

# THE NEW ORDER

## FRENCH STATE PROPOSAL



### Foreword

This proposal, will aim to serve as the definitive document on France development, and will be updated as time goes by to reflect any change occurring while actual development is ongoing. It will also aim to establish a coherent and thorough pre-1962 timeline to explain why France looks the way it does by the time the game starts and how exactly it got there.

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## Pre-1962 Lore

*The list of Chefs de l'Etat [Chiefs of State] is as follows:*

Philippe Pétain (1940-1951)

Émile Laure (1951-1958)

Charles Huntziger (1958-)

*The list of Vice-Présidents du Conseil [Vice-Presidents of the Council] is as follows:*

Pierre Laval (1940)

Pierre-Etienne Flandin (1940-1941)

François Darlan (1941-1942)

Yves Bouthillier (1942-1946)

Henry du Moulin de Labarthète (1946-1951)

Jean-Charles Legrand (1951-1954)

Yves Bouthillier (1954-1956)

Bernard Ménétreel (1956-1958)

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (1958-)

## 1942-1945: The War

The point of divergence from our timeline lies on the 27th of August, 1941. Pierre Laval, disgraced erstwhile *Vice-Président du Conseil*, is eating lunch with Jacques Doriot and Marcel Déat in a lovely Versailles restaurant, in preparation for an afternoon overview of the LVF, volunteer troops poised to go fight against Russia on the eastern front. In our timeline, nothing of note happened during their lunch; however, here, Laval accidentally spills some cream on his suit, and must as such change into another one.

In the afternoon, Laval and Déat's visit of the troops goes smoothly, until Paul Collette, *Résistant* and disgruntled MSR member, fires five shots from his revolver at the collaborationist leaders. In our timeline, the cufflinks on Laval's jacket barely deflected one of Collette's bullets away from Laval's heart; here, however, they are not as sturdy, and the bullet successfully hits Laval, who collapses to the ground; by the time an ambulance has taken him to the hospital, Pierre Laval is dead on arrival, and is buried with full honors in his native town of Aubervilliers.

Flash forward to April 1942. In our timeline, the *Maréchal* Pétain, in front of Darlan's failure to negotiate a favorable settlement with Germany (most notably his tentative attempt to turn the Armistice into a "normal state of affairs", to eventually entertain the possibility of a war declaration against Great Britain) and under German pressure, decides to sack him and replace him with Laval. Here, however, with Laval dead, the Germans instead instruct Pétain to pick Yves Bouthillier, Darlan's relatively unassuming Minister and Secretary of State for National Economy and Finance, instead; Pétain begrudgingly accepts, and so Vichy lives to see another day.

What does Laval's death truly entail? It means, to put it simply, that Vichy never trades its ***traditionalist and broadly technocratic*** ideals, embodied in the *Révolution nationale* for the former and in Darlan's government for the latter, for Laval's return. This means that not only does Petainism stay as a relevant force in the Vichy government, but hardline collaborationists never begin to permeate the government, which means that they end up substantially less important than they did in our timeline.

As there is no allied landing in Africa, the *Reich* never retaliates by enacting *Unternehmen Anton* and invading the southern free zone, which means the Vichy regime continues to exist as an effective administration past this point. While Bouthillier does his best to maneuver around the Germans' demands, Pétain tasks him, along with a small committee of experts, to start drafting a constitution to be enacted once the situation settles down, based on the already-existing 19th July 1941 constitutional draft to replace the imperfect 11th July 1940 constitutional decrees and to give the *Maréchal's* regime a much-needed veneer of legitimacy.

In 1945, the Second World War ends. The French State, having stood at the sidelines of the war, timidly playing both sides in hopes of angering no one, enters an era of great uncertainty. Having failed to properly ingratiate the *Reich*, France now has to pay the price for its refusal to commit to the victory of the Axis.

The Second Treaty of Versailles is very harsh, and widely seen as the most punishing treaty France had to bear since 1815, marking its fall from the status of Great Power. It confirms the Armistice's military restrictions, transfers Alsace-Lorraine to the Reich, annuls the reunion of Savoy and Nice to France, awards Corsica, Tunisia, Djibouti and Lebanon to Italy, Morocco to a German-Iberian condominium, and delegates to Japan the care of French possessions in the East. Finally, while the *Zone occupée* [Occupied Zone] is transferred back to France, the whole of the *Zone interdite* [Forbidden Zone] remains under German occupation. Eventually, France is by treaty obligated to join Germany's newly established European institutions, the European Economic Community and the *Einheitspakt*, shattering its hopes of conducting a neutral foreign policy in the short term.

However, a less-than-enthused and somewhat apathetic population seems to slowly be adapting to the new state of affairs: the peace is harsh, but it is peace nonetheless, and with it come the end of the occupation and of the forced payments France made to finance it, of forced requisitions, and of shortages of every sorts.

As for the regime itself, while it is not overwhelmingly popular, the slow betterment in material conditions since the war's end have made Pétain continue to seem the kind, grandfatherly figure he was seen as at the beginning of the war. Along with that, Bouthillier's maneuvering has made him a somewhat popular figure among the general population, seen as a competent statesman who managed to shield France from the *Reich's* worst excesses.

Bouthillier's performance as Minister and Secretary of State for National Economy and Finance does not mean, however, that the economy has fully recovered, far from it, as inflation has become rampant: with at least 600 billion francs in circulation, mostly held by peasants and farmers who sold to the Germans, a gaping fiscal hole begins to be seen, and there is no easy way for the government to sterilize the government by removing these banknotes from circulation, given that most of them are in the hands of people who constitute the main political base of the Regime, such as farmers and large landowners.

As a result, Bouthillier quickly inaugurates a policy of post-war reconstruction to slowly neutralize the inflation and redirect private savings to public investments, desperately trying to avoid more German encroachment on the French economy. First instituting a tax exemption on newly deposited savings, the Vice-President of the Council is eventually forced to ramp up his efforts and declare, despite an already weak budget, massive infrastructure investments in Algeria to develop its oil extraction industry, and incite people to buy a newly issued high-yield treasury bond. While this move is a gamble, Bouthillier is confident it will pay off, as Algeria has massive untapped resources which, once properly exploited, will become an enormous revenue source for France. Thanks to massive propaganda campaigns, the Reconstruction Bonds are an immediate success, sterilizing the inflation, enriching bond holders and suddenly fueling growth, in what effectively becomes a post-war economic boom.



POUR LA FRANCE  
VERSEZ VOTRE OR



L'Or Combat Pour La Victoire

EDITE PAR LA SOCIETE  
DES AMIS DES ARTISTES

DE VANDER LEEUW PARIS

# 1946-1954: The Quiet Years

## 1946-1951: The du Moulin Government

In March 1946, after over three years of work, the constitutional committee finalizes their draft. It is a staunchly authoritarian system, partly modeled on the Portuguese *Estado Novo*, having a *Chef de l'Etat* with broad executive and legislative powers, and two mostly consultative chambers, that the Chief of State has few obligations to consult. The Assemblies' main legislative attributions are allowing the Chief to declare war, electing the Chief, and potentially impeaching him in case of high treason or similar offenses.

After some back and forth musing, the *Maréchal* finally agrees to its terms, and on the 12th of May 1946, the day of the *Fête de Jeanne d'Arc*, the new Constitution of the French State is adopted. While some of the most hardline collaborationists, such as the RNP and the PPF, deride the Constitution as an antiquated, reactionary construct, and while royalists express their disappointment at Pétain's refusal to outright restore the monarchy, their complaints are drowned out in the popular happiness to finally be back to a normal state of affairs. Soon afterwards, the first elections since 1936 are held, and, without any surprise, the various quasi-political organizations loyal to Pétain win an overwhelming majority of the vote. With Pétain appointing the *Grand Conseil*, France seems to be set on a course of strengthened legitimacy, and Bouthillier, feeling his mission has been accomplished, decides to step back.

With Bouthillier gracefully retiring, Pétain naturally appoints Henri du Moulin de Labarthète, a staunch loyalist and member of his inner circle, as Vice-President of the Council, with a national unity government, composed of varied politicians, including a few from ultracollaborationist parties following Germany's insistence, being formed. Bouthillier then goes on to found, along with banker Alfred Pose, the *Centre d'études politiques et civiles*, a think tank to further technocratic ideas and beliefs.

Du Moulin's first act in office is to resurrect an old idea of his: the *Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale*. Devised in 1941 as a bid to counter Déat's single-party project, it had quickly fallen apart due to a lack of resources and interest on the *Maréchal*'s part. Here, however, in a new regime that lends itself particularly well to such prospects, du Moulin decides to bring together pro-Pétain organizations and movements to finally establish the RRN as the sole legal party. While an overall successful venture, he notably fails at bringing the collaborationist parties into it, as the Reich intervenes to safeguard their independence, considering them potentially useful assets in case of a rowdy French government.

The rest of du Moulin's term is relatively uneventful. Of note is a continued crackdown on remaining *Résistance* movements, which sees the *Service d'ordre légionnaire* gaining an unexpectedly prominent role when they successfully stop an assassination attempt against the Vice-President of the Council, along with du Moulin's attempts at giving the RRN a local implantation through regional and departemental committees, dedicated to "spread the word" of the party, along with organizing activities. It is also worth noting that by 1946 the *Maréchal*, despite being a respected and well-loved

figure, is 90 years old: as such, he ends up delegating most of the actual governmental work to du Moulin, and serving as a ceremonial Chief of State of sorts, with du Moulin forwarding him laws he should sign.

In June 1948, Eugène Deloncle, MSR leader and Communications Minister, is shot in broad daylight by an unidentified assassin. While Deloncle is not particularly missed, the collaborationist ministers start getting rowdy and accusing each other, with old quarrels between the PPF's Doriot and the RNP's Déat flaring up again. After weeks of public mudslinging, and after accusations begin to be thrown after the government and the Prime minister himself, du Moulin decides that enough is enough, and fires the ultracollaborationist ministers from the government. The ultras are quick to find some much-needed unity and go to the German ambassador in order for him to right what they see as an utter injustice; Germany, however, has little faith in the ultras' capacity to act as a coherent political force, and instead favors the until-now trustworthy RRN; thus, Germany kindly tells the ultras to bide their time and to try and "reinforce France's inner security"; with them quickly falling back into petty squabbles once again.

The following years go by relatively quietly on the domestic front, with elections in 1950 renewing the *Conseil national* and consolidating the RRN's grip on power. Foreign policy-wise, France struggles to maintain pre-war partnerships and relations, growing slowly isolated as it becomes dependent on German demand for its agricultural goods to sustain its economy. Hamstrung by cartelisation agreements and military restrictions, France can maintain only superficial heavy industries, mostly in aeronautics, and agriculture consolidates its place as the more dynamic sector of the French economy, light-grade manufacturing a solid second, boosted in part by rising standards of living in the population. While the government is unsatisfied with the sluggish progress on the Algerian resource extraction programme, it has nonetheless managed to stem the tide of inflation, prevent massive capital flight, and preserved an acceptable trade balance; there isn't euphoria like in the 1920s, but the horrors of wartime shortages and mass poverty are now long gone.

## 1951-1954: The Second du Moulin and Legrand Governments

On the 23rd of July 1951, Philippe Pétain, France's respected Chief of State, war hero, and beloved grandfather passes away. The French are in mourning, as it seems to be the end of an era. The *Maréchal* is given a state funeral, with numerous heads of state being present, and he is buried in the Panthéon in Paris, with many of France's most illustrious men by his side. with the Ossuaire de Douaumont (the most prominent WW1 veterans cemetery) still being in German-occupied territory.

While Pétain had repeatedly expressed his desire for Admiral François Darlan to become Chief of State after him, this technocratic figure irritates more than one in Germany, where the Admiral is seen as too independent-minded, and his ties with the Americans Robert Murphy, American Consul to Algiers, and Admiral William Leahy, American ambassador to France, mark him as a suspicious Anglophile. As a consequence, Otto Abetz, German ambassador to France, puts in no uncertain terms that Darlan's

accession to power would be intolerable for the *Führer*, and suggests Vice-President of the Council du Moulin convinces the *Congrès national* to elect a more agreeable figure.

Therefore, the *Congrès national* convenes to elect a new Chief of State in the *palais de Versailles*. However, it quickly becomes apparent that this is easier said than done, as the question of who can succeed the late *Maréchal* seems to have no answer. After all, such a respected and towering figure would always cast a shadow on his successors, so what is to be done? Multiple viewpoints would come to emerge. Apart from royalists around Charles Maurras' *L'Action française* [The French Action] newspaper advocating for a monarchical restoration as the only worthy succession to the *Maréchal*, most politicians don't exactly agree on one person, but they do have a few ideas they want to preserve.

With German intervention having excluded the most legitimate candidate, it seems the most sensible option is to opt for a figure so removed from politics neither Germany nor any RRN member will have a problem with his election. As such, the executive committee of the RRN decides to try to find an unassertive candidate, and they seemingly find the perfect one in the person of Pétain's personal secretary, army general Émile Laure: while devoid of heroic acts or most political experience, this very lack of experience along with his personal connections to the late *Maréchal* make him the perfect person in their eyes.

Laure, while very much surprised when approached by du Moulin, ends up reluctantly agreeing after his insistent lobbying. After only one round of voting, the *Congrès national* elevates Émile Laure as the new Chief of State, despite the collaborationists decrying the "Petainist monarchy", and on the 1st of August 1951, Émile Laure is formally inaugurated as the second Chief of the French State. To signal a continuity between his rule and Pétain's, he re-appoints du Moulin de Labarthète as Vice-President of the Council. Du Moulin further maintains the continuity by maintaining a delicate balance between the varying groups that now compose the RRN, though still excluding the collaborationists.

Du Moulin de Labarthète dies a few months later, on the 17th of November, from a heart attack at the unusually young age of 51. Laure, on Bouthillier's advice, appoints Jean-Charles Legrand, a lawyer and official from the Secretary of State for Information.

Legrand's government is, yet again, relatively uneventful: those aren't the "Quiet Years" for nothing, after all. Most notably, Legrand's Secretary of State for Public Instruction, Jacques Chevalier, manages to have a decree passed to finally dissipate the vagueness of the constitution regarding the nature of religion in France, declaring that the state recognizes Catholicism as the religion of the majority of the people.

In such silent and uneventful years, one could hope and expect that the French State would have ensured its perennity against adversity, and that it would have secured its rightful place among the European order. However, fate would decide against it, and on

the 14th of February, 1954, the Berlin stock market would crash, and its consequences would soon be felt in the farthest-flung corners of France.

## 1954-1962: The Dark Years

### 1954-1956: The Second Bouthillier Government

As the German economic crash happens, its ripples are soundly and thoroughly felt in France. At first, the French economy is relatively shielded from the turmoil, as its archaic banking structure has limited integration and foreign reliance to a certain extent. Moreover, France exports vital foodstuffs to the Reich, and Germany can hardly do away with them, meaning the French trade balance remains steady. However, unemployment starts to spike as German companies massively lay off the cheap French labour they had enrolled until then. At first wary of any massive state intervention, Legrand realizes soon, however, that this unemployment isn't going to dissipate on its own, and decides, to avoid disaffected workers joining a weakened Communist resistance, to extend the duration of the *Chantiers de la jeunesse française* [French Youth Projects] from six months to two years, making room for the unemployed returnees from Germany and allowing France's youth to have an improved training during their unofficial conscription time. While unpopular in the youth, this move essentially freezes any contestation movement, as the concerned individuals are sent into the countryside for two years of training, and their elders mostly approve of the decision, since it frees up jobs for them.

Despite the sluggish pace of change inherent to indirect elections, people nonetheless favor technocratic or economically aware candidates in the 1954 election, and this trend runs to the *Conseil national* as well, slowly shifting the balance of power towards Bouthillier's followers.

While the situation slowly degrades in Europe and France watches cautiously from the wayside, another problem suddenly surfaces, and shatters France's illusion of sustained growth. As 1955 dawns over a gloomy Europe, Algerian independentists, encouraged by the ills faced by the Pakt, declare themselves and start a guerilla war that the French State is unable to put down quickly. The insurrection spreads and gains supporters across the world, and soon the grand promises of cheap Algerian natural resources evaporate. With them the value of the Reconstruction Bonds created by Bouthillier disappears, creating a crazed bank run, followed by an acute liquidity crisis. With a good chunk of the population's savings vanishing in a matter of days, France's economy soon enters a brutal recession, diving with the rest of Europe into an economic crisis of enormous proportions.

This has immediate repercussions on the political sphere, as popular discontent against the establishment and against Germany spikes. German dominance over Europe, which was thought to be unbreakable, is suddenly falling apart at the seams, and France's problematic place in post-war Europe is laid bare for everyone to see. The government, while officially united, heavily disagrees on what course to take, and Jean-Charles Legrand ends up resigning in disgrace over the party's disunity, worsening the public's perception of

the situation. In such dire times, a known and reassuring hand is needed: President Laure, as such, calls back Yves Bouthillier, and appoints him as Prime Minister, urging him to deal with the crisis.

Bouthillier, decided to salvage what he can of his 1946 masterplan, immediately decides to revoke Legrand's orders of fiscal discipline, and spends the next year working tirelessly to repurpose the now barely valuable Reconstruction Bonds everyone thought were impossibly solid. Through costly devaluation measures and a buy-back program, the government is able to contain the losses of the population to about half the initial investments made into the Reconstruction Bonds. People are in uproar, of course, that half their savings could be allowed to dissipate overnight, and the bubbling discontent can do nothing but escalate as the government proclaims it has done all that it could to protect the common man. This causes a number of low-level politicians to break away from the RRN: while nominally loyal to the regime, they are fed up with the partocracy that has taken root and so carelessly gambled with the future of its citizens, and look to a new leader to allow them to coalesce into an effective movement.

At the same time, the repurposing of the Reconstruction Bonds finally takes form, now being staked on the promise of industrial renewal and expansion: despite being in the throes of the crisis, Bouthillier, ever the astute statesman, has understood that the economic downturn gives France the perfect opportunity to reorient its efforts towards a diversification of the economy and a reindustrialisation effort, and away from overreliance on Germany. Still, a large number of people remain unemployed, some have seen their entire savings disappear, and the war in Algeria is already taking a toll on the French morale, as the elusive Algerian independentists manage to avoid direct engagements with the French Army.

At the same time, however, another problem rears its ugly head. In times of crisis such as these, the French people used to be able to look up to its beloved *Maréchal* for guidance and reassurance, with his grandfatherly demeanor serving as a beacon of light even in the darkest of nights. While the boat has stayed relatively steady during good times, it has become apparent, however, that Émile Laure is no Philippe Pétain, and while the Chief of State does his best to calm the nation and soothe the political sphere, the very inexperience for which he was elected make it difficult for him to achieve much of note.

The direct effect this has on the political landscape is that Petainism begins to lose some steam, at the benefit of ultracollaborationist pre-war parties, but also at the benefit of the *Résistance*, which experiences a surge in growth during that period, with unemployed and dissatisfied political dissidents alike joining whichever network suits their sensibilities best. On the surface, however, the regime is still relatively stable, with a mostly apathetic population which recalls the war's sad days.

The remainder of Bouthillier's term happens without fanfare, as France licks its wounds and its post-war development proceeds at a more deliberate pace. However, another problem looms on the horizon, as the old Russian bear prepares to strike back.

On the 9th of May 1956, the West Russian Revolutionary Front declares war on the *Reich*: the West Russian War has begun, and Germany is at war again. The *Légion des volontaires français* is requisitioned to fight on the Eastern front like in the olden days, and the collaborationists celebrate its departure, in hopes that this war will mark the end of communism, once and for all. In France, meanwhile, public opinion is not overly favorable to such a faraway and distant war, with the RRN being relatively lukewarm on the issue: with the *Reich's* defeat unlikely, the harshness of Germany's demands towards France the last time definitely turns the French people and their leaders against their overlord.

The Reich itself, due to the somewhat limited scale of the war, doesn't pressure France, and is content with the LVF's presence, which, unlike in the Second World War, has some military effect; this, in turn, prompts Germany to order the LVF to be brought to division size. The outbreak of the war also has the side effect of reawakening the communist elements in the *Résistance*: following multiple attacks, similar in method and in scope to the 1941-42 wave of communist attacks during the war, and especially following a barely-missed attempt on his life by a Glaive member, Bouthillier decides to resign for the time being, citing fears for his family, and privately not wanting to be blamed should even more terrorist attacks happen.

## 1956-1958: The Ménétrel Government

Laure, advised by Bouthillier, decides to task Bernard Ménétrel, Pétain's former personal doctor and current RRN baron, with forming a government. Ménétrel, while not seen as the most astute politician, is considered an uncontroversial pick, and a sort of spiritual heir to the late du Moulin. However, the new Vice-President of the Council has plans of his own...

While Ménétrel tries to shepherd the RRN to the best of his ability, it quickly shows itself to have limits: while presenting a façade of unity, its relatively loose guiding principles, born out of the endless compromises needed for its creation, make it so that old RRN partisan divisions are still present, with the Party slowly descending into factionalism, with multiple ideological factions forming.

Ménétrel's other main initiative is to fight against the uptick in communist *Résistance* activity, especially as sabotage and terrorist attacks begin to multiply: to that end, Ménétrel decides to establish an actual secret police for the regime. As the traditional military intelligence is suspect of *Résistance* sympathies to Germany, Otto Abetz suggests coopting the quasi-integrality of the wartime *Carlingue*, the French Gestapo, into the *Service de Sûreté Nationale* [National Safety Service], giving them ample funds in exchange for the merciless hunt for *Résistance* members and other

subversives. Pierre Bonny and Henri Lafont, the erstwhile heads of the Carlingue, are chosen to head the newly-created SSN: while the Service quickly gets itself going, and is quite efficient at rooting out subversive activity, its brutality and general carelessness for possible casualties contribute to a growing dissatisfaction with the government, seen as incompetent in stopping the SSN's worst excesses, and although the government would like to, it quickly becomes somewhat reliant on the Service, perpetually delaying any attempt at reform.

In time January 1958 comes, and Ménétrel's government is embroiled in a small scandal concerning the misappropriation of Reconstruction Bonds destined to a number of small factories in the Lot department. Fiscal controls in the region soon reveal the depth of the corruption that had taken root thanks to local patronages, and the relatively small affair quickly balloons to enormous proportions as people take to the streets and gather around an impromptu leader, Pierre Poujade, a papermaker and municipal councillor from the small town of Saint-Céré, whose down-to-earth demeanor and earnest language catches the feeling of many Frenchmen. The movement keeps growing, and shows no signs of stopping.

While Laure and Ménétrel call for calm and reason, and are privately open to discussions, a first round of negotiations ends up collapsing, leaving both sides riled up at the other: Ménétrel publicly orders protesters to return home, threatening reprisals if the movement doesn't die down, as Poujade, by now the unofficial leader of the protests, refuses to follow Ménétrel's demands, and in turn calls on the Chief of State to act and to dismiss the Prime Minister. However, on February 6, Émile Laure is found dead in his office at 76 years old from a stress-induced heart attack. The nation is in shock and disarray, as it finds itself headless.

As the *Congrès national* convenes, and as the protests show no signs of stopping, Ménétrel decides to step down, and to put forward his protégé, Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, as Vice-Presidential candidate, hoping to placate the people and confident his successor would continue the broad strokes of his governance. The *Congrès national* ends up electing Charles Huntziger, military general and respected war hero, in the hopes of replicating the "divine surprise" of a figure for the people to rally around, and continuing the nascent tradition of electing somewhat disinterested military men as Chief of State. Huntziger, in his first act in office, appoints Tixier-Vignancour as Vice-President of the Council, in the hopes to resolve the crisis.

## 1958-1962: The Tixier-Vignancour Government

In his first course of action, to placate the protesters, Tixier-Vignancour decides to meet with Pierre Poujade in early March, to hear the movement's demands. The "*Mouvement des petits*", as it has begun to be called, calls for an end to the tax hike and



more restrictions on big banking, along with a "deprofessionalization of politics", criticizing the opaque and corrupt character of RRN politics.

On the 15th of March 1958, back-and-forth negotiations end up with the adoption of the Accords du Luxembourg: a law on corruption is passed, and a tax cut for SMEs is to be enacted as well. The protesters mostly disperse, but Poujade, now a national figure, dreams of his political destiny. Nonetheless, the new Vice-President has managed to stabilize the situation, even if many problems still plague the state. The 1958 elections confirm this tendency, with many RRN municipal councils falling to independents, and a small number of independents making their way to the *Conseil national* as a result. In the *Grand conseil* election, no independent manages to win a seat, but a few younger, reform-minded candidates make it through.

During the years following the elections, the various policy differences that kept the RRN's divided did not disappear, far from it. While the RRN was ostensibly united, it had become an open secret among the halls of power that factions, coterie and cliques had begun forming: organized around ideas for state reform and around select leaders, those factions would begin advocating for their preferred brand of reform, putting the stability of the party at risk. Tixier-Vignancour, not wanting to depict the RRN as disunited and prone to dissension, would in the following years try some soft reform to the party structure to make it more centralized, but would be met by strong opposition.

The following years of Tixier-Vignancour's administration go by in relative quietness: Bouthillier, as the Minister and Secretary of State for National Economy and Finance, tries to pursue industrial development as best he can. *Résistance* activity has somewhat flared up again, forcing the government to redirect resources to fight it yet again.

And so, the game opens in January 1962, with France still in uncertain straits. The *Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale* tries to keep a facade of unity, but everyone inside it knows that factionalism abounds, ready to show its face at the 1962 *Conseil national* election. Outside of it, the vultures are circling, waiting for an opportunity to strike and to finally have a shot at power. While Tixier-Vignancour and the Conservatives are convinced that tweaking Pétain's system is enough to keep things under control, growing contestation both from their left and from their right threatens their ambitions. What will become of France, in such a tumultuous decade?

Only the *Maréchal* knows.



# Starting Situation

## National Spirits

### Les Années Noires

Political Power Gain : -30%

Stability Factor : -20%

Consumer Goods Factor : +10%

"Ever since the Maréchal's death, France has been feeling lost. The loss of its leader, the loss of its prosperity, the loss of its empire: all these successive tragedies have contributed to the general feeling of somberness within the people, popularly dubbed the Années Noires, the "dark years". France lost seemingly everything following the 1940 debacle, including its very soul; any sense of national pride is long-gone, and it would take a momentous event to get France out of its torpor, and even more to get it to feel pride again."

### Economic Slump

Production Speed Building Factor : -20%

Industrial Capacity : -20%

Production Factory Efficiency Gain Factor : -20%

Trade Opinion Factor : -50%

"Despite the successive governments' best efforts, France has not been able to get out of the economic slump the Reich brought it in in 1954. While the agricultural sector has improved since the war's end (mostly due to German pressure to increase its output), it's just about the only one: the rest of France's economy is horribly disorganized, with various overlapping and overly politicized corporatist bodies turning various sectors in little more than factional fiefs, with much of France's industry having been neglected since the war's end."

### The Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Disunited

Stability: +5%

Administrative efficiency malus

"Henry du Moulin de Labarthète's brainchild, the ruling Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale, or RRN, has established a stranglehold on the French political landscape, with opposition forces being comparatively marginal. And yet, this has far from

secured Pétain's National Revolution as the dominant doctrine of the land, for no one within the party seems to be able to agree on what it actually stands for.\n\n

The party has become divided into multiple squabbling factions, each professing different ideas while paying lip service to the regime's guiding principles, and this has reverberated into France's governance, with corruption and patronage becoming widespread."

## The SSN

"The SSN, or National Safety Service, are the regime's secret police, and our most useful and valued tool to fight against opposition activity of any kind. While their methods are violent, bordering on the gratuitous, and have led to several missteps in the past, we cannot do without them, or else who knows what might happen to us..."

## Assorted Laws

### 1946 Constitution

Fully applied in the immediate aftermath of World War II but already planned by the National Council since 1941, the current Constitution defines the French State as a "national and authoritarian" regime whose goal is to "preserve and to transmit the vast moral or material heritage that is called France". The state's legislature is bicameral but mostly advisory, the National Council and the National Congress being appointed by a President for life - traditionally a military officer in line with Pétain's legacy. However, as the years passed, the President's role became increasingly ceremonial, with the Prime Minister having become the nation's *de facto* main decision-maker.

### Law on the Status of Jews

A legacy of the Laval era signed by Marshal Pétain himself, the 3rd of October 1940 law on the status of Jews symbolizes in the eyes of the free world the infamy of Paris' collaboration with the Reich. Heavily inspired by both Nuremberg Laws and Maurras' state antisemitism, it defines as Jewish every individual with at least three grandparents of Jewish origins and forbids the Jews' access to public and cultural functions. Completed in the following years by increasingly antisemitic measures such as a generalized segregation policy, it culminated with the handover of thousands of men, women and children to Germany - a crime the French authorities still deny to this day.

### Law on Associations and Organizations

The 1901 law assuring the freedom of association was amended by the Pétainist authorities in 1947, making the foundation of a political party or a cultural association possible only if state-approved. This measure aiming to reinforce the RRN's hold over

public life coupled with severe moral laws made the French intellectual landscape greatly barren; state-employed artists are forced to follow literally the censors' directives, while the most rebellious ones either exiled themselves to the United States or created a genuine underground political and cultural life in total opposition with the National Revolution's values. One could say two parallel societies exist in France.

### **Unfinished Corporatism**

While rejecting both capitalism and Marxism in favor of class collaboration, the French State never truly shaped its economic policy; its corporatism remains unorganized in practice. The 1941 Labour Charter, the Peasant Corporation, the Institute for Corporative and Social Studies are as many attempts to build a new paternalist and modernist system - attempts that stay unfinished. These reforms' non-conclusion made the French economy utterly factionalized and disunited, the myriad of diverging interests inside of the various institutions competing against each other. Even worse, this utter deadlock of visions and competing interests makes progress difficult, if not impossible.

### **Chevalier Decree**

The Chevalier Decree stands as one of the key measures of the Legrand premiership; named after the philosopher and then-Secretary of State for Public Instruction Jacques Chevalier, it was first conceived as a way to reconnect France with its Christian heritage by recognizing Catholicism as the faith of the majority of the population without making it the state religion. A turning point in the building of the French State as a deeply reactionary regime, it results in greater privileges for the Church such as state funding for clergy-run private schools and Catholic youth movements. However, the decree is widely criticized by various politicians, some Reformists calling it too backwards and Traditionalists considering it too moderate.

# Party Popularity

Fascism 1: Parti populaire français (Jacques Doriot) - 5% (Fascism)

Fascism 2: Rassemblement national populaire (Marcel Déat) - 6% (Neosocialism)

Ultrnationalism: Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale - Traditionalistes (Thierry Maulnier) - 15% (Reactionary Nationalism)

Despotism 1: Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale - Conservateurs (Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour) - 21% (Civilian Dictatorship)

Despotism 2: Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale - Technocrates (François Lehideux) - 17% (Managerial State)

Paternalism 1: Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale - Réformistes (Antoine Pinay) - 18% (Anocracy)

Paternalism 2: Mouvement poujadiste (Pierre Poujade) - 5% (Poujadism)

Conservatism: Indépendants (Various Leaders) - 7% (Agrarianism)


Liberal Conservatism - N/A

Liberalism: Conseil national de la Résistance (Various Leaders) - 6%

Progressivism: N/A

Socialism - Nouveaux mouvements sociaux (Various Leaders) - 4%

Communism - N/A



# Parties and Organizations Breakdown

## *Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale*

The *Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale* is a rather Frankensteinian entity born as a result of the merger of the RRN's constituent organisations in 1958. While it is nominally united, factions have begun to form due to the heavy ideological differences within the party, and now it is up to Tixier-Vignancour to keep this sandcastle of his own design from crumbling down.

### Conservatives:

The standard-bearers of the status quo within the regime, who claim to govern along Pétain's principles through the RRN. In truth, they are mostly a faction of careerists and partocrats, wanting to preserve the party and their position first, and further truly ideological goals second. That's not to say that they are not ideological, for many of their members still adhere to the principles of the *Révolution nationale*, but as it has largely been entrenched in French society, this political commitment broadly translates into a defence of the status quo.

Main figures: Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Georges Sauge.

Subfactions:

- **Pétainists**, advocating for a direct continuation of the status quo (JLTV, Borotra);
- **Algerianists**, made of Pieds-Noirs and rabidly pro-Algeria MPs, whose main concern is the Algerian departments, and in general the preservation of France's territory (Lagaillarde, Susini, Le Pen);
- **National-Catholics**, who advocate for an expanded focus on religion within society but otherwise support the established order of the "partisan dictatorship" of the RRN (Sauge, Le Roy Ladurie).

Supported by: the majority of the *Conseil national* and of civil servants.

Main ideologies: Civilian Dictatorship; Aristocratic Conservatism, National Conservatism, National Catholicism.

### Technocrats:

The direct heirs of Darlan's technocrats and of Yves Bouthillier's CEPEC. They are united in a belief in top-down management of the economy by experts, whether through corporatism or dirigisme and thorough planification of the economy.

Main figures: Yves Bouthillier, Jean Bichelonne, Pierre Pucheu.

#### Subfactions:

- **Corporatists**, the Technocrats' old guard advocating for a continuation and perfection of corporatism and more input from experts (Bouthillier, Pucheu, Lehideux);
- **Primevères**, Jean Bichelonne's faction, advocating for the Plan PRIME, an ambitious economic planning initiative to thrust France into modernity at 320 kph (Jean Bichelonne, Jean Jardin);
- **Left-Technocrats**, the remnants of the X-Crise think-tank, advocating for an quasi-socialist planned economy (Jean Coutrot, Charles Spinasse).

Supported by: higher civil servants, corporations and the Navy.

Main ideologies: Managerial State; Technocratic Corporatism, Utopian Socialism, Left-Wing Corporatism.

#### Reformists:

The most liberal faction of the RRN. Made up of former Third Republic politicians and of young and ambitious dreamers who advocate for liberalization, de-bureaucratization of the state, or even a return to democracy, their popularity has been growing steadily over the past few years, as the state's problems became ever more apparent. Led by Antoine Pinay, they officially advocate for an expansion of direct elections and for a laxer governance, but their true plans may go quite further than that...

Main figures: Roger Duchet, Antoine Pinay, François Mitterrand.

#### Subfactions:

- **Reformers**, composed of economically liberal politicians who criticize corporatism and the flight of capital to Germany (Duchet, Pinay, EGE);
- **Labourists**, Europeist heirs of the Radical Party and the SFIO, who desire more protection for workers, along with a fairer revision of the Labour Chart (Mitterrand, Hernu, Bousquet).

Supported by: local elected officials and the urban middle class.

Main ideologies: Anocracy; Liberal Conservatism, Neocorporatism.

#### Traditionalists:

The traditionalist elements of the Vichy regime, heirs to decades of reaction and centuries of monarchy, they call back fondly to the better times of Pétain himself, away from the rebirth of parliamentary decadence. They advocate for reinvigorated corporatism, a focus on agriculture and the countryside, and are in favor of more personalist leadership, having



a distaste for the oligarchy of the RRN and especially the (so perceived) undue influence of the Technocrat and Reformist wings which, in their minds, has corrupted the organization.

Main figures: Thierry Maulnier, Pierre Sidos, Pierre Juhel.

Subfactions:

- **Old Guard**, who advocate for a "republican" state in the continuation of Pétain's regime, along with a continuation of the *Révolution nationale* (Maulnier, Vallat);
- **Monarchists**, heirs to Maurras and the *Action française*, who advocate for a monarchy based on the principles of integral nationalism as set down by Maurras (Pujo, Juhel);
- **Neo-Pétainists**, who advocate for a return to *Révolution nationale* principle infused with fascism (Sidos, Venner).

Supported by: the Church, the Army, and rural notables.

Main ideologies: Reactionary Nationalism; Aristocratic Conservatism, Integralism, Clerical Fascism.

## Service d'ordre légionnaire:

The security apparatus of the RRN's predecessor, the *Légion française des combattants* [French Legion of Veterans], the *Service d'ordre légionnaire* [Legionary Security Service] is one of the most powerful militant organizations in France, if only because of its numerical strength. A staunchly pro-German paramilitary, it serves as the rather volatile arm of the RRN, that can serve the Regime's interests as much as it can intentionally or unintentionally hinder them, drawing members from both collaborationist parties and the disaffected French youth. They are as brutal and violent as the Francistes, if not moreso, but they serve as a haven to many young folks disappointed by the sorry state of society, looking for a future career in the RRN, or seeking refuge in the camaraderie of France's biggest paramilitary movement.

Main figures: Joseph Darnand, Francis Bout de l'An, Paul Touvier.

Main ideology: Ultranationalism.

# Collaborationist Parties and Organizations

## Rassemblement national populaire:

The most prominent collaborationist organization at game start, it is led by Marcel Déat. A neosocialist and europeist party, it believes that collaboration with Germany is necessary to eventually achieve a united and socialist Europe. It benefits from the most backing and funds from Germany due to their overt support for the Reich, and has some backing from non-conformist intellectuals and workers formerly supporting the SFIO, and disappointed with the RRN's lack of emphasis on social measures. Nonetheless, it is still relatively small, having been somewhat marginalized by the RRN's creation during the 1950s, and Marcel Déat's dream of a single-party seems to have been stolen away from him...

Main figures: Marcel Déat, Henri Barbé, Roland Goguillot, Georges Albertini.

Main ideology: Neosocialism.

## Parti populaire français:

Led by Jacques Doriot, and once the largest mass party in France, it is nowadays the second most prominent collaborationist party, representing a somewhat unique strand of French fascism, advocating for participationism in the economy, and for public governance founded on plebiscites. Centered around the figure of Doriot as "*le Chef*", and finding most of its strength in formerly communist parts of the country, it has nonetheless somewhat fallen out of favor with their German backers, being seen as potentially too independent-minded. At game start, it has essentially degenerated into a personality cult around the figure of Doriot himself.

