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Concept of the Rework

The Empire of Japan is one of several countries in The New Order to exist in a radically different state from our world. Rather than a peaceful, democratic country beneath the wing of the American eagle, Japan is a militaristic, authoritarian superpower and the hegemon of East Asia. Naturally, this brings up a question: “when so much is different, how do we decide where Japan should go?”

Background

As Japanese history is not well known, it may be helpful to briefly go over some of the major transformations that occurred in postwar Japan. The most famous of these is easily Japan’s rise from the ruins left by the war to the second largest economy in the world. Starting with the Korean War, the Japanese economy began to grow at breakneck speed with an average annual GDP growth of around 10% until the 1970s, at which point the Japanese economy transitioned to an era of stable growth lasting until the Bubble Economy of the late 80s. Many explained this growth and the unique economic environment that fostered it with essentialist arguments - that these simply reflected elements of Japanese culture passed down from age eternal - while others pointed to specific legacies of the wartime era and occupation.¹ One can find similar success stories in postwar Germany, as well as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and modern day China.

Unlike modern day China’s growth, however, Japanese society remained remarkably equal throughout the postwar era. The result was that the social conflict so common in the prewar and early postwar had subsided by the 70s, and political apathy became the norm, buttressed by the myth that now everyone was middle-class. While Japan had been a very unequal society before the war, a combination of wartime devastation, strong welfare laws enforced by the occupation, and one of the most successful land reforms in history worked together to turn the postwar era into one of unprecedented equality in the country’s modern history. As the Japanese economy grew, everyone was able to benefit.

The political world also stabilized in the postwar era. While prewar Japan was marked by constant elite conflict as the political parties, bureaucracy, military all jockeyed for power, the occupation put an end to that by clearly establishing the supremacy of the National Diet and destroying the institutional bases of unelected elites. Political conflict continued, now between socialists and conservatives as well as within the LDP after its formation. But after the Anpō Protests of 1960, the Socialist Party entered a decline from which it never recovered while the LDP succeeded in stabilizing itself.

¹ Those interested may read more [here](#).

Having gone over the major transformations of the postwar era, one can immediately see problems in plucking events and transformations from OTL to place into the world we are building. At the same time, neither would it make sense to take Japan as it was before or during the war and have that be the Japan of TNO. We need a way to decide what transformations of the postwar era should remain. This is where we use the methodology of Total War System Theory.

Total War System Theory and TNO

The Total War System Theory explains the transformation of Japan's unequal, class-based society to the far more equal, integrated postwar society as the result of mobilization for total war.² Total war, the theory argues, demands the total mobilization of society in order to conduct war, but this cannot be done in a society where social and economic inequality is rampant - people will have no reason to fight and sacrifice for a society that denies them the full benefits of the national community. Thus in the process of mobilization for war, the state is forced to engage in a process of forced homogenization, uplifting politically or economically disenfranchised groups such as minorities, women, and the lower classes in exchange for their full participation in the war effort, while further excluding those groups whose participation is unobtainable or otherwise. In this way desires by marginalized groups for change are managed and society is bound together into a single system capable of efficiently waging total war. In the postwar world, the Total War System was institutionalized across the developed world as Germany's social market economy, the United States' New Deal society, and each country's specific brand of social postwar consensus, only falling with the rise of Neoliberalism in the 80s.

One of the major strengths of using Total War System Theory to understand Japan in TNO is that it is a theory that hinges itself on the continuities between the wartime and postwar Japanese state rather than the differences, showing how much of postwar Japan's social system had its roots in the wartime era. However, to follow this to its extreme would be to make the difference between victory and defeat in the war meaningless. Defeat and occupation may not have brought unheard-of reforms like the creation of a pension system and universal healthcare to a backwards and ignorant Japan, but it did allow the already existing reforms to be institutionalized and expanded upon in a way that would have been hard to imagine otherwise.³ This assault on the zaibatsu, the birth of a powerful socialist movement, the enshrinement of progressive reforms in the constitution, and the reign of the bureaucracy all played a major role in guiding the Total War System into the postwar era. With conservative forces remaining a powerful player in Japanese politics, we can imagine the halting and even reversal of many progressive reforms justified in the name of a national emergency well behind them. The repressive state apparatus of the wartime

² Literature on Japan's transwar continuities is vast, but the only work in English to specifically deal with Total War System Theory is *Total War and 'Modernization'*. All works mentioned in this proposal may be found in the Japan Materials Google Drive unless stated otherwise.

³ Those interested in the wartime roots of the Japanese welfare system should look to Gregory Kasza's "War and Welfare Policy in Japan".

system remains while snatching away protections from landlord abuses, guaranteed wages, promises of equality with the metropole, and opportunities for social advancement.⁴

It is this steady decay of the wartime system and how the people once supported by it begin to fall through the cracks once more that forms the main source of conflict in TNO Japan and drives the plot forward. All paths will have to deal with the consequences of a populace that feels angry and excluded, and figure out a way to carry out social reorganization so as to complete the stalled work begun during the war.

Japan at Game Start

Foreword

It may help to clarify some basic information about wartime Japan before proceeding. Though an authoritarian state, Japan never experienced the monopolization of political power by a single group like in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. Rather, politics in prewar and wartime Japan was defined by pluralism and competition among a handful of elite groups (the army, bureaucracy, big business, the political parties), at its core caused by division of power in the Meiji Constitution similar to the American one, but without political parties to make it functional. This pluralism will continue to exist in all paths (with the exception of Konoe), and political stability will be enforced by building elite agreement around a new consensus.

Two other important features of Japan's political system to explain are the role of the palace and Diet. Similar to Imperial Germany and the UK, the right to appoint the Prime Minister lies with the monarch alone, and not the parliament. In practice, the appointment of the premier was handled by a group of elder statesmen and imperial advisors within the palace bureaucracy who gauged public opinion to choose the person they thought most suited to the job. This is still the system at game start, and all potential PMs will need to convince the palace and elder statesman they can be trusted with the job to have any hope of appointment. The makeup of the diet is the other important feature. Again unlike in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, no government was ever able to subjugate the Diet, and independent candidates are allowed to run for office. Though the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association exists as Japan's sole legal party, it is only a semi-official organization uniting factions that have existed well before the war, and able to break up if tensions within the party grow too high. Hopefully, this will help the remainder of the proposal make sense.

⁴ Takashi Fujitani's *Race for Empire* and Sayaka Chatani's *Nation-Empire* are excellent works on the experience of Japan's colonial subjects during the war and their efforts to negotiate their position in the wartime system.

Concept

Japan at game start is an authoritarian society beset by stagnation and suffocated beneath an overbearing and unresponsive bureaucratic leviathan. The basic gist of the postwar era in TNO Japan (elaborated in the Background Lore section) is that political conflict put on hold with the outbreak of the Pacific War erupts again with the conclusion of the conflict, but quickly resolves itself with the establishment of a new status-quo based on the wartime system consisting of agreement between the army, IRAPA⁵, business, and court, excluding both the far right and liberals and from power.

The result of this is that in the decade following the establishment of this consensus under the Shigemitsu cabinet (1950), the fundamentally conservative status-quo forces gradually dismantle those parts of the wartime system that challenge their traditional hold over society, loosening labor protections, pulling the back the state's hand back from agriculture, and shifting economic authority to autonomous cartels. Peasants and the working class find themselves on the losing side of these "reforms," but the new establishment has no interest in political liberalization and so they have no legal way to push for change. Eventually, the dam of discontent over worsening conditions for the mass of ordinary Japanese bursts, and violence erupts in the Niigata Riots, shaking the postwar consensus that will eventually shatter with the Yasuda Crisis.

When we pick off in 1962, Japan is still dealing with the aftershocks of the Niigata Riots, and a new tendency, the IRAPA's Young Turks wing, has taken power under Funada Naka to course-correct. The Young Turks are a creation of TNO and essentially pragmatic fascists, too moderate for Kishi's permanent opposition in the Gokoku Dōshikai but too radical for both the Mainstream and Anti-Mainstream wings of the IRAPA which doggedly deny the need for reform. The player will take charge here in attempting to push through reforms as the Young Turks.

⁵ Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association (1942-1945), Japan's ruling party for much of the war formed after the 1942 elections. It was dominated by new party bosses supportive of a one-party system to reestablish the diet's authority, but hostile to the radical reform plans of the army, reform bureaucrats, and far-right. Despite the name, it was a completely separate organization from the Imperial Rule Assistance Organization (1940-1945). In TNO, it operates at game start as it did during the war as a non-political organization de-facto controlled by the Home Ministry, consolidating various bureaucratic organizations all over Japan.

Starting Situation

Starting Government

Ruling Party - Fascism (Corporate Statism)
<i>Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association - Young Turks Wing</i> 翼政会-少壮派

PRIME MINISTER 内閣総理大臣 (Country Leader)	CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY 内閣官房長官 (Head of Government)	FOREIGN MINISTER 外務大臣 (Foreign Minister)	FINANCE MINISTER 財務大臣 (Economic Minister)
			
Funada Naka 船田中	Kawashima Shōjirō 川島正次郎	Ushiba Nobuhiko ⁶ 牛場信彦	Ikeda Hayato 池田勇人

⁶Also the Minister of Greater East Asia (大東亜大臣)

Starting National Spirits

Dual Economy	The 1942 System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Small GDP Growth Bonus - Production Units to GDP Penalty - Minor Stability Penalty - Minor Monthly Support, Activism Bonus to Salarymen, Business - Minor Monthly Support Penalty to Workers, Petit-Bourgeois - (Probably some Economic Policy Effectiveness Modifiers) <p><i>The Japanese economy is divided between a segment of highly advanced industries by the zaibatsu and a larger segment of inefficient, poorly-paying industries run by small and medium enterprises. This contrast has only increased since the end of the war and shows no signs of stopping despite calls for reform.</i></p> <p>(This idea will have 7 levels, 1 representing high economic concentration and 7 representing low economic concentration. The level will be calculated according to sum economic concentration across all Regions in the ED mechanic)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Flat Support Bonus to all Upper IGs - Flat Support Penalty to all Lower IGs - Large Bonus to Stability - Political Party Law Effectiveness Bonus <p><i>Gone are the intense struggles for reform of the years before the war that once raged across the political world, given way to compromise between the empire's elites that has at least managed to maintain the appearance of tranquility. (Explain that status-quo forces have made peace with corporatism and have managed to defend their autonomy in the new System, while the Army has stopped pushing for renovationism)</i></p> <p><i>The System has also produced losers in liberals, the far right, and the lower classes, who can only watch as the state's bureaucratic machinery delivers less and less to the people.</i></p> <p>(This idea will be replaced with a weaker one after the Yasuda Crisis, again after entering one of the sub-branches, and for a last time at the end of their chosen path)</p>
The Yen Bloc	Blood of Niigata
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (Various bonuses and penalties) <p><i>The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere has come to stand as one of the three great continental blocs of the world alongside the German and American spheres, finally putting Asia on equal footing with Europe and the Americas, or so its leaders in Tokyo would like to believe.</i></p> <p><i>In reality, the Co-Prosperity Sphere and its</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stability Penalty - Political Power Penalty - Tenant Farmer Support Penalty - Tenant Farmer, Smallholder, and Rural Gentry Activism Bonus <p><i>TEMP: The Niigata Riots and the government's botched response to them has seriously shaken trust in the system, and those</i></p>

main economic organization, the Greater East Asia Economic Community (Name TBD) - informally referred to as the 'Yen Bloc' - has turned out to be a mixed bag, rapid growth somehow existing alongside endless stagnation caused by socio-economic instability and chronic underinvestment since the 40s. As the euphoria of liberation turned into the despair of occupation, insurgencies have sprung like weeds over the garden of Southeast Asia, wasting the capital and manpower Japanese investors have seen fit to sprinkle over the region while demanding a slow but steady stream of men and weapons to keep in good order.

Yet the situation in Japan's empire is far from despair-inducing. The Co-Prosperity Sphere remains the largest bloc on earth with near limitless potential for growth. Even its greatest pessimists acknowledge that Asia's near-bottomless supply of cheap manpower and resources have fueled the country's rapid growth since the 50s. If the Emperor's loyal servants can hold on to the fruits of his soldiers' labors, if they can guide their younger brother nations to the same bright future that his ancestors have already arrived at, if they can manage the crises thrown at them from within and without, then it is only a matter of time before the empire claims its proper place at the center of the world - so say the optimists.

(Japan's equivalent of the USA's OFN Unity or Germany's Endsieg. Bonuses will be determined by the size of the Yen Bloc, penalties by members undergoing insurgencies, civil war, occupation, or reconstruction)

country bumpkins are still uppity as ever. We need to put together a more comprehensive response and start pursuing reforms.

