Passive Surface-to-Air Missile Systems: Effectiveness Modeling and Strategic Analysis

Comparative Assessment of the 358/359/369 Family vs. Conventional Radar-Guided SAMs
With Real-World Calibration from the 2025–2026 Iran Conflicts

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED — Analytical Exercise

1. Executive Summary

This analysis compares passive SAM systems — the Iranian 358/359 family and the hypothetical 369 concept in multiple configurations — against conventional radar-guided systems (Bavar 373-II and Khordad 15) using Monte Carlo simulation calibrated with real-world data from the ongoing 2026 Iran war (Operation Epic Fury, February 28 – present, Day 13 as of this writing).

The central finding is unambiguous: **passive SAM systems dramatically outperform conventional radar-guided SAMs in contested environments where the adversary possesses exquisite SEAD/DEAD capabilities.** This advantage derives primarily from survivability — passive systems remain operational for weeks under SEAD pressure that destroys conventional systems in hours. Real-world validation is now extensive: as of Day 13, every radar-emitting Iranian air defense system has been destroyed while passive systems continue to operate, with 10+ confirmed MQ-9 Reaper kills.

Version 5.4 updates real-world calibration to Day 13 of Operation Epic Fury, including the March 12 KC-135 incident over western Iraq. It adds a proliferation analysis covering partner force employment of 358/359/369 systems, including a simplified 369 proxy variant requiring only GNSS-programmed search patterns and no ground-based cueing infrastructure.

Passive Systems ($200M Equal Budget, 30-Day Campaign):

Metric	359RF (33 batteries)	369 Basic Block 1 (17 batteries)	369 Basic Block 2 (15 batteries)	369 Premium Block 2 Mixed (6 batteries)
Investment	$191M	$196M	$188M	$207M
30-Day Survival	55%	55%	54%	44%
Cumulative Kills	34	33	41	45
Value Destroyed	$5.8B	$6.3B	$7.6B	$8.9B
Cost-Exchange	211:1	189:1	139:1	146:1

Conventional Comparators ($200M Equal Budget, 30-Day Campaign):

Metric	Khordad 15 (5 batteries)	Bavar 373-II (1 battery)
Investment	$172M	$117M
30-Day Survival	9%	45%*
Cumulative Kills	5	3
Value Destroyed	$710M	$445M
Cost-Exchange	118:1	37:1

* Bavar survival reflects model attrition only; surviving batteries cease emitting and contribute nothing to air defense. Under observed real-world attrition, they are functionally destroyed within 3–5 days.

Conventional with Adaptive Tactics (EMCON, shoot-and-scoot, offboard cueing):

Metric	Kh15 Adaptive (5 batteries)	Bavar Adaptive (1 battery)
Investment	$185M	$128M
30-Day Survival	12%	47%
Kills / Value	7 / $998M	4 / $610M
Cost-Exchange	119:1	34:1

Even under generous adaptive assumptions (EMCON discipline, shoot-and-scoot, offboard cueing from passive sensors, minimal decoy credit), conventional systems produce 1/9th to 1/15th the value destruction of the passive three-tier optimum. Adaptive tactics improve survivability meaningfully but do not close the fundamental gap.

The optimal three-tier force mix — **11 × 359RF + 5 × basic/Block 2 + 2 × premium ($194M)** — produces ~$11.9B in enemy asset destruction, a 90% improvement over the previous two-tier optimum. The 359RF's low cost ($100–200K per round) enables mass deployment for the volume ISR/UAV kill mission, freeing expensive 369 carriers for high-value targets.

A critical finding: **the 369 Premium with RVV-MD2 is the only surviving anti-fighter capability in the entire IADS after Day 1.** Once conventional SAMs are destroyed in the opening hours of a SEAD campaign, no other system can credibly engage maneuvering combat aircraft. The RVV-MD2's 40G+ terminal maneuverability, dual-band IIR with advanced IRCCM, and lock-on-after-launch capability make the Premium battery indispensable — not just for AWACS and tanker kills, but as the sole remaining threat to fighters and bombers conducting subsequent strike operations.

The proliferation dimension is now operationally validated. Iranian partner forces are employing 358-class weapons against US aircraft from positions in Iraq, hundreds of kilometers from Iran's borders. On March 12, a KC-135 tanker crashed in western Iraq; while the available evidence suggests this was unlikely caused by a 358, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq nonetheless claimed the kill. **Regardless of this specific incident, the mechanism of proliferating passive SAMs to partner forces in order to threaten support aircraft operating over nominally friendly airspace is not only tactically possible but operationally and strategically sound** — and represents a natural extension of Iran's established pattern of transferring 358 systems to partners in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.

2. System Descriptions

2.1 The Fath 358/359: Proven Foundation

The Fath 358 is a single-stage loitering surface-to-air missile that introduced the passive intercept concept central to the entire system family. Weighing just 58 kg and measuring 2.7m, the 358 uses a solid rocket booster for launch, then transitions to a small turbojet (originally the Dutch AMT Titan, later indigenous variants) for sustained flight. It loiters in a figure-eight pattern at up to 8,500m altitude, scanning for targets with an infrared seeker and optical proximity fuse. It can be assembled from three components by a small crew, launched from a simple rail on any truck, and requires no radar, no ground guidance, and no specialized infrastructure. A UN Panel of Experts determined that a significant number of its components are commercially available and acquired off the shelf — a deliberate design choice that enables mass production and simplifies logistics for partner forces.

Figure 1: Fath 358 components as documented from seized shipments. Note the modular construction, COTS electronics (INS/GNSS, gyro, air data unit), IIR seeker, and simple rail launcher. The design is optimized for proxy deployment: field-assemblable, no specialized equipment required.

The 359, unveiled in January 2025, is a substantially larger evolution: roughly 5m length, ~120–150 kg weight, powered by the indigenous Tolou-10 turbojet (an Iranian copy of the Czech PBS TJ100). It achieves speeds up to 1,000 km/h, ranges exceeding 150 km, and a ceiling above 9,000m. The 359 is designed for larger targets — MALE/HALE UAVs, transport aircraft, and potentially AWACS and tankers — while the 358 remains optimized for counter-UAV and helicopter defense.

Figure 2: The Fath 359 on display rail. Note the Tolou-10 turbojet exhaust, folding wings, and enlarged fuselage compared to the 358.

