermal power plant project... Signatories to the agreement included Cotabato Gov. Rosario Diaz, Kidapawan Mayor Joseph Evangelista, Manobo Datu Artia Guabong of the Cotabato Tribal Consultative Council. Environmental and Natural Resources Secretary Angel Alcala, Energy Secretary Delfin Lazaro and Philippine National Oil Co. president Monico, Jacob."¹⁷

In a dialogue with President Ramos two hours after the signing, Lingka Ansula, a tribal representative of the opposition, said in part to the President: "This is a day of sorrow for all people who stand up in defense of Apo Sandawa against the Philippine National Oil Company."¹⁸

Other Energy Projects in Mindanao and Effects on ICCs

The Mt. Apo question is not the only adverse situation the Lumad of Mindanao must face. The T'boli of South Cotabato have protested against the proliferation of fishpond leases by outsiders in Lake Sebu. The Bukidnons tribe and Manobo of Bukidnon province are up against the Pulangi Dam IV in the municipalities of San Fernando, Quezon and Maramag because of the strong possibility of inundation affecting farmlands and several thousand tribal peoples. The Higaunons of Agusan del Norte and Misamis Oriental have been seriously affected by the continuous logging operations of big capitalists in their ancestral area.

What it sums up to is that tribal community rights are being violated and the communities themselves are being forcibly displaced to make way for so-called national development. This story is not new. The same old pattern of dispossession goes back to the beginnings of Spanish colonialism. Nor does it look like it is about to end.

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Agus 1 Hydroelectric Plant: What Price Electricity?

Introduction

Energy crisis in Mindanao! Thus screamed newspaper headlines from late 1991 to the early part of 1992. The National Power Corporation (NPC or NAPOCOR) which supplies almost the entire energy requirement of Mindanao had cut its power output by 50 percent resulting in brownouts lasting for as long as eight to twelve hours. Almost immediately, there were howls of NAPOCOR mismanagement and a call for heads to roll. For their part, NAPOCOR officials explained that they could not help it. The water level of Lake Lanao had gone down to a dangerous level and could not sustain full operation of the five hydroelectric plants dependent on it. More than 90 percent of the electricity being used in the region comes from the five hydroelectric plants strung out along the length of Agus River. Agus flows from Lake Lanao in Lanao del Sur down to Iligan in Lanao del Norte. The situation has improved a bit three months later when curtailment was brought down to 35 percent or only about three to four hours of brownouts. But there is no promise of brighter days.¹

Immediate consequences have been insignificant to some but very grave to others. Among the latter are the factories in the industrial City of Iligan which have been forced to operate at only partial capacity, some to as much as half capacity. There is no telling yet how many billions of pesos in losses this will amount to for all concerned: the companies, the workers and their families, the national economy, and so on.

Much of the blame is being attributed to NAPOCOR officials' mismanagement. In response, they say that the only short-term solution they can think of is to operate Agus I hydroelectric plant in Marawi City which has long been completed. Its 80-megawatt capacity will cut down the current 35 percent power curtailment to 20 percent. But an organized group of Maranaos, led by Save Lanao Lake Movement (SALLAM) has vehemently opposed this for religious, cultural, economic and environmental reasons.²

The long-term solution will require coordinated reforestation and the banning of logging within the watershed area around Lanao Lake from which the hydroelectric plants take their water. Power curtailment, they stress, is the direct consequence of the lowering of the water level of the lake. This they say, is not only due to El Nino, the heat spell that has brought drought to the region for more than one year and four months, but is also the result of unmitigated logging operations within the lake watershed areas. The decision that will bring about this particular solution is not entirely in their hands. Several government agencies, both national, regional and local levels are involved. Apparently irritated by this opposition and pressured by increasingly popular demand to get Agus I into operation, a highly placed government official of Lanao del Norte has even suggested imposing an economic embargo on Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.

Luckily, there has been no takers.³ Never has the lack of electricity bothered so many people. It has also brought to the surface the complex chain of problems and events in which the Agus hydroelectric projects have become entangled. A quick review of the events is in order.

Energy Situation and Hydroelectric Power Project

Three interrelated factors have brought about the Philippine government's feverish effort to tap all of the country's energy resources: oil, water, geothermal, coal, alcohol, ipil, charcoal, etc. First, the country is 95 percent dependent on imported oil, mainly from the Middle East

countries; second, the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 provided the occasion for the Arabs to discover that there is- political power in oil: they refused to export oil to all countries that supported Israel and this included the Philippines. And third, The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) had succeeded in bringing the Bangsa Moro case to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the latter, in turn, granted the MNLF observer status in its roll of members. It was largely these three factors which forced the Philippine Government under President Ferdinand E. Marcos to negotiate with the MNLF under the auspices of the OIC.

And so, alongside with active researches into the energy potentials of water and geothermal resources, coal, alcohol, ipil, charcoal, and so on, were sustained explorations for oil in the Sulu and Palawan seas (both areas happen to be part of the ancestral homeland of the Bangsa Moro, according to the MNLF). Getting a large share of attention and funding were the water resources of the country. Very quickly, one after the other, the public came to know about the Chico River Dam Project in the Cordillera, the Agus River Project in Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, and the Pulangi River Project in Bukidnon-Cotobato-Maguindanao provinces. Altogether the government has identified 52 sites for hydro-energy development for a total estimated capacity of 8,380 megawatts: 30 in Luzon (5,374 MW) and 22 in Mindanao (3,006 MW).⁴ Not included are the expected output from geothermal plants.

The biggest of these projects are those of Agus and the Pulangi. Together they can generate an estimated 1,947 megawatts, more than enough for the power needs of Mindanao for the next 75 years, said a NAPOCOR official. Surplus power can then be channeled to Cebu, Negros, Panay and Bohol in the Visayas.⁵ There is no question that these will contribute significantly to the energy situation.

The Agus River project is composed of a series of seven hydroelectric power plants along the whole length of the Agus River, from its source in Marawi City to its mouth in Iligan City, and will generate a total of 944 megawatts.⁶

The Pulangi hydroelectric-irrigation projects consist of six dams, the first four in Bukidnon and the last two in Cotobato. This complex will produce a total of 1,003 megawatts and service irrigations systems.⁷

Other smaller projects which will have a combined capacity of 714 megawatts are located in Northern and Eastern Mindanao. Tagoloan and Cagayan projects are in Misamis Oriental; Bulanog Batang, Tago, Caracan, Daiwan, Lake Mainit and Sta. Josefa are in the provinces of Surigao and Agusan; Lanon river and Lake Seloton constitute the Lake Sebu project in South Cotabato.⁸

Painful Complications Around the Agus Plants

Saguiaran is the site of Agus II hydroelectric project which completed nearly ten years ago with a power capacity of 180 megawatts. The land expropriated, occupied and fenced in by NAPOCOR which now houses three 60-megawatt generators and the staff residences, comprises more than 2,090 hectares and represents some 13 percent of the municipal territory of Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. The area used to be divided into 149 family lots, all occupied by Maranao families.⁹ There is no need to go into the controversial details of the expropriation proceedings as well as the amount of compensation.

Some of the Saguiaran families resettled in Wao, Lanao del Sur, a municipality adjacent to Bukidnon. But in August 1975, fighting broke out between the MNLF and the government forces. Fifty-nine of the new Maranao residents, men, women and children were ordered to be

dispatched back to Saguieran, where, assured the military officials, they would be safer. They were provided with a cargo truck. Only a handful of these made it.

Along the way, 42 of the residents, including a pregnant woman and six children, were massacred by the local militias, members of the government-organized Civilian Home Defense Force (CDHF) who were believed to be Ilagas. It was not an ambush for the killers drove with them part of the way in a separate vehicle. Some of the valuables looted from those killed were later seen in military camps in the area. The yellow truck used by the killers which belonged to a logging company, was repainted green after the incident.¹⁰

Then NAPOCOR President G. Y. Itchon reported afterwards that one NAPOCOR employee and three workers had been kidnapped, six transmission towers near Marawi had been toppled down, and 27 construction employees of NAPOCOR had been killed and seven others wounded.”¹¹ Secured heavily by a Philippine Army detachment, Agus II looked like a garrison. At the gate stood sandbagged bunker-checkpoint, euphemistically labeled Civilian Assistance Center, where soldiers stopped and searched passing vehicles, including public transports, plying the Iligan-Marawi route.¹²

How do the Maranao people view NAPOCOR? An incident that happened in late 1978 will serve to illustrate this.

The Guimba Incident

On 3 November 1978, 11 Philippine Constabulary soldiers and six workers were killed and four others were wounded in an ambush at Guimba, Marawi City. The group was on its way to restore power line that had been bombed earlier by the MNLF. As a result, innocent civilians were allegedly arrested and maltreated. Hadji Salik Kaluwasan, CHDF head in Marawi City was reportedly killed in the camp of the 25th Infantry Battalion.¹³

The people’s account of the post-ambush incident mentioned a life of peace at Guimba until that day of the ambush. It was Friday and the people were in the mosque for their congregational prayer. The soldiers entered the mosque, rounded up the men who were at the front and more than twenty of them were brought to the camp. Hadji Salik Kaluwasan, the Imam of Guimba, was among them. He was killed at the camp, they said. Soldiers entered and searched the houses. There was plenty of looting. Later, they heard of a plan for either the military or the NAPOCOR to pay them 80,000 pesos in damages.¹⁴

Seven months afterwards, another NAPOCOR truck filled with workers was ambushed, reportedly by MNLF rebels, at Emmi, Marawi City. Twenty-two workers were killed on the spot. The perpetrators took time to cut off the ears of some of those killed. Word spread around later: Their wives would know, why their husband’s ears were taken. These NAPOCOR workers had been marked and remembered for their participation in the looting at Guimba earlier. To the MNLF at that time, the Army and the NAPOCOR were the same. The first was viewed as an armed and uniformed NAPOCOR unit, while the second was seen as an unarmed and un-uniformed AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Unit.

Maranao Opposition to Agus I

SALLAM’s hardline stance at the start was for scrapping Agus I. Located at the mouth of the lake in Marawi City, Agus I serves as an artificial outlet, an addition to the natural one of Agus River. And because of this, it is highly suspect as the additional cause of the lowering of the lake’s water level.

The water level issue has been raised as early as 1978. Between June and November of that year, it was noted that the water level went down by 1.8 masl (meters above sea level). And the first to be affected were those wet rice farmers whose livelihood was directly dependent on the water level. Lower water level means ruined rice paddies. All the lake towns which constitute the majority in Lanao del Sur have their community mosques situated by the lake. They need the water for their pre-prayer ablutions. The lowering of the water level means they have to wade through mud before and after ablution, a situation absolutely unacceptable to a Muslim.¹⁵

The intimate relationship between the people and the lake is affirmed by two Catholic Church officials in Marawi City. Said Bishop Fernando Capalla and Rev. Father Des Hartford: “disturbing the lake’s stability greatly affects the Maranaos’ culture and religion. You touch the water of Lake Lanao, and you practically touch the lives of thousands of Maranao living around the lake.”¹⁶

Besides, the Maranao around the lake feel that the water is their own. They say that they supply the water for the electricity, yet they get nothing from that electricity. The NAPOCOR takes the electricity for the factories in Iligan. Marawi City has no factories. Even electric bills are high.¹⁷

Rev. Hartford points out that “there is a conflict of value system between the Maranao and the lowland people. The Maranao since time immemorial have regarded the lake as the basis of their culture. They do their ablution in the lake, they fish in there, and their farms in the *basak* (rice paddy) are greatly affected. They are very intent on saving the lake. But the people of the lowland regard the power generated from the lake as a source of income and livelihood. They don’t see the destruction of the lake, as long as their needs are met. NAPOCOR and non-Maranao see the lake as a resource to be exploited rather than as a treasure to be cherished and maintained.”¹⁸ The priest expressed his fears that old prejudices and wounds might be rekindled and opened.¹⁹

Since the formation of an independent committee by the Senate Mindanao Affairs Committee, in the work of which SALLAM participated, the latter has softened its opposition. The Committee was composed of engineers from the University of the Philippines, from the Mindanao State University in Marawi City, from the NAPOCOR, and from SALLAM and it was tasked with investigating the feasibility of operating Agus I. One of its 17 recommendations was the construction of a dike at the mouth of Agus River in Marawi City to raise the water level to not lower than 699.15 meters above sea level (masl). The water level used to be an average of 701 masl but went down by two meters recently due to the prolonged dry spell. NAPOCOR President Pablo Malixi was amenable to the idea but he preferred that the level be 698.15 masl instead in order to draw more water for five other plants downstream. He also stressed that NAPOCOR engineers do not consider the dike necessary.