Main figures: Jacques Doriot, Maurice-Yvan Sicard, François Duprat.

Main ideology: Fascism.

## Parti franciste:

The third-most important collaborationist party, it is secretly funded by Italy, and is mostly renowned for its brutal, squadrist-like methods. Led by an aging Marcel Bucard, they find themselves with fewer and fewer members, as many begin to jump over to the more popular SOL, only retaining the original cadre of Franciste loyalists, as well as Italophile fascists looking to distance themselves from German influence.

Main figures: Marcel Bucard, Paul Guiraud.

Main ideology: Sansepolcristmo.

### Mouvement social révolutionnaire:

Once a significant collaborationist party working somewhat harmoniously with the RNP, it now stands as a quasi-satellite of the former after Eugène Deloncle's marginalization and eventual assassination in 1948, with only a few thousand of militants to show for it. It is relatively insignificant, even if it has tried a rapprochement with the RRN's Traditionalists.

Main figures: Georges Soulès, Robert Denoël.

Main ideology: Reactionary Nationalism.

### Parti ouvrier et paysan français:

A most peculiar curiosity among collaborationist parties, the POPF serves as a front party for workers and leftist sympathizers, to avoid them falling into the arms of the Resistance. It is mostly seen as a joke, as its blatant pro-German rhetoric casts doubt on its communist credentials, and most of its potential base already supports either the Resistance, the RNP or the PPF.

Main figures: Marcel Capron.

Main ideology: National Communism.

### Légion des volontaires français:

The Legion of French Volunteers against Bolshevism was originally a volunteer corps created by the prominent collaborationist parties to go fight on the Eastern Front during the war, but went mostly inactive after 1945. As the West Russian War broke out, however, it got reactivated, but its experiences fighting alongside the Germans, along with the collaborationist parties' irrelevancy, only increased factionalism, with competing collaborationist parties looking to appropriate the LVF's glory and command positions. While it ostensibly obeys its political committee and associates itself with the collaborationists, it may have its own agenda, forged from the bonds of wartime camaraderie rank and file volunteers forge on the battlefield, far from their parties' political infighting...

Main figures: Edgar Puaud, Marc Augier, Constantin Amilakvari.

Main ideology: Fascism.

## Independent tendencies

Apart from the crumbling monolith that is the RRN and the collaborationist nebula, some independent councilors sit in the consultative chambers. They can be broadly divided into two groups: Poujadists, and non-Poujadists.

### Mouvement poujadiste:

While not an official party, the *Mouvement des Petits* did not totally disperse after the Luxembourg Accords. Pierre Poujade has become a public figure, speaking in rallies across the nation, and advocating for a radical change in course. Criticizing the RRN's stranglehold on power, his ideas of direct democracy and advocacy for the common man has seen him getting very popular with an important part of the middle class, and while the movement hasn't had any important electoral success yet, it is no secret that some of the independents councilors have indubitable Poujadist sympathies...

Main figures: Pierre Poujade, Léon Gingembre.

Main ideologies: Poujadism; Populist Conservatism, Fascist Populism.

### Indépendants:

The variety of non-RRN aligned politicians that populate the French political landscape. They are mostly present in rural local politics, and hold by essence myriads of different views. Nonetheless, the fact that they reject the RRN apparatus for one reason or another already speaks volume, and a few loud-mouthed independents have managed to become national figures.

Main figures: Camille Laurens, Henri Dorgères.

Main ideologies: Agrarianism.

## The Armed Forces

The French Armed Forces lie in a sorry state due to the Second Treaty of Versailles. This, far from uniting them, has only exacerbated the deep divides within, with a number of factions holding differing viewpoints emerging as a result.

### Imperials:

The bulk of the officer corps, Imperials adhere, consciously or not, to Maurras' motto, "*la France seule* [France alone]". Opposed to any military cooperation with the Pakt, they generally are in favor of growing non-Pakt diplomatic relations, particularly with the United States, in order to balance out foreign influence and preserve the illusion of France's role as an independent, imperial power. While the most populated faction in the military overall, its most prominent and famous leaders come from the Army of Africa stationed outside of the mainland, and the *Centre d'information gouvernemental* [Government Information Centre], France's military intelligence, which is often compared to a parallel state exclusively focused on shielding France from German influence.

Main figures: Alphonse Juin, Raoul Salan, Henri Navarre.

### Organisation de résistance de l'Armée:

A peculiar group, the *Organisation de résistance de l'Armée* [Resistance Organisation of the Army] is composed of many younger officers, making it *per se* not a faction of the Army, but rather a more militant and mainland-based subgroup of the Imperials. Focused around CIG members, the ORA has been responsible for a number of revanchist actions since the Armistice of 1940, such as secretly developing the SARL-42 tank, hiding as much war materiel from the Wiesbaden Commission as possible, or coordinating the various paramilitary organizations created by the state in order to facilitate their conversion to military divisions in wartime.

Main figures: Paul Paillole, Pierre Lejeune, Pierre du Passage.

### Europeists:

A growing clique of otherwise heterogeneous officers, the Europeists advocate for more integration into the Pakt's military structure, either out of ideological commitment or opportunism. As opposed to Imperials, Europeists wish to do away with the pointless revanchism that has inhabited the French Army since 1940, and build a strong European bloc to anchor and strengthen France in its non-European endeavors, through cooperation, mutual understanding and equal relationship with the Reich.

Main figures: Charles Platon, Paul Ely, Charles Léchères.

## Africans:

A "horizontal" faction of the Army intersecting with both Imperials and Europeists, the Africans are mainly preoccupied with protecting what remains of the French Empire from foreign encroachment and erosion, mostly adhering to the *Doctrine de guerre contre-révolutionnaire* [counter-revolutionary warfare doctrine] established during the 1950s. Drawing members from the two main factions, the Africans tend to find common ground with the Imperials in arguing that an African presence is necessary to give the French Army operational depth in future European operations, and with the Europeists in arguing that, through the continuation of an African presence, France can better contribute to Europe's wide palette of defence expertise.

Main figures: Maurice Challe, Edmond Jouhaud, Jacques Hogard.

## Underground Organizations

Those groups are forced to agitate for their cause underground, as they, or their ideology, are banned by the French State. As such, while they find some measure of success with the people, especially as the situation on all fronts hasn't gotten better, they are forced to meet away from the State's watchful glare, such as in underground cafés or basements.

### The French *Résistance*

While the French *Résistance* has undoubtedly seen better days, it has never been truly wiped out, even in spite of the state's best efforts. After Ménétrel's harsh crackdown in the mid-1950s, they took to infiltrating the State and the RRN's many organs through local politics, on top of more traditional actions, and there are whispers of city boroughs and even towns having been completely taken over by them. Some even say they have begun to infiltrate local councils, but surely this is nothing more than fear-mongering drivel, right? While united through the *Conseil national de la Résistance* [National Resistance Council], it has nonetheless consolidated into four different networks, each with their own political inclinations.

#### Réseau Alliance:

This network was founded in 1940 on the remnants of anti-communist Army organizations active in the 1930s, and gathers germanophobic nationalists of every stripe. Despite suspicions from left-wing resisters that Alliance only serves as a front for government activity, the network takes advantage of its numerous sympathizers at every level of the state to gather intel they regularly share with the OFN and Free French.

Main figures: Georges Loustaunau-Lacau, Léon Faye, Marie-Madeleine Méric

Main ideology: National Conservatism.

#### Réseau Moulin:

This network's inception dates back to 1945, two years after the death of famed *Résistance* member Jean Moulin at the hands of the Gestapo. It started relatively small, but it quickly was chosen by the Free French to be the official mouthpiece of de Gaulle. When the *Général* and the *Résistance* started to break apart, the network aligned with the Government in Exile, evolving as a moderate, big-tent group. Its main activities consist in printing clandestine newspapers and broadcast US radio.

Main figures: Georges Bidault, Jean Lecanuet, Henri Frenay.

Main ideology: Christian Democracy.

### Réseau Némésis:

The network was founded by Francis Jeanson, who initially fled to Spain, and went in 1944 to Algeria where he met intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus who tried to persuade him to join the Free French forces. He finally decided to go back to the mainland, hoping to gather a following behind him of like-minded intellectuals to fight against the anti-intellectualism of the French State. In 1956, supported by Albert Camus a few years before his death, he finally "officialized" the creation of the Némésis network. Often described as the "*Résistance* of the thinkers" by the other networks, his following isn't as numerous as the other two, but its influence on the rebellious youth is not to be understated.

Main figures: Jean-Paul Sartre, Francis Jeanson, Henri Lefebvre.

Main ideology: Progressivism.

### Réseau Jaurès:

The more traditionally socialist network, named after Jean Jaurès. It is composed of SFIO members, with the network being very close to the underground SFIO, and of other, non-communists leftists, it is especially powerful in historically socialist regions, where it focuses on infiltrating low-level politics with eurosceptic fellow travelers.

Main figures: Daniel Mayer, Gaston Defferre, Michel Rocard.

Main ideology: Reformist Socialism.

### Réseau Glaive:

The heir to the various communist networks during the war, its growth is notably fueled by the enormous number of banned literature authored by some of the PCF's great ideologues, such as Marcel Cachin or Marceau Pivert, that was being smuggled in France. The Glaive network eventually became a rallying place for communists who wanted to fight against the Regime they saw as anti-social and illegitimate. They are the most active network, having more or less resurrected propaganda of the deed, and are constantly organizing maquis and conducting terrorist attacks in hopes of making their cause better known.

Main figures: Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, Pierre Georges (Colonel Fabien), Charles Tillon.

Main ideology: Bolshevism.



## The Nouveaux mouvements sociaux

More and more within France's youth are being drawn to illegal, revolutionary ideologies, in no small part thanks to the huge amount of banned literature being smuggled through the Mediterranean, the *Nouveaux mouvements sociaux* [New Social Movements] designate the various underground leftist organizations and parties that have sprung up as a result. Being an amalgamation of illegal movements, it mostly meets in undeclared cafés or libraries deeply hidden in dimly-lit basements, but who knows what the future holds when you've got such big dreams?

While the NMS are initially relatively confidential at game start, they progressively grow in size and numbers, and begin to feel more emboldened: this translates into an increasing number of attacks against SOL members and collaborationist parties members, but also against people they see as complicit in the reactionary Vichyist regime...

### Voix ouvrière internationaliste:

This trotskyist political movement was one of the first to appear in France. Founded in the mid 1930s by David Korner, it has grown and shrunk multiple times during the course of three decades of underground fighting against the bourgeoisie. However, it is somewhat less active than the NMS' other organizations, due to the ban on trade unions heavily lessening its potential support base; nonetheless, some young voices in the party are beginning to speak out against its protracted lethargy...

Main figures: Pierre Bousset, David Korner, Arlette Laguiller.

Main ideology: Bolshevik-Leninism.

### Jeunesse communiste révolutionnaire:

Another Trotskyist movement, it also rejects the Stalinist deviationism that caused the fall of the USSR. Offering training for urban combat, its members are often behind attacks against regime personnel and property. They have certain authoritarian tendencies, compared to other more libertarian factions, and support a revolutionary takeover of the state inspired by the October Revolution.

Main figures: Alain Krivine, Pierre Frank.

Main ideology: Bolshevik-Leninism.

### Union marxiste-léniniste de France:

Another organization that sees itself as the PCF's heir, it differs from the JCR in that it claims the legacy of Stalin against the Bukharinist complacency that caused the Soviet Union to crumble once the Reich came knocking. Similarly to the JCR, from which it

originally split, it provides armed training to its militants, and participates in direct action against the reactionary regime.

Main figures: Alain Geismar, Serge July, Régis Bergeron.

Main ideology: Marxism-Leninism.

### Union des groupes anarchistes communistes:

This group is more an amalgamation of different movements, rather than a united one. The UGAC is ideologically anarcho-syndicalist, and its lack of centralized leadership prevents it from getting enough weight in the NMS to substantially influence its focus. However, what they lack in weight, they have in strength. The movements are large, and their members are often very militant, which counterbalance their previous issues.

Main figures: Georges Fontenis, Nicolas Faucier.

Main ideology: Anarcho-Communism.

### Internationale situationniste:

The most libertarian movement of all, they defend a new age without borders, without wars, without money, and without work. These new ideas started gaining ground in France after the complete societal depression of the 1950s, during which young people were traumatized by what they saw as the end result of centuries of “historical misfortune” brought up by a world that has lost the true meaning of being alive. They have the most utopian and unreachable ideas of the NMS, but their influence on the NMS as a whole is felt through their various slogans and graffiti that serve as their main method of direct action.

Main figures: Daniel Blanchard, Guy Debord, Pierre Overney.

Main ideology: Left Communism.

### Action directe:

What started as some students wanting to gather equipment and training for the future revolution, quickly devolved into something that can only be described as an anarcho-communist “revolutionary militia” similar in structure to the SOL. Even compared to the other movements, their methods aren’t limited by ethics or morals: kidnappings, bombings, burning down buildings, nothing is out of the AD's book.

Main figures: Régis Debray, Pierre Goldman.

Main ideologies: Marxism-Leninism (before 1969), Amazonism (after 1969).



# The Issues

As was explained in the lore, the French State faces multiple issues going into the 1960s. This culminates into three major crises: a political crisis, an economic crisis and a diplomatic crisis.

The political crisis is directly linked to the death of the *Maréchal* Philippe Pétain, and to Laure's tumultuous time in office afterwards. One major issue the *Maréchal* and his followers had with the Third Republic, was the amount of political gridlocks it suffered. Parliamentarism and factionism was to him the reason why France fell so quickly. This idea stuck, at least during the war, but as the 1946 Constitution brought back some degree of constitutional legitimacy, and even with the consolidation of the political landscape under the *Rassemblement pour la Révolution nationale*, factionalism reared its ugly head once again.

In 1962, the RRN is quite factionalized, with Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour barely keeping its various factions from tearing each other apart. The other crises, and the lack of progress when it comes to fixing them, have made the party quite unpopular, and while things haven't come to open revolt just yet, the Party's stability is at stake. RRN-aligned politics are unpopular, and it will be up to the player to fix this, one way or another.

The economic crisis is the biggest hindrance for the development of the French State. The French Franc, the official currency of the French State, is a currency that was forced to have its value directly linked to the value of the Reichsmark. This already caused problems during the early stages of the war, as the Franc had its value decreased by the Reich. This was the first step towards financial instability, but the French economy had recovered by the late 1940s.

In the early 1950s, the German economy crashed, and with it the Franc and the French economy itself. Germany had initially reassured the French by promising German help to build extensions of the already existing ports in Marseille and Toulon. The crash had made that plan unfeasible, and the Reich scrapped their plans to help the French. France was left with only Atlantic and English Channel access, which has completely crushed its ability to reach the rest of the World.

By early 1962, the French economy still remains in a predictable slump, with recovery measures being scarce, as despite the Reich's tepid support France's economic well-being is still heavily reliant on Germany's, leaving it in a difficult position until Germany eventually recovers.

Finally, the diplomatic crisis is rooted in the two others, and is what prevents the French State from breaking its bonds with Germany. The 1940 Armistice of Compiègne limited the amount of troops the French State could actively have on its territory to a mere ceremonial, condemning the French Army to play second-fiddle in Europe, with the

added caveat that most of France's heavy gear is German-produced, leaving it truly beholden to the Reich.

As it stands, France is thus chained to the Reich. It is being treated *relatively* well, all things considered, especially in light of the fate reserved to Britain, for example, but it is a partnership at gunpoint, secured by the boots of the Wehrmacht rather than by long-term guarantees. The Franco-German relationship is one of eastern apathy against western resentment among much of the people, and rare are those among the French general population who truly desire to mend the rift with the German brothers. While most of the French political establishment prefers to bide its time, and thus is content to remain with Germany for the foreseeable future, many still dream of escaping the German yoke to achieve true, long-lasting freedom.

The diplomatic question thus needs to be addressed: while Germany is focused on consolidating its influence over the whole of Europe, France remains an unwilling member of its sphere, a horse that has grown tired of its rider. Thus any new French leader will have to carefully navigate the political landscape of bitter revanchists, opportunists and openly Germanophilic collaborators to avoid provoking the ire of its eastern neighbor.

## Intro: 1962-1963 - A Quiet Beginning



### The Cabinet at game start:

- President (GUI slot): Charles Huntziger
- Prime Minister (HoS slot): Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour<sup>1</sup> (Civilian Dictatorship) - Conservative
- Interior Minister (HoG slot)<sup>2</sup>: Roger Duchet (Paternalistic Conservatism) - Reformist
- Economic Minister : Yves Bouthillier (Technocratic Corporatism) - Technocrat
- Foreign Minister : Xavier Vallat (Reactionary Nationalism) - Traditionalist
- Security Minister : Alphonse Juin (National Catholicism) - Imperial

*Note: in France content, unless specified otherwise, the Prime Minister is represented as the primary leader in content and occupies the HoS slot, with the Interior Minister (a quite important role, considering the repressive character of the French State) occupying*

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<sup>1</sup> While Tixier-Vignancour IOTL is mostly known for being a pro-Algerian lawyer and running as the far-right candidate in the 1965 Presidential election, he was also a relatively minor Vichy functionary that served multiple functions before being arrested because of "insults against the Maréchal", freed, and then fleeing to Tunisia to be a lawyer again. What warrants his place here is that his sponsors for the Francisque were none other than Henry du Moulin de Labarthète and Bernard Ménétre, two prominent Prime Ministers TNOTL and the architects of the RRN system. Thus, it is conceivable that Tixier-Vignancour would be taken by the two as a protégé, which makes his position as Prime Minister at game start both the direct continuation and last gasp of the wartime Petainists, responsible for setting up the RRN system. This also explains his classification as a despotist instead of fascist: while OTL Tixier-Vignancour could be argued to be fascist, his position as the heir to the (non-fascist all things considered, para-fascist more than anything) Petainists such as du Moulin and Ménétre, along with his position as the leader of the (also non-fascist and para-fascist) RRN conservatives leaves him categorized in despotism.

<sup>2</sup> Due to the Head of Government (the Prime Minister) occupying the Head of State slot (which makes sense, as they are the "main character" of the narrative), the HoG slot will thus be filled by a minister of choice who either holds an important post for the PM's agenda, or is especially personally close to the PM (or both).

*the HoG slot. The President can be seen in a tooltip, similarly to the Monarch in current English content.*

At game start, the French State's situation is pretty dire. While social tension has somewhat cooled down since the 1958 protests, the situation hasn't substantially improved. As another quiet year begins, three main things are on the government's agenda: legislative work, working with the Algerian CSPA, and improving the economic situation. These three things are all part of the starting focus tree, and can be taken in whatever order.

*Tixier-Vignancour's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State : Charles Huntziger

Prime Minister: Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour - C

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Xavier Vallat - Tr

Minister of Finance and National Economy: Yves Bouthillier - Te

Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces: Alphonse Juin - Armed Forces

Minister of the Interior: Roger Duchet - R

Minister of Justice: Gabriel Jeantet - Tr

Minister of Public Instruction: Jérôme Carcopino - Tr

Minister of Culture: Georges Sauge - C

Minister of Youth and Sports: Jean Borotra - C

Minister of Labor and Industry : Pierre Pucheu - Te

Minister of Information : Jean-Marie le Pen - C

Minister of Agriculture : Jacques le Roy Ladurie - R

Minister of Territorial and Imperial Affairs: Paul Baudouin - R

## The Political Agenda

While the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale isn't completely imploding just yet, the independents' unexpectedly high performance in the 1958 legislative elections have made it necessary to get things in order within the party, and to keep factionalism under control. Tixier-Vignancour, as such, will first try to unite the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale, by making a speech detailing the necessity

for unity, and invoking the spirit of the late Maréchal. Afterwards, he will try to endear himself to a faction of his choice, by passing an act proposed by one of the five factions. As such, he can choose one between three actions, and taking the corresponding focus will boost the faction's opinion of the government.

- The **Reformists** are asking for select amnesty for political prisoners;
- The **Technocrats** are asking for the building of a dam;
- The **Traditionalists** are asking for an expanded emphasis on religious teaching;


Passing the subsequent bill will increase the popularity and influence of the given faction within the RRN.

Once one of these three proposals has been passed, the other main object on the government's agenda will be Education reform, mainly regarding school curriculums. Namely, those haven't been updated since about the mid-1940s, and are starting to severely show their age in many aspects. As such, the government will need to revise the curriculum, and will have to take a specific stance on three main issues. Of note is that adopting a given stance on an issue will both please the given factions supporting it, but also boost their popularity among the people, as their viewpoint will end up "vindicated".

- The War: the government can either choose to depict the "Strange Defeat" of 1940 as the natural outcome of the Third Republic's mistakes, pleasing the **Technocrats** and the **Traditionalists**, or it can depict it as a stain on France's honor, pleasing the **Reformists**.
- The Maréchal: the government can choose to depict the Maréchal as a kindly father for France, pleasing the **Technocrats**; depict him as a brave shield protecting France from the Reich first and foremost, pleasing the **Reformists**; or placing him as the country's spiritual guide, paving the way for newfound national prosperity and European cooperation, pleasing the **Traditionalists**.
- The Successor: the government can either depict Laure as a man who single-handedly tarnished the Maréchal's legacy, pleasing the **Traditionalists**, or portray him as a flawed but well-intentioned man who did the best he could, pleasing the **Technocrats** and **Reformists**.

Once the programs are finalized, the government's political agenda is done, and Tixier-Vignancour can now look at other issues.

## The Algerian Situation

*Detailed document:*  The Land Where Blood Never Rests - TNO Algeria Proposal



While France's grip on its colonial empire slowly but surely slipped in the 1950s, Algeria has remained steadily faithful to Paris. From 1954, however, Algerian nationalists started a guerilla war against the French presence, demanding the end of colonialism and the right to self-determination. While their successes have been varied, the nationalists, having coalesced over time in the Front de libération nationale, have been a consistent thorn in France's side, necessitating ever growing resources to be poured into the colony. But where, in Europe, the French Army has only known defeat and stagnation since 1940, it has been able to pivot towards new forms of warfare in Africa, dealing crippling blows to the ALN. In 1961, General Maurice Challe was able to marshal this strength to effectively wipe out the ALN, with the Algerian nationalists scattering in the countryside, their fighting capabilities destroyed.

At game start, General Challe is focused on mopping up the Algerian mountains, while in France, reformist colonial lobbies are able to use Challe's victory to propose a colonial reform bill in hopes of stabilizing Algeria for good. However, the threat of Houari Boumediène's 20.000-strong Armée des Frontières is still present in Morocco, necessitating urgent action from France and Iberia. Through the foci and the mechanic, the player's task will be to weaken the ALN further, negotiate with Iberia to act jointly against Boumediène, and make sure the colonial reform bill passes. Depending on the player's success with each of these tasks, French Algeria will fare better or worse during the Grande Discorde.

## The Economic Turmoil

By 1962, France's economy has not yet recovered from the German economic crash entirely, and while things are not as dire as they were in the mid-50s, they have not improved that much, with the economy still severely slumping and unrest still brewing. As such, the Président has a plan: by bringing the Technocrats in, namely Bouthillier and Pucheu, and letting them do their magic, the economic situation will improve, and the government will reap the rewards. However, recently, Petainist député Jean-Marie le Pen has come forward with an interesting proposal: instead of implementing the Technocrats' economic measures, which are less "flashy" and thus might be less popular among the general public, the government should co-opt some of Poujade and the independents' economic propositions, that he advocated for back in 1958; while this would be full, unabashed populism, he says this would indubitably result in popularity gains across the country.

As such, it is up to the player to choose what proposition they will adopt. They have three main choices:

- The government can decide to side with the Technocrats and fully follow their advice: Bouthillier will take the reins and bring Bichelonne in, and proceed to extend the public sector and give bigger freedoms to large corporations. This will please, and increase the influence within the RRN, of the Technocrats, while substantially improving the economy.

- The government can decide to side with the **Reformists** and to try to diversify trade outside the Pakt, along with trying to slightly liberalize some aspects of the economy (within the bounds of the heavy restrictions imposed by the Reich). This will increase the **Reformists'** influence within the RRN, and moderately improve the economy.
- The government can decide to side with either, but not fully follow either group's advice by mix-and-matching policy whenever possible; this will increase the influence of the **Traditionalists** within the RRN, and not improve the economy by a sizable amount due to the flip-flopping.

## Interlude: 1963-1964 - La Grande Discorde



[Must rework this whole section pertaining to Algeria - Manuun]

On the 16th of October, 1963, Adolf Hitler dies. In France, there is much rejoicing, with many among both the political landscape and the general population celebrating the death of Europe's tyrant; however, many are also worried, with fears that Hitler's death will cause chaos both within the Reich itself and within its bloc becoming commonplace. Sure enough, about ten days later, a power struggle begins to break out in Germany, and while the Einheitspakt still nominally exists, the Reich's European empire begins to crumble.

Most importantly for France, however, is what suddenly goes down in France's southernmost departments. Despite massive investments from the mainland, full support for the CSPA government, and reassurances from Sérigny that the FLN had effectively ceased to exist, Algerian nationalists launch an insurrection at the worst possible time, gaining control of multiple provinces and solidifying their hold on the southern desertic lands. Italy also sends a few divisions of expeditionary forces from Tunisia, establishing the Italian Expeditionary Forces in Algeria, and soon enough, France's last remaining crown jewel is yet again embroiled into turmoil.

# The Algerian Events

Most of the French Army is quickly shipped to Algeria, in a bid by Tixier-Vignancour to quickly quell the revolt and to keep the situation under control. However, it becomes apparent that 20 years of peace have made the French Army, while a well-equipped and relatively well-trained force, quite ill-suited to the FLN's asymmetric warfare. Following a number of FLN attacks on French bases in Algeria, Tixier-Vignancour decides to go see President Huntziger to ask him to officially declare a state of emergency, in order to give him exceptional powers necessary to curb the crisis. Unfortunately for him, however, he finds Huntziger unconscious at his desk: while quickly brought to a hospital, they find the President to be in a coma, with dubious chances of survival.

Calling his closest allies in the cabinet (Senior ministers Bouthillier, Duchet, and Peyrouton), they quickly decide on a plan of action, convinced by Tixier-Vignancour's pleas and fear-mongering about popular revolt: they are going to announce Huntziger's coma, and eventually his death when it comes to pass, while profiting from the occasion to assume emergency powers. The government agrees to this plan, and Tixier-Vignancour makes a televised address announcing the grave news, and declaring a state of emergency.

A few weeks pass, and the plan thankfully goes without a hitch, until Huntziger finally dies. As the government officially announces it, they decide to scour for presidential candidates that would confirm their administration, and quickly set their ambitions on Alphonse Juin, a respected war hero and the defense minister of the government. The meeting is inconclusive, with Juin politely refusing the offer, privately not wanting to be tied to what he sees as a sinking ship, and possibly standing for President later, at a more convenient time.

Following Juin's unexpected answer, the Conseil des Ministres scramble to find a suitable candidate for President that'd reappoint him as Prime Minister, or at the very least ensure a stable continuity. However, it quickly becomes apparent that all the "compromise options" have been exhausted already, as no evident candidate presents itself.

The Congrès's first round of voting ended with no President, with votes being scattered across various military generals, politicians, and even some dead people. Meanwhile, in the government, trouble is also brewing: to finance the war in Algeria, Tixier-Vignancour forces through an exceptional tax hike, telling local RRN officials to gather whatever they can to fund the war effort. The government is none too happy with this, but Tixier-Vignancour is running the show, and so all they can do is moan.

Being staffed by decrepit Conservatives, the municipalities and local governments' attempts at scrounging up money translate to cutting subsidies, pensions, and whatever they can find, and raising various taxes through the roof. This, understandably, has the effect of setting social tension on fire, and demonstrations and protests begin to break out in the streets. Thus begins...

# La Grande Discorde

As protests break out in many cities, Pierre Poujade, the hero of the 1958 "mouvement des petits", makes himself heard. Condemning the government for betraying the spirit of the Maréchal, he loudly calls for the government's resignation. However, the protests' intensity grows tenfold, as protesters break into a government building in Nantes and find some confidential documents, with among them information on the multiple cases on fund mismanagement, both on the mainland and (especially) in Algeria. Quickly, all of the country not only knows that the former President died a month before his announced death, but that the government, and especially Tixier, lied to cover it up.

Meanwhile with no suitable candidate, Tixier-Vignancour's patience grows thin, as he sees that the clock is ticking, and begins to envision a very, very dire prospect: should the protests continue to grow, it is very well possible that Poujadists protesters would eventually storm Matignon and take over the country, destroying everything Tixier-Vignancour holds dear. Swept up in his own delusions, Tixier-Vignancour begins to consider radical action, such as siccing the SSN and the army on the protesters, in the hopes of finally bringing calm back to France. In a Conseil des Ministres, however, these prospects led to Duchet resigning in protest, quickly followed by Bouthillier, and then by a slew of other ministers; facing this situation, and with popular pressure heavier than ever, Tixier-Vignancour decides to throw the towel, citing incompetence to deal with the situation (and hoping to avoid his head ending up on a pike), and publicly resigns; by early January, the government is empty.

Following the government's resignation, the RRN is left in disarray, and yet one man sees his moment: Alphonse Juin steps up, and publicly announces he's willing to stand for President. Military officers who were planning bids of their own, such as Gabriel Auphan, Henri Ely, or Jacques le Groignec, all gather behind him, and Juin, respected war hero and field marshal, successfully gets elected as France's new President, with much of the military and the political scene (with the notable exceptions of the collaborationists parties) behind him.

Following constitutional tradition, Juin then turns to the RRN for them to put forward a candidate for Prime Minister. However, both the party and himself quickly realize that the former have no compromise candidate, as intra-party negotiations quickly fall through. With no Prime Minister, no caretaker government to be formed, and Poujadism not seeming to die down, the battle lines end up being drawn, and the RRN is tearing itself apart at the seams.

Three main candidates, representing the three broad factions within the RRN, make themselves known: Pierre Sidos, Traditionalist firebrand; Jean Bichelonne, talented Technocrat and engineer; and François Mitterrand, Reformist upstart.

Thus, the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale is divided into three warring factions, as each PM candidate tries to use his political acumen and various connections to the best of its ability in the hopes of becoming the party's candidate. France is headless, instability and dissatisfaction with the RRN are mounting, trouble is brewing left and right: this is La Grande Discorde.

The Grande Discorde will last at most about 5 to 6 months, from early January to early July. Each candidate will have to try to obtain the backing of the majority of the party, to try and ensure their appointment as Prime Minister. In case of societal chaos getting too high, or no PM being chosen by July, Juin will default to a *coup de force* and appoint Poujade, in the hopes of actually having a government that can deal with the Algerian crisis: this massively angers the RRN, but what can it do?

During the GD, ministers will switch a lot, representing how unstable various governments form and fall before elections take place and a president is chosen. Here's a list of the different ministers that can appear randomly :

- Traditionalists: Pierre Sidos, Pierre Pujo, Thierry Maulnier, Jacques Ploncard d'Assac, Pierre Gaxotte, Hubert Lambert, Dominique Venner, Henri d'Orléans, Pierre Juhel.
- Reformists: François Mitterrand, Émile Mireaux, François Piétri, Pierre Pflimlin, Henry Lémery, Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, Maurice Duverger, Olivier Guichard, Antoine Pinay, René Bousquet.
- Technocrats: Jean Bichelonne, François Lehideux, Pierre Pucheu, Jean Coutrot, Charles Spinasse, Georges Soulès, Jean Berthelot.

## The Einheitspakt

During and after the Grande Discorde, France doesn't leave the Einheitspakt. While Germanophobia both among the people and the political sphere is strong, of a military response by Germany makes Tiixier reconsider abruptly leaving the Pakt, and the subsequent governmental chaos doesn't allow for much to be done. When a new President is elected, this state of affairs continues, with France staying in the Reich's Alliance for the foreseeable future.

# I. Pierre Sidos- Réaction



## ===== INTRODUCTION =====

What is Petainism, exactly?

Despite its name, the Révolution Nationale was pretty far from actually revolutionary; it was at its core a deeply reactionary project, supported by traditionalists who desperately wanted France to stay like they had always known her, or at least like they wanted her to always have been: mostly agrarian and agricultural, fervently catholic, and anti-republican. While the Révolution Nationale lasted longer than in our Timeline due to Laval never coming back to power, it nonetheless ended up fizzling out after the war's end, becoming somewhat less prominent with the enactment of the Pétain Constitution in 1946, and over time becoming not much more than a nebulous element to justify the RRN's Conservatives' style of governance. The traditionalists and reactionaries became a faction among others in the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale, and France seemed poised to move away from Maurras' *pays réel*, one way or another.

While old reactionaries began to fade away, however, younger ones picked up the torch. Within the Traditionalist faction, while mildly-germanophobic Petainists and Monarchists still make up the majority, naturally drawing from the Maurrassian doctrine of the quasi-isolationist "France seule", a new guard has begun to emerge: militantly revolutionary, wanting a closer relationship with the Reich, and especially actually believing the Révolution Nationale can be made truly great once again. Pierre Sidos, Hubert Lambert, Dominique Venner: those "neo-Petainists", infusing Pétain's precepts with a renewed yet very traditionalist form of fascism, are still a minority within the Traditionalists, but they have been catching the public's eye, and have gained a very real shot at power with the "traditional" Petainists' relative weakness during the Grande Discorde.

To be able to actually get in power, Sidos has to moderate his rhetoric somewhat: as such, Sidos runs as the candidate of tradition, promising a return to France's "true values", and will govern as such for most of his term. With the Traditionalists' old guard (whether Petainist or Monarchist) staffing the majority of his government, Sidos has to abide by the RRN's rules, at least until his position is secure. Once that is the case, which is after he survives a coup attempt by collaborationist organizations (who saw him as insufficiently Germanophile and especially as too reactionary), and President Juin's health worsens, Sidos will have way more room to pursue his agenda, and will try to tame the RRN, to reorient it around himself. This comes to a head during the Oil Crisis, in which a last-ditch coup attempt by the defiant remnants of the system will see Sidos facing his greatest trial yet.

At its core, Sidos' path is Petainist. He defines himself as a Petainist, and his policies are in line with Pétain's very own; and yet, Sidos pushes them to the limit, radicalizes them, infuses them with a truly revolutionary spirit, and in the end goes beyond what Petain envisioned. Sidos' goal is to rejuvenate reaction: and whether he succeeds and builds an ideology to last a thousand years, or fails to moribund traditionalists and liberal degenerates, is up to the player.

## Phase 1 (1964-1967) - A Veneer of Respectability

Pierre Sidos' cabinet:

President: Alphonse Juin - Imperial

Prime Minister: Pierre Sidos (Reactionary Nationalism) - Neo-Petainist Traditionalist

Youth and Sports Minister: Dominique Venner (Fascism) - Neo-Petainist Traditionalist

Economy Minister: Maurice Bouvier-Ajam (Left-Wing Corporatism) - Technocrat

Foreign Minister: Hubert Lambert (Fascism) - Neo-Petainist Traditionalist

Security Minister: Jacques le Groignec (National Catholicism) - Traditionalist

Pierre Sidos starts his term as Prime Minister in a precarious position. Confidence in the RRN is at an all-time low, and the Traditionalist faction in the RRN is not the dominant one; and Sidos was elected by a relatively thin majority, with the Reformists and many Technocrats still vehemently opposed to his plans, seeing him as a regressive tyrant wanting to keep France in its backwards state. Sidos thus needs to consolidate his position by alleviating France's immediate problems: fixing the economy, restoring people's trust in the government to an extent, and putting an end to the Algerian situation.

Sidos himself is cornered in two aspects: not only is his faction put in minority within the party, he himself isn't even within the majority within the Traditionalists: his bold, borderline revolutionary and rather Germanophile positions have earned him the

suspicion of much of the traditionalist and Maurrassian old guard, and he managed to become their candidate for Prime Minister only through a combination of fiery and inspiring rhetoric and being a relatively young politician not too associated with Tixier-Vignancour's failures. As such, Sidos will need to present himself as a mostly respectable, law-and-order politician, capable of rallying the party and society behind him while not rocking the boat too much.

Sidos' first course of action will be to put an end to Poujadist agitation: to that end, he will first either try to divide the movement by co-opting some of its most palatable positions, or to strike at the movement's main figures; no matter what, he will then proceed to arrest Poujade, hopefully putting an end to Poujadist nonsense once and for all. Obviously, however, discontent will remain as long as its root causes are not fixed; thankfully, Sidos has some ideas of his own...