Both systems share a critical architectural feature: **they emit no radar energy at any point in their kill chain.** Detection, tracking, terminal guidance, and proximity fuzing are entirely passive (IR/EO). This makes them invisible to anti-radiation missiles, the primary Western SEAD tool. The Fath 358's operational record — confirmed kills against MQ-9 Reapers ($30M), Hermes 900, Heron, and Eitan UAVs across Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and now Iran — validates this approach under real combat conditions.

	Fath 358	Fath 359	359RF (proposed)
Length	2.7 m	~5 m	~5 m
Weight	58 kg	~120–150 kg	~125–155 kg
Speed	700 km/h	1,000 km/h	1,000 km/h
Range	100 km	150+ km	120–140 km eff.
Ceiling	8,500 m	9,000+ m	9,000+ m
Seeker	IIR + optical prox.	IIR (enhanced)	IIR + passive RF
Warhead	10 kg HE-frag	~10 kg (est.)	~10 kg
Engine	AMT Titan (Dutch)	Tolou-10 (indig.)	Tolou-10 (indig.)
Unit cost	$30–70K	$80–150K	$100–200K
Status	In service (2016–)	In service (Jan 2025)	Proposed upgrade

The proposed **359RF** adds a passive RF seeker module to the existing 359 airframe, enabling it to home on electromagnetic emissions (radar, TACAN, datalink, IFF) at ranges far exceeding the IIR seeker's acquisition distance. The missile flies toward the emitter's bearing, then acquires the target thermally for terminal intercept. This is a minimal-development upgrade — adding an ESM receiver and modified flight computer to an existing production airframe — with an estimated unit cost of $100–200K. It is buildable now.

The 359RF's range limitation (120–140 km effective, versus the 369's 160–345 km) means it cannot reach deep standoff targets like AWACS and tanker orbits. It is optimized for high-volume kills against ISR/MALE UAVs operating over or near Iranian airspace, plus emitter-homing against any target within range. At $100–200K per round, it is the cheapest way to impose cost on $30M MQ-9s and $10M Hermes 900s.

2.2 The 369 Concept: Carrier-Launched Passive SAM

The 369 extends the 358/359 architecture with a two-stage design. An expendable carrier — a 359-class turbojet body — flies toward the target using passive RF homing. The carrier's captive-carry AAM (R-73 or RVV-MD2) acquires the target thermally before release, then intercepts autonomously with far greater terminal performance than the carrier body could achieve. At no point does any component emit radar energy.

This architecture separates the delivery problem (getting close enough) from the intercept problem (maneuvering to hit). The carrier handles delivery using cheap airframe and engine technology. The AAM handles intercept using proven air-to-air missile performance (40G+ maneuvering for R-73, advanced IRCCM and LOAL for RVV-MD2). The result is a ground-launched system with air-to-air missile lethality — and critically, the only passive system capable of engaging maneuvering combat aircraft.

2.2.1 Carrier Variants

Two carrier airframes share the Tolou-10 engine and a common in-line solid rocket booster for launch. The booster accelerates the round out of a sealed canister (~400mm diameter, 5.5–6.5m length), then detaches, and the turbojet takes over for cruise. Both variants fit the same standardized canister, enabling 4–6 rounds per TEL on a heavy truck chassis.



Figure 3: Block 1 (top) vs Block 2 (bottom) carrier variants.

Parameter	Block 1 Carrier	Block 2 Carrier
Derivation	Existing 358/359 body	Extended folding wing variant
Length	4.8 m	5.0–5.5 m
Wingspan	~1.5 m (fixed)	2.5–3.0 m (folding → ~0.5m)
Weight	85–100 kg	100–130 kg
Range (one-way)	150–200 km	200–300 km
Loiter endurance	12–20 min	20–40 min (better L/D)
Patrol radius	12–28 km	20–55 km
ESM capability	Body-mounted (1.5m baseline)	Wingtip interferometric (2.5–3m)
LPI datalink	Not standard	Directional burst datalink (IIR/ESM contacts to battery)
Body cost	$140–260K	$280–460K
Canister diameter	~350–400 mm	~350–400 mm (wings fold)
Status	Buildable now	1–2 year development

The Block 2 carrier's extended wings provide two simultaneous benefits. First, improved lift-to-drag ratio enables 20–40 minutes of loiter on the same fuel load as the Block 1's 12–20 minutes. Second, wingtip-mounted ESM antennas create a 2.5–3m interferometric baseline for passive RF direction-finding, allowing the carrier to refine its own bearing estimate during flight regardless of ground sensor quality.

The Block 2 also incorporates a low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) directional datalink, enabling it to transmit IIR imagery and passive RF contact data back to the ground battery during its 20–40 minute patrol. This turns each carrier into a forward sensor as well as a weapon: the battery gains real-time battlespace awareness from the carrier's elevated vantage point, can retarget the carrier in flight if priorities change, and can cue other carriers or 358/359 launches against contacts the first carrier detects but cannot prosecute. The emissions tradeoff is manageable — a tightly beamed, frequency-hopping burst transmission at low power is orders of magnitude harder to detect than a phased-array radar.

2.2.2 Terminal Zoom Climb

Before AAM release, the carrier executes a zoom climb — burning remaining fuel to maximize altitude and provide the AAM with optimal engagement geometry. From a cruise altitude of 8,000–9,000m, the zoom climb can push the carrier to 10,000–11,000m at release. The R-73's rocket motor adds further altitude capability, enabling engagement of targets at 14,000–15,000m+ (45,000–50,000 ft). This covers virtually all operationally relevant targets: tankers (7,000–10,000m), AWACS (9,000–10,000m), fighters (8,000–15,000m), and stealth UAVs (12,000–15,000m). Only true HALE platforms like Global Hawk (18,000m+) are marginal for Block 1/R-73, though the RVV-MD2's longer-burning motor with Block 2's higher zoom-climb performance can credibly reach that altitude.

2.2.3 Booster and Canister Design

The 369 uses an in-line rear solid rocket booster (SRB) to accelerate the carrier to turbojet transition speed and provide initial altitude. The booster detaches after burnout, and the Tolou-10 turbojet takes over for cruise flight. The carrier body (~300mm diameter), R-73 (170mm), or RVV-MD2 (170mm) all fit within a ~400mm sealed canister at 5.5–6.5m length — smaller than S-300 tubes (~520mm). This enables 4–6 rounds per TEL on a Zoljanah 10×10 or commercial 8×8 truck chassis. Sealed canisters provide factory-assembled, zero-maintenance, 10+ year shelf life rounds that are carrier/missile agnostic — the TEL doesn't know or care whether it's launching a Block 1 with R-73, a Block 2 with RVV-MD2, or a future variant. This standardization is critical for the simplified proxy variant described in Section 11.