Massive logging operations within the watershed area had also been noted. Governor Liwa Candao of the ARMM, within whose jurisdiction Lanao del Sur now falls, has issued Proclamation No.6 whose intentions are self-explanatory in the title: “Establishing the Lake Lanao Watershed Reservation Area, Delineating Its Boundaries and Providing Measures for Its Protection and Preservation.” The proclamation covered public domain in the 25 out of the 37 towns of Lanao del Sur.²⁰ Everyone hoped that these latest arrangements would stick for the good of all concerned.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 6

20

The McDonaldization of Society

GEORGE RITZER

McDonaldization implies a search for maximum efficiency in increasingly numerous and diverse social settings. *Efficiency* means choosing the optimum means to a given end. Let me clarify this definition. First, the truly optimum means to an end is rarely found. Rather, optimum in this definition implies the attempt to find and use the *best possible* means.

In a McDonaldized society, people rarely search for the best means to an end on their own. Rather, they rely on the optimum means that have been previously discovered and institutionalized in a variety of social settings. Thus, the best means may be part of a technology, written into an organization's rules and regulations, or taught to employees during the process of occupational socialization. It would be inefficient if people always had to discover for themselves the optimum means to ends.

The Fast Food Industry: We Do It All For Them

Although the fast-food restaurant did not create the yearning for efficiency, it has helped turn it into a nearly universal desire. Many sectors of society have had to change in order to operate in the efficient manner demanded by those accustomed to life in the fast lane of the fast-food restaurant.

In the early 1950s, the dawn of the era of the fast-food restaurant, the major alternative to fast food was the home-cooked meal made mostly from ingredients previously purchased at various markets.

But the home-cooked meal was, and still is, a relatively inefficient way to eat. It requires going to the market, preparing the ingredients, cooking the food, eating it, and cleaning up afterward. The restaurant has long been a more efficient alternative in terms of effort.

But restaurants can also be inefficient—it may take several hours to go to a restaurant, consume a meal, and then return home. The desire for more efficient restaurants led to the rise of some of the ancestors of the fast-food restaurants—diners, cafeterias, and early drive-through or drive-in restaurants.

Above all else, Ray Kroc was impressed by the efficiency of the McDonald brothers' operation, as well as the enormous profit potential of such a system applied at a large number of sites. Here is how Kroc described his initial reactions to the McDonald's system:

I was fascinated by the simplicity and effectiveness of the system.

...each step in producing the limited menu was stripped down to its essence and accomplished with a minimum of effort. They sold hamburgers and cheese-burgers only. The burgers were all fried the same way.¹

Kroc and his associates experimented with each component of the hamburger to increase the efficiency of producing and serving it.

For example, they started with only partially sliced buns that arrived in cardboard boxes. The griddle workers had to spend time opening the boxes, separating the buns, slicing them in half, and discarding the leftover paper and cardboard. Eventually, they found that buns sliced completely in half could be used more efficiently. In addition, buns were made efficient by having them separated and shipped in reusable boxes. The meat patty received similar attention. For example, the paper between the patties had to have just the right amount of wax so that the patties would readily slide off the paper and onto the grill. Kroc made it clear that he aimed at greater efficiency:

The purpose of all these refinements, and we never lost sight of it, was to make our griddle man's job easier to do quickly and well. And the other considerations of cost cutting, inventory control, and so forth were important to be sure, but they were secondary to the critical detail of what happened there at the smoking griddle. This was the vital passage of our *assembly-line*, and the product had to flow through it smoothly or the whole plan would falter.²

Getting diners into and out of the fast-food restaurant had also been streamlined. As three observers put it, McDonald's has done "everything to speed the way from secretion to excretion."³ Parking lots adjacent to the restaurant offer readily available parking spots. It's a short walk to the counter, and although there is sometimes a line, food is usually quickly ordered, obtained, and paid for. The highly limited menu makes the diner's choice easy in contrast to the many choices available in other restaurants. With the food obtained, it is but a few steps to a table and the beginning of the "dining experience." Because there is little inducement to linger, the diners generally gather the leftover paper, styrofoam, and plastic, discard them in a nearby trash receptacle, and get back in their cars to drive to the next (often McDonaldized) activity.

Not too many years ago, those in charge of fast-food restaurants discovered that the drive-through window made this whole process far more efficient. McDonald's opened its first drive-through in 1975 in Oklahoma City; within four years, almost half its restaurants had one. Instead of the "laborious" and "inefficient" process of parking the car, walking to the counter, waiting in line, ordering, paying, carrying the food to the table, eating, and disposing of the remnants, the drive-through window offered diners the option of driving to the window (perhaps waiting in a line of cars), ordering, paying, and driving off with the meal. You could eat while driving if you wanted to be even more efficient. The drive-through window is also efficient for the fast-food restaurant. As more and more people use the drive-through window, fewer parking spaces, tables, and employees are needed. Further, consumers take their debris with them as they drive away, thereby eliminating the need for additional trash receptacles and employees to empty those receptacles periodically.

Higher Education: Just Fill in the Box

In the educational system, specifically the university (now being dubbed "McUniversity"⁴), you can find many examples of the pressure for greater efficiency. One is the machine-graded, multiple-choice examination. In a much earlier era, students were examined individually by their professors. This may have been a good way to find out what students knew, but it was highly labor-intensive and inefficient. Later, the essay examination became very popular. While grading a set of essays was more efficient than giving individual oral examinations, it was still relatively inefficient and time-consuming. Enter the multiple-

choice examination, the grading of which was a snap. In fact, graduate assistants could grade it, making it even more efficient for the professor. Now there are computer-graded examinations that maximize efficiency for both professors and graduate assistants.

They even offer advantages to students, such as making it easier to study and limiting the effect of the subjective views of the grader on the grading process.

The multiple-choice examination still left the professor saddled with the inefficient task of composing the necessary sets of questions. Furthermore, at least some of the questions had to be changed each semester because new students were likely to gain possession of old exams. The solution: Textbook companies provided professors with books (free of charge) full of multiple-choice questions to accompany textbooks required for use in large classes. However, the professor still had to retype the questions or have them retyped. Recently, publishers have begun to provide these sets of questions on computer disks. Now all the professor needs to do is select the desired questions and let the printer do the rest. With the great advances in efficiency, professors now can choose to have very little to do with the entire examination process, from question composition to grading.

Publishers have provided other services to make teaching more efficient for those professors who adopt their textbooks. With the adoption of a textbook, a professor may receive many materials with which to fill class hours—lecture outlines, computer simulations, discussion questions, video- tapes, movies, even ideas for guest lecturers and student projects. Professors who choose to use all these devices need do little or nothing on their own for their classes. A highly efficient means of teaching, this approach frees up time for other much more valued activities (by professors, but not students) such as writing and research.

Finally, worth noting is the development of a relatively new type of “service” on college campuses. For a nominal fee, students are provided with lecture notes, from instructors, teaching assistants, and top-notch students, for their courses. No more inefficient note-taking, in fact, no more inefficient class attendance. Students are free to pursue more valuable activities such as poring over arcane journals in the graduate library or watching the “soaps.”

Home Cooking (and Related Phenomena)

Given the efficiency of the fast-food restaurant, the home kitchen has had to grow more efficient or face total extinction. Had the kitchen not grown more efficient, a comedian could have envisioned a time when the kitchen would have been replaced by a large, comfortable telephone lounge used for calling Domino’s for pizza delivery.

One key to the salvation of the kitchen is the microwave oven.⁵ Far more efficient than conventional ovens for preparing a meal, the microwave has streamlined the process of cooking. Microwaves are usually faster than other ovens, and people can also prepare a wider array of foods in them. Perhaps most important, they spawned a number of microwavable foods (including soup, pizza, hamburgers, fried chicken, french fries, and popcorn) that permit the efficient preparation of the fare people usually find in fast-food restaurants. For example, one of the first microwavable foods produced by Hormel was an array of biscuit-based breakfast sandwiches popularized in recent years by many of the fast-food chains, most notably McDonald’s and its Egg McMuffin.⁶ In fact, many food companies now employ people who continually scout fast-food restaurants for new ideas. As one executive put it, “Instead of having a breakfast sandwich at McDonald’s, you can pick one up from the freezer of your grocery store.”⁷ Instead of getting into the car, driving to the restaurant, and returning home, people need only pop the desired foods in the microwave.

Another reason efficiency in the kitchen has not damaged the fast-food business is that fast food offers many advantages over the “home-cooked” microwaved dinner. For one, people can have dinner out rather than just another meal at home. For another, as Stan Luxemburg has pointed out in *Roadside Empires*, McDonald’s offers more than an efficient meal; it offers fun brightly lit, colorful, and attractive settings, garish packaging, special inducements to children, giveaways, contests—in short, it offers a carnival-like atmosphere in which to buy and consume fast food.⁸ Thus, faced with the choice of an efficient meal at home or one in a fast-food restaurant, many people will choose the latter.

The McDonaldization of food preparation and consumption has also reached the booming diet industry. Diet books promising all sorts of short cuts to weight loss are often at the top of the best-seller lists. Losing weight is normally difficult and time-consuming, hence the lure of diet books that promise to make weight loss easier and quicker, that is, more efficient.

For those on a diet, and many people are on more or less perpetual diets, the preparation of low-calorie food has been streamlined. Instead of cooking diet foods from scratch, they may now purchase an array of prepared diet foods in frozen and/or microwavable form. For those who do not wish to go through the inefficient process of eating these diet meals, there are products even more stream-lined such as diet shakes (Slim-Fast, for example) that can be “prepared” and consumed in a matter of seconds.

The issue of dieting points outside the home to the growth of diet centers such as Jenny Craig and Nutri/System. Nutri/System sells dieters, at substantial cost, pre-packaged freeze-dried food. In what is close to the ultimate in streamlined cooking, all the dieter need do is add water. Freeze-dried foods are also efficient for Nutri/System, because they can be efficiently packaged, transported, and stored. Furthermore, the dieter’s periodic visits to a Nutri/System center are efficiently organized. A counselor is allotted ten minutes with each client. During that brief time, the counselor takes the client’s weight, blood pressure, and measurements, asks routine questions, fills out a chart, and devotes whatever time is left to “problem solving.” If the session extends beyond the allotted ten minutes and other clients are waiting, the receptionist will buzz the counselor’s room. Counselors learn their techniques at Nutri/System University where, after a week of training (no inefficient years of matriculation here), they earn certification and an NSU diploma.