*Sidos' complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State: Jacques le Groignec

Prime Minister : Pierre Sidos

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hubert Lambert

Minister of National Economy: Maurice Bouvier-Ajam

Minister of the Interior: Jacques Ploncard d'Assac

Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force: Jacques le Groignec

Minister of Justice: Pierre Pujo

Minister of Culture: Thierry Maulnier

Minister of History and Public Instruction: Pierre Gaxotte

Minister of Youth and Sports: Dominique Venner

Minister of Information and Communications : Jean-Marie le Pen - Conservative

Minister of Agriculture: Henri Dorgères

Minister of Labor, Industry and Social Affairs: René Belin

Minister of Public Faith: Marcel Lefebvre

Minister of Territorial Affairs and Regions: Pierre Juhel

Fascism 1: Front Révolutionnaire National (Henri Barbé) - 8% (Fascism)

Fascism 2: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Néo-Pétainistes (Pierre Sidos) - 12% (Clerical Fascism)



Ultrationalism 1: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Traditionalistes (Thierry Maulnier) - 14% (Reactionary Nationalism)

Ultrationalism 2: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Maurrassiens (Pierre Pujo) - 7% (Reactionary Nationalism)

Despotism 1: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Conservateurs (Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour) - 19% (Civilian Dictatorship)

Despotism 2: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Technocrates (Yves Bouthillier) - 16% (Managerial State)

Paternalism 1: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale - Réformistes (Roger Duchet) - 17% (Anocracy)

Paternalism 2: Indépendants (Poujadistes) (Pierre Poujade) - 10% (Poujadism)

Conservatism: Indépendants (Various Leaders) - 5% (Paternalistic Conservatism)  
Liberal Conservatism - N/A

Liberalism: Conseil National de la Résistance - Moulin (INCONNU) - 5%

Progressivism: Conseil National de la Résistance - Jaurès (INCONNU) - 2%

Socialism - Nouveaux Mouvements Sociaux (Various Leaders) - 4%

Communism - Conseil National de la Résistance - Glaive (INCONNU) - 2%

## Renewed Corporatism

One of the Révolution Nationale's key points was the enshrining of corporatism as the guiding principle behind the French State's economy: workers and bosses marching hand-in-hand for the well-being of the state and the people, with marxist class conflicts being a bygone notion. The two main realizations to further the corporatist ideal were the Labor Chart, a document supposed to steward labor relations, and the establishment of the Comités d'Organisation, a sort of committee aiming to plan and organize production for each sector, and thus efficiently run the French economy.

During the post-war years, however, the Comités slowly became no more than factional fiefs, as they underwent process of Assemblée-sanctioned politicization, following the growing factionalism within the RRN and the RRN: the Comités have thus proliferated, but the economy has suffered from it, as cohesiveness between the different sectors drastically dropped. Sidos, while a believer in the corporatist ideal, can see that the current system isn't working so well, which is why he appoints Maurice Bouvier-Ajam, the President of the Institut d'Etudes Corporatives, et a prominent corporatist thinker, to make the Comités run efficiently again.

The first step in fixing the economy is to depoliticize the Comités, and to ensure the economy is overseen by the government and not by the Assemblée. To that end, Sidos will merge multiple overlapping Comités, sack corrupt Comités leaders (with him also having the option to do a soft-purge and forcibly retire some rival factions' Comités

membres, at the cost of Assemblée support), with Sidos pointing out that it is a necessary step to rationalize the economy and make it less of a "feudal system" with rivaling fiefs running the economy into the ground.

Once this is done, Sidos will try to establish governmental bodies to oversee how corporatism is actually implemented: to oversee that the Labor Chart is respected within business corporations, and to oversee that the Comités run efficiently: on top of shoring up Sidos' support among the people (at the cost of among business and party elites), it actually allows for the economy to recover slightly, if only through a merciless anti-corruption campaign.

Sidos then has the choice between two options, in order to remake the corporatist system: he can either try to further "true corporatism" as envisioned by Bouvier-Ajam, and create true corporations, or he can try to adopt a more syndically-oriented form of corporatism as envisioned by Labor Minister René Belin, and establish a state-controlled "national syndicate" for all workers to belong in.

## A New Moral Order

While Sidos is aware of the unfortunate growth of Resistance movements through the SSN, he is of the opinion that just repressing and hunting down every resistance group is not going to fix the underlying problem, even if it is undeniably necessary. In the Prime Minister's eyes, the problem is a moral one: the French people, for the most part, have abandoned traditional values and have lost sight of what to believe in; once the moral decay is stopped, the problem of sedition should hopefully resolve itself.

During much of the "Années Noires", the successive governments unfortunately lost the youth: once the backbone of France, the youth has become enamored with liberal and radical ideologies through seditious works illicitly distributed, and long for a faithless, radically democratic country, far from what they should be dreaming about; and while some members of the youth are still devout and respectful of authority, the majority of them seems to have surrendered themselves to cosmopolitan degeneracy. Sidos wants to end this, to raise a generation of children that will be faithful to God and the values of the state. To that end, he will try to establish many youth camps, in which the youth gathers to indulge in outdoor activities to develop camaraderie and a sense of affection towards Petainist values; he will try to renovate the Chantiers de Jeunesse to make them an actually pleasant place to be for young kids, on top of making them indoctrination camps.

Along with that, Sidos will try to crack down on the black market: it is, after all, the first and most important source of seditious literature and degenerate propaganda for the French youth. Yet again, taking the problem at the root by mercilessly combating smugglers and coordinating a campaign with Germany, along with tightening border patrols in the South, will hopefully lessen the influence of judeo-liberal propaganda on the French youth.

Sidos is a devout catholic, and will try to right the wrongs that the faithless republic had perpetuated for so long: by naming as "Minister of Public Faith" arch-conservative Cardinal Marcel Lefebvre, he will restart the process started in Vichy's early days to blur the line between Church and State. Daily religious broadcasts are to be instituted, often given out by Lefebvre himself; pro-church propaganda shall be deployed, and the clergy shall be more tightly controlled by the government, to ensure that priests preach in accordance with the Révolution Nationale's precepts.

While Sidos truly thinks restoring France's moral order will go a long way to making the country a safer and more peaceful place, his emphasis on the youth also has an other, more self-interested purpose: as the first step to consolidating his personal control over society, Sidos' aim is to raise one entire generation loyal to him, and quickly so, to ensure that whatever happens, he'll have a young and enthusiastic support base at his disposal. In that sense, the "destruction of the moral rot" is also Sidos making his first move in the coming struggle against the Traditionalist old guard, and against the RRN in general.

## The Algerian Question

When Sidos takes office, the Algerian War is raging on, and has been doing so for several months. In the Prime Minister's eyes, winning the war is crucial to establish himself as a strong and competent leader to the French people, but also because Algeria is an integral part of the country, as French as Aquitaine or Brittany. To that end, he will ramp up involvement in Algeria to the best of his ability, send more soldiers and weapons to the CSPA, and try to rally German support for the war, by playing up the potential benefits of a well-managed Algeria (such as oil deposits). What follows depends on who wins the war:

- Should the CSPA government win the war, Sidos will have two main choices in regards to what the future of Algeria should be: he can either try to reintegrate the colony within France, albeit as an autonomous region, with bigger prerogatives given to the governor, or he can try to establish a Pied-Noir-led state in very close association to France, in the hopes of attracting the more nationalist Poujadists to his cause.
- Should the FLN win the war, Sidos will outright refuse to recognize the new Algerian government, and will instead focus on shoring up domestic support at home for an eventual reinvasion.
- Should the Italian Expeditionary Forces, Sidos will try to engage negotiations with Italy, to obtain at least guarantees for the Pieds-Noirs along with potential access to Algerian resources, should the negotiations prove unsuccessful, he will retreat, declare the government illegitimate, and similarly try to shore up domestic support for an eventual reinvasion (which is unfeasible, as it'd mean quasi-certain war with Italy; Sidos knows this, but this grandstanding allows him to look like a strong and authoritative leader at home).

## Phase 2 (1967-1970) - The National Revolution

In late 1967, Barbé, Bonny and Lafont make their move, and attempt to march on the Palais Bourbon. Despite their best efforts and preparations, the coup fails, and Sidos emerges triumphant, having successfully fended off an attempt by germanophile socialists doubtlessly funded by the Jewish lobby, to weaken Sidos' National Revolution.

Sidos will then embark on the rest of his agenda. Emboldened by his survival, he will escalate the Révolution Nationale, and begin to wage war against the parliamentary system he so much despises. As he can't just shut it down immediately, he will instead try to progressively defang it and make it a mere rubber stamp to his rule, through both legal and illegal means. Along with that, he will try to continue to blur the lines between church and state, and create a cult of personality around himself to solidify his position as the "Guide" of the French people, and as its only legitimate ruler.

### Dieu, Patrie... Roi?

Having been dealt a more favorable hand, Sidos will thus embark on a true crusade to change the very social fabric of the nation away from everything the Republic had inflicted on it for 70 long years. Taking some inspiration from Salazar's Portuguese *Estado Novo*, Sidos will try to enshrine "God, Fatherland, and King" as the guiding principles of the state alongside the more traditionally Vichyite "Work, Family, and Fatherland", even if Sidos and the Maurrassians are conflicted on what "King" should truly mean.

Sidos will first take a stab at the religious question. Having already laid the groundwork in the previous years, Sidos will ramp up his pro-religion campaign: the Ministry for Public Faith's prerogatives will be expanded, Lefebvre will embark on a tour of the French clergy, and Sidos will seek a personal audience with the Pope, which can either be accepted or refused. Along with that, religious teaching in schools shall be made mandatory, and school programs shall be revised (again) to put an emphasis on France's catholic past. Joan of Arc shall be erected once again as a national hero, with the 30th of May officially chosen as the National Day instead of the 14th of July. France shall become a catholic nation under Sidos' auspices, or it shall not be at all.

On initiative of the Maurrassians, Sidos will also try to enact a country-wide program of decentralization. For too long, the Revolution's Jacobin heritage has driven a wedge between the successive governments and the people, the *pays réel*, and has caused boundless suffering by endlessly repressing the true essence of the French nation: its regions. To right those wrongs, the Maurrassians will first try to give back some powers of the communes and regions, and try to suppress the intermediary level between those two: the Départements. He will then try to install regional governance by establishing the "Provincial Councils", executive bodies loosely supervised by the state.

Regarding the cultural aspect, the Maurrassians will try to encourage regional identities, cultures and languages, although a sort of dual identity with Regional and

French on a semi-equality (with the "regional" identities being all encompassed in a broader "French" identity". Similarly, school programs shall also be revised to include praises of France's multi-regional identities, and to decry the Jacobinism of the past 180 years as a grave mistake. However, Sidos has a choice between honestly pursuing the Maurrassians' desired reforms, and passing a watered-down version that still leaves much of the power in the hands of the state, at the cost of mobilizing society less.

Finally, Sidos and the Maurrassians agree on the necessity to have a strong, guiding figure to lead and shepherd France, away from the weak leadership of the Republican era: the only problem is that they can't exactly agree on *who* should be that leader. Sidos thus must tread a fine line to further his stranglehold on society but to avoid his coalition with the Monarchists collapsing: as such, he will try to create a personality cult around himself as the guide of the French Nation, who has successfully propelled out of the misery the parliamentarians of all stripes put it in, who quelled poverty and misery, and who brought traditional valors back to France. At the same time, however, he will also try to appeal to Monarchists, either by establishing himself as the spiritual heir of old, or by maintaining an ambiguity on whether he will eventually crown a king "once the conditions are right" (similarly to De Gaulle during the early years of the Fifth Republic OTL).

## Rerum Novarum

While Sidos is rabidly anti-communist and anti-socialist, he still has a social fiber: while he wouldn't identify as a social catholic or anything of the sort, he nonetheless feels the need for measures to help the poor and downtrodden in French society. This doesn't only come from a pragmatic necessity to build a lasting support base, but also from a sincere need for every French man, woman and children (the non-seditious ones, at least) to be able to live a comfortable life, should they put in the effort to do so.

Firstly, Sidos will try to fight France's slow demographic growth. France historically has had a much slower demographic growth than its neighbors, and most notably than Germany, which came to haunt it in 1870 and 1940. Blaming the country's growing secularism for it, he will thus attempt to encourage people to have more kids, whether through grants for large families, cracking down on underground abortion, and pro-natalist propaganda.

Sidos will also try to terminate unemployment. Whether through creating a National Job Directory, the ASSEIC, through funneling money to CEOs to encourage job creation, or through shaming unemployed people through propaganda campaigns, Sidos will try to put France to work, to have a country that is happy and that can pay for its welfare.

Sidos' compassion also extends to the plight of the worker. He will try to improve the state of French healthcare, along with establishing a state-run retirement funds system. He will also try to establish a minimum wage, differentiated between an 'worker'

minimum wage and a "rural worker" minimum wage, in a bid to revitalize the countryside. He will also implement an obligatory "rural service" for young people, in order to make them discover the ways of the rural world.

Sidos doesn't want the people to think he's just handing out money for the sake of it, however. He will spin his program as a deeply catholic initiative, supposed to reward the "working France" by making them work for their parents, their children, and their own future. In Sidos and the Maréchal's ideal society, no one has to go hungry if they listen to the state.

## The Art of War

Lastly, Sidos will jointly embark on a crusade to make sure the RRN is centered around himself, around his vision of Petainism, and that it doesn't suffer from factionalism any longer.

Sidos will task his interior minister with digging dirt on important figures within the RRN, such as leading officials from non-Traditionalist factions, in order to have blackmail material should the need for it arise. Less legally, Sidos will task the newly-cleant SSN with harassing opposition activists, whether they belong to the RRN or not, through physical or psychological violence, to ensure that the opposition behaves nicely: the goal is to instill a sense a fear and anxiety within the hearts and minds of the MPs. Sidos also has the option to try to stage a few false flag terrorist attacks to convince the people that it is necessary to rally around him, although that can backfire.

Sidos also needs to take a stab at the bureaucracy, as there are still a lot of its members and bureaucrats that are opposed to his agenda, and they need to be dealt with. Sidos will thus try to enact a soft-purge, by forcibly retiring some of the bureaucrats most opposed to his rule, and by replacing them with more cooperative functionaries. The Prime Minister will also try to codify what the RRN truly stands for, to make it less of an ideological mishmash, so that it is truly a vanguard party for the National Revolution.

Sidos' crusade against the establishment will obviously cause transfactional support to initially drop record lows, but it will conversely mobilize his base a good deal, which will help Sidos in the long run. However, while he's waging war against his own party, something unexpected happens: the Middle East explodes, Oil becomes scarce overnight, and the Enheitspakt's economy takes a nosedive: the Oil Crisis hits, and the relatively calm years that had followed the Grande Discorde finally come to an end.

## Phase 3 (1970-1972) - A Coeur Vaillant

### The Oil Crisis

The European Economic Community is hit by the Oil Crisis head on, and France is no more spared than its neighbors: in fact, because of Sidos' generous social programs and sluggish corporatism, France's economy is hit slightly harder, and it seems that hard times have come once again to the country. While the government quickly drafts a plan, that includes oil and electricity rationing among other rather unpopular measures, grim news come from the northern city of Rouen: Dominique Venner, who was there on a personal trip, was badly wounded in a bombing attack in the city center, which the far-left militant group Action Directe quickly claims, with many deaths and many more wounded.

As multiple attacks follow suit, the Chantiers de Jeunesse take up arms to avenge the (thankfully non-lethal) attack against their superior, and begin to conduct attacks in various cities against anyone they deem "anti-Sidosian". Street fighting between CdJ youth and left-wing youth grows into a more and more common occurrence, as many places, including some churches, are ransacked by both the CdJ and the revolutionaries under accusations of "harboring dissidents" and "reactionarism", respectively. Overall, France's domestic situation has taken a turn for the worse, and the heavy atmosphere of the Sidos years has erupted for all to see.

Despite the fear of repression hanging like a sword of Damocles, one priest in Grenoble, Henri Grouès, decides after seeing his church ransacked that he has had enough. Taking to the city center, he pronounces a long sermon, airing out his grievances at Sidos, decrying how his tenure has massively polarized society, and lamenting at how he has caused so much of the youth to turn away from Christ and from the plight of the poor. Immediately, the speech spreads like a shockwave through France, and while Grouès is quickly taken away by Sidos' forces, more and more priests (the anti-Sidos ones, at least) begin speaking out across the country. Soon enough, the middle class, the backbone of French society, gets organized, with a little help from Resistance elements, and protests against Sidos (and more specifically against his excesses, and the excesses he inspired, such as the CdJ's), often spearheaded by sympathetic priests, spread like wildfire through France's major cities.

This puts Sidos into a complicated situation. While he has no moral qualms about using violence to repress what he sees as judeo-bolshevik resistance, he is more hesitant about repressing priests, along with fearing the bad optics of just bathing the protests in blood. On the other hand, just ordering the CdJ to stand down would both give free reign to the leftwing revolutionaries, and alienate the most fervent part of his base. To add insult to injury, there are rumblings within the RRN that the anti-Sidos opposition is organizing to take advantage of this moment of weakness, and even Sidos' staunch allies within the Traditionalists are beginning to have second thoughts.

Finally, for every day Sidos doesn't act, the situation grows worse. More people join the protests' ranks, the RRN's discontent gets bolder, and most importantly street fighting gets worse and worse. Sidos must thus face his hardest trial yet, but how?

## The Protests

Through decisions and focus tree, Sidos will have to decide what approach to take to quell the protests, whether through concessions or crackdown, to the Middle-Class protesters, represented by taking a majority of one side's mutually-exclusive focuses, leading to a "confirmation" tree. This alignment the overall approach regarding the protesters, as well as the eventual ending the player will get.

- Sidos can decide to fully pursue his instincts, by siding with the **Youth**<sup>3</sup>. He will thus try to crack down on the **Middle-Class Protesters**, while offering guarantees to and emboldening the **Sidosite Youth** by assuring them of his support and ideological purity. This will lead into the **Fascist** ending.
- Sidos can decide to try and keep society together, by renegating on his instincts, by offering concessions to the **Middle-Class Protesters**. He will thus try to appease the **Protesters** by offering guarantees of calm and "moderation" while cracking down on the **Youth**, both leftist and Sidos-aligned. This will lead into the **Traditionalist** ending.

**Pro-Youth** choices will generate more chaos than **pro-Middle-Class** ones, representing how they are much more likely to inflame society. Should Internal Opposition get too high, Sidos will get booted from office in a palace coup by a coalition of anti-Sidos RRN Conservatives and Reformists, with Antoine Pinay becoming PM. Should chaos get too high, Germany will intervene and put the LVF in power (as with other paths).

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<sup>3</sup> The Sidos-aligned Youth, obviously.



## Phase 3.A - Travail, Famille, Patrie (1971-1972)



Pierre Sidos' cabinet:

President: Jacques le Groignec

Prime Minister: Pierre Sidos (Clerical Fascism)<sup>4</sup>

Youth and Sports Minister: Dominique Venner (Palingenetic Nazism)

Economy Minister: Maurice Bouvier-Ajam (Corporate Statism)

Foreign Minister Jacques Benoist-Méchin (Technocratic Corporatism)

Security Minister: Hubert Lambert (Fascism)

Should Sidos side with his instincts and fully succeed in quelling the unrest, through cracking down on the protesters and empowering the youth, he will pass his greatest trial yet with flying colors. The emboldened youth will escalate their chaos against the protesters, causing them to disperse, while the SSN "disappears" many of the protests' most renowned faces. France may be in a state of chaos for the time being, but the National Revolution has finally come, and it is up to Sidos' task to pursue it, finally unbound by external constraints.

This ending should be one of dissonance. It is Sidos' successful ending, as he is able to implement his vision unimpeded, finally transforming Petainism into a fascist and rejuvenated ideology. At the same time, it is arguably the worst and bleakest non-ultra ending, Sidos having effectively established a fascist regime and crushed most of his opposition for the time being.

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<sup>4</sup> Sidos' ideology changes from Reactionary Nationalism to Clerical Fascism to represent the fact that he's finally unrestrained by non-fascist traditionalist elements within the party, and also to represent how he gets closer to Germany in alignment; similarly, the RRN's ideology on the pie chart also changes to Clerical Fascism.

Fascism: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale (Pierre Sidos) - 73% (Clerical Fascism)

Ultrnationalism: N/A

Despotism 1: N/A

Despotism 2: N/A

Paternalism 1: Résistance Française - Glaive (Charles Pasqua) - 5%

Conservatism: N/A

Liberal Conservatism - N/A

Liberalism: Résistance Française - Moulin (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing) - 12%

Progressivism: Résistance Française - Jaurès (Michel Rocard) - 6%

Socialism - N/A

Communism - Résistance Française - Glaive (Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont) - 4%

## A Young Nation

The protests have been quelled, yet the right-wing youth is still as fanatical, and Sidos still has some use for them: he will thus order them to go wild on anti-Sidos officials, especially within the RRN. This is, in essence, a purge, one conducted both in a top-down (through the SSN and more generally the state apparatus) and in a bottom-up (through the youth), and one that Sidos has long awaited. This is also represented in a government shakeup, with Sidos sacking and purging most Maurrassian and Old Guard members from his cabinet, deeming them no longer necessary.

*Sidos' complete government is as follows:*

Chief of State: Pierre Sidos

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jacques Benoist-Méchin

Minister of National Economy: Maurice Bouvier-Ajam

Minister of Youth and Sports: Dominique Venner

Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force: Hubert Lambert

Minister of Justice: Jean-Marie le Pen

Minister of Culture and Public Instruction: Jacques Ploncard d'Assac

Minister of the Interior: Pierre Vial

Minister of Information and Communications : Maurice Bardèche

Minister of Agriculture: Henri Dorgères

Minister of Labor, Industry and Social Affairs: René Belin

Minister of Public Faith: Marcel Lefebvre

Former MPs are tracked down and imprisoned, or just summarily executed; Sidos-opposed RRN bureaucrats are publicly shamed by hordes of fanatical young men, only wanting to enact revenge on the system they see as having kept them down for so long. All in all, Petainism completes its transformation into a fully fascist ideology, as violence is glorified not only as a means to an end, but also as something beautiful in itself, used to "clean" the state of any undesirable remnants. As such, Sidos' National Revolution is both a literal destruction of the past through the killing of many members of the past regime, and a metaphorical destruction of the remnants of the merely traditionalist Petainism.

## The Nationalist State

While the purge is ongoing, Sidos will move to finally establish a state along the principles of his very own National Revolution, one that went further than what the Maréchal could ever have envisioned. He will begin work on a new constitution, to replace the now-obsolete one, one that fully enshrines Sidos' legitimacy as the only ruler of the state, with no king or president by his side. With help from his government, now only staffed with people faithful to Sidos' cause, he will try to draft a number of constitutional amendments, fit for a truly nationalist state: Pétain's constitution was a good start, but it's not perfect, and a number of tweaks need to be made for it to be perfect.

The most important thing in the new constitution is to ensure it allows for the nationalist state to be self-perpetuating. To that end, Sidos will create a system similar to the papacy, with a college of electors, with any new members being ordained by the leader, similarly to Catholic cardinals: those electors then convene to elect, who serves until death, and advise the head of state in times of need. The state shall above parties and lobbies, and it shall also be militantly non-parliamentary, with the closest thing to a legislative body being the leader-appointed College, serving as an advisory council. Its deeply Catholic character shall be inscribed in the Constitution, to avoid any secular opportunists moving France away from her true roots; and it shall be enthusiastically yet reasonably European, with France standing alongside Germany as an ally and equal and not as a vassal, as the two proudest soldiers of European civilization.

Once the draft is finished, Sidos will see that it is promptly implemented. In a grand ceremony, broadcast on the radio and television, Sidos is elected by the newly-appointed College to serve as the first Leader of the French State, with no more President or Prime Minister in sight. France has rejected its need for parliamentarians, and has transcended its need for kings; there is but one leader now, and that man is Pierre Sidos.

## La Flamme Tricolore

Sidos' last few months of content are spent contemplating what has been done. He has finally made it: true, revolutionary and youthful Petainism has been enshrined as France's ideology, and the people are proudly marching under its banners, with no one more devoted than the youth. Sidos has successfully revitalized France's spirit, with his mixture of traditionalism and revolutionary fascism having managed to propel the country out of the slump it lingered in for so long. For the first time in what feels like forever, France knows who She is, and the world knows what She stands for.

At the same time, France is in a state of low-level chaos. Left-wing groups and right-wing Sidosite youth are still fighting in the streets, with every action causing an equal and opposite reaction. Sidos encourages the Sidosite youth, oblivious (or willingly turning a blind eye) to the fact that his own troops are also intensifying the fighting: while he realizes ordinary people are living in fear, he deems it a necessary sacrifice for the National Revolution to proceed, also noting that opposition to his rule (bar some elements which can easily be painted as murderous radicals) has mostly died down. All in all, he has won.

Fascist Sidos' content thus ends with the violence having somewhat calmed down, and yet with a heavy sense of dread and anxiety weighing on France. It ends with Sidos himself feeling triumphant and confident about the future, feeling like he has truly achieved and even surpassed everything the Maréchal envisioned, and confident that the country he has built will last long enough to outlast him; and yet, he is oblivious, willingly or not, to the fact that he has led France into what essentially amounts to Years of Lead, with state-encouraged violence leading people to live in fear, now more than ever.

## Phase 3.B - Le Pays Réel



Pierre Sidos' cabinet:

President: Jacques le Groignec

Prime Minister: Pierre Sidos (Reactionary Nationalism)

Minister of History and Public Instruction: Pierre Gaxotte (Reactionary Nationalism)

Economy Minister: Georges-Paul Wagner (Integralism)

Foreign Minister: Thierry Maulnier (Reactionary Nationalism)

Security Minister: Pierre Pujo (Integralism)

Should Sidos decide to try and save what he accomplished and side with the Protesters, he will try to calm society down by cracking down on the Youth, both anti- and pro-Sidos, to bring order back to the country, whatever the cost; should he succeed, he will then begin a descent into apathy and shame, after a brief moment of self-realization, for having destroyed the "revolutionary flame" of his movement, and for having caused the death of so many young people who looked up to him, with the especially striking photo of one such youngster being crushed by a army tank.

This ending, while less bad for society as a whole, is nonetheless Sidos' worst ending of his main two, as it represents him abandoning his beliefs and succumbing to apathy, allowing the aspirant dictator to be outmaneuvered by members of his cabinet: the Maurrassians, and the remnants of the Old Guard who hadn't entirely gave up on their beliefs by then. With Sidos becoming more and more recluse, they finally have an opportunity to shine, and to try to implement their grand plans: the restoration of the Monarchy, one a hundred years in waiting.

Fascism: Renegade Sidosite Groups (Various Leaders) - 19% (Clerical Fascism)

Ultrationalism: Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale (Pierre Sidos) - 54%  
(Reactionary Nationalism)

Despotism 1: N/A

Despotism 2: N/A

Paternalism 1: Résistance Française - Glaive (Charles Pasqua) - 5%

Conservatism: N/A

Liberal Conservatism - N/A

Liberalism: Résistance Française - Moulin (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing) - 12%

Progressivism: Résistance Française - Jaurès (Michel Rocard) - 6%

Socialism - N/A

Communism - Résistance Française - Glaive (Pierre Juquin) - 4%

## Reaction's Reaction

Quickly after the protests are over, and Sidos successfully weathers the storm, he undergoes an intense moment of self-realization. He has saved the state, and what Pétain and him had strived so hard to build, but at what cost? The flame of the National Revolution seems to have dimmed, and with Sidos having made several concessions to the protesters, he had to accept that France wasn't ready for his uncompromising vision.

While he initially resolves to try and go on, even while being ridden with doubts, a fateful event finally breaks his resolve. Dominique Venner, his right-hand man and Minister of Youth, is found dead in his office, of apparent suicide. On his desk, a note: "I cannot go on anymore, after what we have done, to our children, to our nation, and to our race."<sup>5</sup> Venner's suicide is quickly made public, and Sidos' despair intensifies, partly blaming himself for his friend's suicide, and intensifying his guilt about repressing the Youth and reneging on his "revolutionary" credentials.

Within Sidos' government, however, rumblings of opportunity begin to make themselves heard. The Maurrassians, so long ignored and relegated to playing second fiddle to Sidos, see an opening in Sidos' lack of will and self-hatred: progressively, they end up pressuring various ministers to leave, by-passing Sidos by sending the President already-filled out recommendations and nomination orders he only has to sign; and sure enough, the cabinet ends up progressively filled out with Maurrassians.

Why not just pressure Sidos to resign? The truth is, Sidos is not that unpopular; especially after his concessions to the protesters and his crackdown on youth radicalism, many among the population have become at least somewhat resigned, and the

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<sup>5</sup> This parallels Venner's OTL suicide in 2013.

Maurrassians fear that outing Sidos would just be weakening their position. Nonetheless, the Maurrassians know that Sidos may snap out of his apathy at some point, which is why they decide to act quickly.

*Sidos' complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State: Jacques le Groignec

Prime Minister: Pierre Sidos

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Thierry Maulnier

Minister of National Economy: Georges-Paul Wagner

Minister of the Interior: Pierre Juhel

Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force: Pierre Pujo

Minister of Justice: Jean Royer

Minister of Culture and Public Instruction: Pierre Gaxotte

Minister of Youth and Sports: Nicolas Kayanakis

Minister of Information and Communications : Jacques Maurras

Minister of Agriculture: Jacques le Roy Ladurie

Minister of Labor, Industry and Social Affairs: Victor Nguyen

Minister of Public Faith: Georges Sauge

The governmental Maurrassians, led by respected academic, Minister of Culture, and relatively uncontroversial figure Pierre Gaxotte, thus begin to regularly bypass Sidos in the day-to-day running of the nation, by forwarding laws to the President for him to sign, especially as Sidos becomes more and more reclusive and contemplative. They will thus try to deradicalize the lower classes and the clergy, assuaging Germany that everything's fine (even though most of the Maurrassians would ideally prefer France to be outside of the German sphere), and hunting down various underground youth groups, both left and right.

However, the Maurrassians aren't just content steadying the ship while Sidos is too busy gazing at his navel: they have grand plans of their own, for they have the grandest plan of them all...

## The Restoration

The idea of a monarchical restoration, unsurprisingly, isn't the most popular idea. It is seen as a comically anachronistic idea as the seventies roll in, with France's last true king having abdicated some 123 years ago; Sidos himself is against it, but is too oblivious and unconcerned by the affairs of state to care. After all, if the National Revolution hasn't managed to wake the people up, if he himself has failed, why would he care about what happens next? *Après moi, le Déluge* as the old King said. Thus, the Maurrassians have mostly free reign to try and go ahead with their grand endeavor.

Gaxotte and his allies will thus try to legitimize the monarchy in the eyes of the people. While they don't *need* it to be popular per se, as in they don't need direct popular approval through an election or a referendum, they want it to be legitimate, to establish the monarch as the rightful leader of France just like Sidos tried to portray himself. The Maurrassians will appeal to the French people's tiredness about the instability of the previous decades, citing the record-high number of regime changes France went through, and argue that a monarchy is the only path to stability; it will also depict the restoration as the logical continuation of France's history.

The other question is to ensure the pretender is ready for his role, as Henri d'Orléans' positions are... complicated, to say the least. While he supported the Regime, and entertained cordial relations with the Maurrassian monarchists, he also used to be close to Antoine Pinay and Reformist circles, and holds rather "modern" positions in regards to democracy and governance, along with being notoriously inflexible in regards to a possible restoration. After much consultation, they will instead directly ask the Count of Paris' son, also named Henri d'Orléans: reputed as more conservative than his father, and thus more likely to accept the Maurrassians' positions, although he privately wonders whether they are not too reactionary, far away from the modern yet traditional government France might truly need. However, he decides to accept the offer, thinking that it is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to bring the country the unity it desperately needs, and maybe to overpower the Maurrassians should it come to that. With a pretender officially on board, preparations for the coronation can finally begin.

## Sunrise

Traditionalist Sidos' last few months of content, and in general their overall content, are thus spent within a stark dichotomy. On one hand, you have the Maurrassians, increasingly ecstatic as the prospects of a restoration grow ever closer, and ensuring that everything is ready for the pretender's coronation. On the other hand, you have Sidos, a reclusive and broken man who stays shuttered in his study, mostly concerned about mundane hobbies such as sailing or butterfly collecting<sup>6</sup>, and who spends most of his time

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<sup>6</sup> This represents how Sidos, having tried and failed to reshape France, has been so utterly broken by his failure that he has taken up a hobby in which he can exert absolute control over, and yet a very mundane and microscopic one.



trying to stray his mind away from political matters. Sidos' behavior, unintentionally, also reflects that of the majority of the French population, being tired and feeling unconcerned with politics they see as alienating.

During his first tour of France, organized to drum up support from the monarchy, Henri sees firsthand how disinterested most people are, and slowly grows worried himself. The King is to return at long last, and yet most of France doesn't care? Worrying reports coming for the SSN about the continuation of far-left and far-right underground activities also alarm the pretender, as does a quite dreary meeting with the Prime Minister himself. The general feeling, both among the population and within the narrative, is one of apathy, of broken promises and dimmed dreams.

The Maurrassians' content ends with the coronation of the new King, officially turning France back into a monarchy. His first act, as Henri VII, is to appoint Minister of Defense Pierre Pujo as Prime Minister; Sidos is officially appointed. The last few events are thus focusing on the Maurrassians gearing up to fully rule the country, having taken over the RRN, while the King can only worriedly at his country, fearing a creeping sadness once again taking root in his fellow subjects' hearts and minds, and while Sidos, who didn't even turn up to the coronation, tries to find peace in himself at last.

## Phase 3.C - Picking Up The Pieces



Antoine Pinay's cabinet:

President: Jacques le Groignec

Prime Minister: Antoine Pinay (Anocracy)

Minister of the Interior: Maurice Papon (National Conservatism)

Economy Minister: Edmond Giscard d'Estaing (Moderate Technocracy)

Foreign Minister: Maurice Couve de Murville (National Conservatism)

Security Minister: Paul Ely (National Conservatism)

If Internal Opposition gets too high during the protests, anti-Sidos RRN elements will finally act to oust him. Seeing Sidos' indecision and incompetence escalating the protests and plunging France in chaos, and fearing a possible German intervention, the anti-Sidos opposition decide to take matters into their own hands, coalescing around respected reformist statesman Antoine Pinay. Pinay, once thought-of as a prospective successor to Tixier-Vignancour, was eventually passed over by the Reformists in favor of the more youthful Mitterrand, but his resolve to fight for a better, juster France never faltered; and now that Sidos has shown his weakness, he is ready to step up to action.

This ending is Sidos' **failure** ending. While not a failstate, it represents the total failure and rejection of Sidos' term; unlike Sidos' *Fascist* ending, in which he persists with his instincts and achieves personal success, and his *Traditionalist* ending, in which his regime and reforms survive, albeit in a form Sidos finds utterly disappointing and near-unrecognizable, this ending sees the rejection of Sidosism as a whole, with most of his reforms being reversed by the new government. While it is, somewhat ironically, the less bleak ending of Sidos' three, it is far from narratively joyful either: the government still has to deal with street-fighting and terrorist activities, with its illegitimacy fueling resistance and terrorist movements of all stripes.

## Isn't It A Pity

Pinay's government assumes power in a difficult situation. Having gotten into power by convincing President le Groignec to dismiss Sidos, arguing that he isn't able to bring back peace and order to the country; le Groignec, ever the cautious Petainist, reluctantly gives in and dismisses Sidos, appointing Pinay in his stead. Sidos retaliates by refusing to stand down, and by calling for all true patriots to rally in his favor in the streets (effectively adding even more fuel to the fire); the standoff finally ends with Sidos committing suicide before being arrested by the police, all while pledging his supporters to continue the fight against the usurpers. Right off the bat, Pinay's government thus has a legitimacy problem.

The first order for the day for them is thus to try and calm down the protests. Pinay will thus meet with the protesters and try to hammer out a deal; while the negotiations will eventually prove successful, with a reversal of many of Sidos' reforms and some new "democratic reforms" being included, Pinay caving to the protesters will fragilize his already-shaky position within the party even further. While Pinay does try to unite the party and make it appealing to the people, the damage has been done, and the RRN's legitimacy is still shaky, especially as many people among the general population and within the party are still loyal to Sidos. Reversal of Sidos' clerical reforms, and economic liberalization to try and get the economy out of the gutter are also on the table; these measures will prove somewhat popular, but will only alienate Sidos' loyal base (most notably the lower classes and the clergy) even further.

The other main problem is that French society is still plagued with violence. Far-left groups are still on the rise, and far-right groups still loyal to Sidos have taken up armed struggle against the government as well. Despite the army and the SSN doing its best to quell the activity, groups are undeterred, and more and more people are taking part in the violence, with the government's aura of illegitimacy contributing to their rise.

## The Fair State

The last few months of Pinay content are thus focusing on a worried government, trying its best to win back the people's approval through vague promises and piecemeal, if earnest, reforms towards democracy. The government isn't really popular, and it knows it; gaining back the trust of the people will be a long and arduous process, as will getting out of the "Years of Lead" Sidos created through his endless polarization of socialization. All in all, France has lost years to the late Prime Minister, and who knows if it will ever gain them back.

The atmosphere of those last few months, however, is also one of very, very cautious hope. Things are looking bleak, possibly bleaker than they've ever been, yes, but Sidos, the tyrant who brought upon such devastation, is gone; and should the right decisions be taken, and the right conditions appear, the next day might finally be a tad brighter than the previous one. Of course, it's a very dim hope, given that France's situation is still extremely dire, but hope is present nonetheless.

Sidos' failure content thus ends with Pinay hard at work on various plans for reform, most notably economic and political ones; he knows that his government is in a shaky spot, and that himself is getting quite old, but he's determined to make the best of his situation. He is determined, through hard work, through coercion and concession, to be better than Sidos; to create a France that is neither revolutionary nor reactionary, a France where its population can live in peace, without the fear of the government or even worse, of the youth.

He is determined to create, at long last, a Fair State.

## Conclusion

At its core, Sidos' path is an attempt at rejuvenating reaction. Sidos longs for times long gone, but feels the necessity to instill a new, revolutionary spirit to Pétain's deeply reactionary project. Sidos' ideology is fascist, a particularly reactionary and clericalist form of it, and his attempt at creating a "National Rebirth" by mobilizing society with some groups being especially targeted (such as the youth) is all towards the same goal:

enshrining reaction as a revolution against the status quo, and molding Pétain's rather non-revolutionary National Revolution into what Sidos sees as an actual revolution. Should Sidos side with his instincts, France will be molded into a fascist regime, with a mobilized population, and a regime under lock and key for the time being; should he side with the protesters, his attempt a national rejuvenation will be hijacked, with non-fascist yet deeply reactionary forces taking power; and should he failed and be ousted, it will be stopped dead in its tracks, with anti-Sidos elements reversing most of his reforms and.

