

Phase 2 Annex: Conversion of 2nd IBCT, 25th Infantry Division

Pacific Theater Application of the HRR Framework
Annex to HRR Concept Paper — BCTs + IAMD

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1. Purpose and Relationship to HRR Concept Paper

This annex extends the High Readiness Reserve (HRR) Vanguard Strike program to the Pacific theater by proposing the conversion of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division (2nd IBCT/25ID) from active component to HRR reserve status at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Vanguard Strike is the HRR's high-readiness maneuver program, encompassing all HRR brigade combat teams and the attached airborne battalion regardless of their parent division headquarters. The Hawaii IBCT joins the Vanguard Strike program as a 25th Infantry Division unit under USARPAC operational control, demonstrating that the program brand travels independently of the 5th Infantry Division (Red Diamond) organizational headquarters that administers both Vanguard Strike and the companion Persistent Shield IAMD program.

The conversion is designated as Phase 2 of the HRR implementation, to be initiated after the HRR framework and its initial CONUS applications have been validated through the proof-of-concept battalion and early operational capability milestones described in the parent document.

The parent HRR Concept Paper establishes the institutional framework — legislation, training model, benefits architecture, command structure, and career management provisions — upon which this annex depends. All HRR policies regarding quarterly 8-day training blocks, full TRICARE healthcare, individual training funding (TRIT), 110% authorized overmanning, active duty Full-Time Support (FTS) cadre, IDT travel as a statutory entitlement, and the USERRA employer tax credit apply to the Hawaii IBCT as described in the parent document. This annex addresses only those elements unique to or modified by the Pacific application. Section and paragraph references of the form "HRR Concept Paper Sec X" point to the parent document; unqualified section references point within this annex.

The Hawaii conversion represents the HRR's most financially compelling single-unit application. The extreme cost of permanently stationing an active IBCT in Hawaii — driven by Honolulu-rate BAH, overseas COLA, OCONUS PCS moves, and imported infrastructure costs — creates a cost differential between active and HRR stationing that exceeds the CONUS conversions by a meaningful margin. On a gross basis, the Hawaii conversion is estimated to save approximately \$435–\$507 million annually against approximately \$366 million for the CONUS IBCT conversion at Fort Johnson, a premium of roughly 19–38% (see [Section 6](#) and [Section 7](#)). This is a material advantage rather than a step change, and the case for the Hawaii application rests on the combination of that advantage with the Pacific theater access described in [Section 2](#). At the same time, the conversion raises unique strategic, political, and recruiting challenges that justify treatment as a distinct phase rather than inclusion in the initial HRR rollout.

2. Strategic Rationale

2.1 The Indo-Pacific Imperative

The 2018 National Defense Strategy and its successors identify the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater for U.S. military competition. China's continued military modernization, its assertive posture in the South and East China Seas, and the unresolved status of Taiwan create conditions in which forward-stationed, rapidly deployable ground forces in the Pacific retain deterrence value that cannot be replicated by forces rotating from CONUS. A Vanguard Strike IBCT at Schofield provides persistent Pacific presence without the cost of permanent active stationing — a critical distinction as DoD balances forward presence requirements against sustained budget pressure.

2.2 25th Infantry Division Readiness Architecture

The 25th Infantry Division is the Army's only division permanently stationed in the Pacific. Its value as a deterrent and response force depends on maintaining credible combat power at Schofield. A two-BCT division — one fully active and one Vanguard Strike HRR — preserves this deterrent value while dramatically reducing the permanent cost. The HRR IBCT is not a garrison-only formation: it maintains a continuously ready T+30 battalion and can deploy the full BCT within 90 days — a timeline consistent with most contingency scenarios that would not require immediate full-BCT response.

2.3 Pacific Partnership Value

The Vanguard Strike IBCT's training model is specifically structured around USARPAC's bilateral exercise calendar in a way no CONUS-based HRR formation can replicate. Annual Training — the 15-day event — is assigned to USARPAC exercise integration rather than garrison collective training. Each of the three maneuver battalions uses its AT for a dedicated bilateral exercise, staggered across the year on USARPAC-driven calendar dates. With approximately 10–11 days of actual exercise participation after travel, each battalion deploys as a fully participating maneuver element — not a liaison presence. The BCT therefore achieves three distinct Pacific bilateral exercise integrations per year.

This approach deliberately distinguishes the Hawaii Vanguard Strike IBCT from its CONUS counterparts, which use AT for collective BCT-level garrison training or CTC rotations. The distinction is appropriate: 2/25's PACOM-oriented identity and forward Pacific positioning create exercise access that justifies structuring the training year around it. BCT-level collective training is addressed through the BCT Common BA ([Section 5.3](#)), and the T+30 battalion's CTC rotation provides the highest-fidelity collective training event for the ready formation.

2.4 Equipment as Strategic Preposition

The conversion retains all organic equipment at Schofield Barracks. Unlike CONUS HRR conversions, where equipment is stored at the home installation and retrieved quarterly, the Hawaii IBCT's equipment constitutes a strategically positioned asset in the Pacific theater. In a crisis, the T+30 battalion can draw from fully maintained, theater-positioned equipment rather than staging from CONUS. Over time, as the HRR model matures, there is an option to pre-position a subset of equipment at PTA to eliminate inter-island movement for individual BAs — further reducing logistics overhead while keeping the primary equipment set at Schofield for contingency response.

2.5 T+30 Mobilization Logistics

The T+30 readiness designation for the ready battalion requires honest treatment of Pacific transit time. Commercial and military airlift from the U.S. mainland to Oahu typically adds 12–18 hours of travel time compared to a CONUS-based unit. For a Hawaii-stationed unit, the effective deployment timeline is T+30 from order to feet-dry at a Pacific theater destination, accounting for the inter-island movement to Honolulu, commercial or USAF airlift to theater, and in-theater RSOI. In practice, a Hawaii-based T+30 battalion reaches a Western Pacific

destination 24–48 hours faster than a CONUS-equivalent — a net advantage for the Pacific application.

2.6 PTA Land Use and Community Engagement

Pohakuloa Training Area is the Army's largest maneuver area in the Pacific, and its use for Vanguard Strike training will increase under this concept. PTA has been the subject of ongoing community and environmental concerns, including native Hawaiian sacred site access and unexploded ordnance issues. The annex implementation strategy should include proactive community engagement with Big Island stakeholders, transparent communication of the training increase, and investment in PTA environmental stewardship as part of the Hawaii Military Infrastructure Reinvestment Program. These concerns are manageable but require deliberate attention; they are not a reason to forego PTA use.

2.7 Theater Exercise Integration

USARPAC's annual exercise calendar includes a robust portfolio of bilateral and multilateral exercises: RIMPAC, Balikatan (Philippines), Garuda Shield (Indonesia), Orient Shield (Japan), Saber Strike, and others. The Vanguard Strike IBCT's staggered BA model assigns each maneuver battalion to one of these exercises for its exercise-integration BA, ensuring the BCT participates as a genuine maneuver element — not as observers — in three separate bilateral exercises per year. This integration is coordinated 12–18 months in advance through the USARPAC J7 exercise planning cycle.

2.8 Force Design: IBCT vs. SBCT

The 2nd IBCT converts from active component to Vanguard Strike reserve status as a light infantry BCT. The 25th ID converted from SBCT to IBCT in 2015–2016, citing the strategic shift toward lighter, more rapidly deployable forces in the Pacific, simplified logistics, and the prohibitive cost of transporting Stryker vehicles across the Pacific for exercises. The same considerations that drove the active component conversion apply here: light infantry is the right force design for the Hawaii Pacific partnership and contingency response mission.

The HRR model does improve one of the original arguments against SBCT in Hawaii — quarterly 8-day drill blocks provide significantly more continuous Stryker crew training than traditional reserve weekends, potentially making Stryker proficiency maintainable. However, vehicle availability remains the binding constraint. Should a future Army decision make additional Stryker vehicles available, the question of whether they would generate greater value at Schofield (Pacific logistics advantages) or at Fort Johnson (proximity to JRTC for Stryker certification, CONUS logistics) should be evaluated at that time. This annex proceeds on the basis of an IBCT conversion, but the infrastructure at Schofield and PTA should be designed to accommodate a future SBCT if warranted.