Shopping

Shopping has also grown more efficient. The department store obviously is a more efficient place in which to shop than a series of specialty shops dispersed throughout the city or suburbs. The shopping mall increases efficiency by bringing a wide range of department stores and specialty shops under one roof. Kowinski describes the mall as “an extremely efficient and effective selling machine.”⁹ It is cost-efficient for retailers because it is the collection of shops and department stores (“mail synergy”) that brings in throngs of people. And it is efficient for consumers because in one stop they can visit numerous shops, have lunch at a “foodcourt” (likely populated by many fast-food chains), see a movie, have a drink, and go to an exercise or diet center.

The drive for shopping efficiency did not end with the malls. Seven-Eleven and its clones have become drive-up, if not drive-through mini markets. For those who need only a few items, it is far more efficient (albeit more costly) to pull up to a highly streamlined Seven-Eleven than to run to a supermarket.

In recent years, catalogues (e.g., L.L. Bean, Lands' End) have become more popular. They enable people to shop from the comfort of their homes. Still more efficient, though it may lead to many hours in front of the TV, is home-television shopping. A range of products are paraded before viewers, who can purchase them simply by phoning in and conveniently charging their purchases. The latest advance in home shopping is the "scanfone," an at-home phone machine that includes "a pen-sized bar-code scanner, a credit card magnetic-strip reader, and a key pad." The customer merely scans items from a bar-coded catalogue and also scans delivery dates and payment methods. The orders are then electronically relayed to the various stores, businesses, and banks involved.¹⁰ Some mall operators fear that they will ultimately be put out of business because of the greater efficiency of shopping at home.

Entertainment

With the advent of video-tapes and video-rental stores, many people no longer deem it efficient to drive to their local theater to see a movie. Movies can now be viewed, often more than one at a sitting, in people's own dens. Those who wish even greater efficiency can buy one of the new television sets that enables viewers to see a movie while also watching a favorite TV show on an inset on the screen.

The largest video rental franchise in the United States, Blockbuster, predictably "considers itself the McDonald's of the video business."¹¹ However, Blockbuster may already be in danger of replacement by even more efficient alternatives such as the pay-per-view movies offered by many cable companies. Instead of trekking to the video store, people just turn to the proper channel and phone the cable company. New small dishes allow people access to a wider range of video offerings. Now in the experimental stage, video-on-demand systems may some day allow people to order the movies available in video stores from the comfort of their homes. Just as the video store replaced many movie theaters, video stores themselves may soon make way for even more efficient alternatives.

...Travel to exotic foreign locales has also grown more streamlined. The best example of this is the package tour. Take, for example, a thirty-day tour of Europe. To make it efficient, tourists visit only the major locales in Europe. Buses hurtle through cities, allowing tourists to glimpse the maximum number of sites in the time allowed. At particularly interesting or important sights, the bus may slow down or even stop to permit some picture taking. At the most important locales, a brief stopover is planned, there, a visitor can hurry through the site, take a few pictures, buy a souvenir, then hop back on the bus to head to the next attraction. The package tour can be seen as a mechanism that permits the efficient transport of people from one locale to another.

Dehumanization of Customers and Employees

The fast-food restaurant offers its employees a dehumanizing work setting. Said Burger King workers, "A moron could learn this job, it's so easy" and "Any trained monkey could do this job."¹² Workers can use only a small portion of their skills and abilities. This is irrational from the organization's viewpoint, because it could obtain much more from its employees for the money (however negligible) it pays them....

The minimal skill demands of the fast-food restaurant are also irrational from the employee's perspective. Besides not using all their skills, employees are not allowed to think and be creative on the job. This leads to a high level of resentment, job dissatisfaction, alienation, absenteeism, and turnover among those who work in fast-food restaurants.¹³ In fact, the fast-

food industry has the highest turnover rate-approximately 300% a year of any industry in the United States. That means that the average fast-food worker lasts only about four months; the entire work force of the fast-food industry turns over approximately three times a year. The fast-food restaurant also dehumanizes the customer. By eating on a sort of assembly line, the diner is reduced to an automaton made to rush through a meal with little gratification derived from the dining experience or from the food itself. The best that can usually be said is that it is efficient and it is over quickly.

Some customers might even feel as if they are being fed like livestock in a highly rationalized manner. This point was made on TV a number of years ago in a *Saturday Night Live* skit, "Trough and Brew," a parody of a small fast-food chain called "Burger and Brew." In the skit, some young executives learn that a new fast-food restaurant called Trough and Brew has opened, and they decide to try it for lunch. When they enter the restaurant, bibs are tied around their necks. Then, they discover what resembles a pig trough filled with chili and periodically refilled by a waitress scooping new supplies from a bucket. The customers bend over, stick their heads into the trough, and lap up the chili as they move along the trough making high-level business decisions. Every so often they come up for air and lap some beer from the communal "brew basin." After they have finished their "meal" they pay their bills "by the head." Since their faces are smeared with chili, they are literally "hosed off" before they leave the restaurant. The young executives are last seen being herded out of the restaurant, which is being closed for a half-hour so that it can be "hosed down." *Saturday Night Live* was clearly ridiculing the fact that fast-food restaurants tend to treat their customers like lower animals.

Customers are also dehumanized by scripted interactions, and other efforts to make interactions uniform. "Uniformity is incompatible when human interactions are involved. Human interactions that are mass produced may strike consumers as dehumanizing if the routinization is obvious or manipulative if it is not."¹⁴ Dehumanization occurs when prefabricated interactions take the place of authentic human relationships.

Another dehumanizing aspect of fast-food restaurants is that they minimize contact among human beings. For example, the nature of the fast-food restaurant makes the relationships between employees and customers fleeting at best. Because the average employee works part-time and stays only a few months, even the regular customer can rarely develop a personal relationship with him or her. All but gone are the days when one got to know well a waitress at a diner or the short order cook at a local greasy spoon. Few are the places where an employee knows who you are and knows what you are likely to order.

Contact between workers and customers is very short. It takes little time at the counter to order, receive the food, and pay for it. Both employees and customers are likely to feel rushed and to want to move on, customers to their dinner and employees to the next order. There is virtually no time for customer and counterperson to interact in such a context. This is even truer of the drive-through window, where thanks to the speedy service and the physical barriers, the server is even more distant.

These highly impersonal and anonymous relationships are heightened by the training of employees to interact in a staged, scripted, and limited manner with customers. Thus, the customers may feel that they are dealing with automatons rather than with fellow human beings. For their part, the customers are supposed to be, and often are, in a hurry, so they also have little to say to the McDonald's employee. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the reasons the fast-food restaurants succeed is that they are in time with our fast-paced and impersonal society. People in the modern world want to get on with their business without unnecessary personal relationships. The fast-food restaurant gives them precisely what they want.

Not only the relationships between employee and customer, but other potential relationships are limited greatly. Because employees remain on the job for only a few months, satisfying personal relationships among employees are unlikely to develop.

Relationships among customers are largely curtailed as well. Although some McDonald's ads would have people believe otherwise, gone for the most part are the days when people met in the diner or cafeteria for coffee or a meal and lingered to socialize. Fast-food restaurants clearly do not encourage such socializing. If nothing else, the chairs by design make people uncomfortable, so that they move on quickly. The drive-through windows completely eliminate the possibility of interaction with other customers.

Fast-food restaurants also tend to have negative effects on other human relationships. There is, for example, the effect on the family, especially the so-called "family meal." The fast-food restaurant is not conducive to a long, leisurely, conversation-filled dinnertime. Furthermore, as the children grow into their teens, the fast-food restaurant can lead to separate meals as the teens go at one time with their friends, and the parents go at another time. Of course, the drive-through window only serves to reduce further the possibility of a family meal. The family that gobbles its food while driving on to its next stop can hardly enjoy "quality time." Here is the way one journalist describes what is happening to the family meal:

Do families who eat their suppers at the Colonel's, swinging on plastic seats, or however the restaurant is arranged, say grace before picking up a crispy brown chicken leg? Does dad ask junior what he did today as he remembers he forgot the piccalilli and trots through the crowds over to the counter to get some? Does mom find the atmosphere conducive to asking little Mildred about the problems she was having with third conjugation French verbs, or would it matter since otherwise the family might have been at home chomping down precooked frozen food, warmed in the microwave oven and watching "Hollywood Squares"?¹⁵

There is much talk these days about the disintegration of the family, and the fast-food restaurant may well be a crucial contributor to that disintegration. In fact, as implied above, dinners at home may now not be much different from meals at the fast-food restaurant. Families tended to stop having lunch together by the 1940s and breakfast together by the 1950s. Today, the family dinner is following the same route. Even at home, the meal will probably not be what it once was. Following the fast-food model, people have ever more options to "graze," "refuel" nibble on this, or snack on that, rather than sit down at a formal meal. Also, because it may seem inefficient to do nothing but just eat, families are likely to watch television while they are eating. Furthermore, the din, to say nothing of the lure, of dinner time TV programs such as *Wheel of Fortune* is likely to make it difficult for family members to interact with one another.

A key technology in the destruction of the family meal is the microwave oven and the vast array of microwavable foods it helped generate.¹⁶ More than 70% of American households have a microwave oven. A *Wall Street Journal* poll indicated that Americans consider the microwave their favorite household product. In fact, the microwave in a McDonaldizing society is seen as an advance over the fast-food restaurant. Said one consumer researcher, "It has made even fast-food restaurants not seem fast because at home you don't have to wait in line." As a general rule, consumers demand meals that take no more than ten minutes to microwave, whereas in the past people were more often willing to spend a half hour or even an hour cooking dinner. This emphasis on speed has, of course, brought with it lower quality, but people do not seem to mind this loss: "We're just not as critical of food as we used to be."¹⁷

Homogenization

Another dehumanizing effect of the fast-food restaurant is that it has increased homogenization in the United States and, increasingly, throughout the world. This decline in diversity is manifest in the extension of the fast-food model to all sorts of ethnic foods. People are hard-pressed to find an authentically different meal in an ethnic fast-food chain. The food has been rationalized and compromised so that it is acceptable to the tastes of virtually all diners. Paradoxically, while fast-food restaurants have permitted far more people to experience ethnic food, the food that they eat has lost many of its distinguishing characteristics. The settings are also all modeled after McDonald's in one way or another.

The expansion of these franchises across the United States means that people find little difference between regions and between cities. Tourists find more familiarity and less diversity as they travel around the nation, and this is increasingly true on a global scale. Exotic settings are increasingly likely sites for American fast-food chains. The McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken in Beijing are but two examples of this. The spread of American and indigenous fast food throughout much of the world causes less and less diversity from one setting to another. The human craving for new and diverse experiences is being limited, if not progressively destroyed, by the spread of fast-food restaurants. The craving for diversity is being supplanted by the desire for uniformity and predictability.

Conclusion

Although I have emphasized the irresistibility of McDonaldization, my fondest hope is that I am wrong. I hope that people can resist McDonaldization and create instead a more reasonable, more human world.

