/g/ - Technology
install openbsd
[Make a Post]>one-time key exchange system
Why is this a problem? Just make really strong 16384 bit RSA keys and exchange them on physical media in person. Do that once and you're all set.
>if some CIA niggers manage to break the encryption
CIA niggers don't bother with breaking the encryption. Either they coerce you into giving them info, or they hax your computer and steal the unencrypted messages while you're reading them. The encryption is not the weak link, you are, and your traitorous israeli hardware is.
I thought about implementing a system where you sign short term public keys that rotate every week with mid term public keys that rotate once every 6 months, which are then signed by a long term offline public key that is ideally stored on an airgapped machine.
All emails are encrypted with short term public keys and their private counterparts are discarded once the key expires, so even if an adversary manages to break RSA it needs to break a key to access only a week's worth of emails, which should be computationally expensive enough even for intelligence agencies.
The thought seemed amusing because there is no need to switch everyone into another hip messaging app, but its also too much of a hassle to rotate public keys every week.
File: e8c784a6392b4770f9b5facde3ef13f6b74e0546690e8ade9170ab226b35b974.png (dl) (19.80 KiB)

>sign short term public keys that rotate every week with mid term public keys that rotate once every 6 months, which are then signed by a long term offline public key that is ideally stored on an airgapped machine.
Something like that, and you could also include a Diffie-Helman ratchet.
If you send someone a list of pre-keys signed with a semi-permanent private key you could imply that someone would need to encrypt messages beginning with the first public key, then the next, etc. in the order you have been provided them with so you can ratchet them easily on both sides.
Public and private pre-keys should renewed as often as possible to make the ratchet forward (and backward) secret.
So if I send someone a message I'd include my own ephemeral key + (part of) the recipients public key which are provided in the list of multiple pre-keys, e.g.:
>[sender public key][recipient pre-key ID][everything necessary for encryption]
Or you could also only ratchet when you provide a new list of pre-keys which is much easier, and not much less insecure since you it doesn't actually make much sense to ratchet when you still have the private (pre-)keys.
Or not ratchet at all, which makes things even easier :^)
You just delete the list of previously provided pre-keys when providing a new list of pre-keys.
I've been wondering whether it would make sense to encrypt the public key whenever possible. I would have guessed it would be much harder to retrieve secrets generated with secret public keys than public ones (of course it's meant to be shared publicly, but still). There's little I could find online, so I'll ask here instead.
>>2795 meant for >>2794
Ratcheting makes the implementation much hard by the way and I'm not sure how effective it would be in an email setting, but it is possible, I think.
>>2791
anon, pgp is 99.9% the best thing out there for email/file encryption. Rather than worry about if pgp has a weakness worry about if your keys are secure and actually get people to use pgp instead of meme android apps and browser based encryption. you can use crywrap or openssl with pfs to double encrypt if you are that autistic but good luck getting other people to do the same.
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Right now the most popular way to encrypt your mail is with PGP. However, it's a one-time key exchange system. So if some CIA niggers manage to break the encryption, the entirety of the conversation is decrypted. Are there any layers to be added onto this? For non-throwaway exchanges, I was thinking of something ratchet-based - like the encryption instant messengers use. Their one-on-one conversations aren't different from e-mail anyway. For example, you'd keep the PGP layer, but exchange the initial keys for the ratchet as well, deleting the first email from the server or using another/throwaway address for it. That way, the entire dialogue can be read only if you got your hands on the letter with the keys. But I'm sure there are better ways.