3. Force Structure and Unit Lineage

3.1 Conversion of 2nd IBCT, 25th Infantry Division

The 2nd IBCT, 25th Infantry Division converts from active component to Vanguard Strike HRR reserve status as a complete brigade combat team. The BCT retains its Schofield Barracks stationing, its organic equipment, and its subordinate battalion structure. The conversion follows the same organizational template as the CONUS Vanguard Strike IBCT (at Fort Johnson), with the modifications for Pacific-specific command relationships described in [Section 4](#).

Post-conversion, the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks comprises the Division headquarters, the active 3rd IBCT, the Vanguard Strike 2nd IBCT, Division Artillery, the Division Sustainment Brigade, and the Combat Aviation Brigade. The 25th ID retains its status as a deployable two-BCT division, with the HRR IBCT available at T+30 (one battalion) or T+90 (full BCT) for contingency deployment.

3.2 Redesignation of the 100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry

One of the 2nd IBCT's infantry battalions is redesignated as the 100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry Regiment, restoring this storied lineage to a maneuver combat role for the first time in decades. The 100th Battalion/442nd Infantry is currently a USAR unit under the 9th Mission Support Command at Fort Shafter, organized as a training and support battalion rather than a maneuver formation. Redesignation within the Vanguard Strike IBCT reactivates the 442nd as a fighting infantry battalion — an outcome with profound symbolic and recruiting significance.

The 442nd Regimental Combat Team is the most decorated unit of its size in U.S. Army history, earning its reputation in the European Theater during World War II with a force composed predominantly of Japanese-American soldiers. Reactivating the 100th/442nd as a combat maneuver battalion within the Vanguard Strike IBCT directly serves the unit's legacy, provides a powerful recruiting hook for Japanese-American, Pacific Islander, and Asian-American communities on the West Coast and in Hawaii, and gives the Hawaii congressional delegation a compelling affirmative narrative for the conversion.

3.3 BCT Structure

The 2nd IBCT (Vanguard Strike) retains its standard IBCT structure under the current BCT design: three infantry battalions (one of which is redesignated as 100th/442nd IN), a cavalry squadron (reconnaissance), a fires battalion, a brigade engineer battalion (BEB), and a brigade support battalion (BSB). This is seven battalion-level organizations, matching the structure assumed by the FTS command model in the parent document (HRR Concept Paper Sec 6.3) and reflected in [Section 9.3](#) of this annex.

Earlier versions of this annex described the brigade as containing a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) encompassing signal, military intelligence, and military police elements, alongside a separate engineer battalion and no fires battalion. That description reflected the pre-2014 BCT design and is superseded. Under the BCT redesign implemented across the Army between 2014 and 2016, the BSTB was inactivated and its signal and military intelligence functions were absorbed into the newly constituted brigade engineer battalion, which combines engineer, signal, and military intelligence companies under a single headquarters. Military police support is provided from division and above rather than organically. The fires battalion has been organic to the IBCT throughout and was omitted in error from prior versions. All subordinate units convert to HRR reserve status simultaneously with the brigade headquarters.

3.4 Impact on 9th Mission Support Command

The current 100th Battalion/442nd Infantry, organized as a USAR training and support battalion under the 9th MSC, will be redesignated and absorbed into the Vanguard Strike IBCT structure. This eliminates a unit from the

9th MSC's order of battle. Planners should address this impact during concept development. Options include assigning a replacement training or support unit to the 9th MSC, redistributing the 442nd's current support mission to other 9th MSC elements, or accepting the smaller footprint as consistent with the 9th MSC's evolving mission set. Regardless of the specific solution, the 9th MSC commander should be engaged early in the planning process to avoid the perception that the unit was simply taken without consideration for the impact on the broader USAR presence in Hawaii.

The 9th MSC also acquires a continuing role under the conversion. Locally resident non-HRR Selected Reserve soldiers are the standing default source for recurring battle assembly support billets under the operational support ADOS mechanism (HRR Concept Paper Sec 15.2), and the 9th MSC is the principal pool of such soldiers in Hawaii. This gives the command a recurring, funded operational relationship with the Vanguard Strike IBCT that partially offsets the loss of the 442nd from its order of battle. Equipment movement sourcing is addressed at [Section 5.6](#).

4. Command Relationships

4.1 Dual Reporting Structure

The 2nd IBCT (Vanguard Strike) operates under a split command relationship that leverages both the HRR Division's institutional management expertise and the Pacific theater's operational authority.

Administrative Control (ADCON):

The HRR Division headquarters at Fort Knox retains administrative control of the 2nd IBCT (Vanguard Strike), exercised through the Assistant Division Commander — Vanguard Strike (ADC–Vanguard Strike, informally ADC–Maneuver), a brigadier general headquartered at Fort Liberty, North Carolina. ADCON encompasses all elements that define the HRR as an institutional model: training standards and readiness certification, personnel management and career development policy, benefits administration (TRICARE, TRIT, IDT travel), FTS cadre management and rotation, recruiting standards, and readiness reporting. ADCON through the HRR Division ensures the Hawaii IBCT maintains the same training rigor, readiness culture, and institutional standards as the CONUS Vanguard Strike BCTs, preventing drift toward either a standard USAR posture or an ad hoc active-reserve hybrid. The ADC–Vanguard Strike's regular travel to Hawaii for ADCON oversight is anticipated in the parent document's senior leader travel framework (HRR Concept Paper Sec 6.5), and the ADC is also the approval authority for external ADOS and mobilization requests from Hawaii IBCT soldiers as described at [Section 9.5](#).

Operational Control (OPCON):

Operational control runs through the standard Pacific chain: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) as the geographic combatant command, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) as the Army Service Component Command, I Corps as the intermediate tactical headquarters, and the 25th Infantry Division as the immediate higher tactical headquarters. The 2nd IBCT (Vanguard Strike) is OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division within that chain for theater employment. This includes integration into Pacific theater exercise programs, contingency planning and deployment tasking, bilateral and multilateral exercise participation, and alignment of training scenarios to Pacific-specific operational requirements (jungle warfare, island defense, large-scale combat operations in the First Island Chain, humanitarian assistance/disaster response). OPCON ensures the Hawaii IBCT trains to the missions it would actually execute rather than following a generic FORSCOM training template.

This OPCON/ADCON split is the same architecture the HRR Airborne Battalion uses with the 82nd Airborne Division, extended to a second parent headquarters (HRR Concept Paper Sec 25.1). The formation fights as part of the 25th ID's INDOPACOM mission while the HRR Division owns the institutional support that makes it a Vanguard Strike unit.

4.2 Relationship to 25th Infantry Division

As the immediate higher tactical headquarters in the OPCON chain described at [Section 4.1](#), the 25th Infantry Division exercises operational control of the 2nd IBCT (Vanguard Strike) and retains the 2nd IBCT in its order of battle. The 25th ID commanding general directs the brigade's operational training on Oahu, controls Schofield range scheduling, integrates the HRR brigade into division training cycles alongside the active 3rd IBCT, and employs the brigade or its T+30 battalion in division-level operations and contingencies.

The division's authority is operational rather than institutional. Readiness certification, benefits administration, FTS cadre management, personnel policy, and the training model itself remain with the HRR Division through the ADC–Vanguard Strike. The practical boundary is that the 25th ID CG determines what the brigade trains on and when it deploys, while the HRR Division determines how the brigade is manned, resourced, and certified. Where a division training requirement would conflict with the HRR training model — for example, a tasking that would fragment an 8-day battle assembly or displace a scheduled PTA rotation — resolution runs from the 25th ID CG to

the HRR Division commanding general, not to the brigade commander.

A formal support agreement between the 25th ID and the HRR Division should delineate installation support responsibilities, range allocation processes, garrison support to a formation whose soldiers are present only during drill periods, and the specific conditions and notification timelines under which the 25th ID CG can direct HRR IBCT training or employment in support of division-level requirements.

4.3 USARPAC LNO

A USARPAC Liaison Officer (LNO) is assigned to the 5th Infantry Division (HRR Division HQ) with a specific portfolio covering the Hawaii Vanguard Strike IBCT. This LNO coordinates the annual exercise calendar deconfliction, manages the battalion AT exercise slots in USARPAC's J7 planning cycle, serves as the interface between HRR Division institutional requirements and USARPAC operational requirements, and facilitates theater-specific training support (OPFOR, exercise terrain, partner nation coordination). The LNO position is funded from USARPAC's operating budget as part of the cost of maintaining a theater-available HRR formation in the Pacific.

4.4 Time Zone Management

The Hawaii Standard Time zone (UTC-10) creates a 5-6 hour offset from the HRR Division headquarters at Fort Knox (Eastern Time). This offset is manageable with deliberate scheduling: morning meetings in Hawaii fall in the early afternoon at Fort Knox, and routine administrative coordination can be accomplished within overlapping business hours. The FTS cadre at Schofield handles day-to-day operational coordination with the 25th ID and USARPAC (same island, no offset), reducing the frequency of Fort Knox interface required. West Coast recruits and soldiers — who will constitute a significant portion of the non-Hawaii HRR IBCT population — benefit from a 2-3 hour time zone advantage over East Coast-based units when coordinating with Schofield.

5. Training Area Logistics: Schofield and PTA

The Hawaii Vanguard Strike IBCT conducts three Battalion Assemblies (BAs) and one Annual Training (AT) per year — 39 total duty days, matching the standard HRR BCT schedule in the parent document (HRR Concept Paper Sec 11.1). BAs are staggered by battalion so that at most one battalion (or the BCT headquarters element) is assembled at Schofield or Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA) in any given month. Annual Training is not a collective BCT event; each battalion uses its 15-day AT for a dedicated USARPAC bilateral exercise, staggered across the calendar year. The BCT therefore never fully assembles during AT. The sole BCT-wide assembly event is the BCT Common BA, one of the three annual BAs, which is conducted as a distributed operation with elements split across PTA and Schofield simultaneously.

5.1 Annual Training Structure per Battalion

Each battalion executes the following four events annually (three BAs plus AT):

Event	Duration	Location	Assembly Size	Primary Training Focus
BA1 — Installation Training	8 days	Schofield Barracks	~800–1,000 (1 BN)	Individual and crew-level skills, company collective training, weapons qualification, equipment maintenance. Staggered by BN.
BA2 — BN Field Training (PTA)	8 days	PTA (Big Island) via Kona direct; close-out at Schofield	~800–1,000 (1 BN)	Battalion-level FTX at PTA. All three BNs rotate through PTA on staggered dates — guaranteeing every BN at least one PTA event per year.
BCT Common BA	8 days	Split: some BNs at PTA, some at Schofield simultaneously	~4,000 (Full BCT, split)	BCT-level distributed C2 training. Staffs coordinate in real-time across split locations. Summer scheduling preferred (HRR-controlled calendar).
AT — Annual Training	15 days	USARPAC bilateral exercise site (BN-assigned); staggered by BN	~800–1,000 (1 BN deployed)	Pacific bilateral exercise integration. ~10–11 days actual participation after travel. BCT never fully assembles during AT.

Total annual duty days: 39 (24 from three 8-day BAs + 15 from AT). The BCT Common BA is the only event where the full BCT is simultaneously active — but it is physically distributed, not co-located. AT is staggered by battalion, with each BN deploying to its assigned exercise at different points in the year.

5.2 BA2: Battalion Field Training at PTA

BA2 sends every maneuver battalion to PTA for an 8-day field training exercise, staggered so no two battalions are on the Big Island simultaneously. This guarantees every battalion at least one genuine field training event at PTA per year. Battalions assigned to PTA for the BCT Common BA receive a second PTA event that year; this is an intentional feature of the model, not an inconsistency — those battalions accumulate additional field training exposure appropriate to their position in the readiness rotation.

Personnel routing for BA2 is consistent across all three battalions: soldiers fly directly to Kona International Airport (KOA) on the Big Island, bypassing Schofield entirely. Multiple airlines operate direct service from West Coast hubs (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle) to Kona; where a Honolulu connection is required, soldiers transfer at Daniel K. Inouye International without ground transit to Schofield. GOV transport from KOA to PTA takes approximately 45 minutes. In-state soldiers (~400–500) fly inter-island from Honolulu to Kona (\$80–\$150 one-way, 45 minutes).

The operational flow: fly to KOA → GOV movement to PTA → 6 days sustained field operations → movement to Schofield on Day 7 → AAR, equipment turn-in, and outprocessing at Schofield on Day 8 → depart for home stations.

5.3 BCT Common BA: Distributed Collective Training

The BCT Common BA is the formation’s primary collective training event outside of AT. Rather than assembling the full BCT at a single location — which would replicate the logistics burden of AT without the AT timeline — the Common BA is deliberately designed as a distributed operation. Some battalions train at PTA; others train at Schofield. The BCT headquarters and subordinate staffs coordinate in real-time across the split, exercising the command and control skills the BCT would need in a distributed contingency response.

The specific split — which battalions go to PTA vs. Schofield — is determined annually based on readiness rotation (the T+30 battalion may warrant PTA for higher-fidelity training), range availability, and the desire to vary which battalions receive a second PTA event in a given year. A representative split assigns one or two battalions to PTA and the remainder to Schofield, with the BCT headquarters conducting split-based C2 from Schofield.

Summer scheduling preference: Unlike AT, whose dates are driven by USARPAC’s bilateral exercise calendar, the BCT Common BA is entirely under HRR control. The default planning preference is to schedule the Common BA during the summer window (June–August) to minimize disruption for soldiers with school-age children. This preference should be treated as a planning principle, not a binding constraint — range availability and other formation scheduling needs may require adjustment in a given year.

5.4 Annual Training: USARPAC Exercise Integration

Annual Training is assigned to USARPAC bilateral exercise integration rather than garrison collective training — a deliberate distinction from CONUS Vanguard Strike BCTs. Each maneuver battalion uses its 15-day AT for a dedicated exercise, staggered across the year on USARPAC-calendar-driven dates. With approximately 2 days of travel each way, each battalion achieves 10–11 days of actual exercise participation — sufficient for genuine maneuver element integration from start to culminating event.

Battalion	Assigned Exercise	Host Nation	Approx. AT Window	Routing Model
1/27 IN (Wolfhounds)	Exercise BALIKATAN	Republic of the Philippines	Apr–May	Option A: Stage at Schofield D-1/D-2, deploy MNL/Clark direct
100th/442nd IN	Exercise GARUDA SHIELD	Republic of Indonesia	Jun–Jul	Option C: Fly HNL→CGK/BPN direct; advance party at Schofield D-3
1/21 IN (Gimlets)	Exercise ORIENT SHIELD	Japan (GSDF co-host)	Aug–Sep	Option A: Stage at Schofield D-1/D-2, deploy NRT/CTS forward

AT routing: For exercises north or west of Hawaii (Japan, Korea, Philippines, Guam), Option A is preferred — stage at Schofield for 1–2 days, then deploy forward as a tactical movement. For exercises south or east of Hawaii or in the Indian Ocean basin (Indonesia, Australia, Thailand), Option C — direct fly-in with a 15–20 person advance party at Schofield three days prior — eliminates unnecessary Pacific transit. The USARPAC LNO determines routing during the 12–18 month exercise planning cycle.

AT exercise dates are locked no later than the n-18 month planning cycle. The USARPAC LNO assigned to 5th ID coordinates Hawaii IBCT exercise slots and prevents crowding-out by active component units. Because AT windows are calendar-driven by USARPAC, soldiers should expect AT dates to vary year-to-year and to fall outside the summer window in some years.

5.5 Representative Annual Calendar

The table below illustrates a representative stagger across the training year. At most one battalion is at Schofield or PTA for a BA in any given month. The BCT Common BA is the sole event where the full BCT is simultaneously active (though split across locations).