A few years ago, McDonald was sued by the famous French chef, Paul Bocuse, for using his picture on a poster without his permission. Enraged, Bocuse said, "How can I be seen promoting this tasteless, boneless food in which everything is soft." Nevertheless, Bocuse seemed to acknowledge the inevitability of McDonaldization: "There's a need for this kind of thing... and trying to get rid of it seems to me to be as futile as trying to get rid of the prostitutes in the Bois de Bologna."¹⁸ Lo and behold, two weeks later, it was announced that the Paris police had cracked down on prostitution in the Bois de Bologne. Said a police spokesperson, "There are none left." Thus, just as chef Bocuse was wrong about the prostitutes, perhaps I am wrong about the irresistibility of McDonaldization. Yet, before I grow overly optimistic, it should be noted that "everyone knows that the prostitutes will be back as soon as the operation is over. In the spring, police predict, there will be even more than before."¹⁹ Similarly, it remains likely that no matter how intense the opposition, the future will bring with it more rather than less McDonaldization. Even if this proves to be the case, it is my hope that you will follow some of the advice outlined in this chapter for protesting and mitigating the worst effects of McDonaldization. Faced with Max Weber's iron cage and image of a future dominated by the polar night of icy darkness and hardness, I hope that if nothing else, you will consider the words of the poet Dylan Thomas: "Do not go gentle into that good night. Rage, rage against the dying of the light."

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21

The Tragedy of the Commons

GARRET HARDIN

At the end of a thoughtful article on the future of nuclear war, Wiesner and York (1) concluded that: "Both sides in the arms race are... confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. *It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution.* If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation."

I would like to focus your attention not on the subject of the article (national security in a nuclear world) but on the kind of conclusion they reached, namely that there is no technical solution to the problem. An implicit and almost universal assumption of discussions published in professional and semipopular scientific journals is that the problem under discussion has a technical solution. A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality.

In our day (though not in earlier times) technical solutions are always welcome. Because of previous failures in prophecy, it takes courage to assert that a desired technical solution is not possible. Wiesner and York exhibited this courage; publishing in a science journal, they insisted that the solution to the problem was not to be found in the natural sciences. They cautiously qualified their statement with the phrase, "It is our considered professional judgment..." Whether they were right or not is not the concern of the present article. Rather, the concern here is with the important concept of a class of human problems which can be called "no technical solution problems," and more specifically, with the identification and discussion of one of these.

It is easy to show that the class is not a null class. Recall the game of tick-tack-toe. Consider the problem, "How can I win the game of tick-tack-toe?" It is well known that I cannot, if I assume (in keeping with the conventions of game theory) that my opponent understands the game perfectly. Put another way, there is no "technical solution" to the problem. I can win only by giving a radical meaning to the word "win." I can hit my opponent over the head; or I can falsify the records. Every way in which I "win" involves, in some sense, an abandonment of the game, as we intuitively understand it. (I can also, of course, openly abandon the game or refuse to play it. This is what most adults do.)

The class of "No technical solution problems" has members. My thesis is that the "population problem," as conventionally conceived, is a member of this class. How it is conventionally conceived needs some comment. It is fair to say that most people who anguish over the population problem are trying to find a way to avoid the evils of overpopulation without relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy. They think that farming the seas or developing new strains of wheat will solve the problem - technologically. I try to show here that the solution they seek cannot be found. The population problem cannot be solved in a technical way, any more than can the problem of winning the game of tick-tack-toe.

What Shall We Maximize?

Population, as Malthus said, naturally tends to grow “geometrically,” or, as we would now say, exponentially. In a finite world this means that the per-capita share of the world’s goods must decrease. Is ours a finite world?

A fair defense can be put forward for the view that the world is infinite; or that we do not know that it is not. But, in terms of the practical problems that we must face in the next few generations with the foreseeable technology, it is clear that we will greatly increase human misery if we do not, during the immediate future, assume that the world available to the terrestrial human population is finite. “Space” is no escape (2).

A finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth must eventually equal zero. (The case of perpetual wide fluctuations above and below zero is a trivial variant that need not be discussed.) When this condition is met, what will be the situation of mankind? Specifically, can Bentham’s goal of “the greatest good for the greatest number” be realized?

No - for two reasons, each sufficient by itself. The first is a theoretical one. It is not mathematically possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time. This was clearly stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (3), but the principle is implicit in the theory of partial differential equations, dating back at least to D’Alembert (1717- 1783).

The second reason springs directly from biological facts. To live, any organism must have a source of energy (for example, food). This energy is utilized for two purposes: mere maintenance and work. For man maintenance of life requires about 1600 kilocalories a day (“maintenance calories”). Anything that he does over and above merely staying alive will be defined as work, and is supported by “work calories” which he takes in. Work calories are used not only for what we call work in common speech; they are also required for all forms of enjoyment, from swimming and automobile racing to playing music and writing poetry. If our goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do: We must make the work calories per person approach as close to zero as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no sports, no music, no literature, no art...I think that everyone will grant, without argument or proof, that maximizing population does not maximize goods. Bentham’s goal is impossible.

In reaching this conclusion I have made the usual assumption that it is the acquisition of energy that is the problem. The appearance of atomic energy has led some to question this assumption. However, given an infinite source of energy, population growth still produces an inescapable problem. The problem of the acquisition of energy is replaced by the problem of its dissipation, as J. H. Fremlin has so wittily shown (4). The arithmetic signs in the analysis are, as it were, reversed; but Bentham’s goal is unobtainable.

The optimum population is, then, less than the maximum. The difficulty of defining the optimum is enormous; so far as I know, no one has seriously tackled this problem. Reaching an acceptable and stable solution will surely require more than one generation of hard analytical work and much persuasion.

We want the maximum good per person; but what is good? To one person it is wilderness, to another it is ski lodges for thousands. To one it is estuaries to nourish ducks for hunters to shoot; to another it is factory land. Comparing one good with another is, we usually say, impossible because goods are incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared.

Theoretically this may be true; but in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a criterion of judgment and a system of weighting are needed. In nature the criterion is survival. Is it better for a species to be small and hideable, or large and powerful? Natural selection commensurates the incommensurables. The compromise achieved depends on a natural weighting of the values of the variables.

Man must imitate this process. There is no doubt that in fact he already does, but unconsciously. It is when the hidden decisions are made explicit that the arguments begin. The problem for the years ahead is to work out an acceptable theory of weighting. Synergistic effects, nonlinear variation, and difficulties in discounting the future make the intellectual problem difficult, but not (in principle) insoluble.

Has any cultural group solved this practical problem at the present time, even on an intuitive level? One simple fact proves that none has: there is no prosperous population in the world today that has, and has had for some time, a growth rate of zero. Any people that has intuitively identified its optimum point will soon reach it, after which its growth rate becomes and remains zero.

Of course, a positive growth rate might be taken as evidence that a population is below its optimum. However, by any reasonable standards, the most rapidly growing populations on earth today are (in general) the most miserable. This association (which need not be invariable) casts doubt on the optimistic assumption that the positive growth rate of a population is evidence that it has yet to reach its optimum.

We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicitly exorcise the spirit of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography. In economic affairs, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) popularized the “invisible hand,” the idea that an individual who “intends only his own gain,” is, as it were, “led by an invisible hand to promote...the public interest (5).” Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine our individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible.

Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons

The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first sketched in a little-known pamphlet (6) in 1833 by a mathematical amateur named William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852). We may well call it “the tragedy of the commons,” using the word “tragedy” as the philosopher Whitehead used it (7): “The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things.” He then goes on to say, “This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama.”

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land.

Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility *to me* of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.

1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1.
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision making herdsman is only a fraction of - 1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Some would say that this is a platitude. Would that it were! In a sense, it was learned thousands of years ago, but natural selection favors the forces of psychological denial (8). The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers. Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing, but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed.

A simple incident that occurred a few years ago in Leominster, Massachusetts shows how perishable the knowledge is. During the Christmas shopping season the parking meters downtown were covered with plastic bags that bore tags reading: "Do not open until after Christmas. Free parking courtesy of the mayor and city council." In other words, facing the prospect of an increased demand for already scarce space, the city fathers reinstituted the system of the commons. (Cynically, we suspect that they gained more votes than they lost by this retrogressive act.)

In an approximate way, the logic of the commons has been understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private property in real estate. But it is understood mostly only in special cases which are not sufficiently generalized. Even at this late date, cattlemen leasing national land on the Western ranges demonstrate no more than an ambivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring federal authorities to increase the head count to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-dominance. Likewise, the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas." Professing to believe in the "inexhaustible resources of the oceans," they bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction (9).

The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks themselves are limited in extent, there is only one Yosemite Valley whereas population seems to grow without limit. The

values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone.

What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all objectionable. But we must choose-or acquiesce in the destruction of the commons that we call our National Parks.

Pollution

In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in - sewage, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air; and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of sight. The calculations of utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free enterprisers.

The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it. But the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated. We have not progressed as far with the solution of this problem as we have with the first. Indeed, our particular concept of private property, which deters us from exhausting the positive resources of the earth, favors pollution. The owner of a factory on the bank of a stream whose property extends to the middle of the stream, often has difficulty seeing why it is not his natural right to muddy the waters flowing past his door. The law, always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly perceived aspect of the commons.

The pollution problem is a consequence of population. It did not much matter how a lonely American frontiersman disposed of his waste. "Flowing water purifies itself every ten miles," my grandfather used to say, and the myth was near enough to the truth when he was a boy, for there were not too many people. But as population became denser, the natural chemical and biological recycling processes became overloaded, calling for a redefinition of property rights.

How to Legislate Temperance?

Analysis of the pollution problem as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognized principle of morality, namely: *the morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time it is performed* (10). Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, because there is no public; the same behavior in a metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty years ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not in any important sense being wasteful. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior.

In passing, it is worth noting that the morality of an act cannot be determined from a photograph. One does not know whether a man killing an elephant or setting fire to the grassland is harming others until one knows the total system in which his act appears. "One picture is worth

a thousand words,” said an ancient Chinese; but it may take 10,000 words to validate it. It is as tempting to ecologists as it is to reformers in general to try to persuade others by way of the photographic shortcut. But the essence of an argument cannot be photographed; it must be presented rationally in words.

That morality is system-sensitive escaped the attention of most codifiers of ethics in the past. “Thou shalt not...” is the form of traditional ethical directives which make no allowance for particular circumstances. The laws of our society follow the pattern of ancient ethics, and therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable world. Our epicyclic solution is to augment statutory law with administrative law. Since it is practically impossible to spell out all the conditions under which it is safe to burn trash in the back yard or to run an automobile without smog control, by law we delegate the details to bureaus. The result is administrative law, which is rightly feared for an ancient reason, *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who shall watch the watchers themselves? John Adams said that we must have a “government of laws and not men.” Bureau administrators, trying to evaluate the morality of acts in the total system, are singularly liable to corruption, producing a government by men, not laws.

Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to enforce); but how do we legislate temperance? Experience indicates that it can be accomplished best through the mediation of administrative law. We limit possibilities unnecessarily if we suppose that the sentiment of *Quis custodiet* denies us the use of administrative law. We should rather retain the phrase as a perpetual reminder of fearful dangers we cannot avoid. The great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both the custodians and the corrective feedbacks.

Freedom to Breed is Intolerable

The tragedy of the commons is involved in population problems in another way. In a world governed solely by the principle of “dog eat dog” if indeed there ever was such a world, how many children a family had would not be a matter of public concern. Parents who bred too exuberantly would leave fewer descendants, not more, because they would be unable to care adequately for their children. David Lack and others have found that such a negative feedback demonstrably controls the fecundity of birds (11). But men are not birds, and have not acted like them for millennia, at least.

If each human family were dependent only on its own resources, *if* the children of improvident parents starved to death, *if* thus, over breeding brought its own “punishment” to the germ line *then* there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families. But our society is deeply committed to the welfare state (12), and hence is confronted with another aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

In a welfare state, how shall we deal with the family, the religion, the race, or the class (or indeed any distinguishable and cohesive group) that adopts over breeding as a policy to secure its own aggrandizement (13)? To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action.