(This idea will be removed by the end of the Funada tree before the Yasuda Crisis)

Income Doubling Plan

-

- Medium GDP Growth Bonus
- Small Inflation Bonus (raises inflation)

- All Regions Monthly Economic Concentration+

TEMP: The Funada cabinet and Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato have recently unrolled the Income Doubling Plan as a response to the Niigata Riots. Inflation is rising, growth is concentrated in the developed half of the dual economy, and many are worried whether or not this growth is sustainable, but Funada and Ikeda are confident that it is only a matter of time before the entire empire is awash with prosperity.

(This idea will last until the Yasuda Crisis, then be replaced by a new idea showing the economic crash)

Political Situation

Diet Wings

IRAPA-Young Turks Wing

YSK-Shōsōkei/翼政会-少壮系



Funada Naka - Corporate Statism(Fascism)

The "Young Turks" faction is a loose coalition of junior and younger IRAPA Diet members leaning towards the Neo-Renovationist tendency. Intelligent and ambitious, yet inexperienced and underestimated, their true strength lies in their political opportunism and keenness to advance their careers. Their ability to sense where the wind is blowing was fatally demonstrated when they successfully backstabbed the Arita cabinet and took the initiative in forming the succeeding cabinet of Funada Naka.

Despite the faction's diverse nature and tendency to shift political discourses when advantageous, their political orientation remains vaguely aligned with Neo-Renovationist politics. These politics emphasize economic cooperation to maintain social solidarity and advocate the Imperial Diet as the basis for a strong executive branch, skeptical of the bureaucracy's ability to sustain national unity after its failure during the Niigata Incident.

Starting Factions

'Old Turks' Faction: A collection of disparate populist dietmen who follow Funada Naka's injunction against forming formal factions and adhere to the advice of those of their members who are now ministers. Mostly descended from the Nagai faction Minseitō and the Seishin Club of 1942 diet newcomers.

'Young Officers' Faction: A grouping of opportunistic Cooperativist dietmen who have abandoned their independence to support the Funada government. Includes many young veterans

of the Home and Agriculture ministries with visions of decisive top-down action to fix the problems unveiled by Niigata, of both agrarian and post-agrarian views.

IRAYMC Faction: Founded in 1942 by merging all previously existing youth organizations in order to support the war effort, the IRAYMC instead proved itself a thorn in the government's side from the very outset, pushing its own set of candidates in Representatives elections. Militaristic and anti-establishmentarian, this caucus is more connected to its rural middle-class base than any other faction can claim to be to their vote banks. Ironically, its main players are now somewhat long in the tooth.

IRAPA-Mainstream Wing

YSK-Shuryūkei/翼政会-主流系



Kawashima Shōjirō - Aristocratic Conservatism (Despotism)

The "mainstream" wing refers to the party leadership of the IRAPA and traces its lineage from the wartime parliamentarian collaborators, those who cooperated with General Tōjō Hideki in organizing the 1942 general election and took leading roles in Japan's sole legal political party after its formation. The faction's source of power is located at the General Affairs Council, the decision-making organ of the party. The appointment to the Council is under the sole appointing authority of the President of the IRAPA, and the President, in turn, is chosen by the Recommendation Commission governed by the Chairman of the Council. This party structure enables the perpetuation of the "mainstream" leadership.

After the bitter struggle against Premier Kishi's attempt to systemize wartime institutions, the "mainstream" leadership came to terms with Renovationism and established the post-war consensus during the tenure of Premier Shigemitsu. The faction's main interests lie in preserving the social status quo and political stability that perpetuates the faction's domination of the political arena, and the faction respects the expanded role of the state in economic and social affairs for this end. The faction is averse to political changes due to its conformist nature, and is content with the role of kingmaker, but will consider anything to preserve its political privileges if it comes to it.

Starting Factions

Kawashima Faction: A relatively small 'bureaucratic' faction descended from the Maeda faction. Preeminent among the GJPA Mainstream Wing thanks to its principal's Fouchean political maneuvers and hold over key GJPA posts. Represents the interests of the "new middle-class", the social products of the wartime heavy and chemical industrialization and expanded state institutions, as well as a tendency within the Home Ministry that supports growth even at the expense of social stability.

Tsukumo Faction: A militaristic, establishmentarian, and conservative 'party-men' faction, descended from the Maeda and Yamazaki factions of the old Seiyūkai. Having unified the old-style boss politics with a strong partnership with the military, they are seen by their opponents as the most stereotypically corrupt and elitist dietmen who, over thirty years after the introduction of universal suffrage, only truly care for the interests of a few of their richest constituents.

Noda Faction: A militaristic, establishmentarian, and somewhat liberal 'party-men' faction, descended from the Ōasa and Miyoshi factions of the old Minseitō. While not quite as in-bed with the military as the Tsukumo Faction, they have embraced the technocratic tendencies of the new order more fully and receive strong support from big business.

Miyazawa Faction: A small and relatively new 'bureaucratic' faction which is generally seen as the parliamentary wing of the Finance Ministry. Its sharp-speaking and youthful leader, Miyazawa Kiichi, a former financial bureaucrat and descendent of a powerful political lineage, is one of the closest 'mainstream' politicians to genuine popularity. The faction's politics are strongly centered around growth and support of the Income Doubling Plan.

IRAPA-Anti-Mainstream Wing YSK-Hanshuryūkei/翼政会-反主流系



Matsumura Kenzō - National Conservatism (Paternalism)

The "anti-mainstream" faction originates from the dethroned pre-war party bosses and successors who lost their political leadership to the new "mainstream" leaders, often their former subordinates, and relegated to titular and marginal posts within the IRAPA. The failed 1945 attempt at overthrowing the

"mainstream" leadership drove the ex-bosses even further away from national politics. Meanwhile, the monopolization of party management by the "mainstream" leadership alienated many younger party cadres, who began to band together around Inukai Takeru, the charismatic son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. The two groups, alien but aligned by mutual interest, became linked together after the Niigata Incident brought down the Aoki cabinet and allowed the "anti-mainstream" coalition to stand on the political front.

With the untimely death of Inukai, the intrafactional secessions that followed, and the ultimate failure of the Arita cabinet, the future of the "anti-mainstream" faction is uncertain. Many older members continue to retain loyalties from local electoral bases that survived their decade-long political exiles, but the faces of the "anti-mainstream" faction are getting younger and younger as the inevitable generational transition is driving out the last generation of the old party politics. Once the Inukai's disciples replace the dying breeds from the Taishō Democracy in full, the makeup of the "anti-mainstream" faction is unlikely to resemble its former constituents.

Starting Factions

Matsumura Faction: The old guard of the anti-mainstream IRAPA dietmen, composed of old boss-style politicians with deeply compromised records. However, they care deeply about protecting the constitution and the privileges of the diet, and fight for these causes to the extent their generally failing healths will allow them.

Old Inukai Faction: The new anti-mainstream, composed of younger politicians with less compromised records who maintain IRAPA affiliation while criticizing its policies and operation to such an extent that they are kept away from positions of power under most IRAPA governments. Recently on the wane, following the very untimely death of its principal.

Independent Dietmen's Association

Mushozoku Giinkai/無所属議員会



Kōno Ichirō - Goken Conservatism (Conservatism)

The Independent Dietmen's Association is a parliamentary caucus of liberal independents, the continuation of the parliamentary liberal opposition group established by Hatoyama Ichirō with the Companion Association of 1941 and the succeeding Emulation Association of 1942. Because all political organizations except the IRAPA are banned, the IDA is officially registered and operates as a parliamentary study group but de facto functions as a parliamentary caucus like many others. The IDA advocates for the dissolution of the IRAPA, the restoration of multi-party politics, and the removal of bureaucratic control over society, therefore remaining in permanent opposition since its foundation.

But despite its initial colorful and principled opposition, the IDA has been progressively moving towards acceptance and collaboration with the System, increasing its participation in the political process following the establishment of the ill-fated Arita cabinet. In terms of policies, the lines between the IDA's economic platform guided by Ishibashi Tanzan and state policy have been increasingly blurred lately, though the IDA attaches greater importance to the financial independence of individuals and supports a liberalized economy with full employment.

Unity Club

Daidō Kurabu/大同倶楽部



Miki Takeo - Cooperativism (Liberal Conservatism)

The Unity Club is a splinter group established by Miki Takeo, Tanaka Isaji, Nikaidō Susumu, and other young IRAPA cadres who broke off from the IRAPA in the followings of the Arita cabinet's failure to pass the land readjustment bill. Opposed to the conservative inertia of the IRAPA and the economic liberalism of the IDA, they seek to navigate an alternative middle way between the two. Their main propositions include the restoration of agricultural cooperatives with the grant of the mandatory authority to organize farming activities on a cooperative basis, and the rehabilitation of the Patriotic Industrial Association as the means of class collaboration between workers and managers.

National Salvation Society

Gokoku Dōshikai/護国同志会



Ino Hiroya - Corporate Statism (Fascism)

The National Salvation Society is a personalistic political caucus centered around former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Formed in 1949 by the Diet members loyal to Kishi's political agenda, the caucus' diverse ideological makeup stems from its origination and dependency on Kishi's political connections. Despite Kishi's self-imposed political exile after his unfortunate downfall from the height of power, Kishi's continued link with powerful interests allows the caucus to wield political and economic influences disproportionate to its size. Outwardly, the caucus continues to support the political mobilization of the masses as the basis of political power for the structural transition toward a strong welfare state envisioned by Kishi during his tenure as Prime Minister.

Hokuriku People's Association

Hokuriku Kokumin Kyōkai/北陸国民協会



Tanaka Kakuei - Agrarianism (Conservatism)

The Hokuriku People's Association is a regional political group organized in the aftermath of the Niigata Incident by Tanaka Kakuei, who rose to fame for his passionate defense of the rioters against the persecution. The group's sole demand is an immediate land redistribution to the tillers with protections against attempts to retrieve the land thus handed over. Tanaka has been reaching out to other independent representatives to expand the scope of his movement but it has yet to bear fruit.

more sense for any particular peer to try and exert influence through the largest group in the Peers or through the IRAPA with its dominant position in the Representatives. They are organized into two groups: one broadly supportive of the old IRAPA mainstream, centered among the majority of the appointees and based on the Bureaucratic IG, and one supporting the anti-mainstream cause, centered around taxpayers and some very old appointees and based on the Business and Rural Gentry IGs.

There is also an anti-System caucus, somewhat equally divided between taxpayers (Blend of Rural Gentry and Petit-Bourgeoisie) and peers appointed by the Kishi administration(Bureaucratic IG).

Finally, there are the odd cases: the four peers of the Imperial Academy (two from the scientific section and two from the humanities) and the ten peers from the Colonies (seven Korean, three Taiwanese), both serving seven-year terms. Neither are a major player in the deliberations of the Peers: the former limit themselves to questions they are expert on, and the latter are largely particularist in their outlook.

Army Factions

There will be a running side-plot in all paths of dealings within the army. Players will get choices in events to intervene or not intervene in its inner workings, and eventually these choices will lead to political shifts in the Army, influencing its political behavior and the options it presents in proxy warfare.

Army officers have a rather facile understanding of civilian politics, so they initially only judge governing parties based on whether they are 'conservative' or 'reformist', developing further opinions through interaction. It will be totally possible, for example, for a player in the Kishi path to develop a mutual understanding with a dominant Military-Industrial Complex and turn the Army into a supportive group.

Operations Cliques (Alignment: Renovationists)

Based on the cliques of top-ranking Rikudai students who traditionally proceed straight to the Operations Section of the general staff. The cliques seek to bring the army into a form that they consider to be more effective for the type of wars Japan is fighting: proxy conflicts. As such, they seek to better train the army and equip it with proven, robust, all-conditions, and multipurpose technology. They advocate for army expansion, quick and rapid deployment/mobilization of soldiers across the Sphere, and to subordinate naval assets to their needs. Sphere-wise, they are especially obstinate in wishing to hold onto every scrap of land they possibly can. They also tend to support engagements outside the sphere, though demands to e.g. support Kwangtung Army officers in their plots for Siberian intervention will be controversial enough even among the cliques that their dominance won't so much force the government's hand as much as give them additional aggressive options. They are broadly conservative in their political recommendations for the sphere, but in Japan itself they favor renovationist politicians as the cure for Japan's national power not meeting military dreams. However, they have no plans for how the overall Japanese economy should be run.

Military-Industrial Complex (Alignment: Conservatives)

Based on officers from the Army Ministry, who deal with political and business figures. The ministry, while far more pro-status quo than their staff counterparts, do wish to implement certain reforms to the

army and Sphere. This group focuses on deploying small but well-equipped expeditionary forces to proxy conflicts and on solving the problems of continental Asian terrain with air power. They are more amenable to shrinking the overall size of the army than the operations cliques. Sphere-wise, the ministry seeks to maintain the current amount of army influence in China while still handicapping Chinese military development (but not killing it), and focus more on developing Chinese resource extraction. In South-East Asia, they are also largely unmotivated in changing the current situation beyond keeping up with resource extraction. However, the clique also wishes to redefine the economy by using conscription and procurement less as a tool to replenish the military and more as an economic device. This means using conscripts to stimulate the economy and push it into an overall more militarized state, and using military procurement as a way to raise the technological level of the economy.

