

# WEIRD is Suicide

Izzat, Asabiyyah, and How White People Got Bodied




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In the year 2000, white racial consciousness seemed dead and buried. Jewish racial identitarianism was allowed. Chinese, Indian, African, and any number of other non-white identities could be openly celebrated, even to the point of chauvinism. But *American History X* summarized the general feeling of polite society toward any white folkish sentiments—dumb, plebeian, morally inexcusable, and ultimately, an adolescent phase.

Here we are, a generation later, and the president of the United States is regularly tweeting about “remigration,” and we all know what he means. He doesn’t mean deporting Swedes and Poles. The times, they are a-changin’. White racial consciousness is back.

One of the more curious elements of this renewed white self-assertion is that it is often couched in anti-folkish terms. This often takes the form of celebrating our WEIRD personality—Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic. This term comes from a book by Joseph Henrich where he explains how the Christian church, in its attempt to put a lid on Europeans’ clannishness, inadvertently created modernity. This took the form of lower kin-affiliation, smaller (“nuclear”) non-extended families, individualism, analytic and abstract thinking, rule of law or logocentrism, “Faustianism,” love of space and freedom, etc.

White identitarians today celebrate this WEIRD personality as essential to us. As they tell it, this personality built the modern world, with its high-trust societies, universal norms, neutral institutions, science, meritocracy, and many other things besides. But this is suicidal identitarianism. In celebrating Europeans as inherently individualistic and kin-agnostic, they undercut the possibility of any real ethnic identity. To say “our folkhood is individualist” is a contradiction in terms—it is to say that the essence of our folk character is lacking any folk character.

In this article, we will show how WEIRD has been a disaster for Europeans. To do this, we will show how it depends on what came before, and that what came before looks an awful lot like what effete identitarians find “icky” in other peoples. We will show how WEIRD could not do anything but corrode folk-solidarity. And we will conclude by showing that we can love our own because they are our own, not because they meet some standard that was invented yesterday.

To begin, let us examine one of the most defensible elements of the WEIRD personality: meritocracy.

## **Meritocracy: A Case Study in How WEIRD Fails**

For it to be possible, meritocracy assumes that quite a few things be in place already. You need a stable moral and social world. You cannot have meritocracy without rule of law, shared norms, and above all, social trust. Meritocracy assumes the existence of high-trust infrastructure. It assumes a world of high solidarity.

But meritocracy is parasitic on solidarity. Meritocracy only works when most people voluntarily obey norms, which is to say that meritocracy needs cultural discipline—precisely the thing it devalues by focusing only on individuals. The contradiction at the heart of meritocracy is that it pretends to be individualist but it depends on group-formed traits. Everything that produces “merit”—intelligence, work ethic, psychological stability, trustworthiness, impulse control—comes from families, communities, inherited norms, etc. These are group goods, not individual achievements. Meritocracy treats these group-generated traits as if they arise spontaneously in isolated individuals. Meritocracy tells people that their identity is purely individual, and that group affiliation is unfair. “Only personal achievement matters,” it says. But once group structures dissolve, trust collapses. Norms go untransmitted, institutions weaken, and coordination problems multiply. The result is that meritocracy eliminates the preconditions for merit.

So meritocracy dissolves its own foundation. But it gets worse for meritocracy. Behind the assumption of “merit” as a social good is the assumption of individualism—that the “meritorious” entity is the particular person. This is not how natural selection works though. Evolution does not select for isolated individuals. Selection pressures operate at multiple levels: they select for individual fitness, yes, but also for group-level fitness—for such things as group cohesion, cooperation, group norms, etc. Traits that succeed at the individual level may fail at the group level—and vice versa. This nullifies the assumption that individual “merit” equates to group success.

It is well known (and a source of constant hand-wringing) in evolutionary biology that ethnocentrism is the dominant strategy—that cooperative groups outcompete isolated high-merit individuals. Across anthropology, history, and evolutionary theory, cohesive groups prevail.<sup>1</sup> Meritocracy misunderstands this by assuming that individual excellence translates to collective excellence, but in reality, it is group

fitness that translates to collective prosperity, and meritocracy is structurally blind to this.