Unfortunately this is just the course of action that is being pursued by the United Nations. In late 1967, some thirty nations agreed to the following (14):

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the

family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.

It is painful to have to deny categorically the validity of this right; denying it, one feels as uncomfortable as a resident of Salem, Massachusetts, who denied the reality of witches in the seventeenth century. At the present time, in liberal quarters, something like a taboo acts to inhibit criticism of the United Nations. There is a feeling that the United Nations is “our last and best hope,” that we shouldn’t find fault with it; we shouldn’t play into the hands of the archconservatives. However, let us not forget what Robert Louis Stevenson said: “The truth that is suppressed by friends is the readiest weapon of the enemy.” If we love the truth we must openly deny the validity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though it is promoted by the United Nations. We should also join with Kingsley Davis (15) in attempting to get Planned Parenthood-World Population to see the error of its ways in embracing the same tragic ideal.

Conscience is Self-Eliminating

It is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an appeal to conscience. Charles Galton Darwin made this point when he spoke on the centennial of the publication of his grandfather’s great book. The argument is straightforward and Darwinian.

People vary. Confronted with appeals to limit breeding, some people will undoubtedly respond to the plea more than others. Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences. The differences will be accentuated, generation by generation.

In C. G. Darwin’s words: “It may well be that it would take hundreds of generations for the progenitive instinct to develop in this way, but if it should do so, nature would have taken her revenge, and the variety *Homo contraciapiens* would become extinct and would be replaced by the variety *Homo progenitivus* (16).

The argument assumes that conscience or the desire for children (no matter which) is hereditary, but hereditary only in the most general formal sense. The result will be the same whether the attitude is transmitted through germ cells, or exosomatically, to use A. J. Lotka’s term. (If one denies the latter possibility as well as the former, then what’s the point of education?) The argument has here been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good by means of his conscience. To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race.

Pathogenic Effects of Conscience

The long-term disadvantage of an appeal to conscience should be enough to condemn it; but has serious short-term disadvantages as well. If we ask a man who is exploiting a commons to desist “in the name of conscience,” what are we saying to him? What does he hear? Not only at the moment but also in the wee small hours of the night when, half asleep, he remembers not merely the words we used but also the nonverbal communication cues we gave him unawares? Sooner or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has received two communications, and that they are contradictory: (i) (intended communication) “If you don’t do as we ask, we will openly condemn you for not acting like a responsible citizen”; (ii) (the unintended communication) “If you *do* behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons.”

Every man then is caught in what Bateson has called a “double bind.” Bateson and his co-workers have made a plausible case for viewing the double bind as an important causative factor in the genesis of schizophrenia (17). The double bind may not always be so damaging, but it always endangers the mental health of anyone to whom it is applied. “A bad conscience,” said Nietzsche, “is a kind of illness.”

To conjure up a conscience in others is tempting to anyone who wishes to extend his control beyond the legal limits. Leaders at the highest level succumb to this temptation. Has any President during the past generation failed to call on labor unions to moderate voluntarily their demands for higher wages, or to steel companies to honor voluntary guidelines on prices? I can recall none. The rhetoric used on such occasions is designed to produce feelings of guilt in noncooperators.

For centuries it was assumed without proof that guilt was a valuable, perhaps even an indispensable, ingredient of the civilized life. Now, in this post-Freudian world, we doubt it.

Paul Goodman speaks from the modern point of view when he says: “No good has ever come from feeling guilty, neither intelligence, policy, nor compassion. The guilty do not pay attention to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests, which might make sense, but to their anxieties” (18).

One does not have to be a professional psychiatrist to see the consequences of anxiety. We in the Western world are just emerging from a dreadful two centuries long Dark Ages of Eros that was sustained partly by prohibition laws, but perhaps more effectively by the anxiety-generating mechanisms of education. Alex Comfort has told the story well in *The Anxiety Makers* (19); it is not a pretty one.

Since proof is difficult, we may even concede that the results of anxiety may sometimes, from certain points of view, be desirable. The larger question we should ask is whether, as a matter of policy, we should ever encourage the use of a technique the tendency (if not the intention) of which is psychologically pathogenic. We hear much talk these days of responsible parenthood; the coupled words are incorporated into the titles of some organizations devoted to birth control. Some people have proposed massive propaganda campaigns to instill responsibility into the nation’s (or the world’s) breeders. But what is the meaning of the word conscience? When we use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest? Responsibility is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial *quid pro quo*. It is an attempt to get something for nothing.

If the word responsibility is to be used at all, I suggest that it be in the sense Charles Frankel uses it (20). “Responsibility,” says this philosopher, “is the product of definite social arrangements.” Notice that Frankel calls for social arrangements not propaganda.

Mutual Coercion Mutually Agreed Upon

The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort. Consider bank robbing. The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank were a commons. How do we prevent such action? Certainly not by trying to control his behavior solely by a verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility. Rather than rely on propaganda we follow Frankel’s lead and insist that a bank is not a commons; we seek the definite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a commons. That we thereby infringe on the freedom of would-be robbers we neither deny nor regret.

The morality of bank robbing is particularly easy to understand because we accept complete prohibition of this activity. We are willing to say, “Thou shalt not rob banks,” without providing for exceptions. But temperance also can be created by coercion. Taxing is a good coercive device. To keep downtown shoppers temperate in their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short periods, and traffic fines for longer ones. We need not actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we need merely make it increasingly expensive for him to do so. Not prohibition, but carefully biased options are what we offer him. A Madison Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the greater candor of the word coercion.

Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not forever be so. As with the four-letter words, its dirtiness can be cleansed away by exposure to the light, by saying it over and over without apology or embarrassment. To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.

To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we enjoy it. Who enjoys taxes? We all grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the commons.

An alternative to the commons need not be perfectly just to be preferable. With real estate and other material goods, the alternative we have chosen is the institution of private property coupled with legal inheritance. Is this system perfectly just? As a genetically trained biologist I deny that it is. It seems to me that, if there are to be differences in individual inheritance, legal possession should be perfectly correlated with biological inheritance that those who are biologically more fit to be the custodians of property and power should legally inherit more. But genetic recombination continually makes a mockery of the doctrine of “like father, like son” implicit in our laws of legal inheritance. An idiot can inherit millions, and a trust fund can keep his estate intact. We must admit that our legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.

It is one of the peculiarities of the warfare between reform and the status quo that it is thoughtlessly governed by a double standard. Whenever a reform measure is proposed it is often defeated when its opponents triumphantly discover a flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis has pointed out (21), worshipers of the status quo sometimes imply that no reform is possible without unanimous agreement, an implication contrary to historical fact. As nearly as I can make out, automatic rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious assumptions: (i) that the status quo is perfect; or (ii) that the choice we face is between reform and no action; if the proposed reform is imperfect, we presumably should take no action at all, while we wait for a perfect proposal.

But we can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of years is also action. It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its discoverable advantages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for our lack of experience. On the basis of such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable.

Recognition of Necessity

Perhaps the simplest summary of this analysis of man's population problems is this: the commons, if justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-population density. As the human population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.

First we abandoned the commons in food gathering, enclosing farm land and restricting pastures and hunting and fishing areas. These restrictions are still not complete throughout the world.

Somewhat later we saw that the commons as a place for waste disposal would also have to be abandoned. Restrictions on the disposal of domestic sewage are widely accepted in the Western world; we are still struggling to close the commons to pollution by automobiles, factories, insecticide sprayers, fertilizing operations, and atomic energy installations.

In a still more embryonic state is our recognition of the evils of the commons in matters of pleasure. There is almost no restriction on the propagation of sound waves in the public medium. The shopping public is assaulted with mindless music, without its consent. Our government has paid out billions of dollars to create a supersonic transport which would disturb 50,000 people for every one person whisked from coast to coast 3 hours faster. Advertisers muddy the airwaves of radio and television and pollute the view of travelers. We are a long way from outlawing the commons in matters of pleasure. Is this because our Puritan inheritance makes us view pleasure as something of a sin, and pain (that is, the pollution of advertising) as the sign of virtue?

Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody's personal liberty. Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a loss. It is the newly proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of "rights" and "freedom" fill the air. But what does "freedom" mean? When men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so. Individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other goals. I believe it was Hegel who said, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity."

The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding. No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all. At the moment, to avoid hard decisions many of us are tempted to propagandize for conscience and responsible parenthood. The temptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the short.

The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. "Freedom is the recognition of necessity" and it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

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22 Social Movements

CHARLES TILLY & SIDNEY TARROW

Not all episodes of contention constitute social movements, and not all movements endure. Remember the definition of the *social movement* previous chapters: a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities. The first episode we examine in this chapter—Poland in 1956—shows that contention can be widespread and threatening to its regime but fail to survive repression and disorganization. The second episode—Poland’s Solidarity in 1980—provides a key by introducing the crucial distinction between social movement bases and social movement campaigns. The shape of institutions and regimes always affects movements. Our third episode shows how the American women’s movement interacted with American institutions. We close the chapter with observations on what happens to social movements after their major campaigns end.

Poland’s 1956

The year 1956 was a bad one for the Soviet empire that had run East-Central Europe since the end of World War II. In 1953, Soviet leader Josef Stalin died. The disappearance of the longtime dictator of the USSR left a void that was filled by an unstable “troika” of Communist Party bosses. Nikita Khrushchev was one of them. When Khrushchev emerged at the top of the heap, he tried to consolidate his power by attacking Stalinism. In a dramatic “secret speech” to the delegates of the Twentieth Communist Party Congress, Khrushchev enumerated Stalin’s crimes. To underscore how different his own rule would be, Khrushchev called for more pluralism within the party and the Soviet bloc.

Announcing Stalin’s crimes at a meeting attended by non-Soviet Communist elites was actually a strategy of upward scale shift. If it percolated through the international Communist movement, it would be harder for Khrushchev’s Stalinist enemies in the USSR to suppress. Member parties’ reactions ranged widely. They ran from rejection in China and uneasy quiet in France, to the embrace of pluralism in Italy, and to an outright revolt in Hungary. More than that, the speech divided many Communist parties internally. That helped to open new and wider opportunities for dissent among the weak and divided oppositions in East-Central Europe, just as it threatened the authoritarian traditions of the ruling parties of these countries.

This combination of opportunity and threat promoted explosions of contentious episodes across the Soviet bloc’s restive populations. The tragic Hungarian revolution of 1956 attracted the most attention in the West. Hungary was the most “liberal” Communist state in Eastern Europe, and its reform Communists used Khrushchev’s secret speech as an opportunity to move gingerly toward a more pluralistic system of government. Even this action was too much for the Soviet Union, which brought tanks into the center of Budapest and smothered the sparks of reform.

Khrushchev’s secret speech exacerbated existing internal conflicts between reformers and Stalinists in the Polish Communist Party, the PZPR. Disunity deepened when the relatively liberal Warsaw Party Committee circulated the speech both in Poland and in the West (Osa2003b: 29). With Stalinists in the leadership thrown off balance, reformers seized the advantage to increase the powers of parliament, replace Stalinist officials, and rehabilitate reform Communist

Wladislaw Gomulka. Gomulka soon emerged as party secretary. Divisions within the Bloc and the PZPR led to an opening for dissident groups—a classical case of the opening of political opportunities. “In short,” concludes Maryjane Osa (2003b), “de-Stalinization in Poland created an opening for political mobilization” (29–30).