Intelligence Clique (Alignment: Conservatives)

Based on intelligence officers and Anglo-American specialists who were traditionally subordinate to the Operations Cliques, but have enjoyed a period of relative prominence under the sponsorship of Prince Higashikuni. Following the late Kanji Ishiwara's thought if not so much his actions, they consider nuclear war against Germany and/or the United States to be the paramount national issue, and favor strong long-range air and missile forces and air and civil defenses. As they consider large conventional forces for peer warfare to be useless, and proxy wars to be a necessary diversion at best, they have a reputation as doves. They favor the restraint of field commanders and rigorous intelligence-gathering before properly-considered action. Sphere-wise, they wish to withdraw from China militarily and lift Chinese restrictions on military-building so a homegrown force can replace the withdrawn units. In South-East Asia, they seek to intensify resource extraction whilst also investing more money into the governments and peoples of the regions to help stabilize it.

Background Lore

Tōjō Cabinet (1941-1944)

As the German troops landed on Great Britain in 1943, the Second World War was coming to an end. With the European theater entering its climax, many in Japan began to see fewer and fewer reasons to stay in the war, having reached its maximum extent of occupation in 1943 and being unable to break the stalemate in the face of increased American military pressures. Meanwhile, the possibility for a separate peace between Germany and the US grew day by day - a devastating prospect that could have forced Japan to face American might alone.

Koiso Cabinet (1944-1947)

Although Japan's Prime Minister, General Tōjō Hideki, argued for a total victory and resisted the idea of an early ceasefire with the US, a united opposition of the Imperial Court, the Senior Statesmen's Conference (Jūshin Kaigi), and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru outmaneuvered and cornered him into resignation. General Koiso Kuniaki was appointed to consolidate Japan's gains and leave the war, concluding the war between Japan and America in the Instrument of Settlement and Normalisation in the Pacific in 1945. Japan pushed on in China, despite numerous negotiated attempts by the German and Italian Diplomatic corps to preserve the Chiang government, the Japanese captured Chongqing in 1947 consequently concluding the Second Sino-Japanese War in a total Japanese victory.

Having no political wit nor a base to lean on, Koiso courted parliamentary forces in the Imperial Diet to maintain his administration. His empowerment of the parliamentary establishment, in turn, incensed anti-establishment political elements, already dissatisfied by Koiso's supposed betrayal of the Axis cause and now further alarmed by the seeming rehabilitation of old politics. Against this trend, a coalition of radical bureaucrats, hawkish military officers, and populist activists soon coalesced around ex-bureaucrat and controversial Renovationist Kishi Nobusuke.

Within the Imperial Diet itself, the demise of Tōjō brought relaxation of control and discipline, and Japan's sole ruling party, the IRAPA (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association) under the leadership of Maeda Yonezō, who had served Tōjō loyally and controlled the electoral recommendation process, became embroiled in a bitter infighting. Now favored by Koiso, ex-party bosses such as Machida Chūji and Nakajima Chikuhei, as well as their supporters, all sought to dethrone Maeda's leadership by forming a new party structure. While the movement failed to gain further traction and the IRAPA survived, the apparent return of a partisan conflict within the parliamentary force greatly concerned not only the military but also the Lord Privy Seal and the Senior Statesmen's Conference, the institutions that had the authority to nominate Prime Minister.

Kishi Cabinet (1947-1949)

Koiso, considering his task of prosecuting the war and bringing peace complete, resigned after the general election of 1947. Lord Privy Seal Marquess Kido Kōichi struggled to name a worthy candidate with a unifying vision for the post-war Empire in the post-war New World Order. Only after great reluctance and consideration for Japan's state within the post-war New Order and the military's opinion did he nominate Kishi Nobusuke for Prime Minister and gain approval from the Senior Statesmen's Conference.

Kishi's post-war project sought to entrench Japan's totalitarian wartime mobilization institutions as the basis for the post-war state structure. To this end, he reached out to industrial cooperative leaders and agricultural activists in his call to revitalize the ailing Imperial Rule Assistance System (Yokusan Taisei) through popular mobilization and derive its political power from the masses. Against the ex-party bosses who sought to restore parliamentary politics and dismantle the wartime structure, Kishi hoped to protect the System and transition it into its post-war form of the totalitarian welfare state, with powerful politics backed by his mobilization of cooperatives.

The attempt to renew and systemize wartime institutions and measures into a permanent consensus was outrageous to the Imperial Diet looking to terminate the state of war and controversial to the general public suffering from war fatigue. The post-war economic malaise did not help his popularity, as the Japanese merchant fleet was yet to recover from its massive wartime losses to check the post-war shortage, and agricultural products began to trickle into black markets to the state's frustration. The state's initiative to nurture medium-scale owner-farmers faced difficulties as returning soldiers and ex-peasants in war industries flowed back into the rural sector and pressured land availability.

Externally, his vision of an economically integrated Co-Prosperity Sphere required highly centralized intra-regional planning and comprehensive development that would take precedence over local sovereignty and interests. On the other hand, in his attempt to define Japan's post-war role as the home of an international anti-colonial revolutionary movement, Kishi actively encouraged and promoted radical nationalist movements across occupied Southeast Asia, threatening the precarious balance of power within the collaborationist force in many places. Kishi's foreign gambles eventually triggered domestic and external backlashes against him when he attempted to occupy the port city of Guangzhou in his ambition to construct a second 'Manchukuo' in South China. In a political scheme orchestrated by the Lord Privy Seal, the anti-Kishi force successfully mobilized Japan's military and political establishments' skepticism towards Kishi's radicalism, cornering Kishi to resign in 1949 over the South China issue.

Tōgō Cabinet (1949-1950)

The succeeding Prime Minister, Tōgō Shigenori, was a sickly diplomat suffering from a heart condition. An apolitical man with a narrow political network, not helped by his Korean-Japanese heritage and shy personality, his name was pushed by the conservative-leaning Army Field Marshal and Prince Higashikuni, whose royal blood and clout over the military became central to the Imperial Court's political influence. The Lord Privy Seal accepted, hoping to put a more controllable person in the office to handle the delicate foreign affairs Kishi had incited, and the Senior Statesmen's Conference assented to the nomination.

Having its formation controlled by Prince Higashikuni, the resulting cabinet was more in the direction of the pre-war conservative normalcy with the unmistakable resemblance of the old 'national unity' governments of the '30s. Under the guidance of the Prince's ally of Ogata Taketora, the administration initiated demobilization by lifting the state of war and, much to Renovators' criticism and opposition, pushed to repeal legislations and measures dependent upon a state of war. The state's complete wartime control over communications, economy, and labor expired in succession. Only staple crops remained under state management owing to the precarious food supply.

While his cabinet was dealing with the economic impacts of demobilization, the Prime Minister was preoccupied with foreign matters, as Japan faced increasing defiance from its subjects. Shortly after his appointment in 1949, Tōgō convened the Second Greater East Asian Conference, intending to reach an agreement for the Empire's relationship with Asian states. But although the Conference produced an ideological statement that declared mutual defense of sovereignty and affirmed support for the political liberation of the former colonial nations, Tōgō could not materialize tangible outcomes from the Conference. Greatly distressed by the Thai escalation of Operation Issara and the military's cynicism toward his diplomacy, Tōgō's heart health deteriorated rapidly after the Conference, forcing him to resign in 1950 before passing away not long after.

Shigemitsu Cabinet (1950-1954)

The next Prime Minister to get nominated by Lord Privy Seal Kido was Shigemitsu Mamoru, a key Imperial Court ally during Tōjō's fall down and Japan's ex-chief diplomat responsible for the Instrument of Settlement and Normalisation in the Pacific. He maintained stable support within the Imperial Diet as he continued the transition to normalcy by allowing the 4-year term of the Imperial Diet to expire without term extension for the first time since the war, holding a general election in 1951.

On the other hand, the new Prime Minister maintained the electoral recommendation system, earning support from the IRAPA leadership for doing so, and pursued new economic control

legislations with the economic disruption from demobilization serving as the background. The passed 'control law' restored the Ministry of Commerce and Industry the authority to plan and coordinate the production of designated essential goods, but with self-controlled compulsory industrial cartels taking over the responsibilities for the execution, including resource allocation, management, and redistribution, throwing the post-war economic control into conflicts between bureaucratic planners, managerial cartel leaders, and big business interests.

Peasants, however, were left out of the new corporatist rearrangement. The domestic production was not sufficient to feed the booming Japanese population, and although the recovery of food imports from Asia eased nutritional supply at home, the ever-increasing demographic pressure and food demand within Greater East Asia induced the Empire to continue its wartime policies of mandatory crop collection and state monopoly of distribution despite intense opposition from rural interests, setting the price low for the benefit of consumers while subsidizing staple crop producers. At the same time, the mismatch between the cost of the subsidized state collection and the end consumer price contributed to fiscal deficit, causing concerns about financial drains from the "Dual Price" policy.

As a sympathizer of the Renovationist economy at home and a pragmatist abroad, Shigemitsu saw the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere and its informal nature as a failed experiment that allowed conflicts to fester and Thailand to challenge the Japanese domination. Shigemitsu advocated for a formalized regional order as the base international unit under the New Order global reality, binding Asian subjects to Japan's institutionally and internationally recognized leadership over the regional order and thus tying down Thailand to the framework. The opposition against Shigemitsu's foreign policy, primarily coming from the military, argued that such a structure, in reverse, would bind and subject the status of the Empire to the regional order. But much more assertive than his ex-archenemy of Tōgō, Shigemitsu insisted that his authority on state diplomacy was derived from the Imperial Prerogative. In an ironic turn of events, he reacted very harshly against the military for what he claimed was a violation of the Imperial Prerogative.

As state-building efforts in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaya accelerated, Shigemitsu successfully forwarded his concept for a regional collective security body under the Japanese leadership, subsequently realized as the Greater East Asian Peace Organization (Dai Tōa Heiwa Kikō). But much to Shigemitsu's chagrin, during the negotiation that preceded the GEAPO, the Thai occupation of Cambodia and Laos was already undergoing, and the question over the status of the occupied states erected an obstacle. Defiant to the Japanese pressure to end the occupation, Thailand's ascension to the GEAPO was delayed until its withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos in 1956. Amidst his failure to reach a deal with Thailand, and the rising insurgencies in the Philippines, a corruption scandal over the state-planned shipbuilding program ended his administration in 1954.

Iwakuro Cabinet (1954-1957)

The succession of Shigemitsu by General Iwakuro Hideo as Prime Minister oversaw a reintroduction of the military as the leading force within the government, reversing the previous political trends during which its influence continuously receded from politics. Iwakuro served in military commands in Southeast Asia for most of his wartime and post-war career and earned the moniker "SEA expert" that carried him into the premiership, nominated in the Senior Statesmen's Conference as a suitable candidate to stabilize the rising tensions in Southeast Asia. Another factor that favored Iwakuro's appointment was the ongoing Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East, which backed his military career as a political asset.

But Southeast Asia also took him away from Tōkyō for too long, and Iwakuro had only a few familiar faces, including figures such as Aoki Kazuo, Fukuda Takeo, and Shiina Etsusaburō, all of whose bureaucratic careers were characterized by their past collaboration with the military, to work with unfamiliar bureaucracy. A part of Iwakuro's efforts to discipline ministries into submission was his empowerment of the Cabinet General Planning Bureau under the cabinet jurisdiction, previously marginalized during the erosion of the state control over the economy and transfer of its planning power to other ministries. Appointing Fukuda as its chair, Iwakuro gave the Bureau the authority to coordinate economic policies between ministries within the cabinet and produce the outcome as an outline for the state budget, effectively repurposing the Bureau as the means to rein in ministries. The Bureau, in turn, collaborated with the IRAPA while drawing the budget outline, adding to the pressure against the career bureaucrats in ministries.

But ultimately, just like in Southeast Asia during his military service, where his network of unconventional agents fought against rivaling Japanese civilian officials, much of Iwakuro's administration saw his advisors and agents such as Matsumae Shigeyoshi or Mizuno Shigeo competing for influence against conventional channels or even among themselves. Personal envoys prevailed over official diplomatic channels, and individual advisors frequently bypassed bureaucratic hierarchy.

Although Iwakuro's so-called 'envoy diplomacy' was initially met with a string of success in Southeast Asia where he had constructed his political network for decades, marked by the stabilization of post-coup Burma, the admittance of Thailand into the GEAPO, and the end of the Japanese occupation in Vietnam, but reconstruction of the previously occupied Cambodia and Laos consumed significant Japanese attention and resources, while Iwakuro's previous success in Malaya turned into his worst nightmare as the resurgent rebels launched a general uprising. Lastly, his controversial handling of the dissolution of the Hong Kong Railway Company became a subject of bureaucratic and parliamentary attacks and forced him to resign after cabinet disunity in 1957.