Meritocracy's blindness to group strategy as well as its parasitism of the social capital upon which it depends, are two sides of one mutually reinforcing pathology—that meritocracy ignores honour, solidarity, and embeddedness. Recently, a [4chan greentext](#) emerged that illustrates this in stark terms. In it, an anon explains the specifically Indian take on a concept called *izzat*. In his own words:

Izzat has no direct translation into English. We only have terms that can broach the same concept such as 'honour' or 'reputation' or 'face'. Izzat is so much more than that. It's a zero-sum game of collective honour shared by whole groups of people, all of whom take it very, very seriously. A system like this isn't just foreign to Enlightenment values, but I'd argue it's antithetical to every sensible form of governance on the planet. It will destroy any system that assumes good faith.

The problem with the *izzat* greentext (you should read the whole thing) is that it assumes that meritocracy can stand independent of the social capital generated by honour-shame systems. These systems enforce reliability, promise keeping, self-restraint, and social coherence, producing *exactly* the behavioural traits that meritocracy assumes. But meritocracy denies the legitimacy of these honour systems.

The West believes that prosperity came from individualism, but prosperity came from exactly those honour systems and thick cultural norms that “racist liberals” find distasteful about things like *izzat* and *asabiyyah*. The West believes that group identity is a threat to prosperity by undercutting meritocracy, but group identity—not merit—was the engine of Western prosperity. You're not meritorious if you don't win, and you won't win without these pre-modern structures.

Let's take a closer look at those structures.

## Izzat and Asabiyyah: What Are They?

Izzat is an Arabic word that literally means “honour,” “respect,” “dignity,” or “reputation.” It refers to publicly recognised honour—how others see your standing, your moral worth, and your family’s reputation. It is a social currency, something that can be gained or lost, defended or avenged. Izzat comes from pre-modern honour-shame societies where family lineage defines identity and public reputation determines where you sit in the social pecking order. It existed before Islam in Arabian tribal culture, before Persian Islamization, and in Indo-Aryan and Indo-Iranian warrior cultures. Izzat is primarily about how others see you. It’s individualized but also inherited: you carry your family’s honour and can raise or stain it, and as the 4chan anon points out at length, it often triggers personal retaliation to avenge slights and restore honour.

Asabiyyah is related to izzat but distinct—it is the structural force of kin-based solidarity. Various translations into English as “nationalism,” “solidarity,” “prejudice,” and “group feeling,” asabiyyah is mostly about internal cohesion and the willingness to sacrifice for the group. Where izzat is individual, asabiyyah is collective: the group’s cohesion matters more than the personal honour of any one member. Where izzat exists only in the eyes of others, asabiyyah is held in the hearts of the group. As the 4chan anon further points out, izzat is zero-sum—your humiliation strengthens others—where asabiyyah is positive-sum—more members means more power.

Izzat (what we call *honour culture*) is the micro-foundation of public legitimacy in a pre- or post-liberal fragmented environment. It regulates behaviour where state authority collapses. The racist liberal finds it a bit uncouth, and so his solution is to try to recreate that state authority, but what the liberal doesn’t realize is that it was izzat, or this honour culture, that built the state in the first place.

The racist liberal will then turn around and call for a high-trust society, as though such things emerge out of the ground from nothing like mushrooms. What the racist liberal doesn’t understand is that you can’t get to this high-trust society but by asabiyyah, the macro-engine of new political orders. Asabiyyah is central to neo-medieval patchworks and para-sovereign formation, it is the “stuff” out of which social capital is built, and determines which groups survive devolution.

The racist liberal likes the flower but hates the root. He calls for high trust, but spits on the folkish foundation upon which it stands. It feels “plebeian” to him. It carries a whiff of “third worldism,” he might call it “jeetery.”<sup>2</sup> This is all frankly clownish and unserious. Europeans have been folkish and tribal since the Palaeolithic, no different than any other people. We wuz not closet liberals from the beginning. WEIRD is not primordial, but the result of a universalist ideology infecting a folk for whom it was an especially bad fit, with our high trait openness due to our [exceptional phenotypic variation](#)—precisely the kind of folk that needs tribalism for social cohesion, and evolved it specifically for that purpose. WEIRD is not who we are. It is something that arose in the recent past and can be undone just easily as it was done.

To show that honour culture (izzat) and folkishness (asabiyyah) are native to us, let us examine our Indo-European foundations.

### **Extended Analysis Below:**

— What Indo-European concepts izzat and asabiyyah map directly on to



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