No matter how much revolutionary rhetoric he may try to drape it, Sidos' project is still deeply reactionary. This is one of the "takeaways" of Sidos' path: Sidos' National Revolution is still hardline clericalist, serves to reinforce tradition, and is overall a more violent and proactive (and in a way more "modern") form of Pétain's original National Revolution. Try as he might to involve the youth and to mobilize the people, reaction is not revolutionary, and Sidos simply makes the Maréchal's project more viscerally violent, in the hopes of "cleansing the status quo", to return to better and more idyllic times.

What is common to all three outcomes is that the shadow of the status quo always come creeping back: if the anti-Sidos opposition takes power, then Sidos' reign gets mostly erased, signifying a literal return to the status quo; if Maurrassians take power, then Sidos' fascist-revolutionary prospects are strangled in the crib, and the reactionary, Pétain-era status quo leaves France feeling apathetic and morose; and if Sidos sides with his instinct out, the youth he inspired and encouraged begins to get somewhat *too* radical for his tastes, leading him to begin to reflect on whether he may have become the status quo he fought so valiantly against. All in all, Sidos' path also serves to deconstruct the idea of "jeunisme", a society led by the valiant, vigorous, and above all revolutionary youth: people age, die, and fade away, and so do ideas: trying to keep some "revolutionary fervor" alive forever is impossible.

Whether Sidos succeeds or fails, France stands irredeemably changed. The Révolution Nationale has been codified as a set of principles, and the late Maréchal's mark has been even more durably printed on the country's history. And as Pierre Sidos seemed so keen on turning back the clock and spiritually sending France back decades if not centuries, the scars it inflicted will take a long time to heal, if they ever heal at all.

## II. Jean Bichelonne - Progrès



### ===== INTRODUCTION =====

In the 1930s, the Great Depression ended the post-WWI era of economic and cultural liberation, the "Années Folles". In the wake of an economic crisis and rising political instabilities, students from the Polytechnique engineering school decided to form a think-tank to tackle the vast problems of the future : X-Crise. Planist, anti-"classical liberalism", it became one of the largest technocratic intellectual movements. At least, it was until the Second World War. The group splintered between collaborators and resistants, and the technocratic dream went silent. Its spirit lived among the ministries of Pétain's government, especially embodied by Jean Bichelonne, Minister of Industry. As a personal friend of Albert Speer, he organized the economic collaboration with the Reich, and allowed France to find its spot among the greater German sphere.

However the war ended, and the flaws of the Nazi regime became apparent to Bichelonne. Him, and many technocrats, warned of an incoming crisis that nobody else saw, or wanted to see. As a result, he got fired from his position among the government, and was accused of sympathies with the fictional "synarchist" plot against Pétain. But, the crisis arrived in the 1950s, and France went down with the Reich, in a decade called the "Années Noires". Now, in 1964, France remains as an economic power subservient to Germany. It produces products of lower quality, in smaller scales, and using technologies decades obsolete.

Bichelonne finds that situation unbearable, and when the new Président chooses him to lead the country he takes his new position with one idea in mind: make France the technological and economic equal of Germany. To do that, he will enact his decade long plan to rebuild the French economy from the ground up: the PRIME plan. Bichelonne's France can be outlined as large national projects, the birth of national champions, and the advent of new technologies. But, no political leader leads alone. Bichelonne finds himself

stuck between the institutional technocrats who put him in power, and the neo-socialist inspired heirs of the X-Crise group.

At his core, Bichelonne's path embodies the idea of *Progress*. Bichelonne, a forward-thinking mind with plans and dreams for generations to come, sees that France is desperately late in terms of industrialization, urbanization, and generally in terms of being on par with its neighbors, particularly Germany; he wants to change that, to make France progress into the 20th century, and maybe even bring it into the 21st should the train arrive early, and to turn it into an economic powerhouse. Bichelonne will however have to contend with the fact that just as Rome was not built in a day, France shall not become Germany in ten years, even with a perfectly orchestrated plan.

Bichelonne also serves to explore the concept of dedicating oneself to a goal whatever the costs and whatever the conditions. While working diligently on PRIME will see France roaring to new heights in many aspects should all go right, Bichelonne's absent-minded ignorance of political and social matters will ultimately create a country which lead to the youth and the lower working classes feeling unfulfilled, especially as they feel like they are being sacrificed on the altar of progress, a God in which they cannot bring themselves to believe.

This will eventually lead to the Troubled 1971: a year in which the Moulinex pressure cooker blows up, leading to a student revolt and large-scale strikes at the factories of the Champions Nationaux. Bichelonne is hit with the realization that he can't simply race headfirst into progress while expecting everyone to catch up: his actions during the events will either lead him to compromise with the students, and to realize that progress does take time, or to be as uncompromising and steadfast in the face of adversity, chasing an utopia which he refuses to believe will always be a grasp away.

## The PRIME Plan

Jean Bichelonne has developed with his close friends and collaborators, Roger Gaillochet and Pierre Pucheu, a large and extensive economic plan to revitalize the French economy: the "PRIME" plan (P for Planification, RI for Restructuration Industrielle, M for Modernisation, and E for Emancipation). Bichelonne had been during the war the architect of the Comités d'Organisation, corporatist structures which had quickly transformed into a tangled mess of industrialists and companies. The PRIME plan would move past that, and deeply transform the French economy into a regional power, with international reach.

The PRIME plan has been embraced by some technocrats in the RRN as the best way out of the 1950s "Années Noires", but mostly by its planist faction, the quasi-neo-socialist of

former X-Crise, spearheaded by Charles Spinasse. The die-hard corporatists, however, are worried about ending the corporatist structure, most notably Yves Bouthillier. Bouthillier and his faction had been dominant for almost the entire history of the technocratic movement in the French State. However, his demise during the Grande Discorde, and the upswing of Bichelonne redistributed the cards. The basics of the PRIME plan are non-partisan. However, how each step will be carried will depend on which faction Bichelonne will lean into. The three main factions are as follows :

- The **Primevères** : named after the PRIME plan and after the flower, as a mocking way of describing the utopists, they are the main support base of Jean Bichelonne. Supporters of the PRIME plan from the early days, they can hardly be convinced to abandon Bichelonne and his grand vision for France. They are supporters of rapid modernisation, and of great infrastructure projects. Important figures of this faction : Jean Jardin, Roger Gaillochet, Robert Gibrat, Raymond Fischesser, Gabriel Auphan.

- The **Corporatists** : they are the early supporters of Bichelonne's old **Comités d'Organisation (CO)**. They support a vision of centralized cartels of industrialists, working for the state as autonomous entities. They see the PRIME plan only working if these CO are subsidized by the State, without having the State giving them orders. Important figures of this faction : Yves Bouthillier, Pierre Pucheu, René Gillouin, François Darlan, François Lehideux.

- The **Left-Technocrats** : X-Crise was always a planist, more socialist-oriented movement. When its heirs continued to maintain their technocratic ideals, it would be towards a **great nationalized system of industrial coordination**. For them, the PRIME plan's success is a matter of the State taking charge when it comes to economic development and industrial production. This is not socialism of course, but it's the closest a non-socialist state can be to it. Important figures of this faction : Charles Spinasse, Jean Coutrot, René Bousquet, Maurice Bouvier-Ajam.

## General overview of the political landscape during the Bichelonne's premiership

Jean Bichelonne became Prime Minister as the leader of the Technocratic faction of the RRN. However, this faction has almost as many allies than enemies in its own party. The Technocrats, especially the Corporatists, have a rather fragile alliance with the Conservatives. The Marechalistes have a good amount of confidence in them however, as they see in Bichelonne and his CO the continuation of the vision of the Maréchal. Other Conservatives criticize the Technocrats' view of society, especially the National-Catholics who despise the almost Saint-Simonian vision of Bichelonne. But, as long as Bichelonne follows his more Corporatist allies, he can count on the general support of the dying

Conservatives. The Reformists will also find in Bichelonne a reassuring figure, ready to open France to a more modern society. Politically, they will find themselves rivals, and sometimes even enemies especially with the Left-Technocrats. But many will still participate in the PRIME plan, hoping to find a nice position in the new economic order of the French State.

In the party opposition, the Traditionalistes will unite with the goal of preventing the Technocrats from destroying the traditional core of the state. They will represent a strong contender for Bichelonne, always questioning his actions, and petitioning with the agrarian movements to backtrack on its more radical plans. Isolated in the party, they will only become a vocal obstacle during the late 1960s, where the anger caused by Bichelonne's plan will reach a boiling point. Rallying behind Georges Sauge, they will use any weakness of the government at its advantage. This means working with Germany, and with the various collaborationist groups and militias.

## Phase 1 (1964-1967) - Commencement

Jean Bichelonne's cabinet:

President: Alphonse Juin - Imperial

Prime Minister: Jean Bichelonne (Managerial State) - Primevère

Minister for Industrial Planification: Jean Jardin (Managerial State) - Primevère

(EconMin) Minister of Labor, Industry and Industrial Development<sup>7</sup>: François Lehideux (Technocratic Corporatism) - Corpo

Foreign Minister: Jean Coutrot (Utopian Socialism) - Technogauche

Security Minister: Gabriel Auphan (Despotism) - Primevère

Minister of Urban Development: Georges Lamirand (Corporate Statism) - Primevère

During this first phase of the PRIME plan, Bichelonne will focus on drafting a modernisation plan with the help of his political peers, and on restructuring the French economy to support rapid efforts, both to tackle megaprojects, and to facilitate fast evolution of French technological progress in the industrial sector. During this step, each decision will favor either of the three main technocratic factions.

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<sup>7</sup> Bichelonne, being the talented economist and obsessive micromanager that he is, naturally integrates the post of Economy Minister to his portfolio as Prime Minister. Here, Lehideux is chosen to fill the EconMin slot, as his connections to prominent industrialists and role as the main responsible of organizing France's re-industrialization make him a very important figure in Bichelonne's cabinet, and from a gameplay perspective a very important character in Bichelonne's content.



*Bichelonne's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State: Alphonse Juin

Prime Minister: Jean Bichelonne

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jean Coutrot

Minister of Labor, Industry and Industrial Development: François Lehideux

Minister of Finance and National Economy: *integrated into the Prime Minister's portfolio*

Minister of the Interior: René Bousquet

Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces: Gabriel Auphan

Minister of Justice: Georges Vedel

Minister of Industrial Planification: Jean Jardin

Minister of Culture : Michel d'Ornano

Minister of Education: Raymond Fischesser

Minister of Urban Development: Georges Lamirand

Minister of Youth and Sports: Paul Baudouin

Minister of Transport and Communications: Robert Gibrat

Minister of Agriculture: Charles Spinasse

Minister of Territorial Affairs and Regions: Pierre Pucheu

Minister of Research: Louis de Broglie

## Planification

The most important step of any grand ambition is the first one, making the plan. The original PRIME plan offers a framework in which economists and industrialists can offer priorities and suggestions. The aim of this first step is to set the plan for the decade of modernization. This will only take up a couple of months.

### ***ECONOMIC STRUCTURATION***

First of all, planning how the economy will broadly be organized will be at the center of the whole plan. Bichelonne's only aim is to consolidate all economic sectors into a few industrial "champions", state-approved quasi-monopolies which would allow stronger levers. But, both Corporatists and Left-Technocrats offer different ways to achieve the creation of such behemoths.

- The **Corporatist** plan : the corporatists want to maintain the broad structure of the Comité d'Organisation, which Bichelonne established, but to modernize it by building up private semi-autonomous corporate entities which would be sponsored by government subsidies. This will make for an extremely efficient and cost-effective solution, but the companies will often have a mind of their own.

- The **Left-Technocrat** plan : the left-technocrats want to destroy the Comités d'Organisation and to integrate the various companies into a government-supervised list of national champions, which would directly take order from the State. This would make for an easier system to work with, but also a less efficient one.

Whatever plan Bichelonne decides to go with, this will end up with the creation of the **"Comité de Coordination Nationale" (CCN)**, a think tank of industrialists, made up of the heads of the various "national champions", which would coordinate with the government the absorption of smaller companies. The CCN and its early actions will be detailed in the "Restructuration Industrielle" section of this first phase.

### ***"LES GRAND PROJETS" (THE LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS)***

The most visible part of the PRIME plan, is its focus on large projects that are both ambitious, technologically advanced, and necessary to kick the status of France to a ternary European power, to a primary one. This is the "Politique des Grands Projets" (the "Large Projects Policy").

- The **Primevères** already has a lot of personal favorites that he had frameworked in his original writings: fast railway modernizations, work automatisisation and investments in computer technologies, and industrial-urban decentralization and planification. But of course, both the Corporatists and Left-Technocrats also have suggestions.

- The **Corporatists** want to focus on large-scale industrial areas in rural France, linked by high-speed roads inspired by the German Autobahn, and powered by hydroelectric plants.

- The **Left-Technocrats** want to focus on urban transformation, high-speed trains, and of course, nuclear power developments. All of these plans will need varying scales of efforts and materials to carry.

This planification of projects will be the first big unique mechanic of Bichelon's France. Each project will have a difficulty associated with it. To finish planification, you'll need to achieve a minimum plan score which will not be too large, but will still require some effort. There will be no upper limit on plan score, so you can encounter the risk of over-planning. On the other hand, if you achieve a vastly ambitious PRIME plan, you'll get way more favorable end results.

*key : Name of the Project (difficulty score)*

*\* = Easy*

*\*\* = Difficult*

*\*\*\* = Challenging*

*\*\*\*\* = Avant-Garde*

*\*\*\*\*\* = Insane*

- **Corporatists** :

- ORTF (\*)
- The Pierrelatte military plant (\*\*)
- Highway developments (Autoroutes) (\*\*)
- The Serre-Ponçon dam (\*\*)

- **Primevères** :

- Pôle Universitaire of Rennes (\*)
- La Défense (\*)
- Plan Calcul (\*\*)
- Paris International Airport (\*\*)

- Aérotrain (\*\*)
- Concorde (\*\*)
- National Particle Accelerator (\*\*\*)
- CNES (\*\*\*\*)
- **Left-Technocrats :**
  - New Port of La Rochelle (\*\*)
  - TGV (\*\*)
  - Toulouse Technopole (\*\*\*)
  - Marcoule Nuclear Power Plant (\*\*\*\*)

## **URBANISATION PROJECTS**

Finally, a part of the PRIME plan is to go from a Paris-centric industrial economy, to a nationwide one. Decentralization of the economy is something all technocrat factions agree on. But, with decentralization of industry comes rural exodus. This new urban population will need homes, and the old cities of the Maréchal will not be enough. This time, each of the three factions will have radically different approaches to the housing issue, which will have drastic impacts on the landscapes of the French cities.

- The **Primevères** has a very pragmatic solution, inspired by innovations in urban planning made during the interwar : the "Politique des Nouvelles Villes" ("New Cities Policy") of Paul Delouvrier, and the construction of large "Cité-Jardins" ("Garden-Cities"), inspired by housing solutions implemented in the United Kingdom. This means suburbs of low height cheap housing in green areas, close to the city-center and to industrial zones, allowing a shift from both poor dirty industrial neighborhood and isolated rural housing, to a practical enjoyable life in a neighborhood connected to the city by public transports. This is a rather unpopular plan however, as the cité-jardin model had been widely criticized as a very bad solution to fast population movement towards the cities. Bichelonne doesn't think so, but he has few supporters outside of Delouvrier.

- The **Left-Technocrats** have a very radical solution: raze and rebuild. It started with the "Plan Voisin", made by Le Corbusier in the 1920s and sponsored by Georges Voisin, famous aviator and car manufacturer. This idea of the ideal city grew among left-technocratic circles, which ended up in the realization that new urbanism must be built on the rubbles of the old, much like Haussman did in Paris during the 19th century. This plans the

construction of the "Grand Ensembles" (housing projects), cheap dense housing, which will form popular neighborhoods close to new industrial centers. Public services will be present, and public transportation will bring the population quickly and efficiently to the industrial zones. This will be done on the border of the old cities, allowing both historical centers and modern "banlieues" (suburbs in the housing project sense) to co-exist. Most old neighborhoods will be destroyed to make space for these new cities.

- The **Corporatists** are driven away from the cité-jardin model, seen as relics of the past, and as nests for socialist and communist movements to grow in. So rather than that, they will look into dense buildings built on the border of the old cities, allowing both historical centers and modern "banlieues" to co-exist. Large roads will allow a greater amount of traffic to bring the people from their housing to their work. This means building "Grands Ensembles" like the left-technocrats, but away from the core historical center which will stay untouched, transformed into mostly service industries. This is the result of various reports of Gabriel Dessus and Jacques Weulersse, who were in charge of urban planning during the early 40s, but who were replaced early by more traditionalist governments. They still have a very strong political voice supporting them, Georges Lamirand.

## Restructuration Industrielle

The CCN is at the core of Bichelonne's ambitious industrial restructuring plans. Based on the previously decided upon priority between nationalization and laissez-faire, the CCN will be made up of head representatives of all sectors of the economy. They are mainly CEOs of major companies, hardened veterans of how corporations work. It can be summarized as two movements: centralization of the industrial sectors into few State-sponsored or State-overseen national champions, and decentralization of industry from the densely industrialized north and Paris, to a more spread out distribution of production. By making every city a beating heart of its own, Bichelonne hopes to kickstart the economy nationwide. This part is planned to last around three years, for the most part of the first phase.

### CENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECTORS

The CCN's main goal is to transform the fractured net of small and middle-sized companies that could hardly compete with the German titans, into concentrated monopolies that can. The "**National Champions**" of France were for the most part nonexistent at the start of the 60s. A few of them are inefficient government-run companies, often managing public services such as the electrical grid, or the waterworks. But what France needs is more of them, even if created from nothing. That way, the government and private actors can more easily direct the priorities of the new French economy towards the Grands Projets, and modernize the aging German-dependent factories of the country.

The PRIME plan efforts will apply to twelve sectors : **Atomic and Nuclear Research, Civil Engineering, Civil Transportation, Construction, Mining and Ironworks, Oil, Finance and Banking, Supermarket and Agroalimentaire, Electricity Production, Telecommunication, Automobile, Aeronautics and Electronics**. All of these sectors are at various levels of modernization, and sector centralization. But for each of them, the CCN will find, make, or develop companies to become sector monopolies.

Mechanically, this will be translated into two metrics that you can interact with: "**Sector Centralization**" and "**Level of Modernization**". In this part of the PRIME plan, the first metric will be the main focus, as you battle to merge small companies into giants, gracefully, or forcefully. Focus and decisions can act on these metrics, but the main part will come in the form of decisions and interface interactions, coupled with playing with the economic system for certain sectors. While initially abstract, these sectors will be linked to the advancement of the **Grands Projets**, which depending on the project chosen will require a level of involvement to conduct in time for the PRIME plan to succeed.

Each faction will have different ways of achieving this though. **Corporatists** will want the government to subsidize the buyouts of smaller companies, which will cost a lot but it will make the initial centralization efforts easier. **Left-Technocrats** will demand that the State seizes the companies, legally, because they'll make it so. Either way, being too brutal about this will raise an **anger meter**, which represents the public discontent with Bichelon, his government, and his CCN's methods. While this will impact the construction of the projects because of strikes, the greatest impact of this meter will be during the Troubled 1971, which will of course be described later.

## **BUILDING THE GRANDS PROJETS**

The Grands Projets will require never seen before nationwide economic coordination and involvement. They are decade-defining projects, made to radically transform the face of France, to propel it into the 21st century. The concept is rather straightforward, and similar to what can be found in other countries. The specificity of France is that these projects will never be able to be made with the initial state of the French industry. Therefore, they are directly linked to the success of the CCN in centralizing and modernizing the sectors needed.

Mechanically, the progress of each project is represented by "**major milestones**", one for each level of difficulty. Progress represents the development, construction, and finalization of each project. The advancement of projects is by nature passive, advancing by itself at a slow rate. To accelerate this, you'll need to reach either a certain level of

sector centralization, modernization, or have enough buildings constructed. These are a form of conditions that activate boosts when they are met, but don't stop construction when they are not. Once the threshold is met, any higher improvement in the two sector metrics will improve the boost received. Each step can have different needs and thresholds though, so at each milestone you'll have to keep watch of the new requirements. At completion, each project counts to determine the success or failure of the PRIME plan.

## URBANIZATION AND AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS

Finally, the most divisive part of the PRIME plan among the Technocrats is how to tackle urbanization, and how to geographically decentralize the economy. But, overall, they agree on one thing: building up cities by siphoning the worker population from the rural areas. This is a small mechanic, which will be handled both as a mandatory Grand Projet, and during event chains. But of course, this will be met with strong reactions from the agrarian movements. Both the middle-class **Poujadist movement** of Pierre Poujade, and the agrarian **Dorgérist movement** of Henri Dorgères will gain traction as protectors of the rural villages and of the agricultural sector. They are seen as in danger of extinction due to the Technocrats' industrialist views. They rise as the main popular opposition movement, which will need to be taken care of. **Corporatists** will want to co opt them, **Left-Technocrats** will want to eliminate them, **Primevères** will not care about them. In any way you want to act, they will at the end also be a factor in how the Troubled 71 will play out. As the player, this quasi-mechanic will serve as a way to try to make the PRIME plan go through more easily.

## Phase 2 (1967-1971) - Consolidation and Intensification

While the first phase of the PRIME plan was focused on laying down the foundations of the new France, the second phase is the development of the quintessential PRIME modernization plans. The inception of this phase needs the industrial restructuring plan to be close to finished, and will need you to involve yourself in politics more than the previous phase. As social unrest grows, and as the dream of progress has never made Bichelonne so hopeful, the late years of the 1960s will be pivotal for the French State's future.

### Modernisation : the Successes of the Plan

This phase is focused on improving the quality of the tools and machines used by the French industry, as to improve France's competitiveness in the European market. This is important, as until recently France had been using old German machines to produce

mid-quality products for export. Jean Bichelonne says that this is enough, and that France needs to come out of the German shadow, and innovate. This translates mechanically in a greater focus on the "Level of Modernization" statistic for each sector. This is a hugely abstracted concept, and for each sector it means different things. Every sector has a different number of levels, which are discrete steps, meaning that the effects only improve when you reach a level. Using focuses, economic investments, and overall events, new levels can be reached faster, at sometimes the cost of higher subsidies, or higher social unrest.

Modernization is, surprisingly, a universal agreement among the Technocrats. There will be little to no differences between the choices of the Corporatists, Primevères, or Left-Technocrats. Politically speaking, this will only be a backdrop for the political backlash of the economic decisions taken in the previous phase. The PRIME plan's outcome will be decided by how much the modernization effort has been a success, but also, how well the Grands Projets has been going.

## **STATUS OF THE GRANDS PROJETS**

The Grands Projets are supposed to be almost finished by 1970, at least it should have advanced to a level where the Bichelonne government can claim success. If any project has still now reached the final stage of their development, this is considered a failure. If all projects are at the end stage, but not enough of them has been completed, then it is seen as a developing success. It will not be considered a failure, but you will not get the "good ending". If most of the Grands Projets has been completed, meaning if the minimum score for success dictated by the choices made is reached, then the Grands Projets will be a success, which leads to the "good ending", the draft of the "France 1999" plan.

## **FRANCE 1999**

If by 1970 the PRIME plan has been judged a success, Jean Bichelonne will organize a small taskforce to draft a plan for the next thirty years, an even more ambitious plan than the PRIME plan : France 1999. This would be overall economic planification for increased technological advances, investments in tech labs and research laboratories, in public transport and infrastructure, in a way to make France the beacon of progress and prosperity in Europe. It focuses mainly on the nex advances in computing, and on opportunities left by a new positioning as Europe's number 3 economy. This will not be something the player will have the time to play with, but this is a way to showcase the ambition of a successful Bichelonne, probably getting a bit cocky.



## Strikes : the Failures of the Plan

Surprisingly, destroying small companies and forcefully fusing them into larger titans, leaving a lot of workers unemployed, or transferred to factories with less benefits, creates unrest. Anger rises, and with it new movements form and strengthen themselves into forces that can become an obstacle to the PRIME plan. Dealing with this will be tough, because it will always result in the Troubled 71. However, by reducing anger before that fateful year, you can make it less of a country-shattering event. **Primevères** are unwilling to deal with these movements, so the **Corporatists** and **Left-Technocrats** are left to propose how to curb the growth of these movements.

**Corporatists** see the opportunity of co-opting agrarian movements, using them to promote the importance of the Comités d'Organisation as protectors of the equilibrium between the little men and the big shots. The movements will be less diminished by this, but it will at least have the benefit of not increasing anger. However, this will also increase the power of the CCN, which will now not just become a tool of economic progress, but now also of societal equilibrium. This brings them in a position where they can leverage the government, and while it isn't an immediate threat, down the line that road can lead to a very dangerous rivalry between corporations and state.

**Left-Technocrats** on the other hand see these movements as roadblocks that need to be dealt with quickly and definitively. Because most of these movements are reactionary in nature, or ideological rivals, this would lead to political repression. They would send the police, the Gendarmerie, to forcefully, and sometimes violently, kick down the movements. This will quickly decrease the strength of these movements, but this will also rapidly increase the anger of the French people in a way that might snowball into chaos. This is a more difficult path, where you'll need to balance iron-fisted decisions with anger management. For many, this will also be when the Utopian dream of the PRIME plan will die.

### THE ENEMIES OF PROGRESS



Any large action is met with an equal and opposite reaction. Technocratic progress efforts are thus naturally met with resistance from all parts of the French population. From people who feel left out, to workers who feel exploited, to students struggling to be hopeful for the future of French society. The Bichelonne government nicknames them the “Enemies of Progress” (EoP), and will be the subject of a sub-mecanic of the PRIME plan. From left to right :

- **Pierre Poujade** is the infamous leader of the **Poujadistes**, a movement of lower and middle-class craftsmen which had gained enough traction by the 1960s that he had a genuine chance at getting the premiership of the French State. However, his archenemy Jean Bichelonne had won. He has spent the last years accusing Bichelonne of being part of the synarchist conspiracy to destroy France, a puppet of the 200 families. He had always been a nuisance, now he's getting traction again after the destruction of small enterprises due to the centralization efforts.

- **Henri Dorgères**, real name Henri-Auguste d'Halluin, leader of the **Dorgériste** movement, is a convinced agrarian fascist. Founder of the "Comités de Défense Paysanne" in 1929, he led the Mussolini-inspired "Green shirts" through the 30s, which became the foundation of the "Corporation paysanne" (peasants' corporation) created during the Vichy Regime. However, the 1950s were tough on the movement, as it became submerged by both the policies of the French State, and the rise of his great rival, Pierre Poujade. However, Dorgères had found in Bichelonne the great enemy of the countryside, herald of the industrial destruction of the green lands of Francia. He particularly hates the Left-Technocrats.

- **Georges Marchais** is a relatively unknown small figure in French politics. A mechanic, metalworker, he was already close to unions during his younger years. He was during the war sent to Germany to work due to the STO. When he came back, he was sent back to his home region, Normandy, where he became the leader of the metalworkers' workers union in the "Société Métallurgique de Normandie" (SMN). It's hard to be a workers' unionist in a

reactionary world, even with the protections of the *Comités d'Organisations*. But he still made a name for himself among the Norman unions, and since the centralization of his sector he became a voice for the workers in the factories. Known for being a vocal supporter of strikes as a tool of protest, by the late 1960s he became the face of the **Syndicalistes** (workers' unionists).

- The "**Nouveaux Mouvements Sociaux**" (NMS) are all the new socialist movements that arose in the **Student Circles** of the universities of France. Often libertarian in nature, inspired by various left-leaning movements across the world, they will fight the Technocrats accused of destroying liberty by formatting the economy into a planist nightmare. It is unique in the sense that it doesn't have a leader, or a centralized structure (pictured above is Jacques Sauvageot, head of a major movement among the NMS). But they shout with one single voice : "L'Imagination au Pouvoir !" ("imagination in power"). It is without much momentum during this phase, but will be central to be Troubled 71.

Mechanically, the four movements will be represented by simple bars. The size of the Troubled 71 event will not be directly linked to the size of each bar, meaning that only the anger meter will be important for the Troubled 71. But, each movement will decrease the ability of each sector, meaning that your Grands Projets might get delayed, and the PRIME plan might end up being a failure due to that. This is precisely why you need to keep the bars low, at least the relevant ones for your projects, in a way that limits the growth of the anger bar. Because if the movement reaches a "critical level", then anger starts trickling up, which will this time impact the Troubled 71. A game of balance.

## THE MOULINEX STRIKE

A central medium-sized crisis is the Moulinex strike, happening in 1969. Moulinex is a Normandy-based appliance manufacturer, known mainly for making small and cheap electric kitchen appliances. Because of the centralization of its sector, it threatened to close down. However, it always resisted all bids to buy it out, and became a symbol for unionists and anti-technocrats alike. In 1969, the government forced Moulinex to surrender, and as a response, the workers of the factory organized a large strike, protecting the factory. Workers start to directly sell the result of their work, bypassing the company itself, showing that the Moulinex factory will not bow down to the government. The Moulinex Affair is a crisis that will rapidly increase the powers of the EoP. It should be handled by 1970, but it will last months, and actions taken against it will shape the Troubled 71.

## Phase 3 (1971-1973) - Crisis and Resolution

In February 1971, Jean Bichelonne officially announces on radio and television his great vision for the future of France: "France 1999". This was supposed to be a great and hopeful peek at what's planned to maintain France's trajectory towards being once again a world power in economics and progress. However, considering the situation in which he announced it, it ended up being perceived as a tone-deaf proclamation, which had become usual for this government. However, for the young generation, enough is enough! In response to the announcement, which locked their future down in a spiral of cynical modernism, students in the Sorbonne University organized a strike. They occupy their halls, calling for the end of the "tyranny of numbers". Their figurehead is Jacques Sauvageot, a student union leader of the Parisian branch of the "Union Nationale des Etudiants de France" (UNEF). Originally only a student strike, their links with underground socialist and communist NMS quickly snowballed the event into city-wide demonstrations. **The "Troubled 71" has started.**

### The Troubled 1971

The "Troubled 71" starts as a purely student-police fight, concentrated in the city of Paris. However, as the years go by, and based on the government's reaction to it, the events can snowball into a greater nationwide crisis. There will be three phases identified. The first one concerns the first weeks of the Troubled 71, where the students and the police clashed violently in the streets of Paris. The second one happens after a few weeks, or a couple of months, and starts when the workers' union joins in the demonstrations. This phase is supposed to be the longest one, and will be the phase where the government has the possibility of managing to stop the Troubled 71. If it fails, then it reaches the third phase, *révolution*! If that final phase is reached, it means that the government cannot deal with the problem anymore.

#### THE "BATAILLE" MECHANIC

The Troubled 71 will be abstracted into a mechanic that allows to show the struggle between students and police forces, the **"Bataille" mechanic**. "Bataille" is the French name for the card game War, of which a variant will be used in this mechanic. Each side, student and police, has a set of cards, each with a value associated with it. Each iteration, both sides choose a card. The card with the biggest value wins, if both cards are equal then "Bataille" is declared and another card needs to be put on the table. However, victory isn't always the best option in this version of War. There will be two sides: the "Soulèvement", here called the "students", and the "Gouvernement", here called the "police".

For the player, playing as the "police" side, having a bigger value is necessary. If the "students" wins the round, the value difference is added to an overall meter called "Force". Force will represent the "life" of the movement against the government. If it reaches zero, the movement is destroyed, the Troubled 71 are over. On the other hand, if the "police" wins the round, the difference will be subtracted from the Force meter. However, that same difference is added to another meter, "Advancement". Advancement represents the ticking time of the demonstration, slowly morphing into a more and more organized opposition force that can become more difficult to handle. This is how phases of the Troubled 71 advances, representing how disproportionate police action transforms a simple demonstration into a revolution. The mechanic thus relies on a balance of appropriate force used against the protesters.

This is where choices made previously play a deep role. If during the previous handling of the Enemies of Progress, you didn't manage to calm them down appropriately, the "student" side will have more high-value cards. On the other hand, if you have invested into a strong police, and have a government willing to use violent action against protesters (like the Left-Technocrats), then the "police" side will have more high-value cards, making it easier to over-react to protesters action, quickly escalating the conflict.

## **I - STUDENT ACTION**

The strike of the students will be at first relatively tame, but it will quickly devolve into large actions in the streets. Pavement will be destroyed and thrown at policemen, barricades will rise, and the discontent now has the smell of an uprising. This first phase will serve as an introduction to the Bataille mechanic, and will only last up to a month. The action will stay concentrated in Paris.

## **II - THE STRIKES**

As the student demonstrations drags on, the leaders of the main NMS meet with the leaders of the workers' unions of Greater Paris. There he finds support for their actions, and considering how the situation has drifted into violence, the unions are more than willing to lend a hand to stop that government. This second phase will see both students and workers unite their forces and coordinate their actions to put an end to the madness of this government. All of the actions are once again concentrated in Paris, but a few blips of support will come from the Province as well. This is supposed to be the longest phase of the three, being the main stage for the Bataille.

### III - RÉVOLUTION !

If this phase is reached, the government has lost. Whatever the situation of the government, you'll receive the ending 3c.

#### Phase 3.A (1971-1973) - La France Moderne (Primevère/Corporatist victory)



This ending is reached if, during the previous phases of the PRIME plan, the player has chosen the options that favors the Corporatists. This can be reached by choosing to modernize the CO into the CCN, to enact their urban plans, or to favor their co-opting of agrarian movements during the fight against the Enemies of Progress.

The Troubled 71 ends with a victory for the Bichelonne government and the alliance between Primvères and Corporatists. Set on the path of economic modernization, and new corporatism under the wing of the CCN and the RRN, the events now lie as an uncomfortable blip on an otherwise great story of the French phoenix. Jean Bichelonne reaffirms his commitment to his France 1999 project, and continues to work with the CCN to develop further the innovation hubs of the territory. However, the rubbles and the scars of the Troubled 71 will have trouble healing. Society has been broken apart, and only with concessions with the farmers, workers and craftsmen can the government continue its work without constant strife. The new generation, the students, beaten and silenced, is split between the Neo-Bichelonnistes, and the Anti-Bichelonnistes, depending on their side during 71.

1972 ends on a bitter hope for a future painted with progress. Economically, France is on the path to become a regional power, rival of the United Kingdom. The country has caught up technologically, and opens its trading to the Japanese market. Politically, Bichelonne will start the process to liberalize the RRN, slowly opening the state to becoming more moderate, while still conservative in nature. The aging prime minister will also be pushed to think about successions, and to take a step back and let his government and the CCN direct more of the state's focus. Bichelonne will categorically refuse, as the eternal micro-manager that he always was, slowly creating tensions among the government and the RRN.

The CCN is now truly a counter-power to the government. The cartel of National Champions now has a solid grip on the economy, currently aligned with Bichelonne, but who can become a true opponent if their path starts to diverge. Too big to fail, their prospect for the 70s is to continue to grow, to invest in other markets, and to use their great autonomy to talk where the government can't.

*Vive Jean Bichelonne, vive le Maréchal, et vive "La France Moderne".*

### Phase 3.B (1971-1973) - L'Utopie à la Française (Primevère/Left-Technocrat victory)



This ending is reached if, during the previous phases of the PRIME plan, the player has chosen the options that favors the Left-Technocrats. This can be reached by choosing to destroy the CO and build the state-run CCN, to enact their radical urban plans, or more violent action they proposed against the Enemies of Progress by investing in police forces.

The Troubled 71 ends with a victory for the Bichelonne government and the alliance between Primvères and Left-Technocrats. Violent response, while controversial and potentially making the events worse than what they were, had proven effective, and the Troubled 71 is now just a painful memory. The government is now free of its enemies, it sets its goals in granite. The arrest of Poujadistes and Dorgéristes leaders marks the "end" of the agrarian opposition, and the RRN is held solidly within the grasp of the Technocratic leadership. 71 also gave the opportunity to co-opt the leadership of the unions, replacing leaders, making them an extension of the state.

While this picture sounds bleak, and will translate into a broken society, it is also one that will explore the unparalleled success of the PRIME plan on the modernization of the French State. However, instability will make any other move hard to justify, and hard to enact. The utopian society of the Left-Technocrats will be met by the obstacles of an unwilling population. France is a new country, authoritarian sure, but now modern and economically dynamic. A worthy rival to other economic powers on the continent, it does face the downside of potential tensions with the Reich. Student movements are still rampant after all. Jean Bichelonne, set aside by an almost autonomous government, is stuck imprisoned in relentless progress.

Truly under the iron-fist of the government, the CCN will continue its work as the vector of economic development under the complete and overbearing supervision of the Left-Technocrats. But tensions between it and the unions will soon prove to be more unbearable than expected. The memory of the Moulinex Strike still fresh, the scars of 71 still bleeding, 1972 will end with a call for general strikes. The government prepares itself for another round of police actions and repression.

The train is recklessly going at full speed on the rails of progress. May the brakes still work.

## Phase 3.C (1971-1973) - La Chute des Technocrates

### L'imagination au Pouvoir

After months of violent fighting in the streets across France, and particularly in its capital, the Bichelonne government has shown its inability to control the now revolutionaries in the streets. Bichelonne and his government flee to Bordeaux, before being dissolved by président Auphan. The students will occupy the city of Paris and will declare the French Socialist Republic (FSR), while the rest of the country will be in disarray, waiting for a new government to form. The bubble of socialism and libertarianism will encompass the city of Paris, where the now leaders of the new FSR had the duty of writing a constitution, as did the Communards a century prior. Imagination had finally won, and France seemed to go



towards a bright future. But, reality quickly stuck when the various NMS were now in direct ideological competition. Sauvageot was open for compromise, but some opinions were irreconcilable. Surrounded by French armed forces, the city was in a state of siege. Quickly lacking food, the new government was faced with the reality of a failed experiment.