Aoki Cabinet (1957-1959)

The next cabinet, led by Aoki Kazuo, continued to see the surging military influence within the administration. Aoki, the first finance bureaucrat to head the cabinet since 1931, owed his rise to the decades-long relationship with the military dating back to his service in the Manchurian Affairs Bureau in 1936. Chosen by the Senior Statesmen's Conference amidst the general crisis in Europe, Aoki placed national security as his top priority and promised to restore confidence in the state. And indeed, the Japanese leadership was determined to avoid the same fate as the German experiment. Tōkyō's 1957 move to bid for the 1964 Summer Olympics was, in part, motivated by the necessity to demonstrate the Empire's steadfast global leadership on the international stage and showcase its ability to stay afloat in the shifting tides of the Cold War.

Equally necessary was making the Empire sustainable by rationalizing the economic machine. The shift towards economic rationalization began earlier, but it was during Aoki's administration when the future of the System became a subject of open debate among its very operators. The leading proponents of rationalization were a clique of Fukuda-aligned financial bureaucrats, the so-called "Kōno & Co." led by Kōno Kazuyuki, who aimed to achieve a cost-effective state budget and free up resources to prioritize more urgent national needs, such as the military. The resulting policies, drawn solely from the basis of fiscal factors, were deeply unpopular in the Imperial Diet and public opinion. The controversy of financial rationalization extended to the Japanese governance of Greater East Asia when the "Special Economic Zone" was established in South China, subjected to Japanese private corporate influence. Aoki's notorious autocratic personality further contributed to the disapproval of his policies, and his cabinet, full of politically inept bureaucrats and military technocrats, was also seen as the living embodiment of the Japanese bureaucratic culture.

Most hurt by Aoki's economic rationalization policies were rural communities. Until this point, the state subsidies policy allowed each crop producer to receive production subsidies, focusing on the increase of the volume of production but at the cost of a substantial fiscal drain for the state. In 1958, after four consecutive years of good harvests, the state shifted its focus from quantity to productivity and introduced a new subsidy policy. Later known as the 30 percent agriculture policy, the new policy prioritized subsidies to the most productive 30 percent of domestic crop producers over the other 70 percent. The policy considerably reduced the State's financial burden, but peasants and especially those without part-time employment were disproportionately affected by the subsidy cut. Owner-farmers were incentivized to expand the scale of farming at the expense of their tenant occupants, now exposed to fierce competition for land against other farmers and peasants.

As social and economic conflicts between peasants and landlords accelerated, unrest and disputes brewed. The plights within the rural electorate were channeled into the Imperial Diet when the 1959 general election returned a record number of independent candidates. A cavalcade of

propaganda and pageantry starting with the televised Imperial wedding of Crown Prince Akihito to Lady Tokugawa Sumiko, continuing with reports of military victories in Malaya, and culminating in news of the successful Olympics bid, utterly failed to instill enthusiasm within the indifferent public. Peasant contempt began to target not just landlords but local Agricultural Associations, the symbol of bureaucratic-landowner domination over rural society.

In the winter of late 1959, a group of WW2 veterans burned a local Agricultural Association office in Niigata for the office's 'treachery' against veterans. They demanded the association protect their rights to the land they cultivated as their rightful reward for their wartime service. The event unexpectedly started a wildfire, as multiple local youth corps joined the suit until the entire prefecture fell into chaos. The rapid and spontaneous spread of the riots was made possible by the increased accessibility to telecommunication technologies such as telephones, allowing the word to spread across the predominantly agrarian prefecture at a speed previously unthinkable. The rapid spread of the riots raised the possibility of further escalation into nearby areas in Tōhoku, terrifying the officials. Fearing and feeling an atmosphere of revolution, Aoki's administration reacted hysterically by mobilizing additional police reinforcements and local military garrisons to restore order in the affected area through violence, resulting in a few hundred casualties during the process.

The bloodshed in Niigata exposed the deep cracks within the System. The military's sway over veterans was no longer absolute and bureaucracy was no longer in touch with its subjects. The Imperial Court, not wanting to stain the impending Imperial engagement of Prince Masahito by association with the fiasco, delayed the ceremony and distanced itself from the administration as much as it could. Divisions within the IRAPA deepened, as outsider figures like Matsumura Kenzō returned to national prominence and seized the initiative against the IRAPA leadership. Some others even bolted out of the party to sit with liberal independents led by Kōno Ichirō or join the emerging agrarian force around fresh blood like Tanaka Kakuei, who rose to fame for his passionate defense of the rioters against the persecution. Pressured from all sides, Aoki resigned in disgrace.

Arita Cabinet (1959-1961)

The need to mend the broken link between the System and its subjects brought the humble, Niigata-native, and 75-year-old ex-diplomat Arita Hachirō as Prime Minister. The driving force of the Arita's administration was Matsumura Kenzō and his so-called 'anti-mainstream' wing of the IRAPA, an informal political network linking the last generation of old party politics such as Matsuura Shūtarō and Kogure Budayū, and the younger group of party cadres centered around Inukai Takeru, alienated with the 'mainstream' IRAPA leadership. Together with Kōno and his liberal independents, they formed the administration's backbone.

The national unity nature of the Arita cabinet, composed of diverse political forces, was in contrast to the previous bureaucratic administrations and its supporters from the 'transcendental' IRAPA leadership. The dysfunctions of Agricultural Associations, Home Ministry organizations, and bureaucratic IRAA amidst the rural plights and the riot made the Imperial Diet the only means to interact with and integrate subjects into the System, allowing the Imperial Diet to assume greater responsibilities in the administration. The Imperial Diet was, in return, demanded to provide a solution for the System's woes.

Immediately after its appointment in 1959, the new administration announced its intention to replace absentee landlordism with independent smallholdings through land readjustment. The bill submitted to the Imperial Diet mandated Agricultural Associations to purchase and redistribute all agricultural lands owned by absentee landlords and all agricultural lands exceeding five hectares owned by resident landlords. The arrangements were to be brokered by the local Agricultural Land Committees, which would also arrange rent regulations upon all remaining tenancy contracts. The emancipated lands and peasants were required to join compulsory village-level cooperatives for communal farming under the technical guidance of local Agricultural Associations.

Thus, the bill exempted petty landlords, whose leaseholdings were often unprofitable, poor, and consequently responsible for the majority of tenancy abuses and disputes, from land redistribution, and failed to prohibit the practice of rent-in-kind that enabled even the pettiest landlord to extract profitable rents out of the most marginal leaseholds at the expense of their occupants. Never intended to bring systemic changes to the rural dynamics dominated by the medium-scale owner-farmer class, whose interests were intimately aligned with and empowered by the System, the bill's purpose was to sacrifice large landlords, whose holdings were disproportionately located in Tōhoku and Niigata, to appease tumultuous peasants in the regions. And if the exemption of small landlords generated little enthusiasm from Tanaka's agrarian independents, the proposal to abolish absentee landlordism offended landed interests within the House of Peers, who steadfastly defended their property rights and stalled the bill to death.

The failure to push the land readjustment bill through the Imperial Diet raised questions about the party's commitment and energy. Calls to discipline the opposing Peers into submission emerged, but fear of a total rift with the Peers and an ungovernable situation prevailed in the IRAPA leadership, which in turn generated misgivings from the pro-administration camp. Within the cabinet, the failure made internal differences over land redistribution, political orientations, and approaches to the Peers' opposition more salient.

The cohesion of the 'non-mainstream' wing began to fray further after Inukai died of a heart attack in the summer of 1960. Soon the cabinet lost the support of Miki Takeo, Tanaka Isaji, and Nikaidō Susumu too, as they broke with the IRAPA to form an independent caucus. To keep

ranks in line, young cadres such as Kawasaki Hideji, Kosaka Zentarō, and Hara Kenzaburō pressed for another attempt at legislation, but in 1961, with the administration seemingly slipping into disarray, a group of junior IRAPA dietmen, with Nakasone Yasuhiro, Hayakawa Takashi, and Inaba Osamu among its prominent figures, revolted against Matsumura and other leading 'elders' in the faction and broke with the Arita cabinet. Arita in turn succumbed to pressure.

Funada Cabinet (1961-)

Political institutions such as the Lord Privy Seal were wary of the opportunistic streak of the dissenting junior IRAPA members, finding the group too inexperienced and unsuitable to lead the Empire. But they also struggled to find any other options untainted by the blood of Niigata. On the other hand, the junior IRAPA rebels' strong criticism against the indecisiveness of contemporary politics received applause from the Renovationist political circles, and the rebels, for their part, courted Funada Naka, an ex-Kishi supporting dietmen and advocate of the Cooperative movement. Funada's name was repeated in the Senior Statesmen's Conference by a Renovationist coalition of Kishi himself, Prince Konoe, and Iwakuro, which won over Marquess Kido and other's skepticism and nominated Funada as the next Prime Minister.

Backed by the renewed Renovationist coalition of the junior dietmen group, ex-Kishi supporters, and the inclined Young Men's Corps members, which collectively came to be referred to as the 'Young Turks', Funada's administration endeavored to direct the national discourse away from the political minefields of land redistribution in search of more "practical alternatives", navigating a narrow range of politically acceptable options. The most comprehensive solution they produced was the 'Income Doubling' concept promulgated by new Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato. With his proposal for accelerated economic growth and active investment programs, Ikeda projected to double the size of Japan's economy in ten years and close the gap between the pre-modern agrarian sectors and the highly-productive industrial sectors, promising to integrate the underdeveloped rural regions into the broader national prosperity while ushering in economic developments in Greater East Asia.

So far, the new economic policies have only strengthened the "dual structure" of Japan's economy. Inflation is moving up, driven by massive industrial investments and added by infrastructural expansions and construction booms triggered by the Olympics, yet rural and other less developed sectors are still not seeing much productivity improvement. Many are unsure how much of this boom is sustainable, and concerns of economic overheating are rising. Yet the Funada cabinet believes not only is the current economic boom sustainable, but it is a good thing to encourage it even further.

The Yokusan System by 1962

For the sake of this proposal I will be titling the combined political efforts of the **Taisei Yokusankai** (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), the **Yokusan Seijikai** (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association), and the **Yokusan Sonendan** (Imperial Rule Assistance Young Men's Corps.) as "The Yokusan System". This system is meant to encompass not only these three political organizations, but also all subsequent efforts at the local level, from women's groups, to industrial unions, the **Sanpō** (Industrial Patriotic Organization), and various advocacy groups for local farmers. The Yokusan System is a historiographical term, but similar usage was applied in the political environment of the 1940's. For instance, the 1942 General Elections was pejoratively deemed "The Yokusan Election" as it was the first major "democratic" test for the Yokusan Political System and its slate of recommended politicians, which it would "succeed" in with flying colors, winning 381 of the 466 seats in contention.

The Yokusan System by 1962 is an extremely byzantine labyrinth of various bureaucratic organizations and political associations, only somewhat further consolidated through the decade of peacetime governance and kept together largely due to political ossification. Its mandate to rule and enforce the laws of the various local and national associations are largely provided by the sweeping powers of the home ministry, and various precedents opened by many other partial attempts by various reform bureaucrats throughout the years in creating yet another organization that would decisively bring together parliament, the government and Imperial Rule, that would yet again fail. The Yokusan System's main apparatus consists of three primary organs: 大政翼賛会 (The Taisei Yokusankai, henceforth titled the IRAA), 翼賛政治会 (The Yokusan Seijikai, henceforth titled IRAPA), and 大日本翼賛壮年団 (The Yokusan Sonendan, henceforth termed IRAYMC). These three organs operate as extensions and syntheses of imperial, bureaucratic and local government.

The Yokusan System traces its roots to 1940 with the New Order Movement, the ideological progenitor and backbone for the framework that would guide the Yokusan System throughout its years in the political wilderness. The New Order Movement was a wide-spanning backlash among Japanese economists, bureaucrats, politicians and intellectuals to what they saw as the combined failures of democracy, the free market, and ideological liberalism as demonstrated by the rapid surrender of the French Republic, the Great Depression, and the general incapacity for liberalism to provide a substantial answer to the rising tides of radicalism globally. Democracy was considered obsolete and decrepit by this point, to which the New Order Movement felt that Japan had to respond with sweeping political reforms.

The New Order Movement would see its katechon in the form of the Second Konoe Government, which would galvanize the aggrievements that not only the reform-minded political class would have of Liberalism and Liberal Democracy, but the broader pessimism that the Japanese population had of Japanese democracy and aristocratic government. Konoe would use his second

government as a means of promoting these radical and ambitious changes to the Japanese government, starting first with the IRAA. The IRAA was initially intended to be a broad, unified political organization meant to mobilize the parliamentary system, the economic aspects of the home front, and be a vehicle for sweeping social reform meant to revolutionize Japanese society towards their vision of a renovated and modern society.