2.2.4 Missile Options

Parameter	R-73 + Block 1	R-73 + Block 2	RVV-MD2 + Block 2
Total weight	190–205 kg	205–235 kg	212–242 kg
AAM release range	10–20 km	10–20 km	25–45 km
Seeker	Single-band cryo IR	Single-band cryo IR	Dual-band IIR
IRCCM	Basic–moderate	Basic–moderate	Advanced (5th-gen)
Lock-on after launch	No	No	Yes (INS midcourse)
Terminal maneuver.	~40G	~40G	40G+ (thrust vector)
Unit cost	$190–360K	$330–560K	$530–860K
Availability	MiG-29 stocks	1–2 yr (carrier)	Requires Russian supply

All missile types are interchangeable on the same TEL rail via the standardized canister. The RVV-MD2 configuration is particularly significant: its 40G+ thrust-vectored terminal maneuverability, advanced dual-band IRCCM, and lock-on-after-launch capability make it the only passive weapon in the arsenal that can credibly engage maneuvering 4th/5th generation fighters and bombers. Once conventional radar-guided SAMs are destroyed in the opening hours of a SEAD campaign, the 369 Premium is the sole remaining anti-fighter capability in the entire IADS.

2.2.5 Battery Configurations

	Basic Battery (ESM + EO/IR)	Premium Battery (+ PCL Passive Radar + Basic Sensors)
Vehicles	3–4	5–6
Missile canisters	12–16	20–30
Infrastructure cost	$5–10.5M	$14–26.5M
Key sensors	Wideband ESM (2–18 GHz) EO/IR thermal imager	All basic sensors plus: PCL passive radar (3D track)
Provides range data?	No (bearing only)	Yes (range + bearing + altitude)
Setup time	10–20 min	15–25 min

2.2.6 Carrier Recovery

After AAM release, the Block 2 carrier body — with its Tolou-10 engine ($30–50K), flight computer, and wingtip interferometric ESM pods — is still a powered airframe with residual fuel. A parachute + GPS beacon system ($5–10K) enables recovery after every successful engagement, not just failed patrols. If 60% of carrier bodies are recovered and refurbished, the effective per-engagement cost drops by 25–30%, saving $150–250K per shot over a campaign.

Recovery is primarily viable over friendly territory and in peacetime counter-ISR operations where unfired rounds (carrier + AAM) can be fully recovered. A flight computer decision logic governs the outcome: deploy parachute if over a friendly recovery zone, activate self-destruct if over hostile territory (preventing technology compromise of the interferometric ESM).

2.3 Conventional Comparators

2.3.1 Khordad 15

The Khordad 15 is an Iranian medium-range SAM using the Sayyad-3 missile (120–200 km range) guided by the Najm 804 phased-array radar. It achieved Iran's most notable pre-war air defense success — shooting down a US RQ-4 Global Hawk over the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019. The system comprises 3–5 truck-mounted vehicles (TEL + radar + C2), can engage 6 targets simultaneously, and reaches readiness in under 5 minutes. However, it must emit radar throughout its engagement chain, making it vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles and SIGINT-cued strikes.

2.3.2 Bavar 373-II

Iran's indigenous long-range SAM (Sayyad-4B missile, up to 300 km range) with the Meraj-4 AESA acquisition radar. A complete battery of 8–12 vehicles costs an estimated $79–154M loaded — roughly 10x the cost of a fully loaded 369 basic battery. Retained in this analysis primarily as a cost comparison to illustrate the force structure implications of conventional vs. passive investment.

	Khordad 15	Bavar 373-II
Missile	Sayyad-3 (120–200 km)	Sayyad-4B (up to 300 km)
Radar	Najm 804 phased array	Meraj-4 AESA + engagement radars
Vehicles per battery	3–5	8–12
Battery cost (loaded)	$22–51M	$79–154M
Emits radar	Yes	Yes (multiple bands)
Confirmed kills (2019–26)	1 (RQ-4 Global Hawk)	0
Status in 2026 war	Destroyed	Destroyed

2.3.3 Asymmetric Vulnerabilities of Conventional Systems

Beyond the SEAD/survivability problem modeled in this analysis, conventional radar-guided SAMs face three additional vulnerability categories that passive systems largely avoid.

Cyber penetration: Conventional SAMs are computerized, networked systems with radar data processors, IFF interrogators, digital C2 links, and often foreign-supplied software (Russian for S-300, Chinese for HQ-9B). Each is an attack surface. The Stuxnet precedent demonstrates that Iranian military infrastructure is penetrable. A compromised battery might fail to fire, misidentify targets, or broadcast its position. By contrast, the 358 contains an INS, a GNSS receiver, an IIR seeker, and a turbojet — there is essentially no software attack surface beyond GPS jamming, which it can function without.

Human intelligence and sabotage: Conventional SAM batteries are large, semi-fixed installations with 8–12 vehicles, distinctive radar arrays, dozens of crew, and substantial logistics trains. They are known to intelligence services, require maintained roads and prepared positions, and their crews need training facilities that can be monitored. Mossad has demonstrated precisely this capability in Iran — repeatedly sabotaging military and nuclear facilities using deep penetration networks. A 369 battery on 3–4 commercial trucks with a crew of 8 is indistinguishable from civilian traffic. A 358 on a rail on any truck looks like nothing at all.

Graceful degradation: A conventional battery that loses its search radar is blind. Loses its engagement radar, it cannot fire. Loses its C2 vehicle, it cannot coordinate. Each vehicle is a single point of failure for the entire battery. A 369 basic battery that loses its ESM vehicle still has carriers with onboard ESM that can search autonomously (lower Pk but non-zero). Loses its EO/IR — the ESM still provides bearing cues. Each component degrades performance rather than producing total failure. And individual missiles are fully autonomous after launch — even if the entire battery is destroyed after firing, carriers already in flight continue their missions.

3. Real-World Performance: 2025–2026 Iran Conflicts

3.1 The Twelve-Day War (June 2025)

The June 2025 conflict provided the first major test of Iran's air defense network against a technologically sophisticated adversary. The results were devastating for conventional defenses. Israel achieved full aerial superiority within days, destroying 120 TELs and systematically dismantling Iran's radar-based IADS. S-300 batteries near Isfahan and Tehran were located by their emissions and precision-struck. Bavar 373 batteries' large Meraj-4 radar arrays provided unmistakable signatures. The combination of internal sabotage, standoff ARMs (AARGM-ER, Delilah), electronic warfare, and precision-guided munitions rendered Iran's conventional IADS non-functional within 48 hours.

3.2 Operation Epic Fury (February 28 – Present, Day 13)

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched joint strikes preceded by cyber operations degrading Iranian communications, followed by 100+ aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles striking over 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours. By Day 13 (March 13), over 15,000 targets have been struck across 6,000+ airstrikes. 300 Iranian missile launchers destroyed. Iran's ballistic missile production capacity functionally defeated. Iran's reconstituted air defenses — S-300 components, Bavar 373 batteries, Chinese-supplied HQ-9B systems, and Khordad 15 batteries — were again systematically destroyed in the opening hours.

System	Status (Day 13)	Kills vs Manned	Kills vs UAVs
S-300PMU-2	Non-functional	0	0
Bavar 373-II	Destroyed	0	0
Khordad 15 / HQ-9B	Destroyed	0	0
Fath 358 (passive)	Still operating	0	10+ MQ-9, Hermes, Heron, Eitan
Majid (passive EO/IR)	Still operating	0	Contributing
Thaqib (repurposed AAMs)	Still operating	0	Contributing

3.3 The March 12 KC-135 Incident

On March 12, a US KC-135 Stratotanker crashed in western Iraq during a combat support mission, killing all 6 crew. CENTCOM stated the loss was 'not due to hostile fire or friendly fire,' and initial reporting suggests a possible mid-air collision with a second KC-135 that landed with tail damage. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) nonetheless claimed it had shot down the aircraft 'with the appropriate weapon' and claimed to have hit the second KC-135 as well.

Analytical note: The available evidence suggests this incident was unlikely caused by a 358-class weapon. However, the IRI's claim — and its plausibility in the abstract — illustrates a strategically significant point. **The mechanism of proliferating passive SAMs to partner forces in order to threaten support aircraft operating over nominally friendly airspace is not only tactically possible but operationally and strategically sound.** IRI forces in western Iraq are already employing 358-class weapons and are physically positioned along coalition tanker and AWACS flight paths. Whether or not this specific KC-135 was hit by a 358, the capability for such an engagement exists and is growing. A \$30–70K 358 engaging a \$275M tanker would produce a cost-exchange ratio exceeding 3,900:1.

Day 13 summary: Conventional SAMs have achieved zero kills against any aircraft in either Iran war. The only confirmed air defense kills are by passive 358 systems (10+ UAVs). The only coalition manned aircraft losses are friendly fire (three F-15Es shot down by Kuwaiti F/A-18s, March 1) and the KC-135 crash (under investigation). The passive approach is not theoretical — it is the only Iranian air defense capability producing results.

4. Modeling Methodology

The model uses Monte Carlo simulation (1,500 iterations per scenario) across three integrated modules. All parameter distributions use triangular (low/mid/high) bounds; mid values represent assessed most-likely performance. The full parameter tables and simulation code are provided in Annex A.

Kill Chain Engine: Each engagement is a five-stage chain — detection, track quality, carrier/missile reaching engagement zone, terminal IIR acquisition, and post-release intercept. Each stage is sampled independently from a triangular distribution specific to the system×target combination. The composite single-engagement Pk is the product of all five stages. Independence is assumed between stages — this likely overstates some failure correlations (e.g., a target with strong countermeasures affects both acquisition and intercept stages), but simplifies the model and is conservative for passive systems whose stages are more genuinely independent. The 359RF uses a simplified single-stage chain (no AAM handoff), with lower terminal intercept probability reflecting its ~10–15G body maneuverability against agile targets.

Carrier Bonuses (Block 2 only): Three additive bonuses applied after base kill chain sampling: (1) interferometric track refinement (+1–8% to track stage, from wingtip ESM's 2.5–3m baseline); (2) loiter reach (+1–16% to reach stage, reflecting extended patrol time improving probability of finding primary or alternate targets); (3) IIR acquisition (+2–13% to acquire stage, from multiple search passes during 20–40 min loiter). These bonuses are capped at 1.0 and apply regardless of battery type, reflecting the carrier's autonomous in-flight capabilities.

Survivability Engine: Daily attrition is modeled as a proportional loss rate. For passive systems (359RF, all 369 variants), attrition comes only from ISR-based detection: a base rate of 1–5%/day representing the probability that overhead ISR, HUMINT, or pattern-of-life analysis locates and targets the battery. For radar-emitting systems, attrition has two components: a base ISR rate (6–18%/day for baseline, reflecting the larger signature of military vehicles with radar arrays) plus an emission penalty per engagement (3–12% additional per engagement, reflecting the SEAD window created by each radar emission). The 10th–90th percentile bands in the figures represent the spread of Monte Carlo outcomes, not confidence intervals on parameter estimates.

Campaign Integrator: Combines kill chain and survivability over 30 days with finite missile inventories. Target mix is static: 10% AWACS, 20% tanker, 35% ISR/MALE, 10% jammer, 20% fighter (non-EMCON), 5% fighter (EMCON). Each day, surviving batteries engage available targets up to their daily engagement limit; targets are drawn randomly from the mix. Missile inventories deplete with each engagement. Mixed-loadout batteries select RVV-MD2 for high-value targets (AWACS, tankers, jammers) and R-73 for ISR and fighters. When a battery's inventory is exhausted, it contributes nothing further.

Target behavior assumptions: Targets follow static orbits and do not adaptively reroute in response to SAM threat. This understates the deterrent value of passive systems (which would force orbit changes) and overstates the number of engageable targets over a 30-day campaign. No target attrition is modeled — the adversary is assumed to replace lost aircraft, which is conservative for high-value/low-density assets like AWACS and tankers.

4.1 Adaptive Conventional Tactics

To avoid comparing best-case passive against worst-case conventional, the model includes 'adaptive' variants of both conventional systems. These represent a generous best-case for radar-guided SAMs employing modern SEAD-avoidance tactics:

EMCON discipline: The adaptive battery uses offboard passive sensors (ESM, EO/IR) for search and detection, activating its engagement radar only for the final seconds of terminal guidance. This reduces the emission penalty per engagement by approximately 50% — from 3–12% to 1.5–5% per engagement. The battery still must emit to guide its missile; it cannot fire passively.