Formation	Q1 (Jan–Mar)	Q2 (Apr–Jun)	Q3 (Jul–Sep)	Q4 (Oct–Nov)
1/27 IN (Wolfhounds)	BA1 Schofield (Jan)	AT BALIKATAN Philippines (Apr–May)	BA2 PTA (Jul)	BCT Common BA PTA or Schofield (Oct–Nov)
100th/442nd IN	BA1 Schofield (Feb)	BA2 PTA (May)	AT GARUDA SHIELD Indonesia (Jun–Jul)	BCT Common BA PTA or Schofield (Oct–Nov)
1/21 IN (Gimlets)	BA1 Schofield (Mar)	BCT Common BA PTA or Schofield (Jun — summer pref.)	AT ORIENT SHIELD Japan (Aug–Sep)	BA2 PTA (Nov)
BCT HQ / Cav Sqn	Indep BA Schofield (Feb–Mar)	BCT Common BA SCH (C2 node) (Jun — summer pref.)	Indep BA Schofield (Sep)	Indep BA Schofield/PTA (Nov)
Max simultaneous strength at Schofield/PTA	~800–1,000 (1 BN)	~800–1,000 (1 BN at SCH or PTA; 1 BN deployed for AT)	~800–1,000 (1 BN at PTA; 1 BN deployed for AT)	~4,000 during Common BA (split SCH + PTA) otherwise ~800–1,000

The Common BA summer preference is reflected here for 1/21 IN and BCT HQ (June). Wolfhounds and 100th/442nd draw a fall Common BA in this illustration because their AT windows occupy the summer. This tradeoff is acceptable — the summer preference is a planning principle, not a guarantee, and AT exercise participation takes scheduling priority as a USARPAC-calendar-driven event.

5.6 Equipment Pre-Positioning for PTA

PTA field training exercises require vehicles, crew-served weapons, communications equipment, and sustainment stocks normally stored at Schofield. Because BA2 and the PTA element of the BCT Common BA each move only one battalion's equipment at a time, the per-event logistics burden is significantly lower than a full-BCT simultaneous model. Equipment movement to PTA is tiered across five sourcing options:

- Tier 1 — Locally sourced personnel on operational support ADOS:** On-island soldiers transport vehicles and equipment from Schofield to the inter-island barge or USAF airlift staging area, and receive and stage equipment on the Big Island. Two sourcing streams apply, consistent with the operational support ADOS framework in the parent document (HRR Concept Paper Sec 15.2.4). First, Hawaii-resident HRR soldiers assigned to the formation may volunteer for early-arrival ADOS ahead of the battle assembly; their travel is already funded under the IDT travel entitlement, so the incremental cost is duty pay and lodging alone. Second, locally resident non-HRR Selected Reserve soldiers — principally from 9th MSC units and the Hawaii Army National Guard — may fill support billets and drive in, avoiding air travel entirely. This is the cheapest option and the standing default. **Hawaii exception to the standard ADOS window:** the parent document scopes early-arrival ADOS to approximately two to three days ahead of the battle assembly, which is sufficient for arms room, motor pool, and reception tasks at a CONUS installation. Inter-island barge movement requires a 3–5 day lead time, so loading at Oahu must begin before that window opens. Equipment movement ADOS for the Hawaii IBCT should therefore be written for approximately 7–10 days bracketing the barge cycle rather than the 2–3 day CONUS norm. Where a longer ADOS period is not available, the locally resident non-HRR sourcing stream carries the loading task, since it is not constrained by the drill calendar.

- **Tier 2 — Commercial barge (default):** Young Brothers inter-island barge service provides reliable, inexpensive vehicle transport from Oahu to Kawaihae or Hilo. Lead time 3–5 days. Primary workhorse for routine BA2 and BCT Common BA equipment movement.
- **Tier 3 — 3rd IBCT equipment support:** Active 3rd IBCT provides equipment loans or augmentation for surge or short-notice requirements per the 25th ID support agreement. Reserved for contingency use, not routine drills.
- **Tier 4 — USAF C-130/C-17 from Hickam to Bradshaw AAF:** Fastest equipment movement; serves as a training multiplier for tactical airlift integration. Bradshaw AAF is co-located with PTA. Availability opportunistic; supplements Tier 2, does not replace it.
- **Tier 5 — Navy EPF (opportunistic):** Roll-on/roll-off from Pearl Harbor to Kawaihae when an Expeditionary Fast Transport is available. Valuable joint integration exercise; plan as a bonus, not a dependency.

Long-term option: Pre-position a battalion-equivalent training set permanently at PTA. Soldiers fly KOA direct and draw equipment on-site; inter-island barge movement is reserved for the BCT Common BA PTA element and contingency requirements. This option also removes the Tier 1 ADOS timing constraint described above.

5.7 PTA Billeting and Sustainment

PTA's billeting capacity accommodates a battalion-sized element for individual BA2 events without constraint. The PTA element of the BCT Common BA may involve one or two battalions simultaneously, requiring advance coordination with PTA garrison for range sequencing and billeting. Because the BCT Common BA is HRR-calendar-controlled, this coordination can be planned well in advance. Schofield's barracks capacity constraints are effectively eliminated for non-Common-BA events — the installation never hosts more than one battalion at a time for BA1 or BA2.

6. Comparative Cost Analysis

Cost figures in this section are derived from the bottom-up model in the parent document (HRR Concept Paper Sec 22) and are stated on the same basis, so that the Hawaii conversion can be compared directly against the CONUS conversions. Both gross and net figures are presented: gross savings are the difference between the active and HRR operating costs of the formation, while net savings additionally deduct the Hawaii Military Infrastructure Reinvestment Program described at [Section 8.4](#). The parent document's CONUS figures are gross; comparisons in [Section 7](#) are made gross-to-gross.

6.1 Cost Drivers Unique to Hawaii

Permanently stationing an active IBCT at Schofield Barracks incurs cost premiums that have no CONUS equivalent. Honolulu-rate Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) exceeds comparable CONUS installations by \$1,500–\$2,500 per month for a married E-5 to O-3. Overseas Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) adds approximately 30–50% above the CONUS baseline for most pay grades. OCONUS Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves cost \$15,000–30,000 per family, and the 25th ID's operational tempo generates frequent turnovers. The combination of BAH, COLA, PCS, and higher construction/infrastructure import costs produces a per-soldier cost premium of approximately \$25,000–40,000 annually over a CONUS equivalent.

6.2 Derivation of the Hawaii Cost Baseline

The parent document costs a CONUS IBCT conversion at Fort Johnson as follows: \$616 million to operate the formation as an active BCT, \$250 million to operate it as an HRR BCT, for gross annual savings of \$366 million (HRR Concept Paper Sec 22.2). The Hawaii figures are built by applying the Hawaii premium to both sides of that comparison.

Active side. Applying the \$25,000–\$40,000 per-soldier Hawaii premium to the approximately 4,200 soldiers of the active 2nd IBCT adds \$105–\$168 million to the \$616 million CONUS active baseline, producing an active Hawaii IBCT cost of approximately \$721–\$784 million.

HRR side. The \$250 million CONUS HRR baseline rises on two counts. IDT travel costs more from the mainland to Hawaii than to Fort Johnson, adding approximately \$10 million annually above the CONUS travel baseline. More significantly, the FTS cadre remains on active duty and therefore continues to draw the Hawaii premium. At the parent document's manning density of approximately 660 FTS per IBCT (HRR Concept Paper Sec 6.2), the FTS OCONUS premium adds approximately \$17–\$26 million. Total HRR Hawaii operating cost is therefore approximately \$277–\$286 million.

Scenario	Active Cost	HRR Cost	Gross Savings	Reinvestment (Yr 1–5)	Net Savings (Yr 1–5)
Low	\$721M	\$286M	\$435M	\$100M	\$335M
Base	\$752M	\$282M	\$470M	\$100M	\$370M
High	\$784M	\$277M	\$507M	\$100M	\$407M

The low scenario assumes the bottom of the premium range on the active side and the top of the cost range on the HRR side; the high scenario reverses both. The base scenario uses midpoints. Gross annual savings are therefore approximately **\$435–\$507 million**.

Net savings depend on the reinvestment program schedule. During the first five years, the reinvestment program runs at \$100 million per year, producing net savings of approximately **\$335–\$407 million**. From year six onward the program drops to a \$10 million per year ongoing maintenance allocation, and net savings rise to approximately **\$425–\$497 million**, converging toward the gross figure.

These estimates reflect the elimination of active duty BAH, COLA, and OCONUS PCS costs for the part-time portion of the formation, offset by IDT travel (averaging \$1,400–\$2,000 per soldier per BA event for mainland soldiers), FTS cadre compensation for approximately 660 active duty billets retained at Schofield, and the reinvestment program.

Prior versions. Versions 2.0 through 5.1 of this annex stated a \$310–\$390 million savings range. That range was not derived from the parent document's bottom-up model, did not state whether it was gross or net of the reinvestment program, and assumed an FTS cadre of 200–250 rather than the approximately 660 in the parent manning table. The figures above supersede it.

6.3 Staggered BA Model: Cost Implications

The staggered BA model ([Section 5](#)) reduces per-event travel costs relative to a simultaneous full-BCT assembly model. Booking 800 commercial airline seats is significantly easier than 4,000 and far less likely to trigger charter pricing or exhaust available inventory on Hawaii routes. Aggregate annual IDT travel costs should be modeled against the staggered baseline, not a hypothetical simultaneous-BCT baseline. The directional improvement in travel cost is unambiguous; exact savings require DTMO rate analysis.

7. Hawaii vs. CONUS Conversion: Key Differences

The Hawaii application of the Vanguard Strike model differs from CONUS conversions in several material respects. The comparison table below summarizes the most significant differences. Savings figures are stated gross on both sides for comparability, per [Section 6](#).

Factor	CONUS Vanguard Strike IBCT (e.g., Fort Johnson)	Hawaii Vanguard Strike IBCT (Schofield Barracks)
Annual savings (gross, estimated)	\$366M (\$616M active less \$250M HRR, per parent document)	\$435–\$507M (\$721–\$784M active less \$277–\$286M HRR); \$335–\$407M net of reinvestment in years 1–5
BA structure	3 BAs at home installation; 1 AT (typically JRTC or NTC rotation)	BA1 Schofield (individual skills); BA2 PTA staggered by BN (all BNs guaranteed field training); BCT Common BA (distributed C2, split PTA/Schofield); AT = USARPAC exercise, staggered by BN.
USARPAC exercise integration	Possible but requires CONUS-to-Pacific airlift; 1 exercise per year if resourced	3 exercises/year via AT (one per maneuver BN, staggered); 15-day AT provides ~10–11 days actual participation; inherent to training model
Inter-island logistics	N/A	Required for BA2 (1 BN, staggered) and BCT Common BA PTA element; tiered 5-option model; manageable at battalion scale per event
Equipment pre-positioning	Stored at home installation; no theater value between drills	Pacific-theater-positioned; strategic asset for contingency response independent of drill cycle
Recruiting pool	National; some regional concentration near installation	Hawaii in-state (~10%); West Coast (largest pool); Pacific diaspora communities; 442nd lineage draw
PTA field training access	N/A	Every BN guaranteed at least 1 PTA event/year (BA2); some BNs receive 2 (BA2 + BCT Common BA PTA element); exclusive large-maneuver-area unavailable at CONUS
HIARNG deconfliction	Standard ARNG coordination for shared ranges	Schofield and PTA ranges shared with HIARNG; staggered BA minimizes conflicts vs. full BCT simultaneous model
Higher tactical HQ	HRR Division; FORSCOM for force generation	OPCON through INDOPACOM > USARPAC > I Corps > 25th ID; ADCON to HRR Division via ADC–Vanguard Strike
SBCT future option	Fort Johnson well-positioned for SBCT if vehicles available	IBCT retained as baseline; future SBCT contingent on vehicle availability and strategic reassessment

8. Economic Impact on Oahu

8.1 Net Economic Effect

Converting the 2nd IBCT from active to HRR status removes approximately 4,200 active duty soldiers and their dependents from permanent Oahu residence — an estimated 10,000–14,000 people. This will have a measurable economic effect on the Oahu economy, which is significantly dependent on military spending. The analysis must be honest: there will be a negative near-term impact on certain sectors (off-post retail, some service businesses, some civilian employment on-post) that cannot be fully offset.

The recurring visitor spend from HRR soldiers partially offsets this, but the offset is smaller than a simple event count suggests, and prior versions of this annex overstated it. HRR soldiers participate in four events per year (three BAs plus AT), but under the training model at [Section 5](#) only one of those events places the soldier on Oahu for its full duration. BA1 is the sole full-length Oahu event. BA2 routes soldiers directly to Kona and returns to Schofield only for a two-day close-out. The BCT Common BA splits the formation, so in any given year roughly half to two-thirds of the brigade spends that event on the Big Island rather than Oahu. Annual Training is conducted at a USARPAC exercise site overseas, with only the Option A battalions staging at Schofield for one to two days in transit and the Option C battalion bypassing Oahu almost entirely.

A realistic estimate of Oahu presence is therefore on the order of one full eight-day event plus roughly four to six additional days of transit and close-out per soldier per year, against a baseline of year-round residence. Aggregate visitor-days remain substantial in absolute terms across a formation of this size, and the spending pattern resembles a recurring military exercise rather than a permanent population. But the economic model should be built on the actual Oahu-presence figures above rather than on four full events, and it should account separately for the Big Island spend at PTA, which represents a transfer of economic activity from Oahu to Hawaii County rather than a net loss to the state.

8.2 Oahu Housing Market

Oahu's housing market is among the most expensive and constrained in the United States, driven by a combination of limited land area, high demand, and construction costs. Permanently removing 10,000–14,000 military-affiliated residents from the market will provide meaningful relief to Oahu housing prices and rental inventory. For local families who have been priced out of neighborhoods near Schofield, Wheeler, and the North Shore, this represents a tangible quality-of-life improvement. The on-post privatized housing at Schofield could be repurposed for the remaining active units' families, reducing the off-post BAH draw of the 3rd IBCT and further softening the civilian market impact.

8.3 Infrastructure Strain Reduction

Oahu's roads, water systems, and public services operate under significant capacity pressure. Removing 10,000–14,000 residents reduces traffic congestion, water consumption, and public service demand. These are diffuse benefits but are real and accrue to all Oahu residents.

8.4 Hawaii Military Infrastructure Reinvestment Program

A portion of the conversion savings should be structured as a dedicated reinvestment program for Hawaii military infrastructure, providing a tangible benefit to the state that partially offsets the economic displacement effect. The recommended baseline is \$100 million per year for five years, with a \$10 million per year ongoing maintenance allocation thereafter. The ceiling for Congressional negotiation purposes is \$200 million per year. Investments should prioritize: PTA range infrastructure and environmental stewardship, Schofield Barracks modernization for remaining active forces, HIARNG facility improvements (Guard alignment strategy), and transition assistance for affected civilian employees. The effect of this program on net savings is quantified at [Section 6.2](#).

8.5 Phased Transition

The economic impact is softened by the phased implementation timeline described in [Section 10](#). The conversion occurs over approximately two years, with soldiers PCSing out on their normal rotation cycles rather than departing en masse. This allows the local economy to adjust gradually rather than absorbing a sudden shock.

8.6 Congressional Engagement

The Hawaii congressional delegation will scrutinize this conversion intensely, and their concerns are legitimate. The engagement strategy must lead with the reactivation of the 442nd as a combat infantry battalion — a story with deep emotional resonance in Hawaii. It must present housing market relief as a benefit to Hawaii residents, not as an afterthought. It should emphasize that the 25th ID headquarters and the majority of Schofield's military population remain in place. The Hawaii Military Infrastructure Reinvestment Program gives legislators a concrete deliverable to bring home. The conversion should not be presented as a budget cut but as a strategic reinvestment of savings into Pacific readiness. Note that the conversion requires affirmative congressional authorization in any case, per [Section 10.1](#), so delegation engagement is a prerequisite rather than a courtesy.

9. Recruiting and Manning

9.1 Recruiting Population

The Hawaii Vanguard Strike IBCT draws from a geographically distinctive recruiting pool. The combination of the 442nd lineage, Pacific cultural identity, and West Coast proximity creates recruiting advantages unavailable to CONUS Vanguard Strike BCTs.

- **Hawaii in-state (~10% of strength):** Current and former 25th ID soldiers who choose to remain in Hawaii after their active service, Hawaii Army National Guard members who prefer the HRR benefits package and training intensity, and local community members with military interest. The 442nd redesignation provides a specific draw for Japanese-American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander communities in the state.
- **West Coast (largest pool):** California, Washington, Oregon, and Nevada provide a large pool of veterans and prior-service soldiers within a 5–6 hour flight of Honolulu. The West Coast has significant Japanese-American, Filipino-American, Korean-American, and Pacific Islander communities for whom the 442nd designation carries cultural meaning. The time zone advantage (2–3 hours) relative to East Coast-based units simplifies coordination with Schofield.
- **Pacific diaspora communities:** The Vanguard Strike IBCT's annual exercise integration in the Philippines (Balikatan), Indonesia (Garuda Shield), and Japan (Orient Shield) has recruiting appeal for Filipino-American, Indonesian-American, and Japanese-American veterans and prior-service soldiers who have cultural or family connections to those theaters.
- **Adventure and Pacific identity:** The Hawaii application offers a training environment and career experience genuinely unavailable elsewhere in the reserve component: field training at PTA, bilateral exercises in the Pacific, and a culturally distinctive unit identity. These factors appeal to a segment of recruits for whom the unique experience is itself a draw.

9.2 Manning Model

The HRR manning model (110% authorized strength, aggressive individual training funding, full TRICARE, IDT travel as statutory entitlement) applies to the Hawaii IBCT without modification. The primary manning risk specific to Hawaii is the higher cost of IDT travel — mainland soldiers traveling to Schofield will incur \$1,400–\$2,000 in airfare per BA event. This is addressed through the statutory IDT travel entitlement in the parent HRR legislation; it should not be treated as a discretionary cost subject to annual appropriations variability.

The in-state population (~400–500 soldiers) faces no travel burden for Schofield-based BAs. For BA2 (PTA) and the BCT Common BA, in-state soldiers incur inter-island travel costs of \$80–\$150 per event — trivial relative to the mainland soldier's travel costs.

9.3 FTS Cadre Manning

The FTS cadre at Schofield numbers approximately 660 active duty personnel, consistent with the notional manning density for an IBCT in the parent document (HRR Concept Paper Sec 6.2). This includes the full set of seven permanent FTS executive officer positions per the parent FTS command structure: the three maneuver battalion XOs, the cavalry squadron XO, the fires battalion XO, the brigade engineer battalion XO, and the BSB XO — with the BSB XO as arguably the most critical enabler position, as the BSB manages the sustainment readiness that underpins the entire brigade including T+30 FSC synchronization. The brigade DCO (O-5) is the senior FTS leader in the formation. The battalion-level structure these positions map to is described at [Section 3.3](#).

All FTS cadre positions are filled on 3-year OCONUS tour schedules to Schofield, providing stability and continuity between drill cycles. Because FTS personnel remain on active duty, they continue to draw Hawaii BAH, COLA, and OCONUS PCS costs; this is the largest single driver of the difference between the CONUS and Hawaii HRR

operating costs derived at [Section 6.2](#). The staggered BA model produces a more sustainable FTS cadre tempo than simultaneous full-BCT assemblies: the cadre manages a rolling single-battalion operation for most of the year, with AT as the single annual surge point.

During the T+30 ready year, the battalion commander serves on 12-month ADOS orders per the parent HRR framework, with one key leader per maneuver company (CO, XO, or 1SG, selected by the BN CDR) also on ADOS. Additionally, the cavalry troop commander and fires battery commander aligned to the T+30 battalion come on ADOS to match the readiness of the full combined arms slice. Total ADOS company-level billets per BCT per year: 7–10, at approximately \$1.3–\$1.7M per BCT per year, cycling with the readiness rotation.

For ADOS personnel, the on-post periods — approximately two weeks per month — will frequently incorporate travel elsewhere in the PACOM theater rather than consisting solely of time at Schofield. PDSS visits, exercise IPRs, bilateral coordination meetings, and partner nation liaison are a natural part of the T+30 BN CDR's and company key leaders' responsibilities in a Pacific-assigned formation. Consolidating these theater obligations into the on-post window — rather than treating them as additional trips on top of the monthly Schofield presence — preserves genuine downtime during the remote half of the month and reflects the reality that a T+30 BN CDR at Schofield is already embedded in the USARPAC exercise and coordination cycle.

9.4 Barracks, Travel, and Ground Transportation

The parent document's barracks and ground transportation policy (HRR Concept Paper Sec 3.9) applies to the Hawaii IBCT without modification. It is restated here in summary because the Hawaii setting invites the assumption that different rules apply. They do not. Soldiers are reporting for duty, not travelling to a destination, and the policy is deliberately austere.

- **Barracks are the default.** HRR personnel reside in installation barracks during all drill periods and annual training, at Schofield and at PTA. Lodging in Kind is authorized only where on-post capacity is insufficient and only with prior brigade commander approval. Under the staggered BA model, Schofield hosts no more than one battalion at a time except during the BCT Common BA, so capacity shortfalls should be rare.
- **GOV shuttle from the airport.** Pre-planned shuttle routes operate from Daniel K. Inouye International Airport to Schofield, and from Kona International Airport to PTA, on drill arrival and departure days. The expanded GOV fleet at both locations includes 15-passenger vans and buses.
- **Rental cars are not authorized** for individual drill travel, absent an O-5 or above exception-to-policy approval for specific operational necessity. This is the point most likely to be misunderstood in the Hawaii context and should be stated explicitly in recruiting materials and in the soldier's service agreement.
- **Local commuting.** In-state soldiers residing within 50 miles of the installation may use privately owned vehicles for daily commuting during drill periods. The 50-mile local commuting area covers most of Oahu from Schofield, which means the majority of the in-state population commutes by POV to BA1 and to the Schofield element of the BCT Common BA.

Soldiers who wish to extend their stay in Hawaii on personal time before or after a drill period may do so at their own expense in a leave or non-duty status. Neither the IDT travel entitlement nor the GOV fleet supports personal travel, and commanders should set this expectation clearly at accession to avoid the perception that HRR service in Hawaii carries an implicit travel benefit.

9.5 Application of HRR-Wide Personnel Policies

Several HRR-wide personnel policies established in the parent document apply to the Hawaii IBCT without modification and are not restated here. They are noted so that planners do not treat their absence from this annex as an exclusion.

- **External ADOS restriction** (HRR Concept Paper Sec 9.1). Hawaii IBCT soldiers may not volunteer for or be ordered to active duty outside their assigned HRR mission for periods exceeding 30 consecutive days without the written approval of the ADC–Vanguard Strike. The restriction is graduated by readiness cycle year and does not apply to ADOS supporting the HRR mission itself, including the equipment movement ADOS at [Section 5.6](#) and the T+30 command and key leader ADOS at [Section 9.3](#).
- **Critical Vacancy Fill** (HRR Concept Paper Sec 15.1). The CVF mechanism triggers at T+30 minus 90 days, sources USAR-first and ARNG-second, and requires ADC–Vanguard Strike approval for Guard fills. In the Hawaii context the proximate ARNG source is the Hawaii Army National Guard; see [Risk 11.4](#) for the institutional engagement dimension.
- **Operational support ADOS** (HRR Concept Paper Sec 15.2). Non-HRR Selected Reserve soldiers fill recurring battle assembly support billets, with locally resident soldiers as the standing default. The Hawaii application of this mechanism is described at [Section 3.4](#) and [Section 5.6](#).
- **Command tour and key leader stabilization** (HRR Concept Paper Sec 15.6). The three-year command tour aligned to the readiness cycle and the 180-day key leader stabilization gate apply unmodified. The gate is more demanding in Hawaii only in that the pool of in-state candidates is smaller, which argues for earlier slating decisions.

10. Phasing and Timeline

10.1 Phase 2 Prerequisites

Phase 2 initiation is conditioned on Phase 1 validation milestones as described in the parent HRR Concept Paper. Specifically, Phase 2 requires:

- **(1) CONUS readiness validation.** At least one Vanguard Strike IBCT at CONUS has achieved early operational capability and demonstrated T+30 readiness.
- **(2) Recruiting validation.** The HRR recruiting model has demonstrated the ability to achieve 80% of authorized strength at a CONUS BCT within 18 months.
- **(3) HRR framework authorization.** Congressional authorization for the HRR framework has been enacted (estimated FY2030 NDAA under the 2029 Democratic administration implementation scenario).
- **(4) Separate congressional authorization for the Hawaii expansion.** The parent document recommends a statutory cap limiting HRR combat formations to no more than one division equivalent without further congressional authorization, and specifies that expansion to Hawaii or Alaska requires separate authorization consistent with that cap (HRR Concept Paper Sec 8.1.4 and Sec 25.1). The Hawaii conversion therefore cannot proceed under the original HRR authorization alone, regardless of how well Phase 1 performs. This is a deliberate design feature of the coalition strategy: the cap is what makes the “thin end of the wedge” objection answerable, and circumventing it for the first expansion would validate exactly the concern the cap was written to address. Planners should assume a second legislative engagement, with the Hawaii delegation engagement described at [Section 8.6](#) as its foundation.

Requirement (4) also affects sequencing. Because the authorization is separate, the pre-conversion planning window at [Section 10.2](#) cannot begin until that second authorization is enacted, and the Phase 1 performance data supporting it will need to be assembled deliberately rather than assumed.

10.2 Conversion Timeline

Phase	Timeline	Key Activities
Pre-conversion planning	Y-24 to Y-12 (24–12 months before conversion)	Hawaii-specific authorizing legislation enacted; HRR Division designates Hawaii IBCT program manager. Recruiting infrastructure established on West Coast. USARPAC exercise slots confirmed for initial year. 25th ID support agreement drafted.
Transition year 1	Months 1–12	Unit redesignated as Vanguard Strike HRR. First cohort of soldiers offered retain-in-place/join-HRR option. Remaining active soldiers PCS out on normal rotation. FTS cadre positions filled. 442nd redesignation ceremony.
Transition year 2	Months 13–24	HRR manning reaches target. First full annual training cycle completed. Phase 2 readiness certified by HRR Division. USARPAC and 25th ID integration fully operational.
Full operational capability	Month 24+	BCT at 100% authorized strength. T+30 battalion rotation active. Three annual USARPAC exercise integrations executed. Staggered BA schedule at full operational rhythm.

10.3 Dependency on Phase 1

The Phase 2 timeline is explicitly contingent on Phase 1 success. If Phase 1 Vanguard Strike BCTs do not achieve projected readiness levels, cost savings, or recruiting targets, Phase 2 should not proceed. This is a feature, not a bug: structuring Phase 2 as contingent on Phase 1 validation prevents institutional commitment to an unproven

model and provides a defensible decision gate for Congressional and DoD skeptics. The separate authorization requirement at [Section 10.1](#) reinforces this gate by giving Congress an explicit second decision point informed by Phase 1 performance data.

11. Risks and Mitigations

11.1 USARPAC Exercise Access Denied

Risk:

USARPAC J7 declines to allocate bilateral exercise slots to reserve component units, or active component demand crowds out the HRR IBCT's AT exercise assignments.

Mitigation:

Early designation of HRR IBCT AT slots in USARPAC exercise planning documents, no later than n-18 months. USARPAC LNO at 5th ID as dedicated exercise coordinator ([Section 4.3](#)). Legislative language directing USARPAC to ensure RC participation in bilateral exercise programs.

11.2 Recruiting Shortfall

Risk:

Mainland soldiers unwilling to travel to Hawaii for quarterly BAs, resulting in chronic manning shortfalls despite competitive benefits.

Mitigation:

IDT travel as statutory entitlement (not discretionary funding). Aggressive in-state recruiting targeting the ~500-soldier local population. West Coast recruiting focused on veterans with Pacific cultural connections and prior 25th ID service. 442nd lineage as recruiting differentiator. Recruiting materials must state the travel and lodging policy at [Section 9.4](#) plainly, since a recruit who joins expecting a rental car and off-post lodging is a retention risk at first drill.

11.3 Hawaii Congressional Delegation Opposition

Risk:

Hawaii senators and representatives block or attach prohibitive conditions to the conversion legislation, citing economic impact or perceived slight to Hawaii military heritage. This risk is structurally elevated because the Hawaii expansion requires its own authorization ([Section 10.1](#)) rather than riding on the original HRR package.

Mitigation:

Early and sustained engagement with the delegation. Lead with 442nd reactivation narrative. Present Hawaii Military Infrastructure Reinvestment Program as a concrete offset. Emphasize that 25th ID headquarters and 3rd IBCT remain at Schofield. Frame as strategic investment in Pacific readiness, not a budget cut. Present the economic analysis at [Section 8.1](#) honestly, including the limits of the visitor-spend offset, rather than overstating it and losing credibility on the rest of the case.

11.4 HIARNG Opposition

Risk:

Hawaii Army National Guard perceives the Vanguard Strike IBCT as encroaching on its recruiting pool, mission space, or political support within the Hawaii military community.

Mitigation:

Differentiated recruiting messaging (HRR targets veterans and prior service; HIARNG targets civilian accessions). No mission overlap at the operational level. Reinvestment program includes HIARNG facility improvements. Early engagement with the HIARNG TAG. Beyond these general measures, the Hawaii application offers concrete participation mechanisms that CONUS conversions do not, and these should be foregrounded rather than treated

as incidental. HIARNG soldiers are a named source for Critical Vacancy Fill positions during the T+30 year, with state concurrence required and ADC–Vanguard Strike approval (HRR Concept Paper Sec 15.1); locally resident HIARNG soldiers are a standing default source for recurring operational support ADOS billets at Schofield and PTA, funded from HRR program accounts rather than the state's allocation ([Section 5.6](#)); and 3–5 observer slots at each T+30 CTC rotation are reserved for Guard battalion and brigade leaders (HRR Concept Paper Sec 9.2.5), which for the Hawaii IBCT means HIARNG leaders gain access to a JRTC or NTC rotation they would otherwise be unlikely to observe. Each of these is a funded opportunity flowing to HIARNG soldiers rather than a reassurance, and collectively they convert the relationship from zero-sum to participatory.

11.5 T+30 Readiness Degradation

Risk:

The HRR ready battalion fails to maintain genuine T+30 readiness due to part-time manning gaps, equipment maintenance failures, or training continuity breakdown.

Mitigation:

FTS cadre as continuous readiness manager between BAs ([Section 9.3](#)). Equipment maintained at Schofield at institutional standards by cadre, not part-time soldiers. Readiness reporting to HRR Division on same schedule as CONUS Vanguard Strike BCTs. T+30 certification process identical to CONUS standard.

11.6 Inter-Island Logistics Failure

Risk:

A critical logistics tier fails during BA2 or the BCT Common BA PTA element, preventing equipment from reaching PTA and degrading training quality.

Mitigation:

Five-tier logistics model provides multi-modal redundancy ([Section 5.6](#)). 3–5 day pre-positioning buffer built into planning cycle, with equipment movement ADOS written to bracket the barge cycle rather than the standard 2–3 day early-arrival window. Dismounted FTX as fallback if no vehicle transport is available. Long-term mitigation: PTA-prepositioned vehicle set eliminates inter-island movement for BA2 events.

11.7 Equipment Preservation in Hawaiian Climate

Risk:

High humidity, salt air, and volcanic particulate at Schofield and PTA accelerate equipment corrosion and degradation, increasing maintenance costs and reducing readiness.

Mitigation:

Enhanced climate-controlled storage for sensitive electronics and optics at Schofield. FTS cadre conducts monthly equipment serviceability checks. Maintenance funding appropriated at OCONUS premium rates. PREPO management protocols adapted from APS-3 preservation standards.

11.8 PTA Land Use Controversy

Risk:

Legal challenges or political opposition to expanded PTA use delays or restricts training, degrading the unique field training value of the Hawaii application.

Mitigation:

Proactive community engagement with Big Island stakeholders before training increase ([Section 2.6](#)). Investment in PTA environmental stewardship through reinvestment program. Legal review of existing land use agreements and NEPA compliance requirements prior to conversion. Alternative PTA training areas identified as contingency if primary ranges are restricted.

11.9 Phase 1 Validation Failure

Risk:

CONUS Vanguard Strike BCTs fail to achieve projected readiness, recruiting, or savings targets, undermining the institutional case for Phase 2.

Mitigation:

Phase 2 is explicitly conditioned on Phase 1 validation milestones ([Section 10.1](#)). This risk is mitigated by design: the contingency gate prevents institutional overcommitment to an unvalidated model. If Phase 1 underperforms, Phase 2 simply does not proceed — an acceptable outcome given the substantially higher implementation complexity of the Hawaii application.

11.10 Cost Advantage Narrower Than Assumed

Risk:

The Hawaii gross savings advantage over a CONUS conversion is approximately 19–38% ([Section 6.2](#)), not the step change implied by earlier versions of this annex. If the per-soldier Hawaii premium proves closer to \$25,000 than \$40,000, or if FTS manning density runs above the parent document's figure, the advantage compresses further. A conversion justified primarily on cost could then be rejected on cost.

Mitigation:

Do not lead with cost. The Hawaii case rests on Pacific theater access, exercise integration, and forward equipment positioning ([Section 2](#)), with cost as a supporting rather than a primary argument. Present gross and net figures transparently and state the derivation, so that a downward revision is a refinement rather than a discovered error. Model the low scenario as the planning case. Note also that the reinvestment program is a negotiable variable: the \$100M baseline is a recommendation, not a fixed cost, and the \$200M ceiling at [Section 8.4](#) would consume roughly half the low-scenario gross savings.

Change Log

Version	Date	Changes
1.0	Feb 2026	Initial publication. 9 sections, 16 pages. Phase 2 framework, 442nd redesignation, command relationships (OPCON/ADCON), cost analysis (Hawaii premium drivers), economic impact on Oahu, recruiting, phasing, and 7 risk areas.
2.0	Feb 2026	Major expansion to 23 pages. Added: T+30 mobilization logistics with Pacific transit time analysis; prepositioned equipment value as strategic Pacific asset; PTA land use and community engagement; theater exercise integration with USARPAC J7 coordination; 9th MSC impact analysis; time zone management; \$310–\$390M savings range (low/base/high scenarios); Hawaii vs. CONUS comparison table; Hawaii Military Infrastructure Reinvestment Program (\$100M/yr baseline, \$200M ceiling); Risks 11.7 (equipment preservation) and 11.8 (PTA land use); Change Log added.
3.0	Feb 2026	Vanguard Strike and Persistent Shield branding applied throughout. Added Section 5 (Training Area Logistics) with direct-to-Big-Island KOA routing, five-tier equipment pre-positioning model (Tier 1 local IDT through Tier 5 Navy EPF), and PTA billeting/sustainment. Added Section 2.8 (IBCT vs. SBCT force design rationale). Added Risk 11.9 (Phase 1 validation failure). Sections renumbered throughout.
4.0	2026-02-27	Staggered BA architecture introduced. BA1: Schofield installation training; BA2: USARPAC bilateral exercise integration staggered by BN (Wolfhounds→Balikatan/Philippines, 100th/442nd→Garuda Shield/Indonesia, Gimlets→Orient Shield/Japan); BA3: PTA battalion FTX (KOA direct); AT: full BCT collective training at Schofield + PTA. Option A/C routing framework added. Stagger calendar table added.
5.0	2026-03-07	Training model architecture revised. BA2 changed to PTA battalion FTX staggered by BN (all BNs guaranteed at least one PTA event per year, KOA direct). BA3 renamed BCT Common BA: full BCT split across PTA and Schofield simultaneously, exercising distributed C2; summer scheduling preference (HRR-controlled). AT revised to USARPAC bilateral exercise integration staggered by BN (15 days, ~10–11 days actual participation); BCT never fully assembles during AT. Exercise assignments retained (Wolfhounds/Balikatan, 100th/442nd/Garuda Shield, Gimlets/Orient Shield). Sections 2.3, 4.3, 5.1–5.5, 9.2, and Risks 11.1 and 11.6 updated accordingly. Representative annual calendar table updated.
5.1	2026-08-06	ADC-BCT renamed ADC-Vanguard Strike throughout to align with HRR Concept Paper v7.1 nomenclature. Section 9.3 updated: FTS XO scope expanded to enumerate all seven permanent per-BCT positions (3x maneuver BN XO, cavalry squadron XO, fires battalion XO, brigade engineer battalion XO, BSB XO), with BSB XO identified as most critical enabler. T+30 ADOS billets expanded from 5–6 to 7–10 per BCT per year (adding cavalry troop commander and fires battery commander); cost updated to ~\$1.3–\$1.7M per BCT per year. Added paragraph on PACOM travel consolidation during ADOS on-post periods: T+30 BN CDR and key leader on-post windows incorporate PDSS visits, exercise IPRs, and bilateral coordination, preserving remote-period downtime. Change Log restored with complete history from v1.0.
Version	Date	Changes
5.2	2026-08-06	Correction to the v5.1 entry above. That entry states that ADC-BCT was renamed ADC-Vanguard Strike throughout. No such rename occurred, because the term ADC-BCT did not appear anywhere in this annex; the only ADC-string present was ADCON (Administrative Control), which is unrelated. The v5.1 entry is retained as shipped and corrected here. The ADC–Vanguard Strike is named for the first time in this version, at Section 4.1. Realigned to HRR Concept Paper v8.2. Cost figures rebuilt from the parent document's bottom-up model (Sec 22.2) rather than the prior standalone estimate: active Hawaii IBCT \$721–\$784M, HRR Hawaii \$277–\$286M, gross savings \$435–\$507M, net of reinvestment \$335–\$407M in years 1–5 and \$425–\$497M thereafter. Prior \$310–\$390M range superseded; derivation and the reasons for the change stated at Section 6.2. Section 1 claim that the Hawaii differential substantially exceeds any CONUS conversion softened to a stated 19–38% gross premium over the \$366M CONUS figure. Section 7 comparison restated gross-to-gross. FTS cadre corrected from 200–250 to approximately 660 per the

Version	Date	Changes
		parent Manning table (Sec 6.2), at Sections 6.2 and 9.3. Force structure correction. Section 3.3 corrected from the pre-2014 BCT design (BSTB, separate engineer battalion, no fires battalion) to the current design (three infantry battalions, cavalry squadron, fires battalion, brigade engineer battalion, BSB), with an explanatory note on the BSTB inactivation and BEB absorption of signal and military intelligence functions. This resolves a contradiction introduced in v5.1, where the seven-FTS-XO list included a fires battalion XO for a battalion Section 3.3 did not acknowledge. Command relationships. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 rewritten to state the full OPCON chain (INDOPACOM > USARPAC > I Corps > 25th ID) rather than USARPAC through I Corps alone, and to distinguish the 25th ID's operational authority from the HRR Division's institutional authority. ADC–Vanguard Strike named as the ADCON authority and as approval authority for external ADOS. Additions. Section 9.4 (barracks, GOV shuttle, 50-mile POV rule, rental cars not authorized) restating parent Sec 3.9 for the Hawaii context. Section 9.5 cross-referencing HRR-wide personnel policies (external ADOS restriction, CVF, operational support ADOS, command tour and 180-day stabilization gate). Section 10.1 prerequisite (4): separate congressional authorization required for Hawaii expansion under the one-division-equivalent cap (parent Sec 8.1.4, 25.1). Risk 11.10 (cost advantage narrower than assumed). Section 3.4 expanded with the 9th MSC's continuing operational support role. Revisions. Section 5.6 Tier 1 rewritten from “local HRR reservists on funded extra IDT days” to the operational support ADOS framework at parent Sec 15.2.4, with both sourcing streams (early-arrival ADOS for Hawaii-resident HRR soldiers; locally resident non-HRR Selected Reserve including 9th MSC and HIARNG), and a stated Hawaii exception extending the ADOS window to 7–10 days to bracket the 3–5 day barge cycle. Section 8.1 corrected: the four-events-per-year count was accurate, but the claim of four Oahu visits overstated actual Oahu presence under the v5.0 training model; revised to approximately one full event plus 4–6 transit days, with Big Island spend identified as an intra-state transfer. Risk 11.4 mitigation expanded with CVF sourcing, operational support ADOS, and CTC observer slots as concrete HIARNG participation mechanisms. Navigation. Render-time internal navigation added: clickable table of contents, in-text cross-reference links including Risk references, and a bookmark outline with subsections nested under their parent sections. References to the parent document render as “HRR Concept Paper Sec X” and are deliberately not linked, since those numbers address a different document. Change Log entries are deliberately not linked. Format. Cover version block restated as “Version: 5.2 Date: 2026-08-06” with parent document version noted. Dates added to all changelog entries; v1.0 through v3.0 recorded as Feb 2026, exact dates not recoverable. Vanguard Strike footer retained. Reviewed, no change. A sweep for stale four-drill assumptions found none; three BAs plus AT for 39 duty days is correct throughout and matches parent Sec 11.1. Four uses of “quarterly” to describe the three-per-year drill model are retained for consistency with the parent document, which uses the same phrasing.