This is not what would happen. When the four major parties represented in parliament, the Rikken Minseitou, the Rikken Seiyuukai, the Kokumin Domei, and the Shakai Taishuutou, would all agree to dissolve and centralize themselves alongside every major public organization around the IRAA, many institutions and much of the status-quo minded classes: The Incumbent Zaibatsus, the mainstream, constitutionally-minded political class, the hereditary nobility, and others, panicked upon recognizing the degree of radicalism that Konoe would be enabling, pushing, at times demanding, him to cull many of the more radical members of an already abstract and schizophrenic political project, and placing in their stead Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, who would systematically dismantle the more politically radical aspects of the IRAA and transform it into a more apolitical organization which would be placed under the auspices of the Home Ministry.

The IRAA would be further de-radicalized upon the collapse of Konoe Fumimaro's government following what his government would perceive as no foreseeable means to prevent an impending intervention by the United States over the War in China and its spillovers in Southeast Asia. Under the government of Tojo Hideki, the Yokusan system would first be expanded with the IRAPA, which would place together all major political institutions, both that of the political parties in the lower house and the peerage of the Upper House, into a single partisan organization parallel to the now more logistically-oriented IRAA, and would henceforth provide a joint list of recommended politicians to be voted upon in all future elections indefinitely. This expansion would incorporate many more moderating voices into the Yokusan System, which cast it further into the wilderness and would permanently calcify the Yokusan System's capacity for radical change. On the logistical front, the Yokusan System would then see its final major expansion with the Imperial Rule Assistance Young Men's Corps, the IRAYMC. The IRAYMC would be a move towards what many saw as the reformist intent of the creation of the Yokusan System in the first place, as it would begin organizing and rallying local party branches and institute discipline at the local level to the demands of the broader decrees and dictates of the IRAA/IRAPA.

The Yokusan System by 1961 will not have changed significantly as a consequence of the end of the war. While there would be numerous attempts by various reformist governments throughout the 1950's to move it towards its more absolutist intentions, no government in particular would succeed in impressing this vision onto the very obstinate political class it intended to incorporate and unify. While the IRAA would remain in a position of central control of the economy owing to the prerogatives granted to it during the war, gradually the Japanese would relinquish further and

further control back to private interests and the general domestic market, moving towards a position ever slightly more interventionist than that of the MITI in OTL, as the IRAA would still maintain the mandate of dictating trade policy and implementing various administrative reforms on Japanese economic sectors such as agriculture, while the MITI primarily functioned as a vehicle for the distribution of strategic tariffs, subsidies, and occasionally price controls. The IRAYMC would gradually disarm owing to broader demilitarization, and the IRAPA remains largely stagnant given the lack of movement in either direction between the more mainstream Japanese conservatives and the now fully entrenched reformists of the central government.

Paths

Japan will have six main political paths split between three larger “macro-branches” - the Pro-System branch, the Anti-System branch, and the New System branch. All three macro-branches are defined by how the system reacts to the aftermath of the Yasuda Crisis. The Pro-System Branch occurs if the player prevents the Crisis from spiraling out of control, and witnesses the establishment attempt to “fix” the system. The Anti-System Branch occurs if the Crisis spirals out of control, and witnesses the losers of the past 20 years come into power and attempt to build a new system. The New System Branch occurs if the player is only partially successful at handling the Crisis, and is about Konoe, Asanuma, and Matsumae trying to build a social-totalitarian Japan.

Introduction

Funada (1962 - 1963)

For Funada Naka in 1962, the handling of the Aleutian Crisis will take precedence over all other priorities. It serves as a terrifying but welcome distraction for the Japanese society, which had been reeling from the bloodshed of Niigata as well as the failure to kick off land reforms. As the world-ending confrontation greatly reshapes the public worldview and heightens the sense of Cold War, the change of mood when the Crisis ends in a mutual backdown can only be equally immense.

As someone who had been practicing high politics since joining national politics, the peaceful conclusion of the Crisis should allow the triumphant Funada to advance his agenda even further. But before that, he will be required to deal with the diplomatic fallout of the Aleutian Crisis first. Above all, he must make a hard choice between reducing the Japanese presence in the Americas to minimize further friction or making overtures to Europe to counterbalance the renewed American pressures.

Likewise, his following main contents will blend with high politics too. Since taking office, Funada and his Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato have introduced the ambitious Income Doubling Plan already, and multiple massive development projects had been going on for a while before the Aleutian Crisis sidetracked them. Funada, Ikeda, and the Young Turks all see the Plan primarily as a way to guide the weary masses back into a collective national unity, but Funada in particular attaches another Cold War facet to the Plan as the means to compete with American might, without triggering a mutual assured destruction like the Aleutian Crisis almost did. Thus, the Income Doubling Plan is incorporated with Cold War political implications, and the messages of economic development spread across Greater East Asia, resulting in the Greater East Asia Economic Conference of January 1963 (Manchukuo contents under the name of Pan-Asian Economic Conference) - along with new innovative ways for embezzlement and corruption.

But the Income Doubling Plan will be not without troubles and detractors. Bureaucrats like Kaya Okinori promote an opposing vision for the Plan, looking to turn the Plan into a wealth redistribution scheme, while the questions over whether to prioritize economic rationality or balanced development for new projects, whether to hold off tax cuts or reduce investments, etc., arise. The ultimate conclusion to Funada's Income Doubling Plan contents is his preparation for the 1964 Olympics and its accompanying project to renovate Tokyo, at the peak of the blend of modernity, developmentalism, and Cold War international propaganda.

Besides the Income Doubling Plan are the activation of the 'Gotoda Machine', which opens up the intelligence agency mechanics and its subsequent contents unlocking more operations, and the reorganization of the Agricultural Association, which concerns a domestic, low politics item and thus appropriate to introduce the Imperial Diet mechanics. Ostensibly, this reorganization is meant to reorganize the Agricultural Association, which has long served as an agricultural arm of the state and now stands as the symbol of state oppression against peasants, into an independent national organization. However, the actual outcome may vary depending on the options taken during the consideration. The reform may end up superficial, giving the reorganized entity no actual autonomy, or even broken up and dissolved altogether into local agricultural cooperatives. Such outcomes should have implications for the paths that are relevant to agricultural cooperatives.

The above contents should be completed by Mar 1963, as Funada calls an election by that point. Funada's dissolution of the Diet unlocks the election mechanics, which at first is seemingly biased towards the Young Turks but gets shaken by the avalanche of corruption cases during mid-March. On April 3rd, the Yasuda Crash fires, and the Imperial Diet is unavailable with the next election still 25 days away, (April 28th). The only immediately available actor to respond is the Funada administration, but the revelation of the state involvement in corruption schemes completely evaporates public trust in Funada, and the governmental measures to the crash are immediately accused of nepotism. Thus a general crisis is allowed to happen.

Pro-System Branch

In the Pro-System Branch, the establishment survives the Yasuda Crisis and is given the chance to put Japanese society back in order. While popular dissent grows, because of the conservative consolidation the authorities keep a tight handle on the situation. Society in these times is much as it has been for the last decade. Thousands of bureaucrats and executives manipulate pieces of the corporate state in accordance with various administrative theories. Radical and reformist civilian urbanites swallow bitterness and face elites with appeal and suasion to salvage scraps of their goals. If they should dare deviate from the way of the subject, they are no match for the vigilant police. The divided, drained, and seething countryside remains the main area of contestation.

Kaya (1963 - 1965)

Despotism
Managerial State



Kaya Okinori
(賀屋興宣)

The two groups capable of wielding power, the bureaucracy represented by Fukuda Takeo and the IRAPA under Kawashima, will both read different lessons from the crisis. Fukuda and the bureaucrats blame the IRAPA's political meddling for causing the Crisis, while Kawashima and the party castigate the bureaucracy as out of touch and ignorant of local conditions.

In the immediate aftermath of the Yasuda Crisis, however, neither Fukuda nor Kawashima will be able to push their vision for Japan very far. Kaya Okinori, a respected Peer with a wealth of experience working in and with the Finance Ministry, will become Prime Minister with the goal of putting the economy back on track towards stable growth and restoring social order. Kaya should be viewed here as the leader of a coalition of the main establishment forces, proving they still have what it takes to rule the country. Opportunities for political or social reform in this phase will thus be very limited with one exception - the formation of the Greater Japan Political Association.

As the economy shows clear signs of recovery, Kaya's coalition will seek to revise the postwar consensus in favor of the conservative forces by dissolving the IRAPA and IRAYMC and replacing them with the GJPA. While this new party will be controlled by Kawashima's faction, preserving their place as the head of the pro-government camp in the Diet, it will also shed its most troublesome elements in the Young Turks and extend its branches into the countryside, aiming to dismantle the IRAYMC's political machine. This is a tricky process which can involve co-opting and shedding different parts of them.

While this is going on, Fukuda and Kawashima will also be competing for influence in order to succeed Kaya. To this end, both of them will try to push their own responses to the crises as a part of Kaya's cabinet, but they will also try to convince Japan's various elite power brokers - the Jūshin, zaibatsu, unaligned parts of the bureaucracy and Diet - to support them for Prime Minister. The renovation of the political scene through the GJPA will also be a part of this power struggle, as choices made by the player over the reach of the party strengthen either Fukuda or Kawashima. By mid-1965, Kaya will no longer be able to hold his coalition together and will be forced to resign in favor of either Fukuda or Kawashima, who will then call a snap election to secure their power base in the Diet. With the system's survival thus secured, Kaya's successor can start to enact the political and social reforms they couldn't under him.

Of course, just because GDP is starting to go up again, it doesn't mean that discontent has disappeared. The system's survival will deal a major blow to the established anti-establishment forces of Kishi, Miki, and Kōno, but it will also give Tanaka Kakuei the chance to turn his small regionalist coalition into a major force at the national level. Tanaka will thus become the new face of a much more unified anti-establishment movement that, if Kaya's successor fails to maintain stability, can seize power.

Kawashima/Gotōda (1965 - 1972)

<p>Despotism Aristocratic Conservatism</p>

<p>Kawashima Shōjirō (川島正次郎)</p>

The Kawashima path begins in 1965, as Kaya's cabinet falls with Kawashima in the ascendant over Fukuda. The faction Kawashima leads (descended from the Seiyūkai faction of Maeda Yonezō) is relatively small, but this is less due to any surfeit of political power and more due to

his selectivity for cohesion and quality. His faction is preeminent among the GJPA Mainstream Wing thanks to his Fouchean political maneuvers and hold over key GJPA posts.

Kawashima Shōjirō represents the interests of the "new middle-class", the social products of the wartime heavy and chemical industrialization, who owe their status to expanded state institutions and military-production industries. Of the Pro-System prime ministers, he is the most keenly aware of the dire situation of the Empire and the Sphere it has established for survival. Not only is it pressed on the outside by Nazi and American militarism and machinations, but on the inside by an endless cavalcade of subversive elements seeking to carve their own petty fortunes out of greatness. Worse, the state apparatus, the brain of it all, is riddled with lily-livered weaklings who believe they somehow can accommodate the rot. To save the Empire requires the concentration of force. The concentration of money.

Kawashima's policies will strengthen the uneven concentration of economic power towards the developed areas, swing the balance within the economic dual structure in favor of Zaibatsu to the detriment of small and medium enterprises, and allow rural sectors to be subordinated to the urban economy, thereby marginalizing the 'lower' social groups into the peripheral sphere and allowing the privileged "new middle-class" to cement their hegemony within Japanese society. In contrast to Fukuda, Kawashima can reach some of the highest possible growth rates for Japan, but he will have more difficulty in mass politics, in resolving social crises, and in enduring economic headwinds.

Neither Kawashima's agenda nor his survival are reliant on maintaining harmony; he simply has to maintain the ability to get legislation through the diet to get his way. The precise method in which he does this can be left to the player.

Kawashima's main tool to control the System is to exercise the authority of the parliament, and he will seek to dismantle bureaucratic autonomy and assemble independent policy expertise in extraministerial cabinet organs to coordinate state policies. Gotōda Masaharu, a capable bureaucratic coordinator, will serve Kawashima as his Chief Cabinet Secretary. Electioneering will probably prove one of his main challenges. Though the first election he holds after becoming prime minister will be a major success, revenging the failed 1963 election, preventing the GJPA from slipping in subsequent elections will be difficult despite high growth. Social issues take center stage following the Akō Crisis, and as he is less able to concede to Tanaka they will prove harder for Kawashima to manage than for Fukuda.