Shoot-and-scoot: After each engagement, the battery relocates. For Khordad 15 (3–5 vehicles, 5-minute setup), this is practical. For Bavar 373 (8–12 vehicles, 8–25 minute relocation), mobility is severely limited by convoy size. Base ISR attrition is reduced by ~20–25% for Khordad and ~15–20% for Bavar, reflecting improved concealment discipline but acknowledging that 8–12 military vehicles remain a substantial ISR signature regardless of movement patterns.

Decoys: Minimal credit is given. Inflatable decoys are finite, static, and become less effective as adversary ISR learns to discriminate. US/Israeli ISR capabilities — including synthetic aperture radar, multispectral imaging, and signals intelligence — are assessed as highly capable at distinguishing operational batteries from decoys, especially over time. A ~10% initial strike absorption is folded into the reduced base attrition rate; no separate decoy mechanic is modeled.

Offboard cueing: The adaptive battery receives target bearing and altitude from external passive sensors, allowing it to slew its engagement radar directly to the target rather than conducting a broad search sweep. This reduces the radar-on time per engagement but requires exactly the passive sensor infrastructure proposed for the 369 — raising the question of why a passive sensor network would terminate in a radar-emitting missile system rather than a passive one. The additional passive sensor and C2 equipment increases battery cost by approximately 10–15%.

The net effect: adaptive Khordad 15 improves from 9% to ~12% Day 30 survival and from $710M to ~$998M value destroyed. Adaptive Bavar 373 improves from ~0% effective to ~47% survival (but still only 4 kills) and from $425M to $610M. These are meaningful improvements — but even the best adaptive conventional produces less than 1/9th the value destruction of the passive three-tier optimum ($11.9B).

4.2 Key Limitations

This model has several limitations that should inform interpretation of results:

Kill chain stages are assumed independent. In reality, factors like target countermeasure quality affect multiple stages simultaneously. This is moderately conservative for passive systems and moderately optimistic for conventional systems.

Target orbits are static. Real adversaries would adapt — moving tanker tracks, increasing AWACS standoff, adding escort fighters. This understates the deterrent value of passive systems.

No friendly force attrition from adversary action is modeled beyond SAM battery losses. The model does not account for adversary strikes on TEL storage, logistics, or command facilities.

Iranian operational discipline is assumed at the level specified in parameter distributions. Real-world performance may be degraded by poor maintenance, inadequate training, or command failures — as suggested by the rapid collapse of conventional IADS in both the 2025 and 2026 conflicts.

The adaptive conventional model assumes competent implementation of EMCON and shoot-and-scoot. The real-world evidence from two successive conflicts suggests Iranian conventional SAM crews did not effectively employ these tactics, possibly due to doctrinal rigidity, inadequate training, or the speed and violence of the SEAD campaign.

5. Results: Equal Budget Comparison ($200M, 30 Days)

5.1 Kill Probability Comparison

The 359RF shows lower per-shot Pk across all target types, reflecting its single-stage intercept without AAM separation. Against ISR/MALE UAVs (its primary mission), it achieves 0.25 — modest, but at $150K per round versus $275K+ for 369 variants, the cost per kill is competitive. Against fighters, the 369 Premium (Pk 0.55–0.65 non-EMCON) is the only passive system with credible engagement capability, reflecting the RVV-MD2's advanced terminal performance. Conventional systems maintain higher per-shot Pk (Bavar at 0.87 vs AWACS) but cannot survive to employ it. The adaptive conventional variants have identical per-shot Pk to their baselines — adaptive tactics improve survivability, not lethality. Even with improved survivability, the Khordad 15 Adaptive produces only $998M (vs $8.9B for 369 Premium) and the Bavar Adaptive produces $610M (vs $7.6B for 369 Basic/Blk2). Dashed lines on Figures 5–7 show the adaptive variants.



Figure 4: Single-engagement kill probability by system and target type. (Rotate page — view from right side.)

5.2 Survivability Under SEAD

All passive systems retain 44–55% of batteries at Day 30. The Khordad 15 collapses to 9% — worse than the Bavar because its higher engagement rate generates more emission events. The 359RF's identical survivability to the 369 Basic variants reflects that survivability is driven by passive architecture, not battery complexity. This divergence is now empirically confirmed at Day 13 of the real conflict.



Figure 5: Battery survivability over 30-day campaign. (View from right side.)

5.3 Value Destroyed and Cost-Exchange

The 359RF achieves the highest cost-exchange ratio (211:1) due to its low round cost, though it produces less total value destruction ($5.8B) than the 369 variants ($6.3–8.9B) because it cannot effectively engage the highest-value targets. The 369 Premium leads in total value ($8.9B) by combining survivability with high Pk against AWACS, tankers, and — uniquely — fighters and bombers.



Figure 6: Cumulative enemy asset value destroyed. (View from right side.)



Figure 7: Cost-exchange ratio over campaign. (View from right side.)

6. Real-World Calibration (Updated to Day 13)

Using observed attrition rates (35%/day for Bavar, 28%/day for Khordad-class systems), the model compares actual outcomes against counterfactual passive deployments at equivalent investment levels.

System	Batteries	Investment	Surviving (Day 9)	Kills	Value Destroyed
Bavar 373-II (modeled, observed attrition)	8	$954M	5%	3	$365M
Khordad 15 (modeled, observed attrition)	6	$201M	7%	4	$625M
359RF (counterfactual)	80	$490M	83%	13	$2,090M
369 Basic/Blk1 (counterf.)	44	$501M	83%	12	$2,290M
369 Basic/Blk2 (counterf.)	30	$363M	83%	15	$2,755M
369 Prem/Mix (counterf.)	10	$348M	72%	23	$4,428M

Important clarification: The Bavar and Khordad rows above show *modeled* outcomes using observed real-world attrition rates as inputs — not actual wartime results. As documented in Section 3, both systems achieved zero confirmed kills against aircraft in the 2026 war. The model gives them 3 and 4 kills respectively because the simulation allows surviving batteries to engage targets, but in reality these systems were destroyed so rapidly that they achieved nothing. The model is being generous to the conventional side; reality was worse.

The conventional systems — despite costing 2–5x more — produce 1/3 to 1/10 the value destruction of the passive counterfactuals. The 359RF at 80 batteries ($490M) produces $2.1B while retaining 83% of its force, demonstrating the viability of mass low-cost deployment.

Note: If the KC-135 kill claim were confirmed, a single 358-class engagement ($30–70K) would have destroyed more asset value ($275M) than the entire Bavar 373 fleet ($954M invested) achieved across 13 days of war ($365M). While this specific incident appears unlikely to have been caused by a 358, the cost-exchange arithmetic illustrates why the proliferation of passive SAMs to partner forces along coalition flight paths is strategically transformational.



Figure 8: Four-panel dashboard. (View from right side.)

7. Three-Tier Force Optimization

Version 5.0 introduces three-tier optimization: cheap 359RF for volume ISR/UAV kills, moderate-cost 369 Basic/Block 2 for medium-range engagements, and expensive 369 Premium for AWACS/tanker/fighter missions as the sole surviving anti-fighter capability.

Force Mix	Kills	Value Destroyed
11 × 359RF + 5 × Bas/Blk2 + 2 × Prem	65	$11,905M
7 × 359RF + 9 × Bas/Blk2 + 1 × Prem	61	$11,045M
17 × 359RF + 2 × Bas/Blk2 + 2 × Prem	60	$10,570M
8 × 359RF + 1 × Bas/Blk2 + 4 × Prem	57	$10,415M
17 × 359RF + 0 × Bas/Blk2 + 3 × Prem	58	$10,378M
17 × all-Block 1 baseline	33	$6,305M

The three-tier optimum (**11 × 359RF + 5 × basic/Block 2 + 2 × premium, $194M**) produces $11.9B — nearly double the all-Block 1 baseline ($6.3B). The presence of premium batteries in the optimized force is not optional. Without them, the adversary can conduct strike operations with impunity once conventional SAMs are eliminated — fighters and bombers face no credible SAM threat from basic batteries or 359RF systems. The premium battery's value extends beyond its direct kills: its existence forces adversary fighters to adopt defensive countermeasures, fly at higher altitudes, and reduce time-on-station, degrading overall strike effectiveness.

Figure 9: Three-tier force optimization. (View from right side.)

8. Sensitivity Analysis

SEAD attrition rate and engagement rate dominate outcomes, each capable of swinging results by $3–5B. These represent the two most impactful investment areas: concealment and mobility (reducing attrition) and sensor/cueing improvements (increasing engagements per day). Missile cost and battery cost show moderate sensitivity. Missile inventory per battery matters primarily for the premium configuration, which depletes its magazine before the 30-day campaign ends.

The practical implication: **investments that increase engagement tempo (better sensors, faster launch prep) or decrease detectability (smaller footprint, faster relocation, better concealment) yield the highest marginal returns.** Reducing missile cost, while desirable, is comparatively less impactful because cost-exchange ratios are already overwhelming.



Figure 10: Parameter sensitivity for 369 Premium/Mixed. (View from right side.)

9. Elevated Passive Sensor Network

9.1 The Sensor Horizon Problem

A ground-level passive sensor (ESM or IIR) has approximately 15–20 km line-of-sight to a target at 5,000m altitude. This limits the detection and cueing range of any passive SAM battery to short-range targets. Elevating the sensor dramatically extends the horizon: a sensor at 3,000m altitude provides line-of-sight exceeding 200 km for high-altitude targets and 70–80 km for low-flying UAVs.

9.2 Tethered Aerostats

A tethered aerostat at 3,000m carrying an IIR camera and wideband ESM receiver provides persistent 360° passive surveillance over an enormous volume of airspace. Against stealth UAVs — designed to defeat radar but still producing thermal signatures and potential LPI datalink emissions — an elevated IIR/ESM sensor is the most effective detection method available.

Estimated costs for a military-grade tethered aerostat system (balloon, winch vehicle, sensor payload, power, communications): $5–15M per installation, plus $1–3M per year in operating costs. Sensor payloads (cooled MWIR IIR with 360° scan + wideband ESM): $2–5M per set. A network of 10 aerostats covering key sites (Tehran, Isfahan nuclear complex, Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, Strait of Hormuz) would cost $70–200M installed — comparable to a single Bavar 373 battery — while providing persistent wide-area passive detection that no single SAM battery can match.

In peacetime, aerostats are essentially invulnerable and provide 24/7 coverage. In wartime, they are easy kills (a cruise missile or long-range strike on the tether cable) and should be expected to be destroyed in the opening hours. This is acceptable: they are a peacetime force multiplier, not a wartime dependency.

9.3 Mountain-Top Passive Sensor Nodes

Iran’s mountainous terrain — the Zagros range along the western border, the Alborz above Tehran, with peaks routinely reaching 3,000–4,000m — provides natural elevated sensor platforms that are dramatically more survivable than aerostats in wartime. A passive IIR+ESM sensor node on a 3,500m peak near Isfahan provides line-of-sight to a target at 10,000m altitude out to roughly 500 km — sufficient to detect tanker and AWACS orbits over the Persian Gulf from deep inside Iranian territory.

Mountain sensor nodes offer several advantages over aerostats: natural concealment (small building or cave entrance vs. visible balloon), rock shelter hardening against all but direct precision strike, fiber optic cable downlink (zero RF emission for data transfer), and zero operating cost beyond maintenance. Estimated cost per node: $1–3M (shelter, sensor package, fiber connection, power). A network of 20–30 nodes along the Zagros and Alborz ridgelines would cost $30–90M and provide persistent, survivable, passive detection across Iran’s western and southern approaches.

The adversary’s challenge is daunting: each mountain node looks like an ordinary small structure, emits nothing, and must be individually located and struck with precision munitions. There could be hundreds of potential candidate peaks, only some of which host actual sensors. This imposes a significant ISR and strike burden on the attacker — the same cost-imposition logic that makes the passive SAM concept itself so effective.

9.4 Command Uplink Architecture

The elevated sensor layer integrates with the mobile shooter layer via a command uplink network. Aerostats and mountain nodes detect contacts (thermal signature, ESM hit) and pass bearing, estimated altitude, and signal characteristics to a ground C2 node via fiber or directional microwave link. The C2 node vectors already-airborne 358/359 patrols toward the contact, or commands a 369 carrier launch along the provided bearing. Reports of a command uplink capability on the existing 358/359 — allowing ground controllers to vector the missile toward a high-priority area — suggest this architecture is already partially implemented.

The Block 2 carrier's LPI datalink closes the loop: it transmits IIR and ESM contacts discovered during its patrol back to the battery, which can retarget the carrier, cue other shooters, or refine the ground picture. The result is a layered passive kill web: elevated sensors provide wide-area search, ground C2 provides fusion and prioritization, and mobile shooters provide prosecution. Each layer is passive, each is survivable, and none depends on any other to function — but together they are dramatically more capable than any single component.

10. Peacetime Counter-Stealth ISR Operations

The United States and Israel both maintain extensive arsenals of stealth UAVs — the US RQ-170 Sentinel (one captured by Iran in 2011), RQ-180, and likely other classified platforms — that are assessed to operate routinely over Iranian airspace in peacetime. Israel operates comparable systems. These platforms are specifically designed to defeat radar-based detection, making conventional SAMs entirely blind to them.

Passive loitering systems create a fundamentally different threat. Stealth UAVs still produce thermal signatures (engine heat, even if reduced through shaping and insulation), potential RF emissions (LPI satellite datalinks, even if tightly beamed, have sidelobes), and physical presence at predictable altitudes and ingress corridors. An elevated IIR sensor or a loitering 359RF at altitude has a non-zero probability of detecting what ground-based radar cannot see at all.

The cost-exchange logic is compelling: a \$100–200K 359RF patrol sortie threatens a \$100M+ stealth UAV platform. Even a single successful intercept — like Iran's 2011 capture of the RQ-170 — provides both intelligence value and strategic deterrent effect far exceeding the cost of thousands of patrol sorties. If 10 carriers patrol 8 hours per day across 3 likely ingress corridors, they cover thousands of square kilometers of airspace daily, creating a meaningful probability of thermal detection of a stealth UAV transiting at 10,000–15,000m within any given week.

The deterrent effect may be more valuable than actual kills. If the adversary assesses a credible risk of losing stealth ISR platforms, they are forced to alter routes (longer, less efficient coverage), increase altitude (degrading sensor resolution), reduce datalink activity (degrading intelligence take), or avoid certain areas entirely. Each of these responses degrades the adversary's intelligence capability — achieving the strategic objective without requiring a single successful intercept.

The 358/359/359RF/369 family provides a layered counter-stealth ISR capability: the 358 for low-altitude patrol over critical facilities, the 359RF for medium-altitude emitter-homing, the 369 Block 1 for extended-range intercept, and the 369 Block 2 Premium for high-altitude stealth UAV prosecution at 12,000–15,000m+. Combined with the elevated sensor network (aerostats in peacetime, mountain nodes in both peace and war), this creates a persistent counter-ISR capability that no radar-based system can replicate.

11. Proliferation and Partner Force Employment

11.1 Existing Proliferation Infrastructure

The Fath 358 is already proliferated to multiple partner forces. Examples have been seized from Houthi arms shipments (2019, 2020, 2022), found near US bases in Iraq (2021), employed by Hezbollah in Lebanon (2023–present), and now used by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq against US aircraft in the 2026 war. The proliferation logistics chain — maritime, overland, and covert — is established and operational.

The 358's design is specifically optimized for proxy employment: three-part field assembly requiring no specialized tools, rail launch from any truck or improvised mount, autonomous IR engagement with no ground radar or C2 infrastructure, and COTS components that are individually unremarkable. A small team can transport, assemble, launch, and relocate with minimal training.

11.2 359 and 359RF Proliferation

The 359 is larger and heavier than the 358, requiring a truck-mounted launcher rather than a portable rail. However, it shares the same operational simplicity: autonomous IIR engagement, no radar, no specialized ground equipment. The 359RF adds only an ESM receiver — minimal additional training. Both could follow the existing 358 proliferation path within months of entering Iranian inventory.

The geographic implications are significant. IRI forces operating 358/359 variants from western Iraq are 200–400 km closer to Gulf tanker tracks and AWACS orbits than launchers in western Iran. The Houthis in Yemen threaten aircraft operating over the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. Hezbollah in Lebanon threatens Israeli and coalition aircraft over the Eastern Mediterranean. Each partner force position extends the effective passive SAM threat zone without any increase in missile range.

11.3 369 Simplified Proxy Variant

The standard 369 requires a ground ESM/EO battery for target cueing — a level of infrastructure beyond most partner forces. However, a simplified variant can eliminate this requirement entirely.

The concept: 1–2 sealed 369 canisters mounted on a civilian truck (flatbed, cargo, or even pickup with reinforced bed). The operator receives GNSS coordinates defining a search pattern — a loiter box over a likely target area, such as a known tanker track, AWACS orbit, or ISR corridor. These coordinates can be passed by phone, encrypted message, or pre-programmed before delivery. The operator drives to a launch position, enters the GNSS coordinates, and fires. The carrier flies to the designated area, enters a loiter pattern, and its onboard passive RF seeker and captive-carry AAM's IIR seeker search for targets autonomously. If a target is detected, the carrier maneuvers to engagement geometry and releases the AAM. If no target is found within the loiter endurance, the carrier self-destructs or (if over friendly territory) deploys its recovery parachute.

This variant trades engagement probability for operational simplicity. Without ground-based ESM cueing, the carrier must find the target using only its onboard sensors and the GNSS-defined search area. This reduces Pk compared to a properly cued launch — perhaps by 30–50% — but the Pk reduction is offset by three factors:

> **Positional advantage:** Partner forces in Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon are physically closer to target orbits. A 369 Block 1 (150–200 km range) launched from Al Anbar province reaches Gulf tanker tracks that would require Block 2 range (200–300 km) from western Iran.

Volume: At $190–360K per round (R-73 variant), a partner force can launch many speculative patrols. If 1 in 3 finds and engages a target, the expected cost per engagement ($600K–1.1M) still produces extreme cost-exchange against $275M tankers or $500M AWACS.

Denial of sanctuary: Coalition tankers and AWACS currently orbit over Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf with near-impunity because Iranian missiles cannot reach them. Partner forces with 369 variants eliminate these sanctuaries, forcing support aircraft into longer, less efficient orbits or requiring fighter escort — each degrading coalition operational effectiveness.

The simplified variant requires no modification to the 369 hardware — only a software mode in the carrier's flight computer that accepts GNSS waypoints instead of ground-ESM bearings for initial routing. The carrier's onboard passive RF seeker and AAM's IIR seeker function identically regardless of how the carrier was initially pointed at the target area.

11.4 Implications for Coalition Air Operations

The proliferation of passive SAMs — from simple 358s through GNSS-programmed 369 variants — fundamentally challenges the coalition's assumption that air superiority can be established by destroying Iranian territory-based air defenses. If partner forces across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen are each operating passive SAMs independently, the coalition faces a distributed, networked threat that cannot be neutralized by striking Iran alone.

This mirrors the challenge already demonstrated by the March 12 KC-135 incident: IRI forces in western Iraq threatened (and possibly destroyed) a tanker that was operating in 'friendly airspace' hundreds of kilometers from the Iranian border. Scaling this capability with 359s, 359RFs, and simplified 369 variants would create persistent no-fly zones over areas the coalition currently considers safe — transforming the air campaign from a one-sided strike operation into a contested environment where every support aircraft sortie carries meaningful risk.

12. Conclusions and Recommendations

12.1 Core Findings

Passive SAMs defeat the Western SEAD playbook. Three successive conflicts (October 2024, June 2025, February 2026) have demonstrated that radar-emitting systems are destroyed within hours. Every passive system has survived. At Day 13 of the current war, the Fath 358 is the only air defense system producing results.

Three-tier force structure optimizes cost-to-target matching. Cheap 359RF ($100–200K) for volume UAV kills, moderate 369/Block 2 ($330–560K) for medium-range targets, expensive 369 Premium/RVV-MD2 ($530–860K) for AWACS, tankers, and fighters. The three-tier optimum ($11.9B) nearly doubles the all-Block 1 baseline ($6.3B).

The 369 Premium is the sole surviving anti-fighter capability after Day 1. Once conventional SAMs are destroyed, no other system can engage maneuvering combat aircraft. The RVV-MD2's 40G+ terminal performance, advanced IRCCM, and LOAL make the Premium battery indispensable for contesting air superiority beyond the opening hours.

Proliferation extends the threat zone beyond Iranian territory. Partner forces in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen with 358/359/369 variants create distributed, unlocatable threats along coalition flight paths. The simplified 369 proxy variant (GNSS-programmed, no ground cueing) makes carrier-launched AAM capability accessible to any partner force that can operate a truck and a phone.

Elevated passive sensors solve the detection problem. Mountain-top IIR/ESM nodes ($1–3M each) and peacetime aerostats ($5–15M each) extend detection to 200–500 km while emitting nothing.

Peacetime counter-stealth ISR is a unique capability that no radar system can replicate.

Real-world validation is definitive. The Fath 358 is the only Iranian air defense system still fighting on Day 13, achieving confirmed kills against $30M+ platforms while every radar-emitting system has been destroyed.

12.2 Recommendations

Immediate (now): Field 359RF batteries using existing 359 production with added ESM receiver modules. Field 369 Block 1 batteries with R-73 carriers. Combined near-term force: ~15 × 359RF + ~17 × Block 1 for ~$280M.

Immediate (now): Begin deploying mountain-top passive sensor nodes on Zagros and Alborz peaks. 20–30 nodes for $30–90M provides persistent, survivable detection infrastructure.

Immediate (now): Accelerate 358/359 transfers to partner forces in Iraq and Yemen. The 358's proven combat record and established logistics chain make this the fastest path to extending the passive SAM threat zone.

Mid-term (1–2 years): Develop Block 2 carrier with folding wings, wingtip interferometric ESM, and LPI datalink. Transition to three-tier force: 11 × 359RF + 5 × basic/Block 2 + 2 × premium ($194M). Develop GNSS-programmed autonomous mode for simplified partner force 369 variant.

Priority: Premium batteries. Ensure at least 2–3 premium batteries with RVV-MD2 are fielded as early as possible. These are not a luxury — they are the only system that maintains an anti-fighter/bomber capability after conventional IADS destruction. Without them, adversary combat aircraft operate with impunity after Day 1.

Peacetime: Deploy tethered aerostats ($70–200M for 10 sites) for counter-stealth ISR coverage of critical facilities. Integrate with command uplink network for cueing 358/359/369 shooters.

For Western air planners: Passive SAM proliferation — now validated in combat and demonstrated by non-state partner forces — will increasingly challenge assumptions about air superiority. Tanker and AWACS orbits over 'friendly' territory are no longer sanctuaries. Planning must account for distributed, unlocatable threats across the entire theater, not just over Iranian territory.

Changelog

Version 6.0 — 2026-03-13

Added adaptive conventional variants (Khordad 15 Adaptive, Bavar 373 Adaptive) modeling EMCON, shoot-and-scoot, offboard cueing, minimal decoy credit. Expanded Section 4 methodology to 2–3 pages with parameter descriptions, independence assumptions, target behavior, and adaptive conventional tactics (Section 4.1). Added Section 4.2 key limitations. Added Section 2.3.3 asymmetric vulnerabilities (cyber, HUMINT/sabotage, graceful degradation). Fixed Section 6 labeling: conventional rows now labeled as modeled with observed attrition (not 'actual') with explicit clarification that real-world kills were zero. All charts regenerated with 8 systems (dashed lines for adaptive variants). Code annex to follow in future version.

Version 5.5 — 2026-03-13

Fixed table row background color (#fff → #ffffff). Renamed 359+RF to 359RF throughout. Moved figure captions to bottom of page for Figures 4–10.

Version 5.4 — 2026-03-13

Restored all v5.2 text verbatim. Figures 4–10 rotated for right-side viewing with enlarged labels. Tables wrapped in KeepTogether to prevent page splits. KC-135 disclaimer softened: incident appears unlikely to be a 358 kill, but proliferation mechanism is operationally and strategically sound regardless.

Version 5.3 — 2026-03-13

WARNING: This version was produced by an unreliable assistant that deleted substantial content from Sections 2.2.6 and 2.3 without approval, directly violating instructions to preserve all v5.2 text. The assistant cannot be trusted to maintain document integrity without explicit verification. Charts were rotated incorrectly (wrong viewing direction). This version should not be used.

Version 5.2 — 2026-03-13

Updated to Day 13. KC-135 incident. Section 11: Proliferation with simplified 369 proxy variant (GNSS-programmed, no ground cueing). 358 components image.

Version 5.1 — 2026-03-13

Split exec summary tables. Block 2 LPI datalink. 369 Premium as sole anti-fighter capability. Removed VLS.

Version 5.0 — 2026-03-13

359RF variant. Three-tier optimization. Zoom climb. Booster/canister. Carrier recovery. Elevated sensor network. Counter-stealth ISR. 358/359 heritage. Revised costs.

Version 4.1 — 2026-03-09

Table styling fix. Spelled out exec summary headers.

Version 4.0 — 2026-03-09

Extended carrier range. Replaced Buk-M2E with Khordad 15.

Version 3.0 — 2026-03-09

Block 1/Block 2 carriers. Carrier illustrations.

Version 2.0–2.1 — 2026-03-09

Carrier loiter model; weight/cost corrections.

Version 1.0 — 2026-03-09

Initial release.