Contention broke out locally in June. A group of workers from the Cygielski factory in Poznan sent a delegation to Warsaw to complain about their working conditions. When the delegation received a runaround in Warsaw and police detained them on their return, angry coworkers organized a march to Poznan’s city center. As other workers, students, and local citizens joined them, clashes with authorities ensued. When some of the demonstrators stole arms and stormed party headquarters, the party responded by sending in the troops. But Poland’s protest episode in 1956 had no more success than Hungary’s revolt. Faced by repression and lacking a solid basis in society, it rose and fell rapidly. Though it raised the hopes of opponents of Communism in Poland and beyond, it lacked the bases for a sustained social movement.

Osa’s study of oppositional networks in Poland supports this conclusion. In the period just before 1956, she could identify only three organizations with a significant presence in what she calls “the oppositional domain” (2003b: 45–47). Encouraged by Khrushchev’s call for pluralism and by the divisions in the PZPR, Catholics, intellectuals, radical youth, and secular left-wing reformers in 1956 began to organize. The events of 1956–1957 expanded the domain of independent Polish groups fivefold, both increasing the number of active organizations and creating new links among them. But in the conditions of Cold War Poland, such a dense network of organizations couldn’t endure, and demobilization soon set in.

In response to the flowering of oppositional groups in 1956–1957, Communist authorities employed a combination of repression and reform: repression of the Poznan workers and reform inside the party (Osa 2003b: 38–39). By 1960, Poles had returned to the state of surly but largely silent dissent characteristic of the pre-1956 period (Osa 2003b: 55). As one wit put it, “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” By the late 1950s, most of the organizations created in the wake of the 1956 events had disappeared from Osa’s network maps. No sustained social movement formed in response to the events of 1956.

Social Movement Bases and Social Movement Campaigns

Why begin a chapter on social movements by recalling a protest wave that failed to create a sustained movement? The story of Poland’s response to Khrushchev’s “secret speech” tells us a number of things.

First, it shows that in authoritarian regimes, social movements are hard to construct, even when contention is widespread. This would change as the regime weakened and new bases for contention appeared. It also shows how, even in authoritarian regimes, political opportunities grow out of the interaction between contentious and institutional politics. Conflicts and reforms within the ruling party triggered both contention and new forms of organization, which in turn led to grudging reform within the regime and repression against its enemies.

Third, despite its particular properties, Poland in 1956 demonstrates many of the mechanisms of mobilization and demobilization: response to the opening of opportunities, innovation with different performances, radicalization in the course of the mobilization, and the repression of challengers. But this combination of mechanisms was not sufficient to produce a social movement.

Why not? In this chapter, we return to a distinction introduced in chapter 1 that will help us to understand the dynamics of social movements both in Poland and wherever they occur: the distinction between a social movement base and a social movement campaign.

- A *social movement base* consists of movement organizations, networks, participants, and the accumulated cultural artifacts, memories, and traditions that contribute to social movement campaigns.
- A *social movement campaign* is a sustained challenge to power holders, in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders, by means of concerted public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment, using such means as public meetings, demonstrations, petitions, and press releases.
- Poland in 1956 revealed a courageous campaign against state socialism, but there was very little basis on which to construct an enduring social movement.

Some scholars use the term *social movement* to cover most or all of the overlap between contention and collective action, whether it happens in politics or some other arena. In popular usage, it often describes all major changes in society and culture, including scientific, intellectual, and cultural movements (Frickel and Gross 2005). But for purposes of explanation, expansion of the term *social movements* to embrace most or all of contentious politics has three serious drawbacks.

First, such broad definitions make systematic comparison across types of contention difficult. In order to describe and explain contentious politics adequately, we need to identify the special properties of revolutions, military coups, peasant revolts, industrial conflict, and social movements before discovering what they have in common.

Second, so broad a definition makes it difficult to examine transitions between different forms of contention. The conditions that lead an isolated protest to become a social movement are impossible to determine if we raise the umbrella label “social movement” over both. Conversely, we can only understand the failure of contentious episodes like the prostitutes’ protest we saw in the last chapter or the failure of the 1956 events in Poland to generate a sustained movement if we begin with clear boundaries around the concept of movements.

Third, such a broad definition obscures the difference between the bases on which contentious politics builds and the campaigns that launch those politics. While there is a general correlation between the existence of social movement bases and the strength and duration of a campaign, the transition from bases to campaigns is not automatic. It requires the triggering of the sorts of mechanisms and processes we have been presenting in this book.

Remember the British antislavery campaign with which the book began? That campaign built on bases ranging from reformist religious groups—especially the Quakers—to the local newspapers that popularized the cause, to manufacturing towns like Manchester, to influential elites and members of Parliament. But the abolitionists’ campaign depended on Clarkson’s writing an essay on slavery, deciding to commit his life to its demise, and forging ties with the Quakers. It also depended on interactions among campaigners, their targets, and influential third parties.

While movement bases tell us when a social movement is possible, a movement campaign is claim making *in motion*. Our distinction between social movement bases and social movement campaigns helps us to sort out the organizations, networks, participants, and traditions

that makeup a social movement and constitute a movement campaign. It helps to understand why Poland's struggles of 1980, unlike those of 1956, produced a successful social movement.

From Poznan to Solidarity

In the summer of 1980, a strike broke out at the Lenin shipyard in the Baltic port of Gdansk. Like previous outbreaks, it began over largely economic issues. Like other episodes, it escalated to a conflict over the right of the workers to form an independent union (Laba 1991). It also triggered the familiar combination of repression and compromise that Polish authorities had used successfully since 1956 to stalemate, divide, and repress the workers. But, unlike these largely local events, it spread across the country rapidly, paralyzed the government temporarily, led to the recognition of a free trade union, and, ultimately, brought an end to state socialism in East-Central Europe.

The Solidarity strike of 1980 differed from previous Polish episodes of contention in four main ways. First, it enjoyed the certification of the country's most authoritative institution, the Catholic Church. The strike's leaders built an explicit linkage between Poland's national/Catholic heritage and the material demands of workers. Not only had the Polish pope, John Paul II, recently visited the country, but the organizers self-consciously merged Catholic symbols with claims for workers' rights (Kubik 1994). Second, rapid diffusion moved claim making outward from Gdansk, and a shift in scale upward to the national level occurred. The strike at the Lenin shipyard spread not only to other factories along the Baltic coast but also to industrial centers around the country and into Poland's vast peasant population. In fact, when the shipyard workers voted to accept a management proposal, delegates on the interfactory committee from outside the factory convinced them to hold fast. The rapidity of diffusion and the organization of a solidarity base around the strike center in Gdansk rapidly lifted the scale of the conflict into a national struggle.

Third, repression was more contained in 1980 than in 1956. Polish authorities offered the usual compromises and employed standard divide-and-conquer tactics. But, much to the frustration of Poland's "fraternal" allies

in the Soviet Union, their Polish allies applied only limited repression. This happened in part because the strike paralyzed many different parts of Polish society at once—including parts of the state apparatus—but also because of Poland's growing ties with Western bankers. The




Figure 22.1. Oppositional Networks in Poland, 1980

Source: Osa (2003a: 99).

government feared that sending tanks in to suppress the strikers would lead to the government's loss of credits from the West.

Fourth, more than anything, Solidarity's success resulted from expansion of the oppositional domain—its social movement base—in the years after 1956. Since that episode, the oppositional domain had become denser, more diverse, and more centralized—with a few key “nodes” at the heart of a broader map of independent groups. These groups did not start the Gdansk strike or spread the strike to other industrial centers. Many of them, under the rubric of “building civil society,” explicitly denied the desire to attack the state (Ost 1990), which helped to protect them from repression. But in 1980, they were ready to swing into action in response to the strike, diffusing it, certifying it, and raising its scale to the national level. Figure 22.1, which reproduces Osa's (2003a) findings, maps the extensive oppositional bases in Poland at the time of the Solidarity strike in 1980.

Do not attempt to memorize the groups in Figure 22.1. Use the figure to see how dense the number of Polish oppositional groups and their connections had become by 1980, even in the stifling atmosphere of an authoritarian polity. Osa's corresponding map from 1956, not shown here, displays much less density with many fewer connections. Her 1980 map reveals that when Solidarity emerged on the scene in 1980, it could connect to a dense *social base* of groups and organizations.

Since the 1970s, many social scientists have recognized the importance of social networks in triggering collective action (Diani 1995, 2015; Diani and McAdam 2003). In settings as diverse as the 1848 revolution in Paris (Gould 1995), Republican and Communist China (Perry 1993; Zhao 1998), the Italian environmental movement (Diani 1995), post-1960s America (McAdam 1988, 1999), and the transnational climate change network (Hadden 2015:201), networks have been shown to be the crucial building blocks of social movements. If the Solidarity strike in Gdansk triggered a national movement in 1980 and not in 1956, it was largely because, in the intervening years, a broad base of oppositional groups provided its leaders with a social movement base on which to build.

Note three specific factors that Osa's figure reveals. First, by 1980, workers' and farmers' groups belonged to the oppositional base. This gave the opposition a foothold in the productive trenches of Polish society and threatened the mainsprings of the Communist economy. Second, a civic group, KOR (the Worker's Defense Committee), occupied a central position in the base, with brokerage ties to other civic groups, workers, nationalists, and mainstream Catholics (Bernhard 1993). Third, in the years since 1956, and especially following the celebration of the Polish “Great Novena” in the 1960s (Osa 2003b: ch. 2), a dense base of Catholic organizations had formed. In heavily Catholic Poland, these groups helped to certify the opposition in many conservative sectors of Polish society.

The deep and broad social bases of the campaign that erupted in 1980 became visible when the government declared martial law in 1981 and arrested Solidarity's leaders. Unlike the situation after 1956, oppositional groups went underground but did not disappear. Even after the crackdown, underground Solidarity activists were able to use the postal system to diffuse their messages. The opposition base continued to expand (Osa 2003b: 163–165). By 1989, Solidarity was strong enough to mount a new wave of strikes and defeat the ruling party in a national election, bringing Poland into the post-Communist age. Poland in the early 1980s produced a social movement campaign in which many of our familiar mechanisms and processes came together:

- *Social appropriation*: Solidarity built on the country's most legitimate and most powerful institution—the Catholic Church.

- The organizers *certified* their campaign through identification with Catholic symbols and with the memory of the “martyrdom” of victims of past episodes of contention.
- Their movement *diffused and shifted upward in scale* as other organizations that had grown up after the 1956–1957 defeat took up a local conflict on the Baltic coast.

But these mechanisms appeared in many episodes of contention examined earlier that did not qualify as social movements. What made Polish Solidarity’s a *social movement campaign*? Let us see how such campaigns work. The social movement is a particular historical form of contentious politics. As it developed in the West after about 1750, movements emerged from an innovative, consequential synthesis of three elements: campaigns, forms of association and action, and public self-representations. Before we turn to an important contemporary exemplar of that form—the new American women’s movement—let us specify what these terms mean and illustrate them from the case of Polish Solidarity.

Movement Campaigns

A *campaign* is a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities. Unlike a one-time petition, declaration, or mass meeting, a *campaign* extends beyond any single event—although social movements often include petitions, declarations, and mass meetings. A campaign always links at least three parties: a group of self designated claimants, some object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind. The claims may target governmental officials, but the “authorities” in question can also include owners of property, religious functionaries, and others whose actions (or failures to act) significantly affect the welfare of many people.

Even if a few zealots commit themselves to the movement night and day, furthermore, the bulk of participants move back and forth between public claim making and other activities, including the day-to-day organizing that sustains a campaign. The attempt on the part of Solidarity to gain the right to an independent union for Polish workers was a campaign, one that centered on the strike committee in Gdansk but coordinated with strikes throughout the country, attempted to influence public opinion on the part of KOR and other groups, and employed the vast cultural force of the Catholic Church. We call that process *social appropriation*.

Public Self-Representation

Movement participants make concerted public representations of their worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies. For example:

- *Worthiness*: sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, mothers with children or, alternatively, signs of militancy such as wearing army uniforms or carrying the tools of a trade
- *Unity*: matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing and chanting; symbols of solidarity such as a *signatur ecolor*
- *Numbers*: head counts, signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, filling the streets
- *Commitment*: braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and people with disabilities; resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction.

The most dramatic element in the self-representation of the Solidarity strikers was their identification with the “martyred workers” of previous suppressed strikes. The very symbol of Solidarity—a silhouetted group of people supporting one another and carrying a banner—

reflected workers' unitary commitment and their ties to the general population. Certification by association with Catholic faith was also a key factor. No sooner had the occupation of the factory begun than the local bishop negotiated an agreement with the local party secretary: Priests could say mass outside the factory gate and symbols of Christian faith went on display where the media could record them.

Associational and Action Repertoires

Movements employ combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions; public meetings; solemn processions; vigils; rallies; demonstrations; petition drives; statements to and in public media; pamphleteering. We call the variable ensemble of performances the *social movement repertoire*.

The social movement repertoire draws from the general repertoire of contention. But it differs from most forms of collective action we encountered earlier in the *modularity* of its performances: employment of similar forms of collective action by a wide variety of social actors around very different goals against similar actors. As movements developed around a wide range of claims, they elaborated forms of action that could be adopted and adapted in a variety of settings against a wide range of objects: the strike against any kind of employer, the petition on behalf of a wide variety of claims, the street march and demonstration (Favre 1990; Fillieule 1997; Tartakowsky 1998).

Solidarity activists employed traditional tools of working-class insurgency such as strikes and factory occupations. But they also mounted marches, demonstrations, religious processions, and a host of supportive activities such as the handing of food into the factory by family members and friends. The strike committee's meetings with party officials and management around a round table in the Lenin works accomplished two things: It achieved certification of the union and symbolized the equal status of union, management, and state actors. Though separated by eight years, the talks of 1980 prefigured the politically important "round table" negotiations of 1988–1989, which brought Solidarity into power. The form of the round table then spread across East-Central Social Movements Europe. One by one, Communist parties negotiated the end of their regimes in 1989 using the modular form of the round table employed by the Polish workers nine years earlier.

From Movements to Parties

Campaigns, public self-representations, and associational and action repertoires vary enormously from one movement to another, but movements connect those properties in logical ways. Consider the American antislavery movement. Beginning in the 1830s abolitionists launched a long and varied campaign against both slaveholders and public authorities. They used forms of association and public action that drew heavily on the evangelical revival of the previous decade, presenting their movement as righteous, unified, numerous, and stalwart (Young 2006). That movement interacted by fits and starts with institutional politics. By the 1850s, many with abolitionist leanings had joined the mainstream parties and were present in Congress. Then one branch converged with the "free soil" movement. Together with opportunity-seeking politicians from the old Whig Party and breakaway Democrats, that branch formed the Republican Party. The party elected a little-known reformer, Abraham Lincoln, as president in 1860.

We see a similar transformation of a movement into a party in Poland. As martial law wore on in the course of the 1980s, Solidarity leaders (many of them still in prison) began to reshape their roles from the representatives of industrial workers into political party leaders. When, in 1989, the regime was forced to call meaningful elections, Solidarity emerged with a

solid majority in both houses of parliament. That transformation brought the movement into intimate connections with institutions.

Poland's Solidarity was a social movement that produced a change from an authoritarian regime to a democratizing one. The regime change would ultimately have disintegrating effects on the movement, dividing its activists among trade unionists and politicians. Within the latter group, furthermore, it drove a wedge between economic liberals and Catholic populists. New movements would eventually take their place, illustrating the symbiotic relationship between democracy and the form of the social movement. The next section turns to the "new" American women's movement, to examine interactions among social movement bases, political institutions, and contentious politics in a democratic regime.

The New American Women's Movement

Many changes took place in the role of women in American society in the half-century after World War II, but not all were part of "the women's movement" as we have defined it. For example:

- Changes in employment brought more women into the workforce.
- Public attitudes regarding the status of women evolved.
- Legislatures passed laws favorable to women—in part because members of Congress wanted women's votes.
- Philosophies and schools of feminism developed that became part of the base of that movement.
- A base of women's social movement organizations developed around new publications, new forms of friendship relations—for example, "consciousness-raising" groups—and institutional innovations like women's studies programs in colleges and universities.

Our concept of social movements recognizes these changes and their relevance to the formation of the new women's movement. But, as in the Polish case we have just examined, we must distinguish changes in the bases of women's political action from the important movement campaigns that developed in the late 1960s and beyond. While an early women's movement had emerged in the fight for women's rights (Banaszak 1996), it remained largely dormant during most of the interwar and early postwar years (Rupp and Taylor 1987). The 1960s added a new base to women's resources and opportunities. That base came in part through "spillover" of activists from the civil rights movement (Evans 1980; McAdam 1988; Meyer and Whittier 1994) and in part from autonomous social and political sources. Of course, the new movement drew on both liberal and radical feminist ideas, on the increased presence of women in the workforce, and on opportunities in American political institutions. These were part of its movement base. But it went into motion through a series of campaigns that placed it in contentious interaction with other groups, with the government, and against a countermovement that it actually helped to trigger—the antiabortion movement.

The new American women's movement produced innovative solutions to all three aspects of our sketch of social movements: campaigns, public representations, and claim-making repertoires. It consisted of campaigns such as the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) campaign, which occupied the energies of vast numbers of women activists during the 1970s and early 1980s (Costain 1992: ch. 4; Mansbridge 1986). Parts of the movement sought a Social Movements new self-representation through changes in women's dress, language, manners, and collective activities. Although only representative of one branch of the movement, consciousness-raising was a creative tool for the development of a new representation of women. Such grassroots

activities fostered “sisterhood,” women who had previously been demure and retiring learned to speak up for themselves, and new frames of meaning emerged.

In both its associational and action repertoire, the movement innovated equally. Although national groups such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) adopted the increasingly common form of the public interest group, groups such as the Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell (WITCH) expanded women’s action repertoire into theatrical actions, while feminists within professions such as the church and the military quietly organized to advance the status of women within their institutions (Katzenstein 1998). Not all of these innovations lasted into the new century. Some merged with general changes in the repertoire that arose in the protest cycle of the 1960s and declined with the end of that cycle. Others (e.g., the caricatured image of “bra-burning” feminists) never gained acceptance. In fact, they were appropriated by an antifeminist countermovement to roll back feminist gains (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

One of the movement’s bitter ironies was that its gains helped to crystallize a religious countermovement holding a traditionalist view of women’s role. This contributed to the defeat of the ERA, to a powerful grassroots movement against abortion (McCarthy 1987), and to the triumph of a rawform of conservatism in the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations (McAdam and Kloos 2014). Ultimately, these countermoves led to a retrenchment of state programs favoring women, children, and the poor. They rolled back many of the movement’s gains (Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht 2003).

Like Polish Solidarity, the rise of the new American women’s movement offers a prime example of a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of concerted public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment, a social movement. But unlike Polish Solidarity—which had to struggle against instituted power for most of its early history—the new American women’s movement developed through an intimate interaction with institutions.

Movements and Institutions

Remember from previous chapters what we mean by *institutions*: Within any particular regime, they are established, organized, widely recognized routines, connections, and forms of organization employed repeatedly in producing collective action. Some (e.g., the armed forces) are fairly insulated from contentious politics; others (e.g., political parties and elections) are highly sensitive to such politics; while still others (e.g., legislatures, courts, and executives) are both contention-shaping and contention-responding institutions.

Our way of thinking about social movements denies any rigid boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics (Tarrow 2012). We see contentious politics embracing both institutions and social movements. Social movement bases develop both within and outside institutions. Movement campaigns act within, against, and outside institutions. They can contribute to the rise of new institutions—for example, the American women’s movement fostered the rise of a new kind of women’s magazine—and can bolster the role of institutions sympathetic to the movement’s claims—like the growing legitimization of the “liberal” Warren Supreme Court among African Americans after the *Brown* decision. What is more, different institutions harbor, oppose, or stimulate the formation of social movement campaigns.

Boundaries between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics are hard to draw with precision. Take the movement coalition that formed around defeating President Reagan’s nuclear arms policy in the 1980s. It bridged the space between institutional groups and protesters outside institutions. Newly formed movement organizations such as the Nuclear Weapons Freeze

Clearinghouse (NWFC) combined with established peace organizations, on the one hand, and with congressional Democrats, on the other, to form a coalition that persuaded the government to preempt the movement by starting an arms control process (Meyer 1990). Only by looking at both sides of the formal boundary between institutional and noninstitutional politics and at their interactions can we understand the dynamics of episodes of contentious politics.

Of course, much of the work that political institutions do lies outside the boundaries of contentious politics. Executives sign laws, preside at openings, greet foreign dignitaries, and turn on the Christmas tree lights on the lawn of the White House. Legislators declare days of commemoration, make speeches aimed only at pleasing local constituents, and greet visiting Boy Scout troops. Much of what they do is uncontentious and routine.

Social movement activists engage in contentious activities only part of the time. To build their bases, and before any action mobilization begins, movement organizations often engage in “consensus mobilization” (Klandermans 1988). To please their members, they organize festivals and ceremonials. To gain a broader following, they engage in educational activities. To broadcast who they are and the nature of their claims, they cultivate the media. Figure 22.2 portrays graphically the intersection of social movement campaigns, social movement bases, institutions, and contentious politics.




Figure 22.2. Contentious Politics, Social Movement Campaigns, Social Movement Bases, and Institutions

Do not regard figure 22.2 as the vehicle of our arguments about the dynamics of contention. See it instead as a road map to the interactions among our key terms. Any such vehicle would have to put these concepts into motion, asking questions such as these:

- When and how do social movement bases produce movement campaigns, what kinds of institutional frameworks offer them opportunities to do so, and which ones suppress their emergence?
- When and under what conditions do institutional actors produce or assist social movement campaigns, by reaction, transmutation, or fractionation?

- When and under what conditions do movement campaigns ignite broader forms of contentious politics, such as civil wars, nationalist episodes, or revolutions, that threaten institutions?
- When and under what conditions do movement campaigns create new institutions and new social movement bases?

From the beginning of social movement politics, political institutions provided opportunities for movement development, found ways to repress them, but also processed movement claims. Remember how the British Parliament and its practice of receiving petitions served as a vehicle for the advance of the British antislavery campaign? And how the struggle against corruption provided the focal point for the overthrow of President Yanukovich in Ukraine? Institutions serve as an umbrella for social movement activity, a focal point for its campaigns, and the major source of social movement outcomes. The new American women's movement illustrates these points.

From the first, that movement grounded itself within institutions (Katzenstein 1998), which caused it enormous conflict from among its more radical members, who would have preferred to oppose

institutions dominated by men. The first important turning point came with President Kennedy's Commission on the Status of Women in 1961 and with the inclusion of women's rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Beckwith2003: 193). Then came executive orders that assigned the task of monitoring wage equality and discrimination in hiring to government agencies and a burst of legislative activity favoring women in the 1970s (Katzenstein2003: 205–207). Figure 22.3 plots Anne Costain's (1992) time line of legislative enactments in her book *Inviting Women's Rebellion* alongside the activities of major women's organizations such as NOW. It illustrates the general co-occurrence of the new women's movement with congressional activity on behalf of women.




Figure 22.3. News Events Initiated by Women's Groups and Women's Bills as Percentage of All Bills Introduced in the US Congress, 1950–1985

Source: Costain (1992: 108, 113).

One reading of figure 22.3 would see in it evidence that Congress was responding to the pressures of the movement—a direct policy effect of a movement's campaigns. Two other readings are also possible: first, that Congress, or its majority, was responding with electoral motivations to changes in public opinion that were, in large part, independent of the women's movement; second, that members of Congress were ideologically but independently committed to the policy goals they advanced. We cannot, on the basis of the time lines in figure 22.3, decide

among these three different readings. But the only partial parallels between NOW's efforts and Congress's legislation suggest that the movement's policy impact was at least indirect and at best partial.

Movement Impacts

Movement impacts never end with policy change alone. We can distinguish roughly among three kinds of impacts, all of them visible in American women's movements: (1) direct impacts of social movement campaigns on public policies, (2) effects of participation in claim-making campaigns on the lives of activists—and thus on culture, and (3) beyond individual campaigns, effects of involvement in the social movement base on political contention in general:

On Public Policy

As Costain's analysis suggests, the first category—direct effects of campaigns—is difficult to assess. Most scholars now believe that policy impacts are, at best, mediated by political contexts (Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram 2005), while others are even more cautious. Piven and Cloward (1977), focusing on four episodes of contentious politics in the 1930s and the 1960s, conclude that movements seldom succeed, and when they do, success is often followed by failure. Other movement scholars, including Paul Burstein and his collaborators, are even more pessimistic. Referring to a variety of evidence from the United States, they find that collective action on the part of social movement organizations is most often ineffective in influencing public policy (Burstein and Linton 2002; Burstein and Sausner 2005). Policy changes have a great impact on movements (Amenta 2006). For example, simple changes in the tax laws can deprive a movement group of its tax-exempt status. More broadly, the retrenchment of the American welfare state since the 1990s has created a more constrained opportunity structure for women (Banaszak et al. 2003). That in turn has created the need for women to rethink the mechanisms of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment that produced their gains in an earlier generation.

On the Lives of Activists

With respect to the second category—the effect of participation on the lives of activists—the impact of the women's movement appears to have been more certain. Nancy Whittier's study of radical women activists in Columbus, Ohio, shows that well outside public claim-making activity, involved women supported each other and kept each other committed. During the campaign lull of the Reagan years, one woman Whittier (1995) interviewed declared:

Some of these people, I've known them for so long now that we can refer back to a certain event or series of events with just a word or two. It's that kind of communication you can have with someone you've known for a long time, so that we don't really discuss it, we know what we mean. And we get that kind of good feeling that you have with people that you've been through a lot with and you've known for so long.

For her and for women like her, involvement in the movement base had become a defining feature of day-to-day life.

On Future Contentious Politics

With respect to the third category—movements' effects on future patterns of political contention—the balance sheet for the American women's movement is truly mixed. On the one hand, women's movement support was critical in producing a distinguished cadre of women political leaders such as Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Senator Barbara Boxer, and Nancy

Pelosi, leader of the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives between 2012 and 2014. On the other hand, the successes of such “threatening” women as Clinton and the support of the women’s movement for such controversial issues as abortion have helped to polarize American politics and create a countermovement. We still occasionally read journalists commenting on how Hillary Clinton looks in a pantsuit and how “shrill” Nancy Pelosi sounds. This countermovement first grouped around the opposition to the ERA, which was defeated in the 1980s (Mansbridge 1986), and it continues to attack the Supreme Court’s legalization of abortion in the case of *Roe v. Wade*. From the time when that decision came down, antiabortion forces have mustered a powerful coalition that has used the state legislatures to whittle away a woman’s right to choose.

After Mobilization

What happens to movement bases after movement campaigns subside? Building on his research on “new” social movements such as the American women’s movement (Kriesi et al. 1995), Hanspeter Kriesi has constructed a typology of movement dynamics that can help us to answer this question. Figure 22.4 reproduces his typology. All four of the groups that Kriesi and his collaborators studied emerged from the 1968 period; all relied on loose bases of activists rather than on solid bureaucratic bases; all focused their activities around precise claims rather than on general ideologies. All followed a cyclical trajectory (Koopmans 2004; Kriesi et al. 1995). Yet despite their similarities in origins, structure, issue focus, and trajectory, these social movement organizations (SMOs) ended their active period of contention in very different ways.




Figure 22.4. Typology of Transformations in Goal Orientations and Action Repertoires of Social Movement Organization

Starting out from the ideal type of SMO—a formal organization that mobilizes its constituency for collective action with a political goal (Kriesi 1996: 153)—Kriesi deduces four processes of transformation.

First, he sees as one possibility the *institutionalization* of a movement organization, a process we encountered in Italy after the protest cycle of the 1960s. This process combines formalization of an SMO’s internal structure, moderation of its goals, adoption of a more conventional action repertoire, and integration into established systems of government. Figure 22.4 argues that institutionalization involves a shift from the direct participation of a movement’s

constituency to delegation to professional organizers. This resembles the familiar idea of the “iron law of oligarchy” detected a century ago by Robert Michels (1962) and after the last cycle of American protest by Theodore Lowi (1971).

Second, Kriesi sees the possibility of *commercialization*, the transformation of a movement organization in the direction of a service organization. This pattern was typical of the autonomous firms and cooperatives that developed out of the new social movements of the 1970s in Europe, and it can also be seen in the United States in what happened to the consumer group Consumer’s Research as it went from consumer advocacy to becoming a product-testing and product-endorsing firm (Rao 1998).

Third, Kriesi sees the possibility of *involution*: a path that leads to exclusive emphasis on social incentives. SMOs that experience involution become self-help groups, voluntary associations, or clubs. Many of the communes that developed out of the American 1960s experienced a process of involution from active participation in politics to the cultivation of personal and religious development (Kitts 2000).

Kriesi’s fourth variant, *radicalization*, or “reinvigorated mobilization,” we also saw in the escalation of collective violence in Italy after 1968, in the transformation of America’s Students for a Democratic Society into the Weathermen and the splintering of the Weathermen afterwards into a more moderate and a more violent branch.

Kriesi’s typology can serve as a rough guide to the changes in the American women’s movement’s base after the height of its campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s. In this largely “liberal” family of movement groups, institutionalization was the dominant process coming out of its phase of mobilization. Its major expression was the large number of public interest groups that grew out of the 1960s (Schlozman et al. 2010). Most of these, such as NOW and what started out as the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (now NARAL Pro-Choice America), became active in lobbying and educational work in Washington, leading to the formation of an array of public interest lobbies. Though their dedication to the women’s movement remained strong, their tactics and interactions with others resembled those of conventional business and professional lobbies.

Commercialization occurred in American women’s groups in the founding of new women’s magazines like *Ms.* Some of them kept their feminist roots after the 1960s, while others—depending on ads from makeup and clothing companies—drifted into lifestyle preoccupations. Women’s bookstores developed for a time but soon disappeared within the general expansion of book megastores. Services for women’s health, such as Planned Parenthood, inherited some veterans of the new women’s movement but could hardly be called “commercial.”

We find evidence for involution in the development of women’s selfhelp groups—for example, in the groups formed to counsel women on abortion and to help women who have been raped and those diagnosed with breast cancer. The breast cancer coalition in particular embodied both the new conception of gender that grew out of the new women’s movement and an unwillingness to delegate authority to the (mainly male) medical hierarchy (Parthasarathy 2003).

Radicalization shook the movement in the internal struggles that developed between competing philosophies of feminism. Conflict over the admission of lesbians to the ranks of the “straight” feminist community compounded the initial cleavage between liberal and Marxist feminists. Another axis of competition differentiated groups of women of color from mainstream white feminism (Roth 2004). But since the most radical groups were in the universities—where

they had little effect on the lives of ordinary women—this development had less impact on the movement than its overwhelming institutionalization.

Scholars have sometimes seen movements inexorably turning into interest groups or disappearing into institutions. Kriesi's typology shows how periods of high mobilization give rise to a variety of forms of exit that keep a movement base alive during periods when campaigns are in abatement (Rupp and Taylor 1987). By joining self-help groups, working for women's service organizations, and paying dues to public interest groups, women activists from the 1960s and 1970s kept up their contacts with old comrades, remained available for mobilization at times of stress or opportunity (e.g., when two new Supreme Court appointments threatened the legal protection of a woman's right to choose an abortion in 2005), and kept the flame of activism alive to fight another day. That day seemed to be coming, as an increasingly conservative Republican Party, which gained control of a majority of state houses and states legislatures in 2010, worked to narrow the scope of the Supreme Court's abortion decisions.

Conclusion

This chapter's main arguments summarize easily. First, we argued that not all episodes of contentious politics are powered by social movements. The 1956 events in Poland were contentious, at times violent, and, like many of the episodes we have examined, responded to changes in political opportunities. But they did not constitute a social movement, either in our sense of the term or in comparison to what occurred in that country in 1980.

In contrast, Solidarity, like many social movements, emerged from a local episode of contention and, like many of the episodes we have examined in our book, grew through a process of brokerage, certification, diffusion, and scale shift. It qualifies as a social movement campaign because it mobilized an until-then passive social movement base that had grown up after 1956, drew on the certification of the Catholic church, and because it developed the properties of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment that made it a powerful social and political force.

Similarly, in 1960s America, many changes of great interest to women occurred: changes in labor force participation, presence of many more women in colleges and universities, and increasing participation of women in politics. Not all these changes belonged to or resulted from social movement campaigns. Changes in public opinion, vote-seeking members of Congress, judges favoring equal rights, as well as determined women legislators, all affected American public politics. The distinction matters: Only by singling out social movement campaigns can we detect relations between them and other sources of change. Without the distinction, we cannot easily examine transitions between movements and other forms of contention or their responsibility for policy or cultural change.

Third, movements frequently challenge institutions. Both Solidarity and the American women's movement did challenge their countries' institutions. But movements also work within institutions. They often dovetail with parallel changes in institutional politics, as the women's movement did in the 1970s and 1980s. Movements sometimes become institutional actors, as did Solidarity in 1989, when it forced the Polish regime to hold competitive elections, in which it triumphed. Their very success sometimes defeats them, as institutional logic takes over from the logic of contentious politics.

Movements frequently trigger the formation of countermovements. The American women's movement did so in the failed campaign for the ERA and in the struggle over abortion rights. So did the movement for same-sex marriage (Dorf and Tarrow 2013). The give and take of institutional politics often reflects a more civilized version of the struggle for supremacy between

movements for change and countermovements that attempt to return to a more traditional society. That is why a symbiotic relationship exists between social movements and democratic or democratizing politics: Democracy gives scope to the conventional and disruptive activities of social movements and their characteristic properties—broad, alliance-building and consensus building—expand the range of democratic politics. If social movements twin with democratic and democratizing politics, what about other forms of contention and other kinds of politics? If a symbiotic relationship prevails between democratic politics and social movements, do similarly symbiotic relations appear between these other forms and other types of politics? The next chapter turns to more violent forms of contentious politics and their relationship to the dynamics of undemocracy.