Meanwhile, président Auphan struggles to find a suitable replacement, before landing on the relatively unknown, but inoffensive for the various factions of the RRN, Georges Sauge. Sauge has allies both in the Conservative and Traditionalist factions of the RRN, slowly rising as a voice for the return of traditional catholic values in the government. Named prime minister, Sauge starts by reaching towards Germany to help curb the revolution, and police the cities. With the help of the Wehrmacht, the French and German forces enters the city of Paris, encountering close to no resistance. The FSR will have 3 weeks of freedom, before being crushed under the tank tracks of the German army. Various leaders of the NMS are arrested, Sauvageot manages to flee to the United States, and Paris is in the hands of the RRN once again.

## Return to Reality



Georges Sauge's cabinet:

President: Gabriel Auphan - Corporatist

Prime Minister: Georges Sauge (National Catholicism) - National-Catholic

Interior Minister: Maurice Papon (National Conservatism) - Marechalist

Minister of Labor and Industry: Jean Royer (Christian Conservatism) - National-Catholic

Foreign Minister: André Bettencourt (National Conservatism) - Marechalist

Security Minister: Marcel Carpentier (Despotism) - Independant

Order back in Paris, Georges Sauge now rules over an ideologically broken country. Sauge announces the end of Bichelonne's plans, a return to a strict corporatist traditional government, and the breaking of the monopolies. Workers' unions across the country, who participated in the Troubled 71, are broken up, and their leaders are arrested. The Saugist State is now set to drive France back in the shadow of the Reich. It is a grim ending for a country that was, for a while, hopeful. But all hope is not yet lost. 71 had shown how coordinated action could make the government bow to the will of the people. The Reich is still there, threatening France, but it will not be there forever.

Sauge will not be their eternal prime minister, the sun will one day rise again. Jean Bichelonne had failed, the FSR had failed, the Unions had failed. But soon enough, Sauge will fail as well.

### III. François Mitterrand - Réforme



#### ===== INTRODUCTION =====

The 10th of July, 1940, was the last day of the Third Republic. On that fateful day, the two houses of the French legislature, meeting in tandem as one "Congrès" in the aftermath of the signing of the armistice with Germany at Compiègne, voted to transfer all power to Philippe Pétain and away from the elected institutions that comprised the Republic. This day, more than any other, is the defining date of modern French history - excepting, perhaps, the day of the armistice itself.

But though the Republic died that hot summer day, its spirit did not perish. Three inheritors carried the mantle of republicanism into their hearts: first, the Free French, who absconded with the flame to Africa under Charles de Gaulle; second, the Résistance, which forged it into every rifle and bayonet they levied against the Vichy regime; and third, the republican politicians who laid down their arms, who took it and buried it in old trunks and older memories, becoming the institutional Réformistes. Hiding their republican sympathies, they quietly focused their labors on undermining the corporatist foundations of the new regime, hoping it would one day set France on the path of democracy once more.

Yet one score and four years later, when reformism seizes the glass throne of the État, the spirit of the Third Republic is no longer with the ones who watched that Republic crumble in their hands. Instead, it has found a new host in a new generation of Réformistes. These men remember the Republic only as the time of their childhoods; their careers were nurtured in the ranks of the Vichy state; their political lives were shaped by Occupation and by the New Order. Unlike the ancients, beaten into submission and meekness by the trauma of the Occupation and the state of emergency during the war, this new generation is vigorous, energetic, and youthful. They are unafraid to challenge

RRN orthodoxy and criticize the institutions of the state without reservation, relying above all on an argument that the stagnant and lethargic status quo no longer works for the average Frenchman.

But at the same time, if this new generation might be commended for their industry and bravery, might not their reformist credentials be questioned by those who yearn for the return of the Republic?

At its core, François Mitterrand's route is about **reform**. Mitterrand sees the dire situation of the French State, of a nation that has essentially been stuck in limbo for the past 20 years because of a lack of decisive action, and decides that something must be done. He will then try to reform the state, from top to bottom and while leaving no stone unturned, to make it efficient, and most importantly to make it fair, so that the average French person can for the first time in a while be proud of their government.

Mitterrand truly believes in his goals. However, he is also an very self-serving person, and this is reflected in the ways he conducts reforms: while eager to promote social and economic reforms, Mitterrand will be much more reluctant to enact thorough political reforms, as that would take away some of his own power; and with power being one of the things Mitterrand lives for, he will therefore be quite content with using the institutions he once decried to further his goals - and his own position.

However, Mitterrand's half-hearted liberalization will eventually embolden opposition to the RRN system, as the social freedoms he brought upon and the relaxed atmosphere the country finds itself in will enable activists to meet and to gather forces. It's the Tocqueville effect: give an inch, and they'll want a mile. As the Oil Crisis hits, protests will engulf the French State, not against Mitterrand himself, but against the system he is surrounded by - the one he surrounds himself with. Mitterrand will have to face the music at last, and to decide whether to abandon himself to history by siding with the protesters and hope for the best, or to safeguard his own power by quelling the protests.

## Phase 1 (1964-1967) - "La France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur."

François Mitterrand's cabinet:

President: Alphonse Juin - Imperial

Prime Minister: François Mitterrand (Left-Wing Corporatism) - Labourist

Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: René Bousquet (Left-Wing Corporatism) - Labourist

Economy Minister: Antoine Pinay (Liberal Conservatism) - Reformer

Foreign Minister: André Bettencourt (National Conservatism) - Conservative

Security Minister: Henri Navarre (Despotism) - Imperial

François Mitterrand in 1964 is seen as essentially the closest thing possible to a compromise candidate among France's moderates-young and ambitious, yes, but amenable to most of the major factions of the Vichy coalition. Reflecting this, his initial cabinet includes elderly liberal-conservative Antoine Pinay, ex-Radical technocrat René Bousquet, and Catholic conservative bulwark André Bettencourt, all maintaining their own agendas. Bettencourt deserves special mention-in our timeline, his association with Mitterrand was built during Mitterrand's youthful alignment with the anti-republican Cagouards. This flirtation with the extreme right was mostly discarded after Mitterrand definitively signed with the Resistance, but in TNO endures in a chastened form.

There is one tendency near-entirely sidelined, however, and that's the advocates of a fascist party-state. At first this won't be much of a problem due to Tixier-Vignancour's political collapse and the general disorganization of collaborators, of course, but the potential for a rapid ascent cannot be ignored.

Thanks to the deterioration of military presidentialism, the role of Prime Minister has almost become a twisted parody of its Third Republic counterpart and sets the agenda far more than the executive. Yet the constitution itself was designed for an autocratic executive, and Mitterrand quickly chafes against the limits on his authority-for both his personal ambitions and the reform of France, he needs more power. This opens the grand theme of his administration, where he plots to build his own power base to wrangle the military under civilian authority, dissolve the sclerotic RRN, and eventually-if he can marshal the popular force-rewrite the constitution to bring France to modernity.

*François Mitterrand's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State: Alphonse Juin

Prime Minister: **François Mitterrand** - Labourist

Minister of Foreign Affairs: **André Bettencourt** - Conservative

Minister of Economy and Finance: **Antoine Pinay** - Reformer

Minister of the Interior: **Charles Hernu** - Labourist

Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces: Henri Navarre - Armed Forces

Minister of Justice: **Maurice Duverger** - Reformer

Minister of Culture: [Charles Trenet](#) - Reformer

Minister of Education: [René Billères](#) - Democrat

Minister of Youth and Sports: [Raymond Marcellin](#) - Reformer

Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: [René Bousquet](#) - Labourist

Minister for Veterans, Prisoners of War and Deportees: [Roger-Patrice Pelat](#) - Labourist

Minister for Agriculture: [Jacques Chirac](#) - Labourist

Minister for the Budget and Budget Stability: [Maurice Papon](#) - Conservative

Minister of Trade and Union Affairs: [Jean Jardin](#) - Technocrat

Minister of Information and Communications : [Jacques Delors](#) - Democrat

## Versailles

The first act focuses on establishing Mitterrand's court. This is perhaps where the average player may be startled-much of the coterie is composed of influential citizens without a clear ideological bent, as in our world, but dealing with them is essential to Mitterrand's political life. In spite of his attempts to keep knowledge of his clientelism and womanizing hidden from the public, there is no firewall between his personal life and his office.

Keeping it all under wraps will require a great deal of effort from trusted subordinates like the long-suffering Francois de Grossouvre. And really, can a man withstand work like that intact?

## La Cautérisation Algérienne (provisional!!!)

Much like in our world, Mitterrand's involvement in TNO French politics included a stint overseeing colonies, where he proposed significant reforms, was resisted, and promptly shuffled off to another ministerial position. This proved to be surprisingly serendipitous for him, as the rapid deterioration of overseas France set in only just **after** his dismissal, giving him cachet as a colonial Cassandra. With the Algerian war in full swing, Mitterrand has the chance to avenge his record.

The civilizing mission was foolishly discarded in 1940, and loyalty maintained not by the opportunity of Frenchness but by the personal popularity of Petain. This already wasn't enough during the emergency, but now, with a whole generation of Algerian youth

only knowing Petain in the past tense? Reforms to give nominally equal citizenship, bolster the ranks of harkis, and above all else bring a semblance of civilian authority back to Algeria are essential. In this he will be resisted by all involved parties, Algerian, pied-noir, or military. Playing them off against each other and presenting *faits accomplis* where necessary is the only way to stem the bleeding.

Pushing these through is an audacious and doomed gamble. The reward of maintaining French presence in Algeria is destabilizing the country, wasting Mitterrand's political capital in key moments, and-of course-all the advantages of a larger France. This isn't a "trap path" but the logical consequence of keeping a country in chains past all sense, and I do expect some players to go with it.'

If the player instead withdraws from Algeria, Mitterrand's attention will instead be the plight of the refugees. It seems at first blush illogical for him to try to make supporters of people fleeing under his watch-but what chance did he have, after all, to save them? The past governments failed them in the land of their birth-he can only act in the present and in the France that they have fled to. With this justification a constellation of social programs will be established (their precise nature and focus affecting factional influence and the economy) to allow for the resettlement and integration of the refugees to French society. (Writing this properly in events will require a careful hand! We don't want to either valorize settlers or invalidate the genuine social alienation they felt in France.)

This is a path with substantial political upside, though it does in the short-term aggravate the military, conservatives, and-in the short term, most dangerously-empowers the FRN with a new recruitment base of disaffected refugee youth.

## Out of the Fire

Mitterrand's attitude towards economic reform is characteristically blasé, leaving it mostly to his feuding ministers to puzzle out. Pinay, speaking for the conservative bloc, suggests a move away from the most overbearing elements of corporatism and limited liberalization of price controls. (I still need to get a better sense for exactly how the economy's oriented at the start of TNO Vichy, to be truthful.) This is diametrically opposed by the technocrats' urge for expanding the planning system and social spending-a vision far less ambitious than the one Bichelonne pursues in his path, but one also leaving France less indebted to Germany.

There is not simply a choice between one plan or the other-both factions will try to see their own projects through, with Mitterrand (and thus the player) only having limited ability to pull the rivaling ministries' schemes together. Even during this period of administrative incoherence the economic situation will improve no matter what. It fits the overall narrative and many of the key steps are, luckily, basically at a consensus-for instance, the key focus of the initial reforms.

Industrial renewal, though desperately needed, is limited by France's issues with capital-in this phase pressing the agricultural advantage is the key focus to get the necessary capital and stop relying so heavily on unfavorable German loans. The pure

technocrats may find themselves dismayed at the other plans Mitterrand has with the capital (and in the capital, actually), but those are projects for another year.

## Military Reform

In a meeting soon after the civilianization or abandonment of Algeria, President Juin obliquely threatens Mitterrand's dismissal. This unwelcome reminder of the autocratic authority of the president-and how domestic governance is entirely shunted off to Prime Ministers, like a limpid photocopy of the Third Republic-cements in Mitterrand's mind that, eventually, either he or the President will go.

For the time being he is too popular and the RRN utterly unable to offer an alternative. This is the best chance he will have to bring the military under civilian authority, reform the constitution, and restore a decisive and popular government to a nation that hasn't had one since Clemenceau. It will start, Mitterrand decides, with the replacement of the inept Minister of Defence, Henri Navarre.

## Social Reform (I)

A cautious social liberalization also begins during this period, though with the influence of Vichy conservatives and ex-Cagoullards like Bettencourt it's a limited thaw.

Vichy's aggressive traditionalism saw the place of French women forced back to the domestic, which is now neither popular nor remotely beneficial economically. How far the extension of their place in society goes, again, is up to the player and will doubtlessly anger the Catholic and traditionalist blocs.

Some of the onus of censorship shifts from state bureaus to publishers, cracking open the public discourse even in the context of the national and authoritarian state. Freedom of association is still held in a vise grip especially with regards to the security-sensitive situation in Algeria, and the restrictions on academics are almost no looser than in 1950. (For flavor events, we could even show a bit of the Institut de France and components, which hardly need state prodding to be a conservative millstone.) It seems that a true



beginning to the liberalization of French society can only begin after a seismic shift in the government's composition.

## The War Against Militias

France begins Mitterrand's tenure in the throes of political violence, and despite his best efforts in Phase 1 this will only get worse before it gets better. The Milice and collaborationist organizations have been brought under some control since the war (too late for Monsieur Bousquet's mentor Maurice Sarraut, murdered by the SOL), but even this has unraveled thanks to scoundrels like Bonny. Resistance fragments and underground socialists take their own toll, but perhaps the most important factor isn't scars of past wars but present wounds.

Whether France stays or leaves, Algeria has stirred the flames of radical nationalists and Algerian expatriates alike. The slightest hint of withdrawal fuels an insurgent bloc similar to the OAS and remaining creates a large urban Algerian minority brutalized by the state-France faces streets and rivers of blood no matter what.

Once Mitterrand's initial efforts to bring calm fail and he realizes that the state is entirely unable to police itself, he is forced to plot his way into getting a loyal instrument. This is a stage defined by promoting loyal men, consulting officials with expertise, and scheming to undermine the rest, culminating in the 67' putsch.

## The Auspicious Incident

The dismantlement of the collaborator parties and their paramilitaries is a key goal of Mitterrand's. Aside from his personal distaste for fascism and the party-state, they have become a serious threat to the government, to any French plans to distance themselves from Germany, and to public order on the streets. And when rumors of a planned collaborator uprising reach Mitterrand, the thought strikes him-why not let it happen, and have the pretext to deal with them once and for all?

Conversations with close confidant and ashamed ex-militiaman Francois de Grossouvre convince him that the effort will be shambolic, easily dealt with, and a perfect pretext for the dissolution of the FRN and components. With this in mind, he orders reinforcements to the key points in Paris (and, to be safe, a few other key cities) and prepares the parties' proscription.

The extent of intelligence service involvement is not known to him, nor is the shaky loyalty of the civilian apparatus. The result is that, even in the (likely) event that the government prevails, it is bloodier and more dramatic than he ever could've imagined.

## Phase 2 (1967-1970) - Y'a d'la Joie

Following the failure of the coup attempt, Mitterrand's position stands both shaken and reinforced. Shaken, because the biggest challenge to his rule just struck a tough blow to his rule, and because his government came within inches of being toppled; reinforced, because he survived, the plotters having been dispelled, and Mitterrand standing triumphant over the ruins.

Whether they want it or not, the RRN has to admit that Mitterrand is the reason why the party hasn't crumbled like a house of cards the minute the ultracollaborationists and even the government's very own security service came knocking hard. This leaves the Prime Minister in a more secure position than he previously was: free, or at least much freer, to enact his wanted reforms. For the power-driven and outright power-obsessed Mitterrand, his power being solidified should seem like an end in itself, no?

Still, the Prime Minister finds himself wanting more; or rather, he finds himself wanting something *different*. He has stabilized the country, and that is all well and good; but why couldn't he go further? After all, enemies of progress showed with the coup that they would stop at nothing to strike it down, so why bend down to them? This is his time, and he's going to make the best of it.

Following the coup, and increasingly so as time goes by, Mitterrand begins to change. Still obsessed by power, and still very much enjoying its perks, he however begins to grow more radical in his drive to improve the country; his ideological vision, previously fuzzy and politically expedient, starts to narrow down to something more precise; and slowly, very slowly, Mitterrand starts to wonder: when should he stop? And why should he?

## Labor and Capital

Mitterrand's economic reforms in the first part of his term did well to stop the bleeding of the French economy and reform it away from its most bloated inefficiencies, along with throwing a bone or two to the workers. Mitterrand, now, feels like it's time to go further, and Pinay agrees; unfortunately, they disagree on what they want, and on how they should go about doing it.

Having reformed the previously-inefficient Vichy corporatism into something that at least works, Mitterrand would like to go further. Looking at Danish social-democrats for inspiration, Labor Minister René Bousquet will advocate for a version of economic

tripartism in France, albeit a more dirigist one: to ensure that both bosses and workers get their fair share, and that neither is emboldened to ask for too much. To that end, he will want to reform the system of workplace representation by legalizing workers' unions, finally giving workers the right to advocate for their rights. The degree of autonomy and the various privileges he gives to the newly-created unions can vary, as more powerful unions will unsettle the RRN and powerful industrialists, potentially creating problems for Mitterrand down the line; however, it will also satisfy his base, and cement his reputation as looking out for the little man.

Pinay, complementarily, will work to reform business owners' representation as well. While it was a quite transparent fact that Vichyist corporatism was heavily biased in favor of business, Pinay will not want the situation to be turned upside down, and will work to ensure that business, big and small, has a place to voice its concerns. He will thus create a National Business Council, composed of both handpicked big business leaders and elected SMBs owners, that will be charged with communicating with the government regarding its aims and wants. Again, Mitterrand will have the choice to let Pinay do what he wants or to reign him in by reducing the power of the Council, with predictable advantages and drawbacks.

With that done, Mitterrand will look at concrete measures to change the life of France's less well-off. Unlike Bousquet and Pinay's broad agreement on tripartism, however, Mitterrand doesn't trust the bosses. Knowing his history, and therefore knowing that any and all social gains needed to be fought away from their grubby paws, Mitterrand will prefer a top-down approach to social policy, going against the previously-established tripartite approach: such initiatives will include the creation of a national minimum wage, of a state-ran social security system, and of a national healthcare system. Such a top-down vision will undoubtedly satisfy his base, but infuriate both his government and industrialists, potentially leading to a worse economic performance.

Alternatively, Mitterrand can decide to reign in his impulses, and to work with Pinay and Bousquet to ensure those changes come with input from businesses and workers' unions alike. This will result in less-radical programs, generally more voluntarist in approach, although again Bousquet and Pinay will have differing ideas on the matter, with the former still wanting to retain an important degree of dirigisme.

## L'Ouverture

Mitterrand is not blind to the struggles of the burgeoning middle-class either. With their economic situation becoming more comfortable, they instead turn to social issues, for what good is having free time and the situation to enjoy it if there's nothing to do? Mitterrand, ever the visionary, will therefore look to enact socio-political reforms in order to let some fresh air into the stale atmosphere in which the French State has languished for so long.

It is important to note, however, that Mitterrand's motives are not entirely altruistic, as is usual for him. While his motives are increasingly genuine, he is not blind to the appeal of social liberalization, and sees it as a useful tool to placate the people and to cement his own rule. Mitterrand, by that point, does *not* want to fully reform the country into a democratic republic or to do away with the RRN system, especially as the power he enjoys because of that system is something he dearly cherishes. Therefore, Mitterrand will enact socio-political liberalization, but will make sure that it remains carefully controlled, and society changes at the pace he wants it to: however, some of his ministers may be more earnest than him...

Firstly, Mitterrand will take a look at culture. Already having started a Great Works policy in the first part of his term, Mitterrand will go further, and personally oversee France's cultural policy, with Culture Minister Charles Trenet being somewhat sidelined. The Prime Minister wants to democratize culture, to make museums accessible to the working class as well; creating maisons de la culture in towns and villages, and encouraging cultural activities through generous subsidies, will see France enter a cultural rebirth of sorts. Additionally, Mitterrand will coordinate with Foreign Minister Bettencourt to make sure that France leads a cultural offensive abroad as well. For too long, France has been invisible on the world stage, and what better way to signal that it is back than by reminding everyone of its culture?

Mitterrand will also task Information and Communications minister Jacques Delors with enacting cultural liberalization. Censorship will be further relaxed, with mild criticism of the regime being allowed on a case-by-case basis. Delors will also seek to relax the Law on Parties, or at least limit its enforcement. Limiting the formation of organizations deemed "political" by the RRN, the law has severely hampered the formation of free associations, leading to a stale and barren private landscape. This will be difficult, as the RRN will see the relaxation of the law as the beginning of the dislocation of the Party; Mitterrand and Delors will be able to decide to which extent the law will be toned down, whether in law or merely in practice, as Mitterrand makes clear that repealing it entirely is not an option.

Mitterrand will also look at a slight deregulation of the press. The French Office of Information (OFI), responsible for overseeing the French press, has long been subordinate to the government, and has been hard at work "advising" newspapers on what they should publish and how they should publish it, along with carefully exercising censorship on anything that could contravene the government. Mitterrand and Delors will therefore move to restore some degree of freedom of the press by revamping the OFI into a new body, the National Office for Information and Communications (ONIC) that leaves journalists freer than before, if still not entirely free.

However, again, there is something in it for him. Mitterrand will appoint a friend of his, François de Grossouvre, at the head of the ONIC, to ensure that the newly-created

body remembers who created it. Additionally, he will award newspaper contracts to industrialists favorable to his cause, leading to the creation of new, Mitterrand-aligned newspapers, albeit ones in the pockets of Matignon-sanctioned oligarchs.

Finally, Mitterrand and Education Minister René Billères will move to improve the state of France's education. While de-Pétainization is not on the table, both due to the RRN system and due to Mitterrand's personal inclinations not particularly seeing a need for it, Billères will want to invest in all stages of education to ensure that the youth of France is ready to face the hardships of life. Again, in terms of higher education, Mitterrand has the choice to focus mainly on universities, or to instead privilege professional apprenticeships. Coordinating with Bettencourt, Mitterrand will establish a program of exchange students from and to (although mostly from) Germany, facilitating cultural exchange and encouraging students to speak German as a second language.

## The Prince and His Pawns

On the less savory side, Mitterrand will feel sufficiently emboldened to try and take a stab at the RRN itself. Considering it a useful tool to get things done, and very much enjoying the power that it gives him, Mitterrand however feels frustrated by having to deal with RRN stalwarts opposed to progress and to him. Therefore, he will start to move to make the party his; to ensure that those who would stand against him end up all bark and no bite.

It is necessary to specify that Mitterrand is not going to purge the party, nor he is even going to make it fully subservient to him at that stage. Rather, Mitterrand will expand the civil service to indirectly make sure people with a good opinion of him get elected, along with appointing his friends and acquaintances to cushy jobs. To make allies, he will do the same thing, and curry and withhold favors using egregious clientelism: while this will be polarizing, this will ensure that opposition to his rule is not united, should it of course prove successful. And while it could potentially prove unpopular with the public if they ever found out, the system itself is also concerned with self-preservation, and Mitterrand will make sure that the press, for all its liberalization and guarantees of limited independence, does not report about things that could put him in hot water.

## Phase 3 (1970 - 1971) - "L'insurrection est le plus saint des devoirs."

### The Austerity Turn

At the end of 1970, the unthinkable happens. The Oil Crisis strikes, and the Middle East is set aflame, as the worldwide economic system grinds to a halt. In France, this has dire ramifications: Mitterrand's thawing spring suddenly turns into a cold winter, as his

ambitious developmentalist projects and generous welfare policies suddenly putting the health of France's economy into jeopardy.

To Mitterrand, this is a disaster. Both quick-thinking and quite attentist, Mitterrand recommends to wait and see, but his ministers, Pinay chiefly among them, recommend swift and radical action. While Bousquet and the Labourists would rather double down on Keynesian intervention, Pinay virulently holds that it would be an unsustainable course of action, and advocates for temporary austerity in order to weather the storm. Mitterrand is initially unsure about what course of action to take, an intervention by Delors convinces him that austerity is quite unfortunately the best way to go for the time being, and goes along with it.

Not wanting to figuratively nuke his own popularity, Mitterrand arranges for Pinay to make the address detailing the government's austerity program. Said policies, quite predictably, do not go down very well with the French population, with the old and uncharismatic Pinay not being particularly convincing, and Mitterrand's rather muted support not helping matters. Thankfully, it doesn't seem as though France will revolt over this just yet...

## The Tocqueville Paradox

"The regime that a revolution destroys is almost always better than the one that immediately preceded it, and experience teaches that the most dangerous time for a bad government is usually when it begins to reform." What Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1856 proved eerily prescient, and while Mitterrand is undoubtedly a well-read man, he may have forgotten that quite often, it is when regimes start to reform that their citizens feel emboldened to manifest their discontent.

During the sixties, Mitterrand's relative social and political liberalization proved a breath of fresh air for many Frenchmen. For the first time in what felt like forever, they felt free, or at least freer than they had long felt. Those reforms, however, were but half-measures. Mitterrand, opportunist extraordinaire, knew it. It would be hard to blame the good people of France for wanting more, then; for wanting the full extent of what they had been given a sweet taste. Mitterrand's austerity, while dousing the flames of France's economy, prove to be the catalyst for protests, for revolt, and perhaps for revolution.

It all starts with a strike. In retaliation to the government's austerity policies, a small, relatively newly-formed union begins to strike in all legality, using the powers given to it by Mitterrand's reforms. Soon follows some condemnations by political clubs and thought circles, all formed following Mitterrand's relaxation of the law on parties; and soon enough, protesters are in the streets, demonstrating against the RRN dictatorship and for full, unabashed democracy.

Mitterrand, seeing the crisis worsen day by day, unfortunately only demonstrates one of his worst tendencies, and waits to see how the situation develops. As battle lines

are drawn not only within the RRN but even within the government itself, Mitterrand's ministers are torn. Quite a few, chiefly represented by the heteroclitous coalition René Bousquet, Raymond Marcellin and Maurice Papon, are at best lukewarm on the protests, and advocate sending the police to firmly restore order. Others, led by Delors, Billères, and an unlikely Pinay, sympathize with the protesters, and feel that state violence against them would make Mitterrand's regime no better than the most bloodthirsty dictatorships.

The Prime Minister himself, as usual, is torn: while he can understand the protesters' motives to some extent, he still resents them for putting his project, and his rule, into disarray through protests. Seeing a lot of them as immature and selfish for protesting him, he nonetheless wonders whether he can spin the situation to his advantage; and still, he cannot help but share their idealism, and their longing for a better world, despite all his deep-seated desire to deny it. All in all, Mitterrand's thoughts race in his head endlessly, as the protests worsen, and as Germany, itself embroiled in socio-economic troubles, starts to dangerously loom over the Rhine.

While Germany was content to let Mitterrand work his magic as long as he kept the country under control, the explosion of protests in France sees them take a second look at the government across the Rhine. While they do not immediately decree an emergency and send tanks to Paris, they will nonetheless start questioning Mitterrand, and think about taking matters into their own hands. After all, a revolution in France would be disastrous, for multiple reasons; not only would it potentially embolden other Resistance movements across Europe, but it would possibly flare up tensions with Italy and perhaps even the OFN; and in the most unlikely event that the revolution succeeds, then the Reich would lose one of its most trusted friends, and one of its crown pieces. For that reason, the Führer will see to it that Mitterrand keeps the situation under control, and doesn't give too much ground to the rabblers - and most importantly, they will make sure that he *knows it*.

Therefore, Mitterrand is confronted with his hardest struggle yet. Faced with protesters angry at him, but not *with* him, he in turn faces a fateful choice. Should he throw his lot with the protesters, try and hammer out a deal with them, at the risk of losing it all? Or should he instead crack down on them, so that any and all reform is done on his terms, and not on some wide-eyed idealists who'd throw what he worked towards for the past 6 years away in a heartbeat? Mitterrand does not know. Still, he cannot escape his responsibilities forever, for the choice will come to him, whether he wants it or not. For better or worse, Mitterrand seems to have made his mark on History; but now, he must choose what words will caption his picture.

This will be represented in gameplay through the *Bataille* mechanic: presented to the player as a card game, they will need to respond to the protesters with appropriate force if they want the situation to resolve as peacefully as possible, and if they want to achieve the "best" ending. Be too brutal in your handling of the crisis, and the resulting bloodbath will see you presiding over a kingdom of ghosts; be too gentle, and the protesters will not have that kindness, toppling you and inadvertently throwing France into the abyss.

## Phase 3.A (1971 - 1973) - Le Printemps Français



Should Mitterrand succeed in finessing the protests, by coming out neither too hard or too softly against them, he will eventually decide to publicly meet with some high-profile protesters to try and hammer out a deal: despite Germany's vocal worries, and a good part of the RRN's even-more-vocal vociferations, he nonetheless decides that something has got to give, less the protests will continue and possibly turn violent. After some initial hurdles, they eventually come to an agreement: limited, local democracy will be reintroduced, the Conseil National will include some directly-elected delegates, and some guarantees on basic freedoms will be introduced; along with that, Mitterrand is ambiguously open on some future, more radical reforms, as to placate the protesters once and for all.

While the announced reforms are overall quite tame, and do not particularly upset the status quo in any meaningful way, much of the RRN will not see things that way. Irrate at what they deem to be a direct threat to their power, and at Mitterrand for selling out to the protesters, an haphazard coalition of RRN stalwarts will quickly assemble to plan a coup d'etat, in order to overthrow Mitterrand and bring back things to the way they were, and to the way they should be.

### The Three Glorious Days

As the RRN renegades move to take control of the nation's places of power, Mitterrand needs to act, and quickly. Despite his wait-and-see attitude, he decides to go against his instincts, and try : doing one final radio address live from Matignon, he exhorts citizens to resist the factious elements who are attempting to take over the state and overthrow its rightful government. As putschist-aligned soldiers enter Matignon, and place Mitterrand under home arrest in Matignon, he feels determined, yet serene, and doesn't resist, for he knows that if salvation comes, then it will come whatever his enemies do.

Immediately, protests resume with even greater intensity than before. While the police and even the army are sent to control the situation, many of them are on the fence, and quite reluctant to fire in the crowd. This leads to a standoff in the streets for



many hours, as the putschists are themselves hesitant on what to do; and by the time they finally reach a decision, it is over.

Assisted by the National Guard and by the neutrality of the Army and much of the police, protesters breach the Palais Bourbon - the meeting place for the Conseil National and beforehand for the National Assembly - as the legislators disperse from the building long before this, meaning the act is in practice symbolic, but this signifies the climax of what will soon be called the "Revolution of 1971". The fact that this revolution takes place exactly a hundred years after the Paris Commune is not forgotten: socialists among the protesters begin singing the Internationale and chanting leftist slogans, while non-socialist democrats commemorate the revolutionary spirit of 1871, if appreciating nothing else about it.

More influential on this revolution than the Commune of 1871, however, is its ancestor, the Paris Commune of 1789, established after the fall of the Bastille. Almost re-enacting the events of that fateful July, protest leaders, including independent Assemblée members, underground politicians, Résistants, and the street leaders that have arisen in the weeks prior, meet in the Hôtel de Ville and proclaim a "revolutionary committee" tasked with bringing about the downfall of the Vichy regime and organizing the election of a new Paris Commune, rejecting the current local government as illegitimate. At the same time, protesters march to the Elysée Palace and to the Hôtel Matignon, asking President Ely to dissolve the legislature and Mitterrand to work with the new revolutionary committee and recognize the new Paris Commune when it convenes.

One should keep in mind, however, that not all protesters are in favor of cooperation with Mitterrand's government. Indeed, the revolutionary committee itself is sharply divided on the subject - though all support a strategy of non-confrontation with the President and the government while they continue to struggle against the RRN, some radical revolutionaries wish to ultimately supplant the Reformist government altogether - think of it like the Bolsheviks during the February Revolution: they might help topple the Tsar, but that doesn't mean they support the Provisional Government.

Mitterrand, having been let free by the soldiers in Matignon, sees the situation, and immediately sees red. Despite the coup attempt having been foiled by the valiant efforts of the French populace, the pendulum seems to have swung the other way a bit too much, as a revolution is seemingly brewing, if not already underway. All too aware that a revolutionary government will be much less kind to him than ragtag protesters, and even more importantly will provoke a military intervention by Germany, Mitterrand decides that the situation must be kept under control at all costs, lest France - and himself - be cast down the abyss.

Mitterrand will therefore play, as usual, a duplicitous game. Recognizing that the RRN system cannot be saved, and as always never willing to persevere in failure, he will quite savvily try to spin himself as someone who always fought the RRN from the inside, as someone who always supported the protesters over the oppressive RRN, and offer to meet

with the revolutionary committee. On the other hand, he will stay in quasi-permanent communication with Germany through Bettencourt, reassuring the Reich that the situation is perfectly under control, and that communists will be put aside. This is an extremely tense period, and many within the halls of power have the feeling that a German intervention is inches away - and should relations with Germany drop too low, it *will* happen, putting an end to the short-lived revolution.

Should things go right, however, Mitterrand's gamble will pay off. Due to his negotiations with the protesters and shrewd political cunning, along with his grandfatherly image, the meeting with the committee goes well enough, with Mitterrand convincing them of his good faith, and many protesters welcome him with open arms, leading to famous pictures of Mitterrand walking on the Champs-Élysées with unknown protesters by his side; many more radical protesters, meanwhile, are irate at what they see at a shameless recuperation of the revolution, but they are forced to either accept the new situation or go underground.

To ensure that the situation stays under control, Mitterrand will ask Ely to dissolve the RRN. That aside, Ely, seeing the tide turn against the RRN and the existing legislature, issues the decree to do so, something presidential authority fully empowers him to do. With the party dissolved, Ely resigns, following private talks with Mitterrand. With the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers being left as sole constitutional authorities, and enjoying the tacit support of the army, he will then decree a provisional government, announce that a constitutional convention will be held following constituent elections, and formally proclaim a new Republic, like Gambetta did before him in 1870, solidifying himself as the face of the new Republic.

Yet again, Bettencourt remains in constant communication with the Reich, assuaging their fears that France will leave the Pakt or anything of the sorts, and reassuring them that Mitterrand has everything under control. And as fireworks go off in the Parisian sky, the French State ceases to exist, and the Fourth French Republic comes into being.

## The Tricolor Dawn

Now that the Republic has been proclaimed, Mitterrand must make sure that it survives, and that it doesn't become too radical for its own good. As makeshift institutions and committees slowly become institutionalized through the work of the provisional government, itself composed of former members of Mitterrand's government and democratic activists, and helmed by the Prime Minister himself, he will ensure that the transition remains as legalistic and smooth as possible, so that the Reich doesn't see a threat to its power, and isn't tempted to militarily intervene.

In truth, the Reich does not have a fundamental problem with states in its sphere being multi-party, liberal democracies. After all, both Denmark and Romania are relatively free democracies at game start, and chances are they still are by 1972. Mitterrand knows

this, and he thus knows that the new Republic, despite it all, has a chance to survive; however, it can only do so if the Reich does not see it as a potential wildcard that could elect anti-German radicals or leave its sphere at a moment's notice. Therefore, duplicitous and pragmatic as ever, he will work behind the scenes to sanitize the new democracy as much as possible, so as to make it palatable to the Reich.

To that end, he will work to marginalize anti-German radicals and *especially* communists through the covert use of the SSN, and work with his government to hammer out a consensus that France is in the Pakt, end of story. Despite a political consensus across erstwhile RRN members that France is much better in the Pakt, partly because leaving is not a realistic option, many ProvGov members and much of the public, still high off revolutionary fervor, want more. Mitterrand, smelling the opportunity for a political coup, decides to go and talk to Germany, with Bettencourt's help, to ensure that the Reich will "respect France's freedom to determine its own political destiny"<sup>8</sup>:

Germany, already wary of the concessions made, is initially reluctant, but ends up begrudgingly accepting when convinced by Mitterrand that such a symbolic declaration is the necessary price to pay for the defanged democracy to be stable. When the leader of the Provisional Government comes home, having successfully "secured France's independence", his reputation as the revolution's statesman is further solidified, and French democracy has seemingly been saved for the time being.

By this point, it seems important to clarify Mitterrand's real thoughts on the new democracy. While still self-serving and cynical to an extent, as proved by his Germany-sanctioned soft purge of communists, Mitterrand is not entirely unhappy with the recent turn of events, far from it: the new, free France is one he had progressively come to think about and even want during his term as Prime Minister, and the sights of the people in the streets turning out in support of him and democracy convinced him that France took the right path.

Meanwhile, members of Mitterrand's governments are hard at work to make the newly born regime into an actual democracy. Veteran ministers Delors and Billères and newcomer activist Michel Crépeau will work on fully enacting liberalization at long last, restoring press freedoms and freedom of associations, and fully repealing the Law on Parties, allowing for many new organizations to be formed, and for the "thought clubs" and disparate organizations that were formed following the relaxation of the law's enforcement to turn into actual political parties.

Pinay, along with newcomer Lionel Jospin, will try to take a look at the economy and stop the bleeding. Despite Mitterrand's pleas, they will broadly agree that something

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<sup>8</sup> Given that Mitterrand is hard at work defanging the communists and other anti-German radicals, and that Germany can renege on the deal at any point, the measure is mostly symbolic.

must be done; and through tripartite negotiations with business and unions, hammer out a deal of temporary wage restraint, in exchange for a freeze on rent increase. This, while curbing inflation and allowing for the economy to get better, has the side effect of douring some of the population on the "new" Mitterrand: after all, he is the one who allowed this, isn't he?

The Constitutional Committee, trying his best to work despite factional squabbles, eventually results in a parliamentary, bicameral republic. 600 MPs will be elected using Mixed-Member proportional representation, with 250 being elected on a constituency basis, 250 being proportionally elected using regional party lists, and the remaining 100 seats allocated to the best performing party or list in the election. The President, himself indirectly elected by both chambers, then appoints the Prime Minister based on the composition of the lower chamber. In essence, the Constitutional committee creates a parliamentary republic that offers accurate partisan representation, but one that avoids the pitfalls of the Third Republic and ensures work can get done, satisfying both Mitterrand and the protesters. The constitution shortly thereafter is put to a referendum, with the French people broadly approving it.

Finally, the Provisional Government decides it is time to schedule the first free elections since 1936, to elect the Fourth French Republic's first Prime Minister. The various interest groups and thought groups that were created from the relaxation of the law on parties eventually coalesce into proper political parties, and the campaign can officially start. Mitterrand himself will take a backseat from the campaign, being more concerned about carrying out his duties as President of the provisional government, and being generally content with the state of things, although he will officially endorse the leftist PTF, which he helped create.

Following the election, whichever party gets a plurality and manages to form a coalition will have a short, final focus tree showing their first few months in government. As for Mitterrand, despite being happy enjoying his semi-retirement and waiting for the elections to come so a new President can be elected, he cannot let go. Both wanting to safeguard the republic, and still being quite attracted to the prospects of power, Mitterrand will tentatively acknowledge his ambitions to run for President to his inner circle. Depending on who wins the parliamentary election, Mitterrand will have an easy to more complicated time getting elected, but will eventually prevail.

Mitterrand's last few months of content, at least for him, see him happy and contemplative. His power may have been limited through constitutional shackles, but that is the price to pay for democracy, and he nonetheless remains as the respected President of a renewed and hopeful nation; and overall, when he looks out of the window, he sees a better country than the one he first led 8 years ago. Of course, not all is swell: his purge of the more radical and less savory elements has led to a spike of underground and potential terrorist activity, and the Republic is far from secure; but should the right people prevail, so will the Republic, and so will France.

### Phase 3.A.1 - Liberté



Michel Crépeau's cabinet:

President: François Mitterrand - PTF

Prime Minister: Michel Crépeau (Liberal Radicalism)<sup>9</sup> - FRR

Minister of Human Rights and Democratic Transition: René Billères (Social Radicalism) - FRR

Economy Minister: Pierre Laffitte (National Liberalism) - FRR

Foreign Minister: Edgar Faure (Liberal Radicalism) - FRR

Interior Minister: Jacques Chirac (Liberal Radicalism) - FRR

Michel Crépeau, mayor of La Rochelle and pro-democracy activist, manages to lead the Radical and Republican Federation to a plurality, and gets appointed as the first Prime Minister of the Fourth French Republic by President Mitterrand. A longtime advocate of democracy and human rights, Crépeau will assemble a cabinet composed of FRR members, young and old, in order to ensure France's transition to democracy goes well. One problem that arises, however, is that the FRR seems to be a bicephalous party, if not an acephalous one: while it has turned into the party of the pro-democracy activists by some clever positioning, it also serves as a home to a good number opportunists and bureaucrats who see the way the wind is turning and hatch onto the Radical ship in order to keep the place they occupied in the old regime into the new one. While the FRR is the party with the least amount of former Vichy bureaucrats and establishment members, it will still have to reckon with that legacy. This, along with the fact that radicalism is an ideology as fickle as it is malleable, will prove to be a challenge to Crépeau's dreams of reform: what, exactly, is Radicalism? Is it the heir of the *Lumières*, proudly bearing the torch of liberty in order to bring France into the modern age? Or is it a centrist "way of governance" whose main

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<sup>9</sup> While Crépeau OTL would debatably fit Social Radicalism more, his ideology here represents the broader current within the party, which is Liberal Radicalist.

goal is to steward that ship, and that moves, as a weathervane, the same way the wind is blowing?

Unfortunately for Cr peau, what awaits outside of the party are obstacles even greater than those inside of it. Cr peau and his government are keen on righting the wrongs that 30 years of dictatorship have inflicted on France. This translates into expansions of civil rights, which will be unpopular with conservative aspects of society, and into the end of corporatism in favor of mild, Roosevelt-like planism, among other things, something that will ruffle the feathers of much of the economic establishment. However, what will be most tense is Cr peau and Human Rights minister Ren  Bill res attempts to unearth France's autocratic and criminal past in order to safeguard its democratic future. Prosecuting crimes committed during the dictatorship and reforming political and civil society in order to ensure something like the 10th of July will never happen again are part of Cr peau's agenda, but he will face tremendous opposition from much of civil society. Many people, from the lowest bureaucrat to the President himself, were directly or indirectly complicit in the French State's atrocities, and disturbing the "1971 consensus" will not be easy, and may expose Cr peau to a removal from office, through the ballot box or even at the end of a bayonet should things go especially wrong. And besides, the Reich is always watching, wary after the Revolution's developments, and pushing too hard in the direction of progress may lead to the Pakt's leader stepping in and putting an end to the brief democratic experiment.

Cr peau's year of content will thus be spent laying the groundwork for the FRR's grand plans, showing both high hopes and real tensions, as France realizes that a new constitution does not automatically lead to a new, stable society. Should Cr peau give into the more conservative elements, Radicalism's torch will die with a whimper ; but should he push too fast, too hard, it will go down with a bang, taking the Fourth Republic with it. Should he prevail, however, France has a real chance at freedom ; and while the scars of the past cannot be erased, Cr peau hopes that he can get his fellow citizens to acknowledge them.

For the Republic's sake, and for France's sake, they have to.

### Phase 3.A.2 - Égalité



René Bousquet's cabinet:

President: François Mitterrand - PTF

Prime Minister: René Bousquet (Neocorporatism) - PTF

Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: Didier Motchane (Social Democracy) - PTF

Economy Minister: Gérard Bardet (Neocorporatism) - PTF

Foreign Minister: Lionel Jospin (Reformist Socialism) - PTF

Interior Minister: Charles Hernu (Social Radicalism) - PTF

### Phase 3.A.3 - Fraternité



Raymond Marcellin's cabinet:

President: François Mitterrand - PTF

Prime Minister: Raymond Marcellin (Paternalistic Conservatism) - UPF

Minister of ??: ??

Economy Minister: Jean-Pierre Fourcade (Liberal Corporatism) - UPF

Foreign Minister: ??

Interior Minister: ??

## Phase 3.B (1971 - 1973) - L'Été Indien



Should Mitterrand come out too hard against the protests, the French policy will be used to quell the protests, ensuring that order comes back to the country. The Prime Minister, having successfully weathered the storm, now stands as the undisputed leader of the country: extraparliamentary opposition to his rule has seemingly been beaten back, while intra-RRN opposition has been silenced and convinced by his successful management



of the crisis.

His position secure, Mitterrand will move to ensure it remains so.

## My Party

Emboldened by his government's survival, and comforted in his worst ways, the Prime Minister will move to make sure that the RRN is *his* party, and that they know it. While he was subtle enough in previous attempts, he will now be more open and brazen in his attempts: bribes, intimidation, and a heavy dose of clientelism will go a long way to ensure that important posts are staffed with friends or allies of his, preferably both. Slowly but surely, the RRN finds itself majorly controlled by people who may disagree on ideological grounds, but who are united in one thing: a respect, admiration, or fear of Mitterrand.

Of course, many RRN stalwarts and anti-Mitterrandists will protest and try to fight back. And yet, what can they do? Mitterrand is a shrewd politician, and his conquest of the party has been going on in the shadows for a long time now. Ever since he became Prime Minister, he had been subtly disseminating his pawns all across the RRN; and his victory over the protesters has proved the watershed moment for many undecided RRNers, enough to tip him over the edge. At this point, truth be told, it's not even a purge: it's merely cleaning house.

As such, the brunt of the anti-Mitterrand opposition either joins him, keeps its head down, or is forcibly retired, if not worse. Even within his government, as rumblings of opposition are heard, they are shown the door, leading to a restructuring of the government to ensure it remains fully loyal to the party.

*François Mitterrand's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State: Paul Ely

Prime Minister: **François Mitterrand** - Mitterrandist

Minister of Foreign Affairs: **André Bettencourt** - Right-Mitterrandist

Minister of Economy and Finance: **René Bousquet** - Mitterrandist

Minister of the Interior: **Charles Hernu** - Mitterrandist

Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces: Jean Cuq

Minister of Justice: **Gabriel Jeantet** - Right-Mitterrandist

Minister of Culture: **François de Grossouvre** - Mitterrandist

Minister of Education, Youth, and Sports: **Georges Dayan** - Mitterrandist

Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: **François Dalle** - Right-Mitterrandist

Minister for Veterans, Prisoners of War and Deportees: Roger-Patrice Pelat - Mitterrandist

Minister for Agriculture: Jacques Chirac - Mitterrandist

Minister for the Budget and Budget Stability: Pierre Courant - Right-Mitterrandist

Minister of Trade and Union Affairs: André Rousselet - Mitterrandist

Minister of Information and Communications : Georges Fillioud - Mitterrandist

While all the ministers don't necessarily agree on tactics or on ideological ground, they are all fervently loyal to Mitterrand, ensuring that the government runs smoothly as possible. The RRN stands transformed from the top-down, and gone are the factions of yore; in their wake stands different Mitterrandist strains, disunited in practice but united in loyalty. The Mitterrandists follow the Prime Minister's broadly left-corporatist agenda, but in practice follow his person; the Right-Mitterrandists adopt a more conservative and national-Catholic outlook; and the Left-Mitterrandists wish that the Prime Minister would go in a more directly progressive and sometimes outright socialist direction, but they are carefully kept out of government and of most levers of power.

Still, Mitterrand knows his history, and retains respect for the institutions. While the protests may have initially shaken him, they have only strengthened his resolve: the RRN, for all its faults, is a necessary and above-all good institution for France. This means that it cannot be forgotten who made it: thus, Mitterrand will conserve the symbols of the state, and the dedication to its forefathers such as Petain, while elevating some new figures to the pantheon. The RRN, thus, remains a party of patriots.

Mitterrand, true to himself, will cultivate rivalries for his attention and affection, both in the government and in the party. The system he has established has one center, and that is himself: all around it are courtesans, vying for the King's attention, and trying to retain it for as long as possible. Of course, such a system might not be the most practical, functioning, or lasting system, but hey, as long as it works!

## My Vision

Mitterrand, free from the shackles of the cynics and naysayers within and without the party, is finally free to enact his grand, transforming vision for France. After all, isn't it in times of crisis in which true, profound change can be made? Mitterrand will therefore embark on his most ambitious program yet, with the full help of his ministers and the might of the country behind him.

Somehow, bizarrely enough, Mitterrand's vision is not as grand or as transformative as he would like it to be. His disinterest for economics leads his ministers to continue to try and translate vaguely social-sounding directives into actual economic policy, resulting in a half-baked mix of Keynesian investment, reflecting the Prime Minister's own uncertain

leanings. His surrounding himself with sycophants, coupled with his perpetual lust for power, leads to the absence of any perceived necessity for political reform, for further democratization, causing a continuation of the RRN dictatorship, although with a man at the center rather than a party. His firing of ministers with true, concrete ideals leads to haphazard social reforms, to social policy designed to appease rather than to progress. The only thing that Mitterrand fully keeps an eye on is cultural policy, ramping up his previous reforms and announcing more great works as infrastructural projects; as for the rest, the vision turns to stagnation, as Mitterrand's lust for power begins to devour him.

By this point, it is necessary to pause for a moment and explain *why* Mitterrand acts the way he does. After all, until the Oil Crisis protests, he was driven by power in every waking moment, but he managed to use the power bestowed upon him by the institutions of the French State to pass concrete measures to help the people, and to sincerely make France better; moreover, he was growing increasingly convinced that maybe, just maybe, France deserved better than an aging, stale, sealed dictatorship, so why has all that seemingly come to a grinding halt?

One of the key traits in Mitterrand's character is that he will do a U-turn on a given subject and preach his newfound positions with the zeal of the convert. This is exactly what happens here: Mitterrand, having crushed the protests but needing to rationalize that decision to himself, adopts the belief that the protests didn't know what they were doing, and that quelling them, while a painful decision, was right. To compensate, as if to reaffirm his "statesman" credentials, he decides to turn the party into a tool to make society better, retiring all those who stand in his way.

However, what initially starts out as an well-meaning attempt to overcompensate for his failings slowly loses its way. As all people who criticized Mitterrand gets replaced by friends and sycophants, the Prime Minister begins to forget his shortcomings, and instead gets more concerned towards a royal and formalistic practice of power: François Mitterrand may not *do*, but François Mitterrand undoubtedly *is*, and that's all what matters. Falling prey to his worst impulses, Mitterrand relapses, and starts enjoying his power as much as he can, leaving actual, nitty-gritty governance to his ministers.

## My Way

Mitterrand's last few months of gameplay are ultimately quite contemplative. Despite trying to bury his doubts and convince himself that he did no wrong, Mitterrand cannot help but retain a lingering feeling of regret. Could he have done more? Should he have done more? And how will history remember him? Deep down, the Prime Minister knows the answer to these questions, which is precisely why he wants them to remain unanswered. His days are therefore spent escaping his thoughts, reading, meeting with friends, attending the councils of ministers with palpable disinterest, and generally tending to official business of state, while enjoying the formal power his function gives him, and the informal one his position gives him.

Outside the Prime Minister's office, things are not all rosy. Despite some improvements, the economy still remains stagnant, and the impetus for swift and radical action seems to be locked out of the government. Many people who initially put their hopes in Mitterrand, whether they be disappointed protesters or vindicated socialists, are turning to underground violent activity, given that they do not incorrectly see the system as under so strong a lock that any change will have to come from the outside, and reports of terrorist incidents start becoming increasingly common. And after all, who can blame them? If Mitterrand, the self-professed candidate of change, didn't bring what he promised, then what second-rate politician will?

Mitterrand's gameplay ends with him laying a wreath on Pétain's tomb in the Pantheon, paying respect to the man who saved France and who allowed Mitterrand to ascend to power. Walking around the final resting place of so many great men and women, Mitterrand allows himself to wonder how his statue will look; deep down, however, he knows the answer. Deep down, and despite all his attempts to silence it, his conscience remains troubled, plagued by all the things he could have done, by all the futures that could have been. Dejected, yet still maintaining his regal demeanor, François Mitterrand leaves this brief pocket of History, and comes back on earth, cursed to wait for an apotheosis that will never truly come.

## Phase 3.C (1971 - 1973) - Les Feuilles Mortes



Bernard Faÿ's cabinet:

President: Marcel Carpentier - Independent

Prime Minister and Minister of Culture: Bernard Faÿ (Reactionary Nationalism) - Traditionalist

Minister of the Interior and Administrative Affairs: Jacques Ploncard d'Assac (Clerical Fascism) - Traditionalist

Economic Minister: René Belin (Corporate Statism) - Conservative

Foreign Minister: Pierre Lagayette (Fascism) - Conservative

Security Minister: Jacques le Groignec (National Catholicism)

Should societal chaos get too high, RRN opposition to Mitterrand will seriously organize to act against him, with Traditionalists, Conservatives, and disparate Technocrats starting to communicate with the army to restore order and put an end to the protests. Eventually getting a covert albeit unenthusiastic greenlight from the German embassy, the plotters make a move; dispatching the army to key centers of power, they arrest Mitterrand, and send him to an unspecified location, while ensuring that possible governmental resistance is all but extinct.

Given Mitterrand's previously lukewarm and indecisive response to the protesters, it is of little surprise that they do not massively protest the change of government. Or rather, protesters do continue to protest the government with the same fervor they did with the previous one, if not even more so, but virtually no one is clamoring for Mitterrand's return. Instead, Bernard Faÿ, respected academic and near-octogenarian Traditionalist figurehead, is chosen by the plotters as a consensual figure, and appointed as Prime Minister by Ely, with the army giving him little choice. Dispatching the army and the police in the streets, Faÿ sighs, and orders the protests to be put down with as little violence as necessary, to avoid causing a bloodbath. Unfortunately for him, as little as necessary still leaves quite a lot to be needed, and soon enough France's streets are eerily quiet.

## Turning Back the Clock

For all their proclamations about restoring order to France, the plotters aren't only concerned about getting Mitterrand and his clientelist madness out: they also have projects of their own. The former Prime Minister, whether because of perceived political expediency, pernicious advisors, or sincere beliefs, weakened the very foundation of the state, leading to individualist protesters feeling emboldened to question the validity of Petainist thought itself. This is obviously unacceptable, and needs to be swiftly corrected.

Mitterrand-era liberalization on freedoms of speech and associations will be reversed, leading to the cultural landscape becoming barren yet again, as previously blooming artists are driven underground. In fact, Fay is going to pay special attention to the recreation of an official, Petainist culture after the wanderings of the Mitterrand premiership. Having served as the zealously collaborationist administrator of the National Library during the War, Fay will preside over a renewed era of cultural censorship, with books being banned and sometimes outright burned in ceremonies designed to try and involve an uninterested French populace in the proceedings.

Fay, with the help of Interior Minister Ploncard d'Assac, will also try to rid the country, starting with the administration, of its greatest threat: free-masons. Mitterrand's cronies, plutocratic technocrats, and others will be investigated and summarily retired, blacklisted, imprisoned, and sometimes executed under suspicions of freemasonry, with Fay publicly declaring a "war on freemasonry". While some of the accusations end up being true, most are unproven, but this doesn't matter, for Fay knows them to be true. Fay's administrative and cultural purge, to be clear, is both motivated by a want to unroot Mitterrand's influence from wherever he sunk his claws, and by an earnest ambition to rid France of what he sees as its greatest evil.

Overall, Fay and his government will restart the National Revolution at long last, after the relaxation and stagnation of post-Pétain governments and the outright abandonment of the Mitterrand government. The relative relaxation of state clericalism will be put to an end at once, as France will learn again that She is a catholic nation, and that She is at her greatest when that fact is as clear as day. Finally, at long last, a government truly committed to Petainist principles stands in Matignon, and it is undoubtedly the beginning of greatness for France.

Still, one cannot help but notice that there's something almost... eerie? The coup and subsequent repression of the protests may have dispelled peaceful protesters, but it also reinforced many in their beliefs that the system could not be changed by honeyed words and well-meaning demands. Communist groups, whether PCF-inspired or more new left-inspired, have seen renewed activity, and despite Ploncard d'Assac's best efforts to monitor them, the anti-mason campaign has left some gaping holes in France's security apparatus...

## The Crusader-King

Fay's last few months of gameplay are composed of contrasts. While Fay is fully committed to his grand campaign against freemasonry, almost fanatically so, members of his government start to worry. While the anti-Mitterranders initially encouraged Fay's crusade as a way to destroy Mitterrand's remaining embers of influence over the administration, some see it as getting out of hand. The Prime Minister may be a respected academic and a fully devout adherent of the National Revolution, but he is also a frail old man whose time is limited, and one whose uncharacteristic fieriness starts to worry. After all, who's to say he won't come after them next? Slowly, dissent grows, both among party and government. Still, for the time being, Fay reigns supreme: the supposed caretaker has taken a life of his own, and has begun to use his power to enact a personal crusade of his.

Outside the halls of power, things are grim. A disaffected and disenchanted populace pays little attention to whatever goes on in power, and just hopes that the economic situation will get better, and that what little advantages they got under Mitterrand will not be rolled back and taken away. Speaking of the Prime Minister, no one really knows what happened to him: some say he got shot, some say he's imprisoned somewhere, and some even say he managed to escape to another country. Still, he is gone, and very likely not coming back: the Mitterrand era, for better or worse, is over, and so are its promises of change, openness, and freedom. In his stead stands Fay, an

unpopular and arguably illegitimate Prime Minister, although now legitimacy holds little meaning, and one whose pet crusade threatens to tear apart a country whose future already looks grim.

Fay's content ends with him continuing to look for possible masons in French society, as he makes more and more lists, to the growing worry of his ministers. As Ploncard d'Assac and Lagaillarde start to worry about his cognitive faculties<sup>10</sup>, Fay has never been more lucid: Pétain's vision will be completed, just as it should have been, and Mitterrand's name will be buried in history, just as it should be, and France shall be cleansed at long last.

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<sup>10</sup> While it should be left somewhat ambiguous in-game, the fact that Fay continued to publish historical papers until his death would seem to indicate he remained relatively lucid.

## IV. Pierre Poujade - Populisme



### ===== INTRODUCTION =====

In TNO, Pierre Poujade represents the same thing he was the embodiment of IOTL, only tenfold: the very French sentiment of "ras-le-bol", the feeling of having enough. Poujade's ascent to power is permitted only by the French people becoming absolutely fed up with the RRN's inaction and disunity, which allows someone who is very good at channeling their grievances to get into government. However, the political establishment, while quite weakened, is still against him, which will make his presidency something of an uphill battle.

At its core, Poujade's path is motivated by ideals of anger, by ideals of justice. The French carried him to power because they wanted someone who'd listen to them, because they wanted someone who'd fight for the French people, and who better than the advocate of the little man himself? With a ragtag coalition behind him, the new President will have a lot of work to do, to make France a great nation again. After all, this is what "Travail, Famille, Patrie" is all about, isn't it?

Poujade serves as an exploration of the very concept of *populism*. The archetypal populist, representing *the people* against *the elites*, Poujade will do everything in his power to break the latter's stranglehold on France, and to create a fairer state, free from overbearing German domination and from the grubby hands of the synarchist families that have been influencing the Republic for decades. However, Poujade will quickly become trapped in a machine of his own design, and realize that populism often becomes synonymous to demagoguery, as his followers slowly become more radical than he started out to be...

Poujade will also explore the personalistic aspect of populism: while he begins as a somewhat humble if strong-headed champion of the common man, his newfound fame and position will progressively get to his head, bringing increasing intransigence and self-importance that will be exploited by many of Poujadism's hanger-ons, hoping to hijack the movement to further their causes.



## Phase 1 (1964-1967) - Stable Beginnings

Pierre Poujade's cabinet:

President: Alphonse Juin - Imperial

Prime Minister: Pierre Poujade (Poujadism) - Independent (Poujadist)

Minister for Political Renewal: Marcel Bouyer (Poujadism) - Independent (Poujadist)

Economic Minister: Léon Gingembre<sup>11</sup> (Populist Conservatism) - Independent (Poujadist)

Foreign Minister: Jean-Marie le Pen (Right-Wing Populism) - Independent (Poujadist)

Security Minister: Marcel Carpentier (Despotism) - Independent

As Poujade is sworn into office, a slight reality check falls upon him, as he realizes that governing only with Poujadists and independents is going to be... complicated, to say the least. The RRN's political machine, while severely weakened, is still out to get him, and it is only a matter of time before it begins its counteroffensive against him. Poujade thus decides to prepare, and assemble a government composed of Poujadist allies.

*Poujade's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State : Alphonse Juin

Prime Minister : Pierre Poujade

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jean-Marie le Pen

Minister of Finance, National Economy, and Labor: Léon Gingembre

Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces: Alphonse Juin

Minister of the Interior : Jean Dides

Minister of Justice : Henri Dorgères

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<sup>11</sup> Gingembre, unlike OTL, doesn't gain preeminence as the leader of the Small and Medium Businesses union the CGPME, given that it isn't created in this timeline. Instead, Gingembre gains prominence as an official within the Vichy administration, as a renegade member of the Technocrats, who eventually defects to Poujade in a high-profile move.

Minister of National Education : Georges Sauge

Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports : Jean Borotra

Minister for Political Renewal : Marcel Bouyer

Minister of Information : Serge Jeanneret

Ministry of Agriculture : Camille Laurens

Minister of Health and Food : Raoul Lemaire

Minister of Territorial and Imperial Affairs: Pierre Lagaille

## The Campaign Against Partocrats

Poujade's sworn enemy is the RRN - the party of the establishment, the party of the elites - the party of evil. It directly descends from the elites of the Third Republic, and has been keeping France down and at the mercy of the Germans and of moneyed interests for too long, subverting the Maréchal's will from the beginning. Thankfully, Poujade is here to stop them - but he will need to be careful and methodical, for one wrong move may unseat Poujade from his shaky position.

Therefore, Poujade will start out relatively slow and measured, on advice of the Algerianists (chiefly Le Pen, who used to be part of the RRN, and still has contacts inside it). He will try to oust and forcibly retire anti-Poujade officials under the guise of anti-corruption, by draping his fight in a broad anti-corruption campaign, and will often try to theatrically expose crooked officials to satisfy his base and to show he's doing something. He will also try to streamline some aspects of RRN control over society, relaxing RRN restrictions over the economy, over the guise of "efficiency": the goal of this is to keep the Enemy on edge, to keep them unsure of whether he is *wholly* out for blood, or if getting into power has tamed him a little.

Of course, "liberal" Poujadists such as Gingembre, along with personalistic Poujadists such as Bouyer, will be somewhat disappointed, which is why Poujade will need to throw them red meat through grandiloquent display of corruption-fighting and establishment-busting, while at the same time giving assurances to the establishment through Le Pen. It is a fine balancing game, but one that is initially necessary, if only for Poujade to solidify his position.

Poujade will also target the intellectuals. Seeing them as part of France's decline, being in cahoots with big money and having strayed too far from France's roots, he will try to depoliticize education and the universities through the implementation of loyalty tests to the Maréchal, the President and the PM, simultaneously somewhat satisfying the RRN and ensuring that teachers and professors are fervent Poujadists.

Similarly, one of the grand gestures Poujade will undertake is to take a stab at the Grandes Ecoles. ENA, X, ENSP: all these acronyms have created out-of-touch bureaucrats for generations now, and they have essentially become home to a self-replicating bureaucratic class that has ruled France from the shadows. Poujade can either try to reform those schools and "democratize" them, toning down their perceived elitism, or simply close them down, with the latter option being more appreciated by the base.

## The Green Revolution

Ah, France's countryside. Home to many of France's truest sons and daughters, it has long been neglected by the various urbanite governments of the successive regimes: Poujade, however, aims to change that. Farmers were after all some of his biggest supporters, and with Laurens as agriculture minister, Poujade is ready to cause the Green Revolution.

Poujade will firstly pass economic policy that helps the farmers: progressive taxation, subsidies, and most importantly the "Common Agricultural Policy", supposed to encourage sustainable farming while allowing farmers to stay financially solvent. His final action will be to try to extend the CAP to Andorra by meeting with the Co-Prince.

Secondly, Poujade will try to recreate a true "farmers' science" in France, by rebuilding and funding various agricultural schools and institutes, such as the Institut National d'Agronomie. He aims to make France's agricultural technologies among the most advanced in the world, to trigger a true "Green Revolution".

Thirdly, the President will try to make farming and agriculture "trendy" to the people, as a bid to get more people invested in the agricultural domain. Reviving the Salon de l'Agriculture and embracing the power of television to exult the benefits of a "simple life" will be the keys to making agriculture appealing again.

## It's the Economy, Stupid

While the farmers were and still are among the biggest supporters of the Prime Minister, his main base of support undoubtedly resides within the middle class. Always ignored, never heard, the middle class's anger and thirst for justice was what put Poujade in power, and they now expect the President to pay them back.

Poujade's first economic measures will be threefold: first, he will deal with the fallout of Algeria's explosion, by resettling refugees, finding them jobs, and in general guiding the country back to normality. Secondly, Poujade will try to introduce a stimulus check for most Frenchmen, to be able to consume and get the economy back on track. The support for this will not be unanimous within his cabinet, and he will be able to make the bill more or less radical to avoid fracturing his coalition/ Thirdly, Poujade will cut taxes across the board for the middle-classes, to alleviate the tax burden and foster

entrepreneurship. Overall, the radicalness of these measures will have to be negotiated across Poujade's coalition.

This, however, goes hand in hand with Poujade's third and most important (in his eyes) set of measures: he will begin to take on the most important industrialists and corporate fatcats in the French State. The remnants of the pre-war 200 families, they control the economy from the shadows, and enrich themselves off the middle-class' back: the President thus prepares to wage war against them, to rid France of their influence once and for all.

## Phase 2 (1967-1970) - The Intensification

In mid-1967, the ultra-collaborationists, at long last united within the FRN and tired of being marginalized, attempt a coup against the government, and tried to storm the Hôtel Matignon. The coup thankfully fails, but its ramifications are wide-reaching: Poujade's latent germanophobia finds itself intensified, as he *knows* that the plotters were directly supported by the Reich. In parallel, his victory over the coup emboldens him, and convinces him to begin putting his more radical plans into motion.

After a short tree, consisting of re-establishing order by hunting down coup plotters and dissolving the various organizations (in which Poujade has the possibility to be more or less lenient towards some organizations that could be of use to him, most notably the SOL), Poujade will embark on two of his grandest endeavors, both closely intertwined: the fight against the 200 Families and the Synarchy, and the radical restructuring of the political system. The previous trees (bar the military reform one) disappear, and get replaced by those two.

This phase should show how Poujade gradually gets radicalized by his own rhetoric, and starts to think that he's under attack by the political and economic sphere (which isn't entirely false: but while neither the RRN nor the business interests like him very much, they mostly see him as a relatively harmless idiot, and in no way engineer a shadowy conspiracy to oust him): as such, he aims to retaliate by rallying the people, his people, against what he sees as the elites. This second phase, in essence, is a sort of hyperpopulism which will see Poujade relying heavily on popular support and extra-parliamentary means in order to pursue his agenda.

## The War Against the 200 Families

For as long as the Republic has been imposing its law on the French people, some people have overwhelmingly profited from it. 200 families, whether they be financiers, career politicians, so-called intellectuals, or elites of all sorts, have been controlling all spheres of power from the shadows, and while the late Maréchal tried to do away with them once and for all, it has become obvious that he failed.

In Poujade's eyes, the recent coup attempt shows that the 200 Families' influence is still prevalent within French society, and that the Synarchic conspiracy has infiltrated the political sphere to an appalling extent. The collaborationist socialists were upfront, and have seemingly been dealt with, but the masonic technocrats and their shadowy backers still remain, ready to strike whenever the moment is right. And the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale's relative inaction in front of this naked attack against governmental power is proof that they are at best ignorant, and at worst wholly complicit! The 200 Families' reign has gone on for too long, and must cease at once, or else France will never recover.

Poujade's fight against the 200 Families will thus see him embark on a crusade against everything he sees as part of "the system". This will manifest as concentrated efforts against various actors. Firstly, Poujade will target the banks. The greedy culprits behind France's financial ruin, they have speculated without care or reason and have sold the country to the highest bidder, all while making indecent profits in the meantime! Those traitors to the nation must be punished, and Poujade will thus make moves against them. The Banque Worms, most notably, will be nationalized, and turned into the "perfect French bank", with French people invited to invest in it.

Secondly, Poujade will try to wage an all-out war on the renegade members of the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale. While the Petainists and some Reformists and Conservatives are safe, many Conservatives and especially the Technocrats (as Poujade sees them as the dark knights of the synarchic conspiracy) will be targeted. Whether through legal means, extra-legal means (blackmail and intimidation), or a combination of both, Poujade will try to clean the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale of its corrupt elements.

Again, Poujade will widely publicize this, and make the War a public endeavor. With his position comparatively secure, Poujade will be able to portray the War as fighting against the enemies of the people, against the all-powerful "elites" who are opposed to Poujade's (and thus the people's) agenda without bothering as much with accusations of corruption as he previously did. This is the intensification of the anti-RRN fight, and is essentially a society-wide, years-long fight between Poujade and the government, with both trying to appear as the legitimate option in the eyes of the people.

The Fight Against the 200 Families is ultimately a rather mixed endeavor, if only because the groups and individuals Poujade targets seldom have links between each other, and that the "200 Families Synarchist conspiracy" is not much more than, well, a conspiracy theory. However, the point here is not really to succeed or fail, as Poujade is essentially chasing ghosts, but to throw more and more red meat to the base in the hopes of satisfying its hunger, along with Poujade's personal expectations. The "War" is essentially to destroy the old system in order to rebuild Poujadism on its ashes, and to mold Poujade into the Prime Minister of the People against the Elites once and for all.

Nonetheless, the level of the success of the war will influence the extent to which society has been "Poujadised", and the starting variables during the Oil Crisis protests.

## Direct Democracy Now!

Poujade's fight for direct democracy may have once been hampered by the overbearing confines of the RRN system, but the failed coup against him has emboldened the Prime Minister to go further: seeing the collaborationists as the logical emanation of the German influence on the country, the very same that has allowed the RRN partocracy to fester for all these years, he will thus try to wage war against the political establishment, to try to destroy the RRN dictatorship, in order to build a better, fairer, and stronger system over its ashes.

The Prime Minister shouldn't be mistaken for an earnest parliamentarian, however. The Third Republic only brought ruin and desolation by appointing careerists to key posts, which allowed France to fall in record time once a competent government kicked the door open. And yet, Poujade, doesn't hold the nazi system dear either: it may not have collapsed for the time being, but it is a fundamentally godless and dictatorial system that has shown its limits time and time again. No, the Prime Minister doesn't believe in just copying a system that has "worked" abroad, unlike the collaborationists, or in restoring the old system that failed France, like the foolish dreamers that make up the Resistance. Poujade wants to make something truly adapted to face the country's current and future challenges, something truly new, something truly French.

All while fighting the old system through the war on the 200 Families and the Synarchy, Poujade will try to rebuild something new over its ashes. Initially wanting to call a Constitutional Convention, Poujade quickly realizes that he lacks the political capital and especially the institutional support to do so, and resolves to work around the RRN's current institutions, to in essence build an parallel system to the one established by the Pétain Constitution: he thus hopes to delegitimize the old system enough that it will eventually crumble, or at least give Poujade a window of opportunity to seize the moment and call the "General Estates", a new constitutional convention to remake France once again.

Poujade will thus try to build a parallel system, aside and "on top of" the RRN system, including many of these proposals. Whether through legitimizing referendums through popular consultations (even if they're not legally binding, given that those referendums have no constitutional value), through implementing reforms for local democracy through regional parliaments (that may more easily be swayed through his cause), and simply through general grandstanding to rally the people to his cause, along with a gradual delegitimation of the current system, Poujade will try to establish direct democracy as the "rightful" system of government for France. By tying it to such great figures in French history as Pétain, Napoléon I and III, or Charlemagne (somehow), he will present his proposal as the best possible system of governance: a democratic government with a strong and decisive leader helming the state, and with careerism kept to a

minimum. The RRN won't like this, of course, but when have they wanted what was good for France?

## The Economic Reorganization

France has been under the thumb of Germany and big business for too long, and this is one of the factors that has contributed to its continued destitution. It has strayed too far from its traditions, from the localism and ruralism on which it used to rely, and look where it led it. Poujade knows this, and has known it for a long time; while the RRN system used to stand in his way like an impenetrable brick wall, but with his position solidified, Poujade can finally pursue his goals without the eggheads of the RRN obstructing him at every turn.

Poujade will embark on a grand program of economic restructuring, to actually make the French economy work for the people, once and for all. This is one of the areas in which the Poujade-Gingembre-Le Pen trio will show its differences: the current corporatist system in France is a mess of competing federations and organizations, with economic cohesiveness having ground down to a halt. While all three agree that something must be done, and while all three agree that the economy must be depoliticized (both for the economy's sake and to try to dislodge RRN influence out of it), there are strong disagreements on what exactly must be done to replace the current system.

Gingembre, the advocate of the small businesses, will advocate for destroying the system and creating a series of national federations for each profession, chiefly with the creation of the General Confederation of Small and Medium Businesses (CGPME in French), an organ to act as the representative of the small and medium businesses to the government. While Gingembre also creates a federation for bosses and big business interests, the CGPME is in his eyes paramount to the others. Gingembre will also move to liberalize the economy, in order to bring it out of the state's all-encompassing influence and to create an economic environment in which SMBs can thrive. He will thus try to have the SMBs to have legal protections, while potentially working with some technocrats for some *limited* planification. This plan is personally preferred by Poujade, who feels like it is the best for the SMBs.

Le Pen, on the other hand, will want to work with the RRN to revamp the *Comités d'Organisation*, to massively streamline and overhaul the whole corporatist system, and to try and give an equal voice to employers and bosses. This will be better-received by the RRN establishment, as it is less of a break from the current system, but will similarly less enthusiast Poujade's base. Le Pen, ever the pragmatist, thinks that the system is a good compromise and is more achievable than Gingembre's radical proposals.

Poujade will also try to massively break up business conglomerates and trusts, to devolve economic power back to the people. This will essentially act as a deindustrialization of sorts, with economic power slowly brought back to a local framework in the rural

countryside and to the SMBs owners in general. Many factories will be closed down, especially those with German corporate influence, and France will overall become a more rural, ruralist and localist nation. Poujade hopes to revitalize the countryside, and to finally heal the "rural-urban divide", even though that is easier said than done...

## Phase 3 (1970-1972) - All Good Things...

### The Oil Crisis

In December 1970, the Oil Crisis strikes. The Middle East descends into chaos, and as Oil prices spike across the world, France is not spared in the slightest, especially in light of its closeness to the Reich. As Germany takes a plunge towards instability, so does France: the sixties abruptly come to an end.

Poujade's France will be very affected by the Oil Crisis, especially in light of Poujade's rather unorthodox and dubiously-effective economic policies. The extent to which the economy will be hit will also be affected by whether Poujade followed Giscard's relatively liberal policies or went all-out with Le Pen's renewal of corporatism. With the country in uncertainty, and the economic situation rapidly deteriorating, Poujade and his government rapidly get to work to try and draft a recovery plan, as well as to reassure the people that things are going to be fine. However, something unexpected, and yet somewhat predictable, strikes when France and Poujade's government are at its weakest: the intellectuals, which Poujade had derided and scapegoated for so long, decide to go on strike.

### The Intellectuals' Revolt

The idea of a strike by intellectuals may initially seem a bit silly, but in fact it is anything but. Organized under the broad banner of the "Front for Dignity in Politics", doctors, school and university teachers, and a good number of civil servants decide to go on strike for an unlimited amount of time, to protest against Poujade's "bestialization of society". Their goals are clear, if quite ambitious: the resignation of Poujade and his government, and the formation of a "government of public interest" that would restore stability and especially dignity to France, instead of scapegoating some parts of the population as a cover for bad governance.

Of course, a substantial numbers of the strikers have liberal sympathies, and many of them would rather have France hold free and fair elections to elect the post-Poujade government; however, not all of them do, and there is also a good proportion of the strikers who are RNR members, whether convincingly or opportunistically. Therefore, the movement's goals are quite muddy besides the broad opposition for Poujade, but at least for the moment they manage to overcome their differences in unity against the Prime Minister.



Poujade, predictably, doesn't react well. Making multiple addresses on the radio to order the strikers to stand down, he ponders whether to send the police or even the army to quell the unrest, but is talked out of it by the majority of his cabinet, who think the response would be ill-advised and disproportionate, in addition to making Poujade seem like a heartless tyrant. Unfortunately for him, the gears are already in motion, and the anti-Poujade feeling has been allowed to fester, which in turn inspires more unrest...

Anti-Poujade protests begin to pop up in various cities across France: these protesters, inspired by the FDP, march and chant against the "tyrannical" Prime Minister, who plunged France into chaos and vileness, and clamor for Poujade's resignation. However, Poujade's base is still sizable, and *pro-Poujade* protests begin in return, with Pierrot's supporters turning out in support of the PM, with multiple riots and skirmishes erupting when the two happen to meet. Doctors' offices and schools are vandalized, as are government buildings, and France braces itself for months of civil unrest.

Finally, the situation is further complicated by the valiant last stand of the old order: the RRN, quite battered and bruised from Poujade's War in the previous years, decides to take a stand through the Conseil National (in which it has a majority of the seats), and to publicly support the strikers; Yves Bouthillier, two-times Prime Minister, former economy minister, and embodiment of the "RRN system", comes out of retirement to become the face of RRN opposition to the Prime Minister.

With the Prime Minister feeling cornered, and domestic situation deteriorating, the government must aptly manoeuvre the situation through an apt handling of carrot and stick to make the protesters and strikers eventually stand down, one way or another, while keeping the RRN at bay. This is represented through the *Bataille* mechanic, in which Poujade must fight a metaphorical card game against his opponents, and achieve a higher score than them to reduce their score to zero, while making sure that events don't progress up until the third and final phase of the Intellectuals' Revolt, lest Poujade will fall.

## Phase 3.A (1971-1972) - ...Come to Those Who Wait



Should Poujade manage to resolve the situation tactfully without succumbing to anger and extreme violence, he will manage to emerge from the crisis strengthened, with his principles mostly intact and his resolve ever stronger. As France progressively calms down, with the protesters subdued and the strikers coming back to work, Poujade takes some time to reflect. After years of ruthless crusade against various enemies, Poujade had almost lost sight of the goal: a truly democratic France, that works for the people, as the praises of his followers went to his head.

With his greatest trial successfully passed, the time has now come for the Prime Minister to implement true democracy, and to complete France's transformation into a new, yet traditional nation. To that end, Poujade will strike the final blow at the establishment by dissolving the RRN, publicly announcing it in a radio address. The announcement comes as a shock to much of French society, as Poujade uses the military (now fully loyal to him) and the SSN to arrest many high-ranking RRN members in one fell swoop, de facto dissolving the party and committing what essentially amounts to a self-coup in the process. His hands finally free, the Prime Minister can finally move to establish the final piece in the Poujadist puzzle: a constitutional convention.

## The General Estates

The Maréchal, in all of his greatness and brilliance, was at least in part bound by the conditions in which he took power, and by the nefarious influence of those around him. The Constitution he instituted was not all bad, far from it, but it was shaped by the need to protect the country in tough times, and it allowed the RRN partocracy to take form once he himself was gone, leaving France to decay. This is why a new, fairer system is needed, one that would give every Frenchman his much-deserved freedom, and one in which the leaders would only be the "first among equals", not careerists who would order reverence and adoration from a chained populace.

Poujade already has quite a few ideas of his own, some he had already put into practice during his tumultuous war against the RRN: the idea of a system that would bring the people together through permanent direct democracy, with a strong leader to steer and advise the people, is one he holds dear, and one he intends to put into practice once and for all. However, the people need to have some input in the new system, which is why Poujade decides to call up a long-delayed project: the General Estates.

Calling back to the General Estates of medieval times, in which the people were consulted by the sovereign on the matter of taxes, Poujade intends to call the General Estates to allow citizens to air out their grievances with the late RRN system at long last, and with society in general, in order to build a regime by and for the people. As with the 1789 Estates, each city will be writing *Cahiers de Doléances* to send their grievances, along with sending representatives that will vote on the various proposals during the Estates, including and with special attention given to the new constitution. Such a democratic system will therefore provide healthy and solid bases for the years to come.

Truth be told, however, the Estates are not as democratic as Poujade would want them to be, and never really could be. By this point, the Prime Minister holds near-unlimited power over France, having essentially committed a self-coup with the support of the army and the secret services, and his popularity is almost overwhelming, with the opposition *de facto* quieted, if not entirely silenced. This means that while grievances against the RRN system are surely aired and repeated at the Estates, those against Poujade and the state of French society at the moment (regarding the bad state of the economy, for example) are far and between, by fear of reprisal or by apathy directed towards the Prime Minister and the system he desires to build.

## Referendum or Plebiscite?

As the General Estates unfold, it quickly becomes apparent that Poujade's plans, and even the Prime Minister himself, are widely lauded by the representatives. Grievances against the RRN and its officials are widespread, while concerns regarding the Prime Minister's plans and general conduct are far and between. Poujade takes this as a sign of his bottomless popularity, which in turns means that he must be doing things right, as the people recognize its champion against the Elites.

Poujade's proposals are then "debated" by the representatives in the Estates, and adopted with broad approval. This includes tax cuts, the adoption of a "new diplomatic position"<sup>12</sup>, and most importantly the adoption of a new constitution for the French State. This constitution establishes an explicitly "democratic state", in which most decisions are taken through direct democracy initiatives such as local and national referendums, with a President with strong executive powers elected for a maximum of 2 10-year terms. It is a unicameral system, with an advisory chamber half-elected through universal suffrage, and

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<sup>12</sup> This has many varying and sometimes conflicting implications, but mainly refers to a shift of relations towards Germany, with Poujade's eventual aim being to leave the Pakt to pursue a non-aligned policy. This is not in TNO1 territory.

half-drawn from representatives of corporatist organizations, with the representatives being elected for 5 years and having a two-term limit; additionally, the system is explicitly "apartisan".

The constitutional project is not exactly loved by everyone within the government. Le Pen and the Algerianists worry that the President won't have enough powers, while Gingembre frets at the comparatively little room given to corporatist representatives in the chamber; additionally, the harsh term limits for representatives worry a lot of the more opportunistic Poujadists, who were hoping for a cushy job for life with little stress attached. It is however very popular among the general population, being even warmly accepted by people who were apathetic regarding Poujade. Of course, opposition to the Prime Minister remains, but at least he is widely seen as making good on his promises. As for his government, Poujade's handling of the protests managed to keep it together, at least for the time being.

With the project's success in the General Estates, Poujade will then move to organize a nationwide referendum for the people to approve or reject his new constitutional plan, once and for all. He will try to ensure the referendum is fair, by reigning in any possible pro-Poujade or anti-Poujade agitation, and by carefully monitoring polling stations for any irregularities: he wants his triumph, and democracy's triumph, to be legitimate. While some occurrences of voting fraud and intimidation take place, the referendum is *mostly* fair, and results in about 71% approving Poujade's constitution, with a relatively high turnout too. With his triumph secured, and the French State successfully adopting a new constitution, Poujade will then move to organize the first Presidential elections of the French State.

## For The People

Poujade's last few months of content are spent in a contemplative, yet nonetheless happy state. Poujade's goals are on the cusp of finally being achieved, with the elites having been beaten back, their hold over France finally broken, and with the French State finally becoming a system that works for the people. Poujade is in a very good mood, having done most of what he set out to do, although his government is less enthusiastic. After all, not all is well: the economy is still in a bad state, and something must be done to keep it from actively getting worse, with Gingembre and his allies worrying as they try to come up with solutions.

Similarly, Poujade's system is not as perfect as he'd want it to be; despite good intentions and failsafe measures, such as stringent term limits, his system is quite prone to be abused by less well-intentioned people, or even by *too* well-intentioned people, with the wide array of powers it confers to the President. The good number of opportunists who have coalesced around him over the years will not stand idle either, and will aim to benefit from the new system as much as possible; far from disappearing along with the RRN, corruption has simply taken up a new and insidious shape. Of course, Poujade is

currently vehemently insistent on not allowing the mistakes of the past to become those of the future, but will this always stand?

The Presidential election results in a handy majority for Poujade, being elected without the need for a runoff, while the other candidates get a respectable but small part of the vote. Pierre Poujade therefore becomes the new President of the French State, and the first of the "Second State", succeeding Carpentier who steps down and retires; Poujade assembles a government, similar to the previous one, and sets out to try and right the remaining wrongs France finds herself in, as the results of the legislative elections come in, assembling a chamber which will likely be open to whatever the President proposes next.

Poujade's content thus ends in an uncertain but still hopeful note. The President has a lot to do, and repeating the mistakes of the past may seem unescapable to many an outside observer, but in truth it is not, and never will be. Provided Poujade hangs on to his convictions, and doesn't let it get to his head, the spirit of half-apathetic goodwill may be able to evolve into something greater, into a true and actually competitive democracy; into a system that, at long last, works for the people.

## Phase 3.B (1971-1972) ...Must Come to an End



Poujade's cabinet:

President: Marcel Carpentier - Independent

Prime Minister: Pierre Poujade (Fascist Populism)

Foreign Minister (HoG): Jean-Marie Le Pen (Fascist Populism)

Economic Minister: Henri Dorgères (Fascism)

Imperial Affairs Minister: Jacques Foccart (National Conservatism)

Security Minister: Roger Holeindre (Reactionary Nationalism)

Should Poujade decide to be uncompromising and to fully follow his instincts, he will forcefully quell the strikes and the anti-Poujade protests, leaving a trail of blood in its wake. What remains of the country is either silent or fanatically devoted to him, and nothing or no one stands in his way to finally rid France of every illness that plagues it.

Poujade's first action after quelling the protests will be to officially dissolve the RRN by executive order, along with officially adjourning the two chambers. This fatal blow to the old establishment will succeed, as many of the high-ranking officials of the party are arrested, flee the country, or are just summarily executed by the police; the Rassemblement finally breathes its last, as the monolithic octopus which had infiltrated the entirety of France for the past 25 years finally perishes. A lot of things need to be done, but tragedy unfortunately strikes.

## The State of Emergency

Violence breeds violence. Poujade's brutality in dealing with the protesters and strikers has unfortunately emboldened illegal and violent resistance against him. Soon after the protests clear up, Poujade and Gingembre are walking together in the gardens of Matignon, with the latter privately expressing his doubts about Poujade's handling of the protests in a rather forceful manner. As they get back to Poujade's office, an explosion can be heard all around the Prime Minister's residence; when alarmed bystanders come to check, they find Poujade unconscious and grievously harmed, and he is rushed to the hospital; Gingembre is found dead. The nation is in a state of shock, and Poujade's future hands in the balance.

After some days in a coma, (with Le Pen acting as interim Prime Minister) the Prime Minister wakes up. Something has changed in him, however; he seems more bitter, more revengeful at those who wronged him, and more determined than ever to fight. Gingembre's cold-blooded murder has proved that the country must be cleansed of the opposition elements before it can actually embrace a sort of democracy and freedom, and Poujade has understood that.

After sorrowfully attending Gingembre's funeral, and making a ranting address which leaves the crowd speechless, Poujade officially proclaims a state of emergency on the radio. This gives the government emergency powers to enforce curfews, arrest and detains suspected enemies of the state, and to "safeguard France's security". This leaves Poujade free reign to conduct a final, country-wide purge, arresting, detaining, and sometimes disappearing anyone with suspected RRN, Resistance, or Germanophile sympathies. Poujade's purges will focus on the public sector, ensuring that teachers and doctors don't revolt again and that the bureaucracy carries out "the will of the people". He will also target the military, forcibly retiring many generals and officers unsympathetic to his cause, to ensure that Germanophilia is a nonexistent belief within the ranks.

Speaking of Germany, Poujade will multiply the gestures of diplomatic grandstanding against the Reich, even while nominally being a member of the Pakt and the EEC, and will stoke the flames of Germanophobia within France. This will culminate in an incident involving the German ambassador being brutally beaten by thugs on the street, with Poujade only half-heartedly condemning the attack, leading to a new era of bad Franco-German relations. Privately, Poujade hates Germany, and ponders about trying to leave its sphere once and for all, sending secret messages to Iberia and Italy, but he decides that it is still too risky for the time being.

## The Enemy Within

As time goes by, Poujade's measures will become divisive even within his own government. Some more liberal-minded Poujadists will oppose the government's harsh liberty-defying measures, and some Institutional Poujadists will question the extent to which former RRN officials and adherents are being persecuted. The Prime Minister will not take lightly to such opposition, and will fight the elites wherever they are, including in his very own cabinet.

Poujade will therefore sack many of his own ministers to replace them with loyalists (and sycophants). The remaining ministers dare not to oppose him, lest they fear losing their post or worse, and the true believers naturally follow the word of their leader.

*Poujade's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French State: Marcel Carpentier

Prime Minister: Pierre Poujade

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jean-Marie Le Pen

Minister of Finance and National Economy: Pierre Lagaille

Minister of the Armed Forces and National Defense: Roger Holeindre

Minister of the Interior: Jean Dides

Minister of Justice: Alain de la Tocnaye

Minister of Education, Youth and Sports: Jean-Claude Perez

Minister of Culture and Information:

Minister of Communications and Information :

Minister of Labor and Industry :

Minister of Agriculture and Food: Henri Dorgères

## I Demolish My Bridges Behind Me

The last few months of France content are thus spent in a rather sorrowful state. Poujade, having isolated himself from all those who wanted to restrain him, is now all-powerful and all-mighty, but is stuck in a crusade against the eternal invisible Enemy. The Enemy has many shapes: the elites, the intellectuals, the Germans, even Poujade's own ministers; and whenever the Hydra seems to finally be headless, more and more regrow at an alarming pace. Therefore, Poujade's work is never over, and his fight against France's enemies is fully and entirely justified.

This, of course, is what Poujade would like to believe, and even he can't fully adhere to it. The Prime Minister has been fully consumed by anger: he has become a bitter man, one who has gone too far to stop, and one who is obsessed with chasing ghosts but incapable of understanding he'll never catch them. Isolated from all the people that told him "no", the humble papermaker from Saint-Céré has become anything but. With a rabid base behind him, and an entire country united in deafening silence, the Prime Minister cannot afford to reflect, for there is much work to be done.


Poujade's promises of democracy both economic and political, which he once held as uncompromisable beliefs, have now been relegated to the future for the time being. France isn't ready for democracy just yet, as proves the multiple bombing attacks rocking the country, and order and stability must be brought back before any new constitution can be implemented. Pétain's constitution was and still is deeply imperfect, but it is nonetheless useful to root out threats; and like the Maréchal did in 1940, Pierrot will rule until peace and quiet comes back to France, so that the idyllic vision of a localist and democratic France can come to life.

Unfortunately, as we have seen, violence breeds violence. Poujade's use of the SSN and the military to quell the protests ensure that Resistance to his rule only grows more radical, as violent groups take up arms and commit attacks and sometimes even small-scale uprisings against the Regime. France is therefore stuck in a cycle of violence, a vicious circle which will take time and effort to be broken.

Poujade's content ends with a final referendum. To show that the people are behind him, and privately to assuage his conscience, Poujade decides to put to referendum the continuation of the state of emergency to "safeguard" France. Whether he wants it or not, however, the referendum will not be free or fair, as makeshift bands of Poujadist militias come to observe the polling stations, to ensure that the referendum is "properly conducted". The referendum ends in a stunning success for Poujade, with 87% of the population supporting his rule; and yet, it's a hollow victory for the Prime Minister, for deep down his conscience cannot be silenced. His crusade will continue, but who knows when it will end?



## Phase 3.C (1971) ...That Could Have Been



Yves Bouthillier's cabinet:

President: Marcel Carpentier - Independent

Prime Minister: Yves Bouthillier (Technocratic Corporatism) - Technocrat

Minister of Labor, Industry, and Labor Relations: Pierre Pucheu (Corporate Statism) - Technocrat

Economic Minister: Georges Sauge (National Catholicism) - Conservative

Foreign Minister: Maurice Couve de Murville (Paternalistic Conservatism) - Conservative

Security Minister: Jacques le Groignec (National Catholicism)

Should the social turmoil in which France has found herself go on for too long and escalate to a borderline civil war, the situation will be untenable. The Military and the RRN opposition to the Prime Minister will go to President Carpentier, and issue an ultimatum: either dismiss Poujade and appoint a RRN Prime Minister, or get forcibly removed from office. Carpentier, already on the fence about Poujade's actions during the crisis, and just wanting the chaos to end, relents and dismisses the Prime Minister and his cabinet.

Poujade, somewhat understandably, doesn't take the news very well. Through a last-minute emergency broadcast, he tries to rally the people to his cause, telling them to revolt against the RRN partocracy to save him, the rightful Prime Minister; however, the people are weary and tired of the chaos going on in France, and just want a return to stability, and in a way a return to "boring" politics, without the grandiloquence and anger of the Poujade years. Thus, the few loyalists that come to Poujade's rescue are quickly routed by the army, and the Prime Minister is arrested and summarily shot, as Yves Bouthillier, the figurehead of RRN anti-Poujadism, is appointed Prime Minister.

## Dousing the Flames

Having assembled a government, Bouthillier has the unenviable task of fixing the mess of a situation he inherited. The economy is on fire, people are still protesting, relations with Germany are bad, and an important part of the French population has been radicalized by Poujade's rhetoric, and therefore mistrusts the RRN. In fact, the situation is arguably worse than the previous time Bouthillier was Prime Minister, in 1954, if only because civil turmoil is drastically higher than what it once was. Therefore, the Prime Minister has work to do.

The first order of the day is to douse the flames, and to return calm and order to France. To that end, Bouthillier will negotiate with the strikers on one hand, giving them "guarantees of respect" and a slight pay raise to sweeten the deal, in order to get them off the government's back, in addition to scoring a PR coup at the beginning of his term. Unlike his predecessor, Bouthillier is far from populist and doesn't court popularity, but he realizes that he will not be able to govern much if most of the population hates him and sees him as illegitimate. He will thus try to appear as a reasonable Prime Minister, willing to compromise on some issues, but not afraid to be firm and resolute on others.

Bouthillier, as explained, will not be afraid to use force to quell the Poujadist menace. After 7 years of Poujade as Prime Minister, Bouthillier and the RRN as a whole have seen the damage Poujadism did to France, to its economy, and to its institutions. The disease of Poujadism therefore needs to first be treated, by alleviating and cracking down on its visible symptoms; Bouthillier, ever the physician when France is ill, will move to crack down on the pro-Poujade protesters, through over orders such as curfews, and covert threats, such as using the police and the army to track down violent Poujadists.

Poujade having contaminated many key organs of society, such as the SSN, Bouthillier will need to try and excise the rot from the afflicted parts, through soft purges and forced retirements, to ensure that France's institutions are free of Poujadism. This, of course, is not entirely successful. Poujade's mark has been so deep that he has essentially polarized society along the lines of pro-Poujade and anti-Poujade, and it will take time for France to forget and get past the wounds he has opened.

Finally, Bouthillier and his government will take a look at the economy. Having been grievously hit by the Oil Crisis, and not helped by Poujade's peculiar economic policies, France's economy is in the gutter. Bouthillier, former minister of Economy, will draft a recovery plan for France, which involves reversing most of Poujade's irresponsible tax cuts, along with some slight planification. Of course, these moves will not be popular in the short run, but they are the price to pay for France to get better.

## Under Lock And Key

Bouthillier's last few months of content are spent in a rather morose state, as the Prime Minister makes plans to reform the RRN, to ensure that Poujadism, or anything similar to it, never happens again. Using the broad powers conferred on him to stem the crisis, he will embark on a grand reform plan, to fight against corruption and opportunism within the party, so that any Populist movement doesn't have a base to stand on anymore. The "purges" will be relatively soft, being mostly composed of reshuffles and forced retirements, for Bouthillier knows that to try and act too swiftly against those who put him there would be tantamount to suicide.

Bouthillier is not a democrat, however, and he has a very strict conception of what the RRN should entail. Among his reforms is the solidification of France as an elitist and technocratic state, in which appointments are not made based on elections or loyalty, but based on merit alone. Populism has no place in the new and improved RRN, and by extension it has no place in French society. Debate can be encouraged to some extent, but at the end of the day, those who know decide, and those who don't obey.

However, the "return to order" touted by the government is a short-lived one. Poujadism, having been forced underground, turns violent and illegalist, as bands of neo-Poujadist terrorists rock France in a wave of attacks; the SSN, still reeling from the anti-Poujadist purges (and from the previous *Poujadist* purges during Poujade's term), are almost powerless to act, leaving much of France to live in a renewed state of terror. And even with the police and army behind him, Bouthillier still grows more and more infuriated at the continued violence; why must Poujade, even in death, still torment him?

Bouthillier's reforms aren't particularly well-received by the general public, although it would be more accurate to say they aren't really received at all. After years and years of Poujadist grandiloquence, and especially after Poujade's grand promises and eventual failure, people are tired of politicking and "reform", and they just want their situation to improve. Too many promises have been made by Poujade for any new ones by Bouthillier to be taken seriously, and the atmosphere of political apathy plagues the last few months of gameplay, as Bouthillier ultimately reflects on the RRN and on what Poujade tried to accomplish.

Bouthillier's content ends in a state of reflection. Hard at work making plans to get France back on the right track, and out of the tyrant's shadow, and yet wondering whether it is actually possible to escape it; whether it is truly possible to make a country in which the French people are actually content and safe to live, to turn the RRN into an organization devoid of opportunism, and to move past the terrors of Poujadist populism. This, the respected technocrat does not know, and he can only hope that one day, when his great-grandchildren's grandchildren will have grown old, the name of Pierre Poujade will be forgotten.

## Conclusion

At its core, Poujade's path is an examination of populism, and of the anger that breeds it. Pierre Poujade, a humble papermaker whose meteoric rise to power was carried on the shoulders of the common people who were tired of corruption and careerism, is the Weberian ideal of populism, for his entire worldview hinges an eternal fight between *the people*, who are ontologically good, and *the elites*, who are ontologically evil. *The elites* have corrupted France for as long as they have been ruling it from the shadows, and it is up to *the people* to rise up and to put their champion, Poujade himself, in power in order to take over the very apparatus of state, which will then allow them to finally defeat *the elites* once and for all.

Truth be told, Poujade is not entirely wrong. The RRN is an institutionally corrupt organization, and its time spent lording over France for the past 20 years has seen little progress in France's situation. It is also filled to the brim with opportunistic careerists, who joined it for various reasons closely related to their own situation, leaving the RRN as a party that essentially stands for everything to everyone<sup>13</sup>. Those are legitimate grievances, and Poujade is essentially among the only high-profile figures who addresses them, leading to a disgruntled populace latching onto him as a vehicle for all of their complaints about the state of the country under the RRN. Poujade, despite his quick temper and numerous character flaws, has genuinely well-meaning motivations: to make France into a democracy, and in general to reshape it into a regime by and for the people. However, it is those very character flaws which eventually define his term as Prime Minister; and much more than his ideas, Poujade's time in office is defined by his character.

Unwilling to compromise, vindictive, and narrow-minded in the pursuit of his goals, Poujade also lets the power and fame he gets as a result of his post get to his head somewhat too easily, despite his best instincts. He obviously doesn't become a tyrant as soon as he takes a step into the Palais de Matignon, but he slowly becomes less and less scrupulous about the means taken to pursue his goals, persuaded as he is of doing "the right thing". This is reflective of another theme in Poujade's path: the concept of anger at the status quo, of anger directed against the way things are, and its use as a justification for positive change, or eventual transformation into a full-fledged justification in itself.

Those themes come to a head during the Oil Crisis, in which the groups Poujade marginalized and used as scapegoats band together against him, united only by a deep-seated resentment against the Prime Minister. The intellectuals, derided as out-of-touch and self-obsessed, refuse to do the essential jobs they occupy; the RRN, battered by Poujade's endless war against them, decides to fight one last battle to make Poujade fall. Poujade himself sees the crisis as a "make-or-break" moment, as the ultimate battle between the people and the elites; and the way he fights, and whether he wins or loses, leads to one of his three endings.

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<sup>13</sup> Within the acceptable confines of the Vichyist-Pétainist framework.

Poujade's *Democrat* ending leads him to realize his crusade must end at some point, and that the people against him aren't always the ontologically evil manifestations of *the Elites*, leading to the establishment of a well-meaning, if flawed, democracy, making good on his populist promises. His *Crusader* ending has the violence he used against the protesters backfire on him, leading to a circle of violence to which he feels obligated to respond in kind; anger becomes not only the cause of action but its very motivator, as Poujade's endless crusade alienates him from the rest of the world, including from *the people* he is supposed to represent. His *Failure* ending, in turn, has him forcibly removed from office and be replaced by his antithesis: a silent if efficient technocrat, embodiment of the RRN partocracy, who heralds a return to the muted, "boring" and elitist politics of the pre-Poujade era.

All three endings have in common that France in 1973 has been irredeemably shaped by Poujadism. Whether Poujade is remembered as the father of French democracy, as the emergency dictator fighting against windmills, or as the historical anomaly who somehow got into power and proceeded to wreak havoc on institutions that preceded and eventually survived him, Poujade's name will be uttered for generations, for better or for worse. Populists of all stripes often garner a personality cult, wittingly or unwittingly, and Poujade is no different; and whether he succeeds or fails, France stands changed, and it will likely remember him long after he's departed.

"A great man is one who leaves others at a loss after he is gone."

- Paul Valery

## V. Henri Barbé - Révolution



### ===== INTRODUCTION =====

In the French State, the post-war period saw the (relative) triumph of the Vichy administration: Pétain, Bouthillier, du Moulin, and their eventual and numerous successors took the reigns of the State, and led it through hell and high water for much of the following two decades. Overall, France saw the victory of the *collaborators*.

What of the *collaborationists*, however? What of the people who threw themselves head-first into Germanophilia, professing how France's future would be alongside the Reich or would not be at all? While some of them, such as Jean Bichelonne, decided to integrate the RRN, seeing it as better for their career's advancement, the overwhelming majority of them persisted in marginal organizations, perpetually at odds with each other. PPF, RNP, Francistes, MSR, SOL, condemned to perpetual marginality, condemned to fade away with their erstwhile German backers having long forgotten about them.

Or are they?

Under some specific circumstances, the collaborationists, united under the shared banners of the FRN, can ascend to power. In a spectacular *coup de force*, supported by the SSN and LVF, the FRN can march on both the Hôtel Matignon and the Élysée in Paris, and seize the reins of power from the current government, all while Lafont and Bonny ensure that no one can challenge the collaborationists' newly-born regime. The people, however, won't appreciate such a blatantly antidemocratic arrival to power, especially as a minority among them actively support the FRN, but do they really know what's good for them?

While FRN leader Henri Barbé ostensibly leads the nation, unlike the other paths, the collaborationist path isn't particularly focused on him: rather, it is more concerned with the character and squabbles of the various collaborationist movements encompassing the FRN, chiefly among them the RNP and the PPF. While united in anti-RRN sentiment and

in the belief in a German Europe, they are divided on almost everything else, and the boiling conflict between them will be the driving force behind their path, especially as Barbé's health begins getting worse.

The collaborationist path thus serves as an exploration of the hardline collaborationist side of the French occupation, with all of its idiosyncrasies and petty rivalries. Highlighting important and less important collaborationist figures that were active during the War and introducing some plausible newcomers, the path aims to showcase a France that decides to decidedly tie itself to the Reich in the hopes of better fortunes, instead of trying to slowly wiggle away from its grasp; a France that at long last embraces the revolutionary aspects of fascism after languishing for years in the crypto-reactionary *Révolution Nationale*; and a France whose people, for the first time in an eternity, are French, European, and proud to be both.

Of course, the path will be tortuous, for both intra-FRN squabbles and Judeo-Bolshevik Resistance movements may eventually bring the fragile regime to its knees; but after waiting 25 years for their rightful place in the sun, our brave Revolutionaries are not yet ready to let the moon eclipse them.

## Phase 1 (1963-1967) - Gears in Motion

### How Did We Get Here?

In the fall of 1963, all comes crashing down, as French Algeria's collapse into civil war at the hands of Algerian nationalists caused the RRN political establishment to crumble. Galvanized by the apparent weakness of the Conservative administration and encouraged by their previous negotiations, the various collaborationist parties (chiefly among them the RNP and the PPF, in spite of their historical enmity) assemble into a hastily-organized congress, and following a round of negotiations<sup>14</sup>, they proclaim the rebirth of the Front Révolutionnaire National [National Revolutionary Front], a broad anti-RRN and hardline collaborationist coalition.

Their overt pro-German positions, along with the Poujade phenomenon, end up crippling them and making the place of first and real opposition taken away from them in favor of the Poujadist movement. While they supported Admiral Charles Platon, a enthusiastically pro-German admiral and the fiercest advocate for a "European" Armed Force, in his long-shot bid at the presidency against Juin, their attempt would yet again fall flat.

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<sup>14</sup> The negotiations' success was helped by the death of RNP leader Marcel Déat the previous year at the hands of partisans, as his presence in the FRN had been the most important factor for Doriot's PPF to stay out of it, with the two being personal rivals.

Yet, with their aggressive and proactive campaigning, *something* had changed in the collaborationists' situation: for the first time ever, they have managed to unite against a common enemy and while the FRN remained relatively marginal when compared to non-collaborationist formations, the idea of a takeover of the state by collaborationist forces seemed closer than it had been in the past 20 years, if still far away.

## The Grand Conspiracy

It is in January 1965 that Henri Barbé receives a call from an unknown number, instructing him to meet in a secluded place: accompanied by bodyguards should the encounter turn sour, Barbé is surprised to meet Pierre Bonny and Henri Lafont, the "co-leaders" of the SSN. Afraid that the newly-elected Prime Minister is eventually going to come for them to replace with a direction more aligned with his own beliefs, they have come to propose covert support to the FRN, to direct funds and weapons to them should the government make a move against either them or the SSN's leadership. And thus, a plot is set into motion, as the SSN starts to prepare a contingency plan should the Prime Minister ever decide to go for their heads.

Close to three years pass, when during an SSN mission, tragedy strikes: after some poor planning on Bonny and Lafont's part, a raid on a purported Resistance hideout in Toulouse turns sour, and results in the death of 19 civilians. Public and political uproar quickly ensues, and the sitting Prime Minister decides to use the incident as a pretext to finally sack Bonny and Lafont, a first step to cleaning up and restructuring the Service. Lafont and Bonny, alarmed at their impending demise, call up Barbé, and together they decide to fast-track the coup process, and to launch it right away.

At about 1PM, on the 14th of October 1967, groups of armed men break into the Hôtel Matignon, the Élysée and the seats of both the Conseil National and the Grand Conseil, proclaiming the current regime to be illegitimate, all while Bonny and Lafont ensure that crucial sectors of the regime (that is the SSN, the regular police, and the army) are on the plotters side; depending on [TBA NEED TO FIND SOMETHING HERE], the coup either succeeds or fails; here, the coup succeeds.

Rapidly, the gears are set in motion: the sitting President is killed by a faraway gunman, and the FRN quickly pressures the Congrès National into electing Admiral Charles Platon as President, who subsequently appoints Barbé as Prime Minister; while the previous government's remnants have been scattered, institutional opposition to the new administration still stands firm, and Barbé's position is fragile; given that playing by the rules would get them removed, the FRN has to move quickly to solidify their position, and thus begins their actual content...



## Phase 2 (1967-1970) - In the Hot Seat

Henri Barbé's cabinet:

President: Charles Platon - Independent

Prime Minister: Henri Barbé (Fascism) - FRN

Interior Minister: Joseph Darnand (Fascism) - SOL

Economic Minister: Roland Goguillot (Neosocialism) - RNP

Foreign Minister: Jacques Doriot (Fascism) - PPF

Security Minister: Marcel Bucard (Fascism) - Parti Franciste

Barbé's "introduction" consists of a small introductory focus tree, slightly different depending on who the previous Prime Minister was. For each tree, the FRN government will embark on reversing course on the previous Prime Minister's reforms, and methodically destroy the RRN system once and for all. After all, du Moulin's weak-willing attempt at a single-party was what allowed corruption and degeneracy to foster within France, and it was an integral part of the political establishment.

Barbé's government will thus wage an all-out war on the RRN, by arresting its leaders and MPs, vandalizing and destroying its offices, and methodically repealing close to everything the previous PM passed. Once the system has been sufficiently weakened, Barbé will officially proclaim the end of the "reactionary" Pétain constitution, and proclaim a new, fascist republic. This is where the first cracks within the FRN will show up, however: while the RNP is in favor of a Republic, albeit a totalitarian one, the PPF is most definitely not, and would much rather have a "People's State" instead of a weak-willed republic, arguing that it recalls to the accursed days of parliamentarism too much.

The disagreement quickly degenerates into bickering and intra-coalition slap fighting, as the PPF threatens to pull out of the government, taking the SOL with them. As governmental stability quickly worsens, the FRN gets a stern but firm reminder from the German embassy, telling them to calm down and actually govern together, or face the risk of being themselves overthrown for a more stable and unified government. After some back and forth, they agree on an acceptable, if temporary compromise: for the time being, and until an acceptable solution can be reached, France shall remain the French State; while this essentially pleases no one, and reeks of the RRNocracy, it nonetheless allows the new government to present itself as the legitimate continuity of France, and not as usurpers or plotters. With the various factions forced to work together, under threat of German retaliation, FRN content can truly begin.

*Barbé's complete government is as follows:*

President: Charles Platon

Prime Minister: Henri Barbé

Minister of the Interior: Joseph Darnand

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jacques Doriot

Minister of Finance and National Economy: Roland Goguillot

Minister of the Armed Forces: Marcel Bucard

Minister of Justice: Maurice-Yvan Sicard

Minister of Education: Georges Soulès

Minister of Culture: Robert Brasillach

Minister for Youth and Sports: Victor Barthélemy

Minister of Labor and National Solidarity: Claude Harmel

Minister of Information: Robert Denoël

Ministry of Agriculture: Marcel Capron

Minister for European Affairs: Georges Albertini

General Commissioner for the Jewish Question: Henry Coston

## The Securocracy

The FRN's rise to power was facilitated by the SSN's utmost collaboration, if not entirely permitted by it. Bonny and Lafont are happy that they're allowed to keep their place and methods, but the new situation, and mobilization of Resistance in the face of the coup, has led them to ask for more: meeting with Barbé, they ask him gently but firmly for the establishment of a large-scale system of surveillance, along with a blank check to the Service, to ensure it can engage in its mission unimpeded: Barbé agrees, both out of genuine interest, and also to ensure they don't turn on his administration like they did on the previous one.

By signing a blank check to the SSN, Barbé will effectively allow it to fight against the Resistance in any way it sees fit, starting by massively expanding the security apparatus. SSN offices are to be opened in many more cities, existing ones are to be expanded, and a massive recruitment drive, both open (for agents) and covert (for informants) is to be enacted. The SSN will become a faceless force that can strike anywhere and whenever it wants, always three steps ahead of its opposition, be it Resistance or RRN remnants.

The fight against the Resistance will also be expanded: Bonny and Lafont being true to themselves, they will continue and escalate their "brute force" methods, to strike fear into the hearts of any aspiring Résistant. Casualties are unfortunate, but they are no barrier in front of which justice should arbitrarily stop: the Resistance, through their terrorist methods, would undoubtedly do far more damage than Bonny and Lafont ever could, which makes the latter a necessary evil.

Obviously, the Service's plans don't work exactly as envisioned. The government's paper-thin legitimacy and its crackdown on the few freedoms the people could enjoy during the RRN time only send people running into the arms of the Resistance, as all other political opposition is now strictly forbidden. With Bonny and Lafont's gangster-like methods now being officially state-sanctioned, the SSN's perception as a self-interested roving band of thugs only grows larger and larger among the population, and the informant recruitment program is not that efficient either, as many fear potential reprisals should fate turns against the government once more.

## Burn it Down

In all its contradictions, among the only things the entirety of the FRN can agree on is that the RRN system must be entirely destroyed, and that something must be rebuilt from the ground up in its stead. While they exactly agree on *what* exactly must take its place, they will nonetheless burn the system to the ground, in preparation of the national and European rebirth to come.

The destruction of the system starts with punishing the people responsible for it. Filled with bitterness after spending 20 years in the shade, the collaborationists will hunt down former RRN officials, such as MPs or committee members, and put them on trial; prison, exile, or even outright execution are among the various options to punish those who "served as obstacles to France's entry into the European order". Non-office-holding members will be invited to repent, with "card-tearing parties" being organized, and them (along with the general population) being encouraged to join one of the FRN's constituent parties.

While the Collaborationists encourage people to join the FRN's various organizations, and actively work towards making France a one-party system under the Front, it is a task easier said than done. The various parties within the coalition managed to work together to achieve a common goal, and against a common enemy; now that they actually are in power, however, the fact that they can't stand each other and have wildly differing plans for France resurfaces again, which makes agreeing on policy quite difficult, if not near-impossible.

As such, most proposals in this phase will be subjected to either of those three fates: shot down because of perceived favoritism, or implemented but covertly sabotaged by the parties who feel let down by it. As expected, this only worsens the state's stability,

and Barbé's health, as he has to spend a considerable amount of his time trying to placate every party and faction.

## The National Economy

While the collaborationists all agree that the RRN's economic policy kept the country down, they unsurprisingly can't agree on what actually needs to be done to fix it. Talks of a "National-European" economy are all well and good, but actual, concrete plans are what put bread on the people's table, and are duly needed, even more so when a government has as little legitimacy as the FRN's. Thus, two main plans have come forward: one from the RNP, and one from Doriot's PPF with the backing of the Francistes.

Drafted by Georges Albertini, the RNP's plan is to turn the French economy into a fully planned one, albeit according to "left-wing", neosocialist principles. Through careful economic planning led by engineers, and through the willing participation of the French working class through class collaboration, the RNP believes France can develop an economy that can work for the individual as well as the nation, while phasing out class conflict (and thus blunting the growth of Resistance movements). His plans are somewhat similar to the ideas erstwhile advocated by Jean Bichelonne and his Primeverians technocrats, albeit with a more outwardly socialist leaning, with many of them having since joined the RNP or the MSR.

Drafted by François Duprat and Victor Barthélemy, the PPF's plan is more straightforward. Espousing a form of corporatism with worker-favorable rhetoric, deeming itself "national-revolutionary", it eschews the erstwhile comités d'organisation in favor of "national syndicates", duly run by the state, in coordination with a council of state-aligned prominent businessmen. This strange mishmash of national-syndicalism, corporatism, and nazism-influenced economic policy is less coherent than the RNP's plan, but it's also less radical, making it less of a departure from the current system and thus potentially less of a hassle to actually implement.

Whatever the chosen plan ends up being, Barbé will see to it that the French economy is restructured according to authentically fascist principles. Along with that, the FRN's government will seek increased economic cooperation with Germany, including joint Franco-German ventures in cinema, for example, so that France can finally take its rightful place in the European theater. Barbé and his government intend for France to become a useful and respected member of Germany's economic sphere, for varying reasons ranging from believing that it'll make France stronger in the long run to earnest and ideological belief in France's multisecular friendship with Germany<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> This seems like a good occasion to clarify that the collaborationists are *not* fanatical German "simps". While they are steadfastly enthusiastic about cooperation and collaboration with the Reich in all areas of state, more so than "traditional" RRN collaborators, they nonetheless want France to be strong and prosperous; they just believe that the best possible future for France happens to be one in which it stands as the Reich's best and most committed ally.

## Phase 3 (1970-1972) - When the Levee Breaks

### The Oil Crisis

In late 1970, the Oil Crisis strikes. Discontent in the Middle East reaches a boiling point, oil supply lines get cut short, and economic turmoil engulfs the European sphere, with France being no exception. The domestic situation, already quite tense between FRN infighting and governmental illegitimacy, takes a turn for the worse, and as Barbé desperately tries to keep the FRN together in such a period of disunity, tragedy strikes.

As far back as 1967, Barbé already wasn't in the most healthy state. Bouts of chronic illnesses, kept secret to the rest of the government, had motivated him in trying to achieve as much as he could in little time, and to ensure the FRN could stay together even after he'd be gone. Unfortunately, the Oil Crisis cuts these plans short, as the added stress finally causes Barbé's body to break, with a fit of bloodied coughing in his study degenerating into a heart attack. When Albertini and Doriot find him a few hours later, Henri Barbé is no more, and they fear that France, or at least the FRN's grasp onto power, may soon die with him.

### Tearing Itself Apart

As soon as the word of Barbé's death gets out, the FRN predictably breaks down. Given that Barbé was just about the only acceptable compromise leader to the various factions, attempts at finding a new one fall flat, with it being made worse by Barbé giving no indication whatsoever for his succession. While the halls of power deadlock, the resistance to FRN rule mobilizes, and reports of multiple Resistance attacks quickly come in, with their number increasing by the day. It seems that the Resistance, emboldened and massified by the FRN's policies and general illegitimacy, have decided to seize the moment to launch an insurrection against the regime, as whispers of popular mobilization slowly make their way to the capital.

As reports of insurrection get louder and louder, and both Germany and the FRN-supporting parts of the population turn to the FRN to do *something*, the only reaction from the government is dead silence. Indeed, RNP, PPF, and PF, along their respective allies, are stuck in a three-way Mexican standoff, with each of them ordering the other two to stand down, and covertly trying to weaken their concurrents. Unsurprisingly, this results in a deadlock, with "unaffiliated" pro-government organizations (most notably the SSN and the Division Charlemagne) tasked with keeping the peace through whatever means necessary.

Two key events break the deadlock, however; firstly, Germany officially convenes representatives from the Charlemagne Division to Berlin to discuss the situation in France, instead of convening any representative from the nominally still-standing government.

This sends a shockwave to the various FRN parties, as they realize that they aren't as indispensable to Germany as they thought they could be, and while it doesn't cause them to work together, it does encourage them to escalate their actions against the other two contenders. Second, and more importantly, many high-ranking Franciste leaders, including leader Marcel Bucard and second-in-command Paul Guiraud, are killed in a Resistance attack on their headquarters, leaving the Francistes headless; with one party out of the race, this leaves the RNP and PPF free to try to fight each other, to win enough influence among key stratas of state (such as the army, the SSN, and the other constituent parties) to outpower the other and fully seize control of the government.

In the meantime, the Resistance continues its campaign against the regime, with the SSN working overtime to try and mitigate it, to little avail. Despite the Service's best efforts, the regime's personnel is dropping like flies, and the Resistance seems to be making gain after gain, as the government remains headless. And with the Charlemagne Division running wild in the country, and feeling emboldened by its visit to Germany (with no one within the government or the SSN truly knowing what exactly was said), the remains of the administration can only hope that a victor quickly emerges from the power struggle, or else who knows what might await France...

## Phase 3.A (1971-1972) - Neosocialism and Paleopolitics



Roland Gogillot's government:

Head of State: Roland Gogillot (Neosocialism)

Head of Government: Georges Albertini (Neosocialism)

Economic Minister: Pierre Celor (Neosocialism)

Foreign Minister: Jacques Benoist-Méchin (Fascism)

Security Minister: François Brigneau (Fascism)

*Gogillot's complete government is as follows:*

President of the French Social Republic: Roland Goguillot  
Prime Minister: Georges Albertini  
Minister of Foreign and European Affairs: Jacques Benoist-Méchin  
Minister of Finance and National Economy: Pierre Celor  
Minister of the Armed Forces : François Brigneau  
Minister of Justice: Georges Soulès  
Minister of the Interior: Robert Denoël  
Minister of Culture: Michel Brille  
Minister of Education, Youth and Sports : René Château  
Minister of Labor and National Solidarity : Claude Harmel  
Minister of Information: Robert Hersant  
Ministry of Agriculture: Maurice Levillain  
General Commissioner for the Jewish Question: Henry Coston

If the RNP comes on top of the power struggle, and manages to acquire more weight in the FRN than the PPF, then it will purge them from the Front, and quickly move to solidify the RNP as the sole legal party in France, incorporating the other FRN parties into itself. With Barbé and Déat dead, the leadership will fall onto Roland Goguillot, minister of finance in Barbé's cabinet, who will then look to finally reshape the country along neosocialist principles.

In Paris, Goguillot will proclaim the French Social Republic on the radio, with a constitution to be promulgated at a later date. This new, avowedly totalitarian regime will be able to fully thrust France into Europe, and into the 20th century; the Social Revolution<sup>16</sup> is a *revolution*, after all, and the new state is but a continuation of France's great republican moments, such as 1789 and 1848.

## The Constructive Revolution

Now firmly in power with its opponents dead, in exile, or imprisoned, the RNP will quickly move to actually implement the Neosocialist vision for France. A top-down, Technocratic albeit socialist Revolution is long overdue, and no one else whether in the RRN partocracy or in the FRN was advocating for it, the RRN Technocrats's half-measures

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<sup>16</sup> OTL, Déat called it the *National* Revolution. Here, however, the term has been quite associated with the RRN, which explains the change in terminology.

notwithstanding. Albertini and Celor will therefore move to create a comprehensive plan for France's economic and social renewal.

The Plan comprises sweeping nationalizations and planning, along with the creation of multiple governmental bodies to oversee the planification of the economy. This goes hand in hand with the popularization of the RNP as a mass party, through the creation of regional and departmental RNP divisions, along with multiple sub-groups (unions, peasants' groups...): the goal is to turn the RNP into what the NSDAP is to Germany: the vanguard of the socialist revolution, present in all moments of the citizen's life, and openly safeguarding the totalitarian conception of state so dear to the RNP.

Quickly, however, Goguillot and Albertini run into a problem. After the purges during Barbé's leadership, *and* the violent post-Oil Crisis power struggle, the RNP find the halls of power strangely short-staffed. The bureaucracy is severely lacking in numbers, and those that are remaining there dislike the RNP for various reasons, if only for their violent takeover and for the uptick of Resistance activity caused by Barbé's actions. This leaves the RNP short of people to actually implement their agenda, a problem intensified by the inherently technocratic, top-down nature of their plans.

Albertini will therefore move to try and recruit civil servants from all walks of life, although with stringent ideology tests along the way, to ensure that the recruits are neosocialist enough, and won't try to subvert the new social republic from within. As a result, the new bureaucracy is both inexperienced and highly politicized, especially as another problem rears its head: what exactly is neosocialism?

## The Ideological Question



## Phase 3.B (1971-1972) - Libère-Toi France!



Jacques Doriot's government:

Head of State: Jacques Doriot (Fascism)

Head of Government: Victor Barthélemy (Fascism)

Economic Minister: Maurice-Yvan Sicard (Fascism)

Foreign Minister: François Duprat (National Socialism)

Security Minister: Simon Sabiani (Fascism)

*Doriot's complete government is as follows:*

Leader of the French People's State : Jacques Doriot

Minister of the Interior: Victor Barthélemy

Minister of Foreign Affairs: François Duprat

Minister of Finance and National Economy: Maurice-Yvan Sicard

Minister of the Armed Forces: Simon Sabiani

Minister of Justice: Jacques Martin-Sané

Minister of Education: Lucien Rebatet

Minister of Culture: Robert Brasillach

Minister for Youth and Sports: Alexandre Villaplane

Minister of Labor and National Solidarity: Pierre Clémenti

Minister of Information: Paul Marion

Ministry of Agriculture: Armand Lanoux

General Commissioner for the Jewish Question: Henry Coston

If the PPF comes on top of the power struggle, and manages to both acquire more weight in the FRN than the RNP and get the support of the SOL, Lafont and Darnand will back Doriot, allowing him to fully remake France in his own image. Goguillot, Celor and all the other high-ranking neosocialists will be quickly assassinated, while their supporters will be mercilessly hunted down.

Broadcasting his speech on TV, the newly proclaimed Chef will accuse his former allies of being crypto-Marxists to justify his coup then will officially proclaim the end of the degenerate Pétainist era. With the French State lying dead, the purely fascist French People's State will arise from its ashes, ready to lead the nation towards its rebirth. Thousands of PPF militants will parade in Paris in the next few days, shouting their leader's name as France will enter a new, grim chapter of its history.

## The National Reconstruction

Doriot's totalitarian grip being confirmed, the "Reconstruction nationale" process will begin. A series of measures inspired by Hitler's Gleichschaltung policies, its stated purpose is to fully purge France of its last anti-Doriotiste elements and durably unify it under the PPF. The first act will be the creation of a Schutzstaffel-like ideologically fanatical paramilitary, with the SOL being brought under the Chef's direct authority; Darnand is given free reins to extinguish the last fires of the Resistance. In the meantime, the SSN is rewarded for its services by being given the opportunity to absorb other police agencies.

Security reconstruction is followed by deep constitutional changes. The French People's State is practically indistinguishable from the PPF itself, with the Chef being the head of the state, the government and the party. All Vichy-era legislatures are abolished and replaced with an Italian-style Council of Corporations, while a Council of Provinces is created for some sort of (totally PPF-aligned) local representation. The Council of the Empire will not be a thing as intended by Doriot in the 1930s due to the loss of all overseas territories.

However, the PPF's revolutionary measures did not take account of a non-negligible problem : popular support. Not only do they have a very relative legitimacy due to their violent takeover and their rejection of Pétainism, but Doriot's plans changed little from their elaboration back in the 1930s and are thus not really fitting to a society at the dawn of the 1970s. Moreover, the old age of most of the party's leaders disconnects them from the vast majority of the French youth. Few months after its establishment, the French People's State reveals itself to be built on foundations shaky at best.

That issue will be dealt with through the final element of the Reconstruction nationale : a vast operation of propaganda and cultural reforms mainly led by the

Marion-Duprat-Villaplane trio in order to begin the creation of the New French Man. The New French Man is a true fascist ready to die for his nation, and whose main characteristics are : 1) fondness for risks, 2) faith in himself, 3) sense of group and 4) liking for collective impetuses. Sport and virilism will be heavily promoted to young men, cultural productions will be subjected to a new specialized department of the PPF and the whole history of France, “that of the Capetian kings and the Jacobins, (...), that of Richelieu, Colbert, Napoleon, the Third Republic (...)”, will be reimagined as an uninterrupted continuity of glorious successes almost lost to Marxism and Judaism but saved by Doriot’s arrival.

## Economy Matters

Unlike the RNP, the PPF never stood against private property, and the Duprat-Barthélemy plan made it very clear. Cronyism with fascist businessmen and national syndicalist-influenced corporatism already rythmed the French economy under Barbé, and this will only increase under Doriot. The first step in the post-PPF takeover economic policy will be a renewed trade treaty with Germania, signed by Doriot and Abs in person; in exchange for “voluntary workers” and technology patents, France will receive privileged access to Eastern resources. Ukrainian cereals, Caucasian oil, Ostlander consumer goods will begin to flood the French markets, tying even more France to the Reich.

The second part of Doriot’s economic program aims to prepare France for the dawn of the 1970s. The Chef himself, flanked with Barthélemy, Duprat, Sicard and Lanoux, will invite at a meeting in the Palais-Royal the whole of the businessmen’s council, with figures such as Jean-Louis Renault or Jacques Corrèze now negotiating with the regime’s highest instances. At the end of this meeting, a new Labour Charter reaffirming the PPF’s commitment to class collaboration will be made public. The meeting also includes secret clauses allowing businessmen to use the SSN in case of strikes and to get privileges when it comes to opening new European markets, thus making the French economy a lot more cartelized.

## An Uncertain, Bleak Future

The People’s State is born. Its opponents have been reduced to oblivion, its society is on the way of indoctrination and at last its institutions have been stripped of all degenerate Pétainist influence. And yet, Doriot feels more and more depressed, for a reason unknown to his subordinates. This will all culminate when he’ll start to mope around during a particularly heated debate between the more and more divergent Duprat and Barthélemy.

The very night of this incident, Doriot will be alone in his office in the Élysée, looking at a photography of himself surrounded by other PPF leaders in the 1940s; there,

with no one to see him, he'll start weeping endlessly : his long-awaited triumph at last happened, but too late. He's now a sorrowful 70 years-old man leading a party and a state in his own image only to be at the gates of death, and he knows that once he disappears the various PPF bigwigs will start tearing apart each other.

Thus ends the TNO1 content of the French People's State. Will it last after Doriot's closer and closer demise ? Will it keep its course under Barthélemy's old guard ? Will it radicalize further under Duprat's guidance ? No one knows for sure, but the only thing to be certain of is that the 1970s shall be a grim decade.

## Phase 3.C (1971-1972) - Partisans, Workers and Peasants



Jean Lecanuet's government:

Head of State: Jean Lecanuet (Partisan Movement)

Head of Government: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (Liberal Conservatism)

Economic Minister: Michel Rocard (Reformist Socialism)

Foreign Minister: Marie-Madeleine Bridou (National Conservatism)

Security Minister: Henri Rol-Tanguy (Bolshevism)

*Lecanuet's complete government is as follows:*

President of the Provisional Government : Jean Lecanuet

Vice president : Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

Commissary for Justice : Michel Debré

Commissary for Police : Henri Rol-Tanguy

Commissary for National Defence : Pierre Georges

Commissary for Foreign Affairs : Marie-Madeleine Bridou

Commissary for Agriculture and Supplies : Charles Tillon

Commissary for Reconstruction and Urban Planning : Michel Rocard

Commissary for Transportation and Public Works : René Pleven

Commissary for National Education : Jean-Paul Sartre

Commissary for Information : Claude Bourdet

If neither the PPF nor the RNP manage to acquire more weight than the other and the militias stay unaligned, France falls into chaos. The Resistance will shoot more and more officials, managing to take out Darnand himself in a shooting. As Goguillot and Doriot meet in order to find a rapid solution to the crisis, a bomb will explode, killing the entirety of the collaborationist leadership.

As Paris and big cities fall into chaos, the Resistance will easily defeat the last remnants of the armed forces (greatly weakened by the SSN's purges) and take control of all major points. Lecanuet, Giscard and representatives of the various networks will officially proclaim in a grandiose speech the end of the French State, the canceling of all laws passed after 1940 and the constitution of a provisional government in order to ensure the democratic transition. However, the task will be a heavy one, as collaborationist groups will still be roaming (united under the banner of Mark Frederiksen) and the Germans will already be standing at the ready.

## The De-Pétainification of France

One does not end more than thirty years of collaboration with the Reich without shedding blood. The vast network of commissaries of the Republic implemented after the Liberation will round up most fugitive FRN-era criminals and put them into public trials with numerous pieces of evidence of their various crimes. Lifelong prison is the most common punishment, death by firing squad being restricted to the worst offenders and the regime's masterminds.

This legal purge, however, will have to face the problem of popular anger : the FRN's harshness and ineptness made a lot of people eager for settling scores. Accounts of extra-judicial lynchings and shootings of former functionaries and sympathizers, in rural zones and street corners alike, will flow on the commissaries' desk. Even when the Resistant authorities publish a decree reserving judicial actions to the police forces, such matters will remain prevalent as 1970 awakes the ghosts of 1940.

De-Pétainizing France also implies working towards the repair of generations of enrolled citizens. The Constituante will thus pass the Sartre reforms on education, that remain consensual despite their author's own communist leanings and mostly involve an enshrinement of pre-1940 ideals in the new school programs. Another major event will be the live radio leaking by Bourdet himself of the orders of deportation signed by Bousquet and Heydrich back in the 1940s - a decision that will cause outrage in Germania, with the Führer dementing the claims as Judeo-Bolshevik propaganda.

France will also have to move on from the previous regimes' economic corporatism, which proved itself incomplete in the Pétainist era and utterly worsened during the Barbé years. Rocard will do most of the job, overseeing first the seizing of collaborationist companies and nationalizing en masse all essential activities. That new dirigiste logic will be very much welfare-oriented due to the minister's own socialist leanings but also out of development needs, but still heavily militarized : war looms on the horizon, and every Frenchman knows it.

## Rome's Blessing

Iberia isn't a major player in its own right; Japan is too far away; the OFN can't risk supporting an insurgency at the gates of the Pakt. The only option the government will have is to reach Rome. Negotiations will immediately start with whoever sits in the Palazzo Chigi, be it a Duce, a president of the Council or a general secretary; the terms will be simple : a protection from the impending German invasion in exchange of France joining Italy's economical and political sphere.

The negotiations will be hard, and most of the time fail; Germany will march once again on Paris and put in power Frederiksen, who will start a new reign of terror against what's left of the Resistance, emulating the Reich in the form of a "French National State" with the Führer's entire approval. If the negotiations succeed, Italy will take a hard stance against the Germans, their intervention blackmailing forcing the Reich to back down; France will finally breath free, yet will still have to face another battle - that against her new overlords.

## Many Paths lay Open

## VI. André Bettencourt - Apaisement

TBD




# Mechanics

## Non-President-Specific Mechs

### The Halls of Power

The Halls of Power mechanic represents how government is conducted within the French State, and how despite the executive theoretically enjoying absolute power, it is nonetheless beholden to a variety of special interests, which leads to compromises being necessary. The mechanic is composed of two main parts: the Conseil des Ministres [Council of Minister], and the Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale.

## The Conseil des Ministres



In France, the Council of Ministers is the name for the weekly meeting of the government, and more specifically of the ministers that make up the cabinet. Here, it represents the government and the fact that the Prime Minister has to contend with the varying voices in his government if he wants his tenure to be a steady one.

The Prime Minister will first have to contend with the President. His direct hierarchical superior, who has the ability to dismiss the government at will, even though he accepts to fulfill a mostly ceremonial role. Presidential support is therefore the central

variable the player will have to worry about, with the PM being dismissed (resulting in a failstate) should it drop too low.

The government (as in, all ministers, as referenced in **Government's French State**) are also represented. While the government will normally be part of the PM's faction, each faction in turn harbors various sub-factions, which will make for some dissent and conflict within the government. Thus, the Prime Minister will have to try and balance the support of each of the sub-factions, to ensure that his government stays united behind him. The support of the various sub-factions within the government will have an effect on government unity. Government unity positively or negatively influences President support, which is why it is important to keep the government united as possible. The average faction happiness (with respect to each faction's strength) changes the government unity monthly with a weighted equilibrium at 50%; Faction Happiness can also be spent to gain PP in decisions and to help with presidential-specific variables.

Additionally, each sub-faction has a given strength within the government, which is determined by the percentage of ministers of that sub-faction within the government.

To pass policy, the PM will have to introduce resolutions. Resolutions (similarly to bills in the US or ordinances in Guangdong) will have various effects, and their passing will represent achievements in policy. Each resolution will have two variables:

- radicalism (on a scale of -2 to 2): this represents how radical a resolution is. The level can be adjusted by 20pp per level, and each level multiplies the resolution's effect by 25%. Do note that you lose 5% presidential support for each radicalization level on any resolution which the current president deems against his interests (marked by a variable, and does not work for negative radicalism).
- government support (on a scale of 0-100): this represents how much the resolution is supported by the government (60% of the factions' initial support for the bill + 40% of the factions' happiness).

To pass a resolution, the player does not need to have a given amount of govt support for it. *However*, a resolution that passes with less than 75% government support will do exponentially more damage to the coalition the less it is supported.


Resolutions can be amended with amendments that alter the effects and boost faction support, and that are dynamically added on the player depending on what they want. Standard Resolutions are on the docket for 15 days before they are introduced, marked by a resolution-specific event/focus that introduces them and then a resolution-specific event that ends them.

At various times, ministers will give out what can be accurately described as "side missions". These missions have varied objectives (build 3 hospitals in x region, for example), and are completed when all of their objectives are completed. Completing a

side mission will give 10% support for the faction of the minister that gave it, therefore keeping government unity high.

The President will serve as a "special" mission-giver, giving out yearly military-related missions(such as producing a given amount of army equipment, for example) that must be completed at the risk of losing the President's support.

## The Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale



The Rally for the National Revolution, or Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale (RRN) in its native French, is the regime's party, and the sole legal one in France

(apart from collaborationist parties). Originally created by Henri du Moulin de Labarthète as the official vehicle of the National Revolution, in a bid to make France a true party-state, it has slowly but surely degenerated into an ideologically-divided oligarchical system rife with corruption, nepotism, and opportunism. The system, however, still stands, and those who would have the power to reform it by 1962 are precisely those who benefit the most from it. Besides, reform in one direction would likely cause outrage from the other side, and rocking the boat is precisely what Tixier-Vignancour wants to avoid.


All 4 main factions of the RRN (Conservatives, Reformists, Traditionalists, and Technocrats) are represented on the mechanic, with each faction's size proportional to its influence within the party. The player's goal is twofold: first, and most pragmatically, they must ensure that the government is supported by at least one other faction than his own, to make sure the majority of the party can't band against him and overthrow his government through dubious-legal measures. Second, they must work towards getting their faction to a plurality and then to a majority within the party, with the eventual end goal of making the RRN fully adopt their faction's ideology.

## The Service de Sûreté Nationale

The French State is a place home to terrorists of all stripes. Whether they belong to Moulin, Némésis, or Glaive, all those so-called "Résistants" have one thing in common: a wish to bring down what Pétain and the RRN worked so hard to build, and to push France into anarchy. Thankfully, however, at the 93 Rue Lauriston, a handful of patriots work tirelessly from the shadows so that every French family can sleep soundly: the Service de Sûreté Nationale, or SSN.

...or that's not quite right, is it? The SSN directly descends from the Carlingue, or French Gestapo, the aptly-named French branch of the German Gestapo established during the Occupation's early days. Headed by Pierre Bonny and Henri Lafont, it was home to many ex-mobsters and erstwhile felons, who saw in the Carlingue an opportunity to either regain respectability or to be able to engage in their former activities within a legal framework. Until the end of the war, Lafont's merry band engaged in a number of occupations, ranging from the expropriation of jewish-owned property to the hunt for Resistance members, with the Reich's support.

In 1946, following the War's end, the Carlingue was reorganized still under Bonny and Lafont's leadership into the Service de Sûreté Nationale, as a "purely French" secret police, with the rationale that their usefulness in searching and destroying hints of Resistance activities was worth overlooking their few extralegal proclivities. As the years ensued, however, the SSN came to be seen by much of the general populace as not much more than the band of state-sanctioned thugs they started out as, with an exponential growth of unfortunate casualties during their missions. Yet, the successive governments have kept them around as-is for now, as their usefulness in rooting out dissidents of all stripes cannot be understated, and also because of a taboo yet lingering notion that they are the only force truly keeping the Resistance at bay...



As such, the SSN serves as the second main mechanic for the French State, and will consist of the following (as is illustrated in the above mockup):

- Resistance groups are organized in strongholds, the *Maquis*. These strongholds are visible on a map of France, and each represent a different group or regional tendency of a Resistance network.
- When active, a maquis commits Resistance actions at semi-random intervals. These actions can consist in sabotage, assassinations, raids on government offices, etc. Those actions cause economic damage and most importantly a decrease in RRN unity.
- The SSN's task is thus to find and destroy every maquis. To that end, they must lower the group's support among the local populace and its organizational strength and increase the SSN's intel on the group. This is where Bonny and Lafont come in (do note that this is simply to explain who does what in the organization):
  - Bonny, as Director of the SSN, is tasked with investigation and upstream work: he thus oversees decisions to organize propaganda campaigns to lower the group's support, and to plan investigations to increase intel on the group (a higher intel level opens up more decisions in the other two categories);

- Lafont, as *Chef des Opés* [Operations Director] of the SSN, is tasked with actual, operational ground work. He thus oversees the decisions to lower the group's local strength by organizing raids, kidnapping, and assassinations.
- Once a given maquis' support and strength are low enough, and the SSN's intel on it is high enough, the SSN must try to strike the killing blow by dissolving it (the player can theoretically try to dissolve the group at any time, but the 3 indicators are what determine if the attempt succeeds or fails). Either the attempt fails, and the maquis' strength lowers but its popularity increases, or it succeeds, in which case the maquis definitely disappears from the map, which gives a considerable boost to RRN unity.
- All decisions within the mechanic do not require political power, but rather SSN-specific SSN Resources. There are three ways to acquire these resources:
  - A few Resources are gained every month;
  - Some Resources can be gained through focuses and events;
  - Periodically, the player can introduce a "SSN Finance bill" in the Assemblée, in a bid to gain a hefty amount of Resources if it passes: while the first one should pass relatively easily, each successive bill should be harder to pass than the previous one (potentially contributing to a deterioration of RRN unity if it lingers on the floor for too long) and give a small malus to government-Assemblée relations as well, given that the Assemblée will complain that the sitting Prime Minister would be seen as handing blank check upon blank check to the secret police, while the money could be better spent elsewhere.

While the SSN at the beginning of the game is only used to hunt down proper Resistance groups, the mechanic's versatility allows for a variety of groups to be featured depending on what happens in each Prime Minister's path (such as far-left groups in Bichelonne's).

Additionally, while the successive governments up until and including the one at game start have tolerated Bonny and Lafont's overtly brutal and sometimes counter-productive methods for a lack of a better option and because it did the job well enough, the Prime Ministers elected after the Grande Discorde will try to restructure the organization once they have stabilized France's immediate situation. Lafont and Bonny, fearing such plans, will get in touch with the FRN to try and plan a coup; should it fail, the sitting Prime Minister will have free reign to clean up the organization and remake it as they see fit. This starts by sacking Bonny and Lafont and replacing them with a more competent (and less volatile) director, fusing their two posts together:

- Sidos will appoint

- Bichelonne will appoint Pierre Sidos as SSN Director: a Traditionalist firebrand and visceral anti-Resistant and anticommunist, Sidos has a well-deserved reputation as a man with accumulated intel on a large number of figures within the political class; Bichelonne appoints him as an olive branch to the Traditionalists, and to make sure the SSN doesn't lose any of its brutal efficacy even after it's "cleaned up" of its most noxious elements.
- Mitterrand will appoint Pierre Debizet: a clever and secretive man with shady links to
- Poujade



## The Ides of March



Sometimes, politics get dirty. When handshakes and forced smiles are not enough, politicians need to fight to get what they need, and especially to stay in power should they already have attained it: everybody wants to become Caliph in the Caliph's stead, after all. In times of trouble, it is thus logical that the struggle for power turns into an actual, bloody fight. This is where the *Ides of March* mechanic comes in.

The mechanic represents a fight between two or three contenders, styled similarly to those in JRPGs, such as Earthbound. Each contender has 4 main stats:

- **HP, Hit Points**, representing their health, with its political name being **Party Support (PS)**, to represent how much their faction of the party (and the party as a whole) supports them;
- **AP, Action Points**, representing their ability to attack physically, with its political name being **Fervor (Fv)**, to represent a contender's supporters' willingness to fight;
- **MP, Mana Points**, representing their ability to engage in magic-based attacks and special actions; with its political name being **Connections (Cs)**, to represent how they allow the player to engage in actions that necessitate outside help (such as asking business connections for funds, or political connections for intel).
- **Speed**, representing who gets to attack first, with its political name being **Preparedness (RRN)**, as it allows you to strike first, before the other contenders.

Each contender thus has 3 main actions at their disposal:

- **Attack**: the contender picks from a variety of attack moves to attack one or both contenders, depending on the move chosen: this has the effect of lowering the target's HPs, unless they successfully...
- **Dodge**: the contender tries to dodge the next attack against them. The chance of success is defined by the contender's speed against the attacker's, and the contender's remaining APs.
- **Special**: the contender picks between various special moves, each with a different mana cost. Those can include incapacitating another contender or decreasing their stats, boosting the caster's stats, or interacting with the environment.

The mechanic's goal is to defeat the other two contenders by bringing their hitpoints to zero, while keeping yours above zero, and while avoiding for the environment to become too dangerous. Indeed: as a fight goes on, the environment will progressively become more and more **chaotic**, represented by flames progressively getting bigger; if the environment gets **too chaotic**, then this is game over, as no one wins.

This mechanic is during the Grande Discorde, from January to August 1964, as François Mitterrand, Jean Bichelonne, and Pierre Sidos square off to become the party's chosen candidate for Prime Minister; this is thus a three-way fight, with the player's chosen contender fighting the other two, while the flames of Poujadism grow in the background; should the flames get too big, then Poujadists storm the Assemblée and Juin appoints Poujade as PM.

-

Each contender has different stats, to represent their personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies. Let us for example look at the three contenders during the GD, one of which the player will play as for the rest of the game:

- Mitterrand is an archetypal **Warrior**: his speciality is to fight through hard-hitting attacks, at the cost of little fervor from his supporters. His stats are **HP:120**; **MP:100**; **AP:75**; **S:2**. If AI-controlled, he will most often attack.
- Jean Bichelonne is an archetypal **Mage**: his speciality is to use special moves to subdue his adversary, at the cost of little party support. His stats are **HP:75**; **MP:120**; **AP:100**; **S:3**. If AI-controlled, he will most often use connection-based moves.
- Pierre Sidos is an archetypal **Rogue**: his speciality is to attack quickly, and relentlessly, at the cost of few connections His stats are **HP: 100**; **MP:75**; **AP:120**; **S:4**. If AI-controlled, he will most often dodge.

Here are the various moves (attacks and special moves) that each contender can use. The costs and effects are written that way (cost, cost; effect, effect).

- Mitterrand:
  - Attacks: Contrast your Record (5AP; -10HP); Cast a Wide Net (10AP; -15HP to all opponents), "Me or Poujade!" (20AP; -40HP)
  - Special: Use the Press (30MP; 3\*-5HP); Dig Up Dirt (50MP; -25AP); Promise the Moon (10HP; decreases **Chaos** by one level).
- Bichelonne:
  - Attacks: Lay Out the Plans (5AP; -10HP to all opponents); Emphasize your Competency (10AP; -20HP); "The Future is Now!" (30AP; 2\*15HP)
  - Special: Call our Donors (30MP; +25AP on Caster); Play Both Sides (40MP; Contenders cannot attack you for the next time); Deconstruct Poujadist Lies (20MP; decreases **Chaos** by one level)
- Sidos:
  - Attacks: Play up Petainist Credentials (10AP; 4\*5HP to all opponents); Intimidate Opposed MPs (15AP; 15HP); "It's In Your Walls!" (30AP; 3\*10HP)
  - Specials: Meet Freiherr Von Braun (15MP; +10AP on Caster); Air Dirty Laundry (20MP; -30MP); Use the Clergy (25MP, 10AP; decreases **Chaos** by one level)

# President-Specific Mechs - OUTDATED

## Sidos - The National Revolution

Pierre Sidos' main political goal is the mobilization of society towards one single goal: the continuation of Pétain's somewhat aborted National Revolution, with the enthusiastic masses being spearheaded by himself. The problem, however, is that years of factionalism and weak-sauce parliamentarism have made most of France's population politically apathetic, which means that mobilizing them will be quite an effort. This is where Sidos' mechanic comes in: he will attempt to mobilize society behind him, to propel the good people of France out of their political torpor.

French society will be represented by three different groups, with each having a separate degree of mobilization, ranging from 1 to 10. The more a group is mobilized, the more the player gains bonuses specific to each group, with similar maluses should mobilization get too low; mobilization naturally decreases over time, to show that the people will eventually grow weary of Sidos' should he be idle for a long period of time. Groups and bonuses are:

- The Clergy. Sidos will need to bring the clergy to his side if he wants his ultraclerical ideology to have any weight behind it, and even if some are naturally sensible to his ideas, many others are on the fence, if not outright opposed.
- The Youth. Sidos is very attached to the revolutionary ideals of youth, and will thus try to mobilize the young people of France to make them as loyal as can be.
- The Lower Classes. Sidos, ever the social catholic, will aim to turn the lower strata of society (urban workers, and poorer classes in general) into a loyal base of support, through both social programs and finding them a scapegoat to rally against.

Overall, the combination of those three groups will then assemble into a single "mobilization of society variable", with society being either "scarcely mobilized", mildly mobilized", or "enthusiastically mobilized": this variable will be useful in certain events, as will be detailed later.

The mobilization of society will be mostly interacted through by focuses and decisions within the mechanic, and will interact with the two other non President-specific mechanics. Along with that, the degree of overall mobilization of society will also intervene at two crucial moments in Sidos' gameplay: following the 1967 coup attempt, and following the Oil Crisis and the Reformist coup attempt, as detailed earlier in the subsections dedicated to those events.

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National Socialism: Mouvement pour le Renouveau Français (Pierre Sidos) - 4%  
Ultrnationalism: N/A

Fascism: Front National (Jean-Marie Le Pen) - 14%

Despotism: N/A

Paternalism: N/A

Conservatism: Rassemblement pour la République - Jeunes Loups (Jacques Chirac) - 11%  
Liberal Conservatism - Rassemblement pour la République (Antoine Pinay) - 19%

Liberalism 1: Union Radicale et Républicaine (Some dude) - 25%

Progressivism: Parti Travailleiste Français (François Mitterrand) - 27%

Socialism: N/A

Communism: N/A

Fascism: Front National (Jean-Marie Le Pen) - 14% (Fascism)

Paternalism: Union pour la Fraternité Française (Pierre Poujade) - 7% (Poujadism)

Conservatism 1: Mouvement du Peuple Français (Raymond Marcellin) - 21% (Conservatism)

Conservatism 2: Mouvement des Intérêts Ruraux et Paysans (Camille Laurens) - 5% (Agrarianism)

Conservatism 3: Centre pour la Démocratie Chrétienne (Robert Buron) - 3% (Christian Conservatism)

Liberal Conservatism 1: Parti Libéral-Démocrate (Claude Coulais) - 3% (Market Liberalism)

Liberalism 1: Fédération Radicale et Républicaine (Michel Crépeau) - 18% (Liberal Radicalism)

Liberalism 2: Mouvement pour une Démocratie Populaire (Pierre Abelin) - 5% (Christian Liberalism)

Progressivism 1: Parti Travailleiste Français (François Mitterrand) - 20% (Left-Wing Populism)

Progressivism 2: Mouvement Social-Réformateur (Max Lejeune) - 4% (Progressivism)