The Akō Crisis is a challenge for Kawashima's diet strategy as well in its aftermath. The GJPA will cleave together during the Crisis due to their mutual loathing of grassroots land redistribution movements, but after it is successfully resolved they disagree on how to deal with the root issues of the crisis. Many bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats, especially in Home and Agriculture, believe

Japan's agrarian problems are definitely unsolvable without reforming the Agricultural Associations and may even require a moderate land redistribution, a proposal deeply resented and feared by representatives of landed interests in the HoR and many peers. These representatives insist that the basic problem lies with unbalanced development and the depression of agricultural prices with respect to industrial prices, and insist on a comprehensive agrarian rescue program, wherein the government would ensure support prices for soft commodities, bail out indebted tenants, embark on new construction projects in the countryside, and put in place protectionist measures against cheap Sphere produce. Left unspoken is how massively the landowning nobility and gentry would profit from this all. Both gentry and agrarian bureaucrat politicians are present throughout the GJPA, and will temporarily disentangle from their factions to advocate for their solution.

Meanwhile, the countryside will still be seething, and renewed protests may break out, keeping Japan's agrarian problems in the spotlight. As a politician with a decidedly urban focus, Kawashima has the leeway to take either side in this fight over the fate of Japan's lesser regions. However, his intervention to pass one of the competing agrarian plans will outrage whichever side he does not take, ensuring their permanence, cratering their support for the government, and moving them to the Anti-Mainstream. To reduce the impact of this alienation, Kawashima can work on peeling off more moderate members of each side with minor concessions and diet maneuvers, but this will require potentially alienating the other side and in any case delaying the desired action.

The longer it takes for Kawashima to put together a viable response to Japan's agrarian problems, the more time Tanaka has to re-consolidate the populist right into a consistent opposition force to the government, complicating the political calculus of the response further. If no viable response can be made, simmering agrarian dissent and protest will simply continue, represented by a negative National Spirit, while Tanaka's new National Political Coalition will both narrow Kawashima's room for political maneuver and make future elections more difficult. A successful response, on the other hand, will re-fragment the out-of-party right.

Despotism
Managerial State



Gotōda Masaharu
(後藤田正晴)

As Kawashima's health begins to decline thanks to old age and chronic asthma, he will spend more and more time recuperating on a Pacific island while his CCS Gotōda runs the country for him. He will die, with no apparent successor, in the November of 1970. His demise coincides with the breakout of the Oil Crisis, and the complexity of the foreign problems that will engulf Japan makes Gotōda, a foundational figure in the intelligence field from his work in the Funada government, the pick of the Jūshin for handling the situation. The urgency of the situation and fundamental outsider nature of Gotōda means he will keep all of the same people in his cabinet, but the now-Gotōda cabinet will come under increasing scrutiny from the party, which seeks to influence and eventually overtake policy-making from the cabinet, emphasizing the Imperial Diet's ability to represent and recruit from a diverse range of interests and expertise.

While Kawashima sought to increase the power of the Diet because that was where his power lay, Gotōda's strengths lie elsewhere, in his knowledge of and relationships with key players in the State. Compared to Kawashima he is a cooler head with less insecurity, but in the pursuit of Japan's internal and external security, he is ruthless, aiming at both the individual troublemakers and the intellectuals or superpowers who egg them on with equanimity. He will seek to survive political and economic crises by asserting the cabinet's authority without alienating the confidence of the party without which he can pass no legislation or confirm no edict. Here, the narrative dichotomy of bureaucracy vs Imperial Diet will transition into the dichotomy of cabinet vs party. To succeed and remain in his post past the end of the crisis, and get to actually finishing the job Kawashima started, Gotōda will have to pacify (exclude) all of Japan's IGs and deprive the Diet of the mass and elite class assertion that gives it its power. Gotōda will also have to

resign shortly after the resolution of the Korean Hostage Crisis if it occurs in a major way, but otherwise he will stay into the TNO2 time period.

Fukuda (1965 - 1972)

<p>Despotism Managerial State</p>

<p>Fukuda Takeo (福田赳夫)</p>

The Fukuda path will begin in 1965, as Kaya's cabinet falls with Fukuda in the ascendant over Kawashima. As the second prime minister in a row from both the Peers and the controversial Kenkyūkai specifically, it is necessary for him to collect positive support from the IRAPA dietmen to showcase his ability to control both sides of the Diet. While he will mostly be targeting the old Mainstream factions, he will also have support from a new diet faction led by fellow Finance bureaucrat and Ikeda protege Miyazawa, consisting predominantly of former Young Turks who now repudiate the disastrous Income Doubling plan. One of his first acts as premier will be to call for new elections, allowing the new GJPA to surge back from the IRAPA's 1963 humiliation and again hold a whopping majority.

The political watchword of the Fukuda cabinet is 'Cooperation and Unity'. The goal is for the Japanese masses to be cooperative with the bureaucracy, whence the nation will be united, providing benefits for the other elites as well: peace in the countryside for the gentry, marginalization of radical politicians for business and the nobility, and a suitable political environment for retrenchment abroad for the military. To that end, he intends to continue the plans of the Kaya cabinet, maintaining a balanced budget and prioritizing social spending over infrastructure, tax cuts, or militarism, while strengthening bureaucratic control over the economy.

The Fukuda Cabinet is supported in the Representatives by the GJPA, and many of its ministers are GJPA dietmen, but it is not a GJPA cabinet. Its agenda is quite divergent with the gentry-based politics of the dietmen, and to prevent them from overthrowing him (leading to the Miyazawa failstate) he must play a balancing game with the factions of the GJPA, keeping as many of them as possible in a state of looking to garner favors from him instead of at the benefits they could accrue without him. This is the main conflict of the Fukuda path.

To balance the factions of the GJPA, Fukuda will need to use all the tools the Representatives interface offers. Ultimately he will aim to increase the power of his tools. For example, he can increase his relations with the Court, allowing him to call in major Imperial orders such as cabinet reshuffles more often. He can also aim to secure control of the organs of the GJPA and IRAA, allowing him to use committee assignment and electoral recommendation (whenever he wishes elections to occur) as disciplinary tools against Dietmen.

Outside the Diet, the harmony between classes becomes a crucial issue after the nationwide protests of the Akō crisis. Fukuda's policy will make him better able to withstand this crisis, but there still are negative outcomes should Fukuda fail to maintain the harmony between social classes after the end of the crisis. If he gives into the pressure from labour or from Tanaka, this will alienate elite IGs, leading to problems in the Diet and possibly from there to Miyazawa. But if he angers the people, and in particular if he should fail to pacify Japan's tenant farmers and renew nationwide protests, it would discredit his policy, possibly leading to Tanaka (especially if Tanaka develops and keeps good relations with the Court, which is a real possibility if he joins government).

Even if he averts protests, failing to solve social issues will strengthen the challenge from the populist right wing led by Tanaka Kakuei alongside dissidents from the former IRAYMC and whatever would be left of Kishi's corporatist mass movement. If the GJPA performs disappointingly in elections, it will increase discontent among the remaining dietmen. Fukuda has popular policies which can help him in elections, and if Tanaka's faction is included only large victories are possible as the opposition will lack any sort of cohesion, but managing this faction's demands for both policy and seats will erode support among the mainstream if they are given into, and lead to his secession from GJPA if too many of them are rejected. The higher the support and lower the activism of his tenant farmer base, the more reasonable he will be.

The diet balancing game will become more difficult as it goes on. An especial turning point is the retirement of Matsumura Kenzō in 1969. With Matsumura out of the picture, the old Anti-Mainstream wing will unify under a clique of younger leadership and display a vigor and direction in its criticisms of bureaucratic leadership that it hasn't shown for decades. With Kawashima and other Mainstream leaders seizing on the moment, the diet will become more

difficult to handle and may start to stonewall legislation as well as Fukuda's annual requests for budget increases.

To solve this, Fukuda has choices. The first avenue he can take is to lean on the Imperial Court to give him the ordinances necessary to allocate more money without the diet, risking painting himself as an autocrat and alienating the Court. The second avenue is to use mass organizations, like the Sanpō or IRAA, to implement programs from the pockets of their members and bypass the budget entirely. This of course involves quick policy drafting, leans on the functionality of the mass organizations, and poses political-economic problems. Miyazawa will also personally benefit by emerging as a popular critic of this political approach, making him more dangerous and serious a challenger.

During the Oil Crisis, Fukuda will have to take bold, decisive steps to ensure that Japan gets its rightful share of the Sphere's petroleum output and align the economy with the reality of finite natural resources. But if he has managed to fully implement his policy, it will hardly be a crisis at all politically. Rather, as his policy will have made Japan's economy quite robust, it will have notably fewer economic problems than other countries, and he will receive kudos for his skilled and willful management, boosting his political position in the Diet. However, if he bows to pressure and pursues a strategy of heedlessly spurring economic growth through monetary and fiscal policy, his political position will be quite eroded.

Tanaka (Failstate)⁷

<p>Conservatism Populist Conservatism</p>

<p>Tanaka Kakuei (田中角栄)</p>

⁷ 'Failstate' in this proposal refers to a non-endgame path without content.

The Tanaka path will begin in 1967 after the player has failed to deal with the nationwide protests in either the Fukuda or Kawashima paths. Similar to Ōkuma Shigenobu some 70 years earlier, Tanaka here is an outsider appointed as a measure of last resort by the establishment, expected to either moderate himself once in power or crash spectacularly and take his movement with him. His path will thus be a struggle to hold onto power while walking a tightrope between tarnishing his image as a champion of the common man on the one hand, and smashing head-first into a wall of entrenched institutional resistance on the other. If he succeeds, his path will end up being the most democratic insofar as this implies as much as government as possible is responsible to an elected parliament. Failure, however, will be much more common.

Tanaka's main agenda upon taking office will be fulfilling his popular mandate to carry out a sweeping land reform that puts land directly in the hands of the peasants who till them. Given that the riots have been bad enough to put Tanaka in power, passing a bill through the Diet shouldn't be too difficult, especially if new elections have been called to give his side a majority. Discussion in the Diet is one thing however - enforcing it is another. Much of Tanaka's premiership should be concerned with actually carrying out the land reform he has passed, and here success and failure should both be real options. Besides that, Tanaka should also take aim at the bureaucratic leviathan that his base of small businessmen and peasants have every reason to despise - dismantling the system of economic controls strengthened by Fukuda or left in place by Kawashima should thus be a close second priority, and one that should encounter far more fierce resistance. Given his reputation as a corrupt politician in OTL, it's not difficult to imagine him making under-the-table deals to speed this process along and benefit his supporters.

Much of Tanaka's powerful support in his home prefecture of Niigata in OTL came from his ability to direct lavish amounts of government funding in the prefecture. His economic policy should essentially be this but on a nationwide scale, spending widely on projects designed primarily to benefit the 'forgotten' areas of rural Japan. Tanaka is also likely to have business interests all over the Co-Prosperity Sphere, so his investment spree may extend all over Asia. These are much less sound economic policies than Fukuda or Kawashima's, but they serve an important function in building his support base. This is one of the many trade-offs for Tanaka's Japan.

Miyazawa (Failstate)

Paternalism
Paternalistic
Developmentalism



Miyazawa Kiichi
(宮澤喜一)

Miyazawa Kiichi's rise to power is a direct consequence of Fukuda Takeo's failure to maintain the delicate balance between the Diet and the bureaucracy. As Fukuda's grip on the GJPA weakens due to factional infighting, social unrest, or poor electoral performance, Miyazawa emerges as the compromise candidate, backed by a coalition of disillusioned Dietmen and former Young Turks who reject Fukuda's bureaucratic centralization. His ascent is framed as a return to a more collaborative style of governance, one that prioritizes harmony within the Diet and responsiveness to the demands of the middle class. However, Miyazawa's path to power is less a triumph of his own vision and more a reaction to Fukuda's overreach, leaving him with a fragile mandate and a deeply divided political landscape.

Unlike Fukuda, who sought to strengthen bureaucratic control over the economy and society, Miyazawa allows decentralization of power, opening the "money tap" to win over Dietmen and placate the middle class with targeted economic stimulus. His policies focus on tax cuts, increased infrastructure spending, and maintaining popular programs of Fukuda's making. However, his agenda is inherently contradictory: while he empowers the Diet, his personal clique is itself bureaucratic and he will fiercely defend his class's prerogatives once Fukuda's encroachments are rolled back. Whereas Fukuda was a bureaucrat with a vision of bureaucratic hegemony over the political process, Miyazawa is a bureaucrat with no vision at all.

Miyazawa's initial style will be "low-posture", seeking to represent all major GJPA and Peers factions in decisions. This will compensate for his young age, superior attitude, and short temper

in allowing him to maintain good relations with all factions, but it will lead to a notably slow pace in getting anything done. His middle-class base, while initially supportive, quickly becomes disillusioned as his reforms fail to deliver immediate results, while tenant farmer groups sense weakness and grow restless. Within months, Miyazawa finds himself trapped between the competing demands of the Diet, the bureaucracy, and the public, unable to satisfy any of them fully and increasingly seen as a weak and indecisive leader.

New System Branch

In the New System Branch, the IRAPA ceases to be an effective control mechanism for politics, but no similar liberalization takes place societally. Instead, the struggle between popular renovationism and elite conservatism continues along the same lines as before, with no unbridgeable fissure between different types of renovationist existing and with discontent at the Diet's and Cabinet's factionalism growing daily. It is the perfect setup for the top-down revolution that Konoe intends. However, after this great upheaval, the social bases of the various renovationists will begin to assert themselves, and the natural fissures among the various leading groups will take center stage. The elite factionalism of the Diet will be replaced by an all-classes factional struggle to use the new totalitarian party to their advantage. Movement leaders will act on their own, and the political figures they support will often be left chasing after them.

Konoe (1963 - 1966)

Despotism
Interim Government



Konoe Fumimaro
(近衛文麿)

In contrast to the Pro-System and Anti-System branches, the New System branch sees a return to the wartime solution of totalitarian state established through sweeping reforms, and contains the most radical outcomes in TNO Japan. The basic gist of it is that Konoe Fumimarō is appointed Prime Minister to rescue the establishment from the earthquakes of the Yasuda Crisis, but once in power, works behind the scenes with Asanuma Inejirō and Matsumae Shigeyoshi to resurrect the New System Movement, culminating in the establishment of a new totalitarian body in 1966 that the would-be dictator will not live long enough to lead, leaving his two allies to carry on the work in their own vision.

As stated before, the path will begin in 1963 as Konoe Fumimarō is appointed Prime Minister to lead a national unity cabinet to deal with the aftermath of the Yasuda Crisis. As a political veteran and figure well-connected with various establishment forces, Konoe is a natural choice for a successor to Funada, and one well in line with established tradition. Konoe's backers - virtually the entire political establishment - will expect him to fix the economy, provide a trusted face for the government, and then resign once his task is complete, but the man himself has other plans. While he cleans up the mess of the Yasuda Crisis, Konoe will begin working in secret with Asanuma Inejirō and Matsumae Shigeyoshi to recreate the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in its intended form as an all-powerful, totalitarian body. Once his given task of stabilizing the situation is fulfilled (presumably early 1965) Konoe will organize a mass resignation of his cabinet, and then will form a Fifth Konoe Cabinet, which will be filled with like-minded reformists who will support the reconstruction of the IRAA.

Fascism

Corporate Statism



Konoe Fumimaro

(近衛文麿)

This cabinet will act as a normal Japanese cabinet for one regular diet session. During this time, while ministers find their way around the bureaucracies they lead, Konoe has a number of choices

to ingratiate his cabinet with the people and make easier what comes next. He can back legislation which is too progressive for the House of Representatives, drawing a contrast between conservative political figures and himself. He can attempt to reform the Privy Council, passing widely popular but anti-bureaucratic and dubiously constitutional legislation in order to provoke an early confrontation with the 'Palladium of the Constitution' on grounds favorable to himself. He can even attempt to pass pragmatic legislation aimed at common national goals.

Once this mandatory yearly diet session comes to an end (estimated spring 1965), Konoe will begin the second phase of his branch - finding a justification to invoke Articles 8 and 70 of the constitution, which allow him to pass laws and only later get the consent of the Diet, to make changes the Diet would never agree to. He should be able to find a suitable justification in the many foreign crises of the year and the severe drought in China straining food supply.

Once he has achieved this, Konoe will then have until that December to build support and reshape the institutions of the New Order before the Diet reconvenes. In this phase he must achieve control of the IRAA, IRAYMC, and Sanpō, either replacing their leadership and reforming them from within or creating entirely new organizations out of what is still vital and progressive in their local and prefectural chapters. Another important goal is formulating popular programs to introduce by ordinance, increasing his public approval.

During this time, many conservative and establishmentarian figures will attempt to organize against the Konoe Cabinet. They will attempt to stir the Imperial Court against Konoe's ordinances, meeting with Imperial princes, court figures, and Jushin and ultimately intending to influence the Emperor's immediate advisors to advise him to refrain from changing Japanese law to his liking. Additionally, if the Privy Council has not been completely suborned already, which most of the time it should not have been, it will attempt to find flaws in your ordinances and veto them as unconstitutional. This is a process of some length, and with his allies in the press Konoe can provoke a fusillade of criticism of the gerontocratic and undemocratic role of the Privy Council, and may suborn it completely with a reform granting cabinet ministers more influence from their roles as titular Privy Councillors.

The final phase of Konoe's seizure of power is to take control of the Diet. So when the Diet convenes in December, he will dissolve it on the first day, call for elections in five months time, and reissue all previous imperial ordinances plus a new one allowing his public organizations to campaign openly for candidates. Konoe will aim to construct an alliance of progressive forces and candidates, centered around the National Salvation Society led by Inejirō Asanuma, to win control of the Representatives, and will use the Home Ministry's election-influencing power to full advantage while the IRAA, Sanpō, and IRAYMC (or new organizations fulfilling their role) campaign for his candidates and harass their opponents.

At this time, the attitude of the Court is crucial, and the Privy Council will certainly attempt to challenge Konoe's actions. If Konoe loses his ordinances and can not reissue them in time, his allies will be demoralized, the progressive forces will be muffled, and the people will be confused and not vote in favor of his pro-ministry alliance. After failing in the election, for whatever reason, Konoe will resign and this will lead to the failstate path of Takagi Sōkichi.

If Konoe's supporters win a majority, then his project will succeed and he will become the dictator of Japan, uniting all of the mass organizations loyal to him with his Diet majority in a new party. He will then pass away mere months later. Either Asanuma or Matsumae will succeed him, depending on who is more influential within the new party.

Asanuma (1966 - 1972)

Progressivism
Mass Productivism



Asanuma Inejirō
(浅沼稻次郎)

The Asanuma path will begin in 1966, following the death of Konoe Fumimaro. In contrast to the game up until this point, the years until the oil crisis will be a relatively stable period where the player is able to implement their agenda without any major crises.

Asanuma's main goal in this path will be to overcome capitalism and Japan's persistent backwardness through cooperation with the Patriotic Industrial Association (PIA) to ascend to a post-capitalist system of patriotic productivism.⁸ In practice, this is going to mean expanding

⁸ The Patriotic Industrial Association, also known as Sanpō, was a state-controlled labor union created in 1940 and strongly supported by the country's legal left as the realization of their goals, though it later fell well short of their expectations.

Japan's 'productive forces' (the zaibatsu) while also using the PIA to assert control over their internal management, creating a 'dual hierarchy' of business and the PIA in management of which the latter should eventually dominate. This will naturally go hand in hand with his other main goal of improving the lives of Japan's working class. Justifying himself in the language of Cold War necessity through emphasizing the need to maximize the nation's human power, Asanuma will continue the work of building a welfare state begun in the wartime era, attempting to expand welfare provisions, implement a living wage, and construct a universal healthcare system. In theory, these reforms taken together should destroy the country's feudal elements and overcome the crisis of modernity at the same time, and in game, they will integrate or exclude the Mass IGs.

In implementing these reforms, however, Asanuma will face significant resistance from big business, the House of Peers, and conservative elements in the court, all of which will have managed to survive the initial *gleichschaltung*. They will act as a check on the government's radicalism, forcing the player to tone down or blocking altogether different reforms. While the court and peerage won't be touchable from 1966-1970, business and the Elite IGs will be. Working through the focus tree will unlock options to integrate them, which will let the player push through steadily more radical options. Expanding the political influence of the new IRAA - which he should stack with a mix of sympathetic reformist bureaucrats and fellow socialists from the Diet - will be one of the main ways Asanuma overcomes the Elite IGs.

Like in most tags, the player's biggest challenge will come near the end of the game during the Oil Crisis. While Asanuma scrambles to halt the economic bleeding, the remaining conservative elements in Japanese society, which up until now have remained relatively quiet, will seize at their chance to overthrow what they see as a crypto-communist regime. Depending on how successful the player has been in dealing with the IGs, they will either survive the crisis and be able to complete Konoe's *gleichschaltung*, or fail and be replaced by a moderate figure within the new IRAA. As the path ends, Asanuma, recognizing his declining health, will begin considering a successor.

Matsumae (1966 - 1972)

Fascism

Techno-Fascism



Matsumae Shigeyoshi
(松前重義)

The Matsumae path starts in 1966. Following the death of Prince Konoe, fears spread among Japan's capitalist classes that his most natural successor, Asanuma Inejiro, plots a communist revolution from above. They rally around Matsumae Shigeyoshi, who through internal maneuvers succeeds to party leadership and thus becomes Prime Minister of Japan. His path is defined by the struggle between his own agenda, at least as radical as Asanuma's, and the interests of the organizations which brought him to power.

Matsumae's watchword is to transform Japan into a 'science-oriented society'. This means placing technicians in leadership wherever possible, in a manner not particularly congruent with the interests of any other group: to place technical-bureaucrats over law-bureaucrats in the ministries, production engineers over both labor and management in the Sanpo, accredited agronomers over gentry and tenants in the agricultural associations, etc. It also means increasing research spending, revamping education to produce more technical graduates, and centralizing the nation's research so that all national producers might benefit from it. The end goal, if he gets his way, is a rational economy and society, directed by the state rather than by owners and oriented for growth rather than for consumption.

Of course, Matsumae does not have the political support to do that, not just yet. He will have to meet the demands of the various groups comprising his party: the interest groups, more or less. The diet and court are not particularly friendly to Matsumae's agenda, and he can not allow the resurgent factional spirits in his party to break it apart. The Zaibatsu are in a particularly strong

position, as Matsumae's scientific development plans require not just the compliance but the active cooperation of their large research apparatus.

Ultimately, Matsumae wants to replace his IG support with control of the bureaucracy and party organs. While he does this, he also pursues a partial version of his agenda, starting with items which are relatively uncontroversial such as expansion of education and R&D investment, and forges internal consensus for steadily enacting greater reform expanding technical-bureaucratic control.

When the Oil Crisis arrives, Matsumae will see both danger and opportunity. On one hand, there is a severe threat to the Japanese economy. On the other hand, he now has the perfect excuse to radically upend that same economy. To adapt to the new normal of high fuel prices, Japan needs its technicians and engineers to change every facet of production and society. This radical course of action will injure and upset a significant number of people in every social class, and bring Matsumae on a collision course with the forces who placed him in charge to prevent a radical socialist top-down revolution. Depending on Matsumae's success in controlling powerful institutions and dealing with IGs, he will either succeed and completely consolidate his position within the party by purging internal opposition, or fail and be forced into retirement.

Takagi (Failstate)

<p>Despotism Interim Government</p>

<p>Takagi Sōkichi (高木惣吉)</p>

The Takagi path begins on the heels of Konoe's failed attempt to turn Japan into a progressive party-dictatorship. Baron Takagi Sōkichi is the president of the IRAPA, having led it through the post-Yasuda period of massive defection and preserved it through cooperation with the Fourth

Konoe Cabinet. During this period he was a renovationist figure in the government, working with the likes of Matsumae Shigeyoshi and Yabe Teiji to promote reform. However, he is at his core a moderate, and became a key figure in the opposition against the radical Fifth Konoe Cabinet, using his renovationist links to weaken Konoe's efforts from behind and his IRAPA faction to attack it in public.

With help from the Privy Council and influential Jushin, the Third Movement to Protect Constitutional Government succeeded in winning a majority in the Representatives. As Prince Konoe Fumimarō resigns in shame before the new Diet can be empaneled, the Jushin recommend Takagi Sōkichi, with the Emperor giving him a special order to 'avoid killing the cow to correct its horns'. This will be difficult, as the new diet is vindictive and paranoid, and the new premier shares their sentiments. As a symbolic first act, they will not merely reject all of Konoe's Imperial Ordinances which are now before them for approval, but also declare that anyone who acted on these ordinances is a suspect for conspiracy to subvert the Kokutai, and set up a special diet committee to persecute these conspirators.

While the Diet will be too divided to pursue any particular economic policy, they do have a consensus that mass organizations are a threat to constitutional government. They will abolish the Sanpō and the IRAYMC (or whatever their successors are), ban or heavily restrict labor and other groups, and, with the assistance of the Home and Justice ministries, target people who were leaders in these organizations for prosecution. Additionally, they are very wary of Prime Ministerial authority, and will push for the abolition of extra-ministerial cabinet agencies and the restoration of ministerial autonomy. If Takagi attempts to restrain the constitutionalist reactionaries in the diet, they will determine him to be an obstacle, and will begin to obstruct the government.

Ultimately, the goal of both the Diet and the Cabinet is to remove renovationists from any positions where they can possibly influence the electorate and then hold fresh elections, where the renovationist caucus will be eliminated and either the IRAPA or the Liberals can win a majority. The institutional damage they must do to get to that point is a price they are willing to pay.

Anti-System Branch

The Anti-System Branch is the route where the "losers" of what we call in this proposal the 1942 system - liberals, the far-right, and anti-establishment figures of other stripes - are able to return to relevance and change the empire's course from what they see as the mistaken route it has been on any time from 1931 to the postwar era. Their opportunity is the disaster of the Yasuda Crisis in 1963, which the Funada cabinet will in this branch fail spectacularly at handling. The fracturing of the IRAPA will be run its natural course into a disintegration of that party, and these Diet happenings will be mirrored in society with a broadening of public discourse and a revival of independent organization in all corners of society, as well, unfortunately, as an explosion of

scandal in newspapers and organized crime. This creates a kaleidoscope of popular reactions, from conservative disgust and backlash to popular cries for change and renovation. The new civil society broadly falls into two categories, both of which transcend Western notions of 'left' and 'right': Cooperativists, who cherish the autonomies the System has to some extent provided and seek to build on them to something much better for the people, and National Salvationists, who believe that it is the duty of they the people to create a better statist political and economic system to make Japan a strong and rich country. It will be one of these two groups that will get their chance to remake Japan.

Kōno (1963 - 1965)

Conservatism
Goken Conservatism



Kōno Ichirō
(河野一郎)

With the establishment thoroughly discredited and minor adjustments to the system as put forth by the Young Turks no longer a viable solution, Kido and the jūshin will have little choice but to turn to someone outside the political mainstream to pick up the pieces. Kōno Ichirō will be the natural choice here as a moderate alternative to Kishi and Miki.

The branch will start as the Kōno path in 1963. Kōno is a popular and forceful politician in the Diet, and also the leader of Japan's liberal opposition, who strongly back parliament-centered politics and a free market economy. Kono and the liberals will probably start with a plurality thanks to Funada's ill-timed election just after the Yasuda Crisis, but they will need a coalition partner to secure a majority in the Diet, of which player can choose between Miki's Cooperativists or Kishi's National Salvationists. Both of them should have their own perks. Miki

is closer to Kōno politically and also has a good public image, while Kishi is reasonable and has connections all over the political world. Whoever Kōno chooses will take up a few cabinet posts and influence the government's agenda towards themselves.

As Kōno takes office to deal with the Yasuda Crisis in its worst form, his main agenda will be restoring the economy to good health and calming an angry public. The brains behind carrying out this agenda will be the liberal economist and well-known intellectual Ishibashi Tanzan, who will serve as Finance Minister in the cabinet. Their policy will aim to minimize the damage caused by the crisis through a Keynesian policy of deficit spending to maintain employment and preserve the social safety net, which both Miki and Kishi will find agreeable. Politically, Kōno will also make use of the Yasuda Crisis by supporting anti-corruption investigations into certain elite groups as a way both to respond to calls for justice from the public and kick his opponents while they're down. Narratively, this will be a handy way for Kōno, known for his domineering "bulldozer" personality, to reshuffle the country's long-stagnant bureaucratic organizations. In gameplay terms, this will begin the process of dealing with the various Interest Groups. Who Kōno can choose to focus on will be influenced by his coalition partner.

As the economy begins to exit the recession, the coalition can also begin working towards the positive parts of their agenda. Strengthening the Japanese welfare state will find broad consensus, the exact terms being determined by the player's coalition partner. Kōno will also take special interest in preparing for the Olympics in October 1964, marking Japan's recovery from the crisis.

Kōno will complete the recovery and move towards the second part of his agenda around early to mid 1965, but die only a few months later in July. With the political scene undeniably changed and no obvious successor around, Kōno's coalition partner - either Kishi or Miki - will be appointed Prime Minister and elections held later that year, which the player will be expected to win. In this short period, the player will be able to finish the agendas in the Kōno branch but taken in either Miki or Kishi's direction. The election will begin the next phase of the Anti-System Branch.

Miki (1965 - 1972)

Liberal Conservatism
Cooperativism



Miki Takeo
(三木武夫)

Following Kono Ichiro's death, Takeo Miki is chosen as Prime Minister. Tasked with maintaining unity in a fragmented post-System Japan, Miki aims to reduce elite group influence in politics through a "Political Purification." His premiership focuses on balancing various factions of his party along with Japan's corporations, bureaucrats, and military while pushing for reforms to create a true party democracy.

Miki leads the Daido Club, a coalition of three different factions from which he is merely first among equals - the Cooperative Unionists who descend from the former Social Masses Party's right-wing, the Cooperative Centrists led by himself who advocate a mixed economy combined with bureaucratic social control, and the Cooperative Democrats led by Hayakawa Takashi and supplemented by Nakasone Yasuhiro and his breakaways from the IRAPA's Young Turks, who practice Cooperativism in more or less its original form as conceived of by Yabe Teiji. Balancing these groups is key to his success. Initially, Miki avoids overt partisanship, cooperating with Liberals and National Salvationists to pass legislation, but his long-term goal is to marginalize these allies and reform his party.

From 1965-1969, Miki will focus on economic reforms, aiming to empower cooperatives, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and decentralize power to prefectural assemblies. His ambitious "Life Cycle Plan" seeks affordable housing, modern education, social security, and retirement systems, though resistance from bureaucrats and zaibatsu is strong. Internationally, Miki aims to reform the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, reducing corruption and integrating economies to benefit the Japanese "little people".

The 1969 election offers Miki a chance to reshape his party, replacing compromised Diet members with fresh candidates. Post-election, he pushes for party reform, dissolving factions and introducing primary elections, though factions persist in new forms. Miki then intensifies his Purification agenda, targeting bureaucratic corruption, military influence, and partisan media.

The 1970 Oil Crisis tests Miki's premiership. Factions clash over economic responses, with Nakasone advocating drastic measures and others prioritizing Cooperativist principles. Miki's focus on Purification may hinder crisis management, leading to internal strife and possibly his ouster. If he survives until 1973, Miki retires. He is succeeded by either Nakasone of the Revisionists or Susumu Nikaido of the Anti-Revisionists, depending ultimately on how successful Miki was at integrating the IG beneficiaries of Cooperativism.

Kishi (1965 - 1972)

<p>Fascism Corporate Statism</p>

<p>Kishi Nobusuke (岸信介)</p>

The Kishi path begins a few months after the death of Kono Ichiro, with an intervening stage-managed illusion of an Ino Hiroya government to set the stage for Kishi's dramatic comeback into politics, leading the Gokoku Shintō to eclipse its partner in an election and making it impossible for the other Jushin to advise the Emperor to select any but him as the premier of the new government. As leader of the Gokoku Shintō, he promises a new form of "national consensus" built on a radical synthesis of populism, authoritarianism, and anti-liberal ideology.

Kishi's strategy contrasts starkly with Miki's conciliatory, cooperative politics. Instead of negotiating between interest groups, Kishi builds a broad, ideologically driven coalition rooted in

the wartime New Order vision—a mass mobilization state where class distinctions are subordinated to national defense. Kishi draws support from both the radical right and anti-capitalist “patriotic” left (the Fudai wing), as well as technocratic and disillusioned bureaucrats who follow his brother, Sato Eisaku (the Tozama wing). This uneasy alliance relies on a balance of ideological fervor and administrative discipline, with Fudai dominating mass organizations and Tozama controlling policy infrastructure.

Phase 1 (1965–1966) sees Kishi moving quickly to consolidate power amid post-Yasuda instability and international tensions in Asia and Africa. He undermines Finance Ministry authority via the creation of the Economic Stabilization Board, co-opts the Diet through favors and populist agitation, and revives centralised economic planning in the mold of his ideology. However, elite suspicion—especially from the Peers and liberal Representatives—threatens to expose his political manipulations, risking early collapse.

The endgoal of this first phase is the legal formation of the Economic Planning Agency through a Representatives vote. This marks a shift towards the centralisation of powers in the Prime Minister. Failure here would lead to a much harder time planting a strong footing in the Peers in the 1967 Peers Election, and subsequently build the grounds of failure in dealing with the endgame crises.

Phase 2 (1966–1970) is marked by aggressive expansion of state corporatism and suppression of political dissent. This is the time where Kishi must act to change Japanese society into something suited to supporting him, marginalizing the middle class and the old intelligentsia and consolidating the working class into a patriotic body. Kishi’s government will attempt to tie all economic organizations directly to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (or Agriculture, if more applicable), while cartelizing small businesses to support Japan’s proxy wars and economic diplomacy in Asia. State-run industries are massively expanded, creating a strategic economic base devoted to the furtherance of the Advanced National Defence State and fighting to retain Japan’s assailed rights in Huabei. He will seek to weaken Miki’s support base among farmers and workers by co-opting or repressing cooperativist unions and guilds (strengthening the Fudai), while cultivating ideological legitimacy through the KS-Operation think tank, attempting to make Japan the global pole of anti-liberal, anti-communist thought (and strengthening the Tozama). Both the Peace Preservation Law and Kishi’s informal networks—including both crime and secret police—are used very actively to silence opposition.

Phase 3 (1970-1973) By 1970, Kishi’s machine dominates, with near-total Diet control, institutional loyalty, and grassroots support. However, the fragile balance unravels early that year. A disgruntled citizen assassinates Kodama Yoshio, revealing Kishi’s brutal repression apparatus. Public outrage follows, and the Home Ministry, emboldened, blocks Kishi from suppressing the

investigation. As state bureaucracies begin to rebel, Kishi's grand project of national unity under authoritarianism teeters on collapse.

Across the country, police roll up Kodama's yakuza network, acting on long-suppressed hunches and guidance by ambitious gangsters seeking new turf. The media explodes into a flurry of criticism as its leash is slipped. The scandal even shakes the Party, as any disgruntled factions will take the opportunity to distance themselves from Kishi, despite the desperate attempts of loyal retainers like Satō to keep them in line.

The Kishi government will circle the wagons, calling on all of its mass organizations and cultural satellites to defend the government, attack the police-bureaucratic clique, and to be prepared if need be to shelter rough-speaking and heavily tattooed fugitives without asking unnecessary questions. Their effort will be assisted by Home Ministry overreach, as they succumb to the inevitable temptations to also begin arresting and torturing National Salvationist (and non-National Salvationist) union and guild leaders. Solid Cooperativist leaders may even be found to denounce the deep state coup, and the situation on the media front gets better.

Ultimately, Kishi needs to fire most of the top bureaucrats of the Home Ministry and replace them with people he can trust. This involves negotiations with the Court, as dismissing officials is a power of the Emperor. In exchange for the required firings, Kishi will trade assurances: mostly to keep the radical or left-wing elements of his party in line, but if his negotiating strength (support in the Representatives, support in the Peers, inklings of positive media coverage, success keeping his nationwide political and underground apparatus out of jail) is below a critical level, he will have no other way to secure Imperial assent to what needs to be done but to promise resignation.

Once the Home Ministry is back under control, the situation will quickly get back to normal. The Diet will conduct its own investigation into the Kodama assassination, and if Kishi has promised to resign, its version of events will be somewhat more truthful. Kishi will shoulder the blame for using violent organizations to enact policy, defending his actions as necessary for national rejuvenation. Then he will leave government, and the Emperor, seeing no viable alternative to another Gokoku Shintō cabinet, appoints Satō Eisaku as the new prime minister, beginning a failstate. Though he is loyal to Kishi, Satō has a different policy and will elevate the Tozama. His rule is a quasi-failstate, containing various debuffs representing his continued reliance on Kishi to glue the party together and his need to avoid relying too heavily on Yakuza. With Kishi or Satō leading the party, elections will finally occur.

The Oil and Colonial Crises will both hit Japan hard, due to the inflation beforehand of a large asset-price bubble by Kishi's expansionist economic policy and residual chaos in the Home Ministry. After it, if Kishi is still Prime Minister, he will resign, citing bad health. He will be succeeded by Aiichirō Fujiyama.

Ishida (Failstate)

Conservatism
Goken Conservatism



Ishida Hirohide
(石田博英)

If either Kishi or Miki failed to demonstrate their control of the whole diet by passing some form of Peers reform, they then retire. Ishida Hirohide, a young dietman and former Home Minister, replaces him. Though a Representative, Ishida was a key figure in inciting the Peers against the government which succeeded Kono Ichirō's. In this, he was motivated by a combination of a sense of betrayal at his old friend Miki's failure to give him a ministry (if applicable) and fear that the gains of the liberal ministry would be swept away by the rising Renovationist tide. Though being a protagonist in the recent governmental crisis counted against him to a degree, the Jushin saw another Liberal ministry as necessary to bridge the divide between the conservative Peers and reformist Representatives, and as the most prominent Liberal who remains in good health by 1966, he was the natural pick.

Neither house is particularly amenable to Ishida's premiership. The Peers (spiritually dominated by the Kenkyūkai) are not enthused by the prospect of political liberalization, and with their powers confirmed by the fall of the last government, they feel confident enough to not just block further liberalization but demand rollback of some of the reforms under Kono. Propelled by the criticisms of ex-finance bureaucrat Peers such as Fukuda Takeo, they also disagree with Ishida's favored expansionist economic policy, and demand balanced budgets for the foreseeable future.

The Representatives will be quite different depending on whether it was the Miki or Kishi route which led to them, but they fundamentally disagree with the ideas of economic liberalism Ishida holds dear. The Daidō Club/Gokoku Shintