
1.THREAD: The Twitter Files TWITTER AND "OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES"


After weeks of "Twitter Files" reports detailing close coordination between the FBI and Twitter in moderating social media content, the Bureau issued a statement Wednesday.

2.It didn't refute allegations. Instead, it decried "conspiracy theorists" publishing "misinformation," whose "sole aim" is to "discredit the agency."

The men and women of the FBI work every day to protect the American public... It is unfortunate that conspiracy theorists and others are feeding the American public misinformation with the sole purpose of attempting to discredit the agency.

- 3. They must think us unambitious, if our "sole aim" is to discredit the FBI. After all, a whole range of government agencies discredit themselves in the #TwitterFiles. Why stop with one?
- 4. The files show the FBI acting as doorman to a vast program of social media surveillance and censorship, encompassing agencies across the federal government from the State Department to the Pentagon to the CIA.
- 5. The operation is far bigger than the reported 80 members of the Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF), which also facilitates requests from a wide array of smaller actors from local cops to media to state governments.
- 6.Twitter had so much contact with so many agencies that executives lost track. Is today the DOD, and tomorrow the FBI? Is it the weekly call, or the monthly meeting? It was dizzying.





7.A chief end result was that thousands of official "reports" flowed to Twitter from all over, through the FITF and the FBI's San Francisco field office.

8.On June 29th, 2020, San Francisco FBI agent Elvis Chan wrote to pair of Twitter execs asking if he could invite an "OGA" to an upcoming conference:

9.OGA, or "Other Government Organization," can be a euphemism for CIA, according to multiple former intelligence officials and contractors. Chuckles one: "They think it's mysterious, but it's just conspicuous."

10. "Other Government Agency (the place where I worked for 27 years)," says retired CIA officer Ray McGovern.

11. It was an open secret at Twitter that one of its executives was ex-CIA, which is why Chan referred to that executive's "former employer."

12. The first Twitter executive abandoned any pretense to stealth and emailed that the employee "used to work for the CIA, so that is Elvis's question."

On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 2:29 PM wrote:

Stacia, I have no involvement here - I leave this to you to respond.

used to work for the CIA, so that is Elvis' question.

13. Senior legal executive Stacia Cardille, whose alertness stood out among Twitter leaders, replied, "I know" and "I thought my silence was understood."

I know. Let me see if it is publicly announced and I will tell him that. (I thought my silence was understood.)

14. Cardille then passes on conference details to recently-hired ex-FBI lawyer Jim Baker.

Stacia Cardille

Fwd: [inform] Info Ops Conference with Carnegie

To: Jim Baker

Sunlight conference tomorrow. No need for you to attend. Carnegie is doing the heavy lift. I offered to assist Nick and Yoel, but there are no academic papers to review or anything. I was involved in the early scoping of the joint project as well.

I invited the FBI, and I believe that the CIA will virtually attend too.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks, Stacia

15."I invited the FBI and the CIA virtually will attend too," Cardille says to Baker, adding pointedly: "No need for you to attend."


16. The government was in constant contact not just with Twitter but with virtually every major tech firm.


17. These included Facebook, Microsoft, Verizon, Reddit, even Pinterest, and many others. Industry players also held regular meetings without government.


<u>18.One</u> of the most common forums was a regular meeting of the multi-agency Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF), attended by spates of executives, FBI personnel, and – nearly always – one or two attendees marked "OGA."




19. The FITF meeting agendas virtually always included, at or near the beginning, an "OGA briefing," usually about foreign matters (hold that thought).









20. Despite its official remit being "Foreign Influence," the FITF and the SF FBI office became conduit for mountains of domestic moderation requests, from state governments, even local police:




21. Many requests arrived via Teleporter, a one-way platform in which many communications were timed to vanish:




22. Especially as the election approached in 2020, the FITF/FBI overwhelmed Twitter with requests, sending lists of hundreds of problem accounts:








23. Email after email came from the San Francisco office heading into the election, often adorned with an Excel attachment:



24. There were so many government requests, Twitter employees had to improvise a system for prioritizing/triaging them:




25. The FBI was clearly tailoring searches to Twitter's policies. FBI complaints were almost always depicted somewhere as a "possible terms of service violation," even in the subject line:


Chan, Elvis M. (SF) (FBI)


FW: Possible Terms of Service Violation - Twitter

- 26. Twitter executives noticed the FBI appeared to be assigning personnel to look for Twitter violations.
- 27. "They have some folks in the Baltimore field office and at HQ that are just doing keyword searches for violations. This is probably the 10th request I have dealt with in the last 5 days," remarked Cardille.



29. The New York FBI office even sent requests for the "user IDs and handles" of a long list of accounts named in a Daily Beast article. Senior executives say they are "supportive" and "completely comfortable" doing so.





30. It seemed to strike no one as strange that a "Foreign Influence" task force was forwarding thousands of mostly domestic reports, along with the DHS, about the fringiest material:



By Mary Fanning and Alan Jones | October 31, 2020 In February 2009, the Obama administration commandeered a powerful supercomputer system known as THE HAMMER. THE HAMMER includes an exploit application known as SCORECARD that is capable of hacking into elections and stealing the vote, according to CIA contractor-turned-whistleblower Dennis Montgomery, who designed and built [...]

31. "Foreign meddling" had been the ostensible justification for expanded moderation since platforms like Twitter were dragged to the Hill by the Senate in 2017:

The New Hork Times

Tech Executives Are Contrite About Election Meddling, but Make Few Promises on Capitol Hill

32. Yet behind the scenes, Twitter executives struggled against government claims of foreign interference supposedly occurring on their platform and others:

[UE-193128] <u>FITF</u> 2022-08-15	Referral: IRA account on Reddit Created: 2022-08-09 Updated: 2022-08-15 Resolved:
Status:	Closed
Project:	Unified Escalations
Affects Version/s:	None
Fix Version/s:	None
Security Level:	SI RESTRICTED

- 33. The <u>#TwitterFiles</u> show execs under constant pressure to validate theories of foreign influence and unable to find evidence for key assertions.
- 34. "Found no links to Russia," says one analyst, but suggests he could "brainstorm" to "find a stronger connection."

Comment by	[2022-03-08]	
Hi Hi		
After I reviewed the account	ts, and found no links to Russia, I asked on this ticket answer:	
the account does not have indicators to and email checks for OSIN	is Russian. Even the other phone linked accounts (suggest it is Russian proxy. Did checks via DomainTools for IP reserved. However, going by the content and narrative coming out from the sissian, and/or could be a Russian proxy."	olves,
I can brainstorm with connection.	and see if we can dig even deeper and try to find a stro	nger

35. "Extremely tenuous circumstantial chance of being related," says another.

Looked into this here. Didn't find any exact naming matches and really any information to link the reddit account(s) to any on-platform presence at Twitter. There was one account that has an incredibly tenuous circumstantial chance of being related so documenting the account here just incase we ever need to come back to it (created in a similar timeframe, RU login, sus english name):

36. "No real matches using the info," says former Trust and Safety chief Yoel Roth in another case, noting some links were "clearly Russian," but another was a "house rental in South Carolina?"

No real matches using most of the info. The only thing that did turn up something was the IP addresses and accounts using multiple from the provided.

Even then, nothing looked particularly violative, some clearly Russian though, but also included an account for a house rental in South Carolina?

<u>Yoel Roth</u> not really anything worth taking out. But there are 2 personas linked to 2 clusters they might be interested in. Both appear to be Russian-like names. However, I wouldn't even call that a slam dunk since it was based on IP data and I think at least 1 of the returned accounts form the IP data doesn't at all look related.

37. In another case, Roth concludes a series of Venezuelan pro-Maduro accounts are unrelated to Russia's Internet Research Agency, because they're too high-volume:

Hey

Thanks for reaching out. A couple of things from a quick review of this data:

A few of the accounts whose tweets appear in your list are not IRA/Russia-linked. In Feb 2019, we re-released our IRA-linked datasets, excluding a number of accounts that were operated out of Venezuela. Those accounts were extremely high volume tweeters, generally using automation (in a way that was pretty uncharacteristic of a lot of the other IRA activity). We have very high confidence that they are not linked to the IRA, or to Russian activity in any form. The current official datasets you can download from us do not include these accounts in the RU archive, and instead include them in a Jan 2019 release of Venezuelan activity (titled "Venezuela (January 2019, set 2) - 764 accounts"). If you download the unhashed Venezuela release, you should be able to cross-reference and exclude.

Also, at least a couple of the tweets I spot-checked were deleted by the users themselves. When we first published our archives of Russian activity, we indicated that we excluded tweets deleted prior to the suspension of the account, amounting to a less than 1% decrease in the volume of tweets (as

best we were able to tell). We had to exclude them due to legal constraints. But, again, the volume there should be a very small part of the overall RU activity - if you see something different after excluding the Venezuelan accounts, let me know and I can dig back in.

Thanks,

Yoel

38. The Venezuelans "were extremely high-volume tweeters... pretty uncharacteristic of a lot of the other IRA activity," Roth says.

- 39. In a key email, news that the State Department was making a wobbly public assertion of Russian influence led an exec the same one with the "OGA" past to make a damning admission:
- 40. "Due to a lack of technical evidence on our end, I've generally left it be, waiting for more evidence," he says. "Our window on that is closing, given that government partners are becoming more aggressive on attribution."

October 1, 2020 at 5:19 PM

Re: Flag from the GEC

To: Cc: Yoel Roth, integrity-io

Details

Yep. InfoBRICS is an entity that we've received previous notice on, though if recollection serves, government partners have never been so specific as to say that it was directly controlled by the GRU. BRICS is an inherently Russia-dominated economic organization, so it was always likely that a website and Twitter account designed to promote it would be directed by the Kremlin. Due to a lack of technical evidence on our end, I've generally left it be, waiting for more evidence. I think that our window on that is closing, given that government partners are becoming more aggressive on attribution and reporting on it. I'm going to go ahead with suspension and marking the domain as UNSAFE.

Rebel Inside was a new one for me too. Not even sure what the goal of the account could possibly be other than to highlight unrest in other areas of the world besides Russia. I've already suspended it and marked its domain as UNSAFE.

- 41. Translation: "more aggressive" "government partners" had closed Twitter's "window" of independence.
- 42. "Other Government Agencies" ended up sharing intelligence through the FBI and FITF not just with Twitter, but with Yahoo!, Twitch, Clouldfare, LinkedIn, even Wikimedia:

21 April 2022

2022-29989

USA/Other:Other/Apple; USA/Other:Other/Google/Youtube; USA/Other:Other/Facebook/Meta; USA/Other:Other/Twitter; USA/Other:Other/Reddit; USA/Other:Other/Verizon Media/Yahoo; USA/Other:Other/LinkedIn; USA/Other:Other/Wikimedia

(U) Tearline:

(U) The tearline must be used as-is; no changes to the text/language are permitted.

START OF TEXT

UNCLASSIFIED

- (U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.
- (U) We previously passed you information that highlighted, as part of Russian mogul Yevgeniy Prigozhin's Internet Research Agency's (IRA) attempt to denigrate French President Emmanuel Macron's campaign ahead of the late April 2022 presidential run-off election, IRA plans to expose its own troll farms in Benin, Mali, and Senegal while alleging that Macron's campaign was the entity responsible for their use and creation.
- (U) We assess that the following links are also part of the IRA's effort to amplify the same narratives:
 - https://netafrique.net/fievre-electorale-en-france-reseau-africain-de-la-propagande/
 - https://theworldnews.net/ml-news/les-habitants-du-senegal-et-du-mali-elisent-lepresident-de-la-france-2022-par-hassana-diallo
 - https://bamada.net/les-habitants-du-senegal-et-du-mali-elisent-le-president-de-la-france-2022-par-hassana-diallo
 - https://senego.com/les-habitants-du-senegal-et-du-mali-elisent-le-president-de-la-france-2022-par-hassana-diallo 1411114.html
 - https://news.piaafrica.com/senego-politique/les-habitants-du-senegal-et-du-mali-elisent-le-president-de-la-france-2022-par-hassana-diallo/54fe9e8d69
 - http://mali.niooz.fr/les-habitants-du-senegal-et-du-mali-elisent-le-president-de-la-france-2022-par-hassana-diallo-43320573.shtml


- 43. Former CIA agent and whistleblower John Kiriakou believes he recognizes the formatting of these reports.
- 44. "Looks right on to me," Kiriakou says, noting that "what was cut off above [the "tearline"] was the originating CIA office and all the copied offices."
- 45. Many people wonder if Internet platforms receive direction from intelligence agencies about moderation of foreign policy news stories. It appears Twitter did, in some cases by way of the FITF/FBI.

- 46. These reports are far more factually controversial than domestic counterparts.
- 47. One intel report lists accounts tied to "Ukraine 'neo-Nazi' Propaganda." This includes assertions that Joe Biden helped orchestrate a coup in 2014 and "put his son on the board of Burisma."





- 48. Another report asserts a list of accounts accusing the "Biden administration" of "corruption" in vaccine distribution are part of a Russian influence campaign:
 - (U) We also assess with high confidence that the IRA was responsible in mid-February 2022 for producing and placing in media and social media information in multiple languages, to include French, English, and Spanish, on the following two narratives:
 - That Western Europeans in Africa were not acting in the best interests of the African nations, and specifically were involved in intimidation, coercion, and blackmail in the Sahara-Sahel zone, and were not interested in helping to fight terrorism in the Sahel.
 - The Biden Administration was selling better places in the COVID-19 vaccine queue to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and therefore, U.S. corruption was influencing the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.
- 49. Often intelligence came in the form of brief reports, followed by long lists of accounts simply deemed to be pro-Maduro, pro-Cuba, pro-Russia, etc. This one batch had over 1000 accounts marked for digital execution:



50. One report says a site "documenting purported rights abuses committed by Ukrainians" is directed by Russian agents:

2022-21593

USA/Other:Other/Apple; USA/Other:Other/Google/Youtube;

USA/Other:Other/Facebook; USA/Other:Other/Twitter;

USA/Other:Other/Reddit; USA/Other:Other/Verizon Media/Yahoo;

USA/Other:Other/LinkedIn; USA/Other:Other/Wikimedia;

USA/Other:Other/CloudFlare

(U) Tearline:

(U) The tearline must be used as-is; no changes to the text/language are permitted.

START OF TEXT


UNCLASSIFIED

- (U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.
- (U) We assess that The Tragedy of Donbas (donbasstragedy.info), a website documenting purported human rights abuses committed by Ukrainians since 2014, is directed by the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

UNCLASSIFIED

END OF TEXT

- 51. Intel about the shady origin of these accounts might be true. But so might at least some of the information in them about neo-Nazis, rights abuses in Donbas, even about our own government. Should we block such material?
- 52. This is a difficult speech dilemma. Should the government be allowed to try to prevent Americans (and others) from seeing pro-Maduro or anti-Ukrainian accounts?
- 53. Often intel reports are just long lists of newspapers, tweets or YouTube videos guilty of "anti-Ukraine narratives":







54. Sometimes - not always -Twitter and YouTube blocked the accounts. But now we know for sure what Roth meant by "the Bureau (and by extension the IC)."

Privileged and Confidential

Hi team,

The questions we received are attached. I'm frankly perplexed by the requests here, which seem more like something we'd get from a congressional committee than the Bureau. There's a big discussion to be had about state-controlled media, which will be impacted by the label launch later this month — but I'm not particularly comfortable with the Bureau (and by extension the IC) demanding written answers here. What's your perspective on how best to navigate?

Thanks,

Yoel

55. The line between "misinformation" and "distorting propaganda" is thin. Are we comfortable with so many companies receiving so many reports from a "more aggressive" government?

56. The CIA has yet to comment on the nature of its relationship to tech companies like Twitter. Twitter had no input into anything I did or wrote. The searches were carried out by third parties, so what I saw could be limited.

Watch <u>@bariweiss</u>, <u>@ShellenbergerMD</u>, <u>@lhfang</u>, and this space for more, on issues ranging from Covid-19 to Twitter's relationship to congress, and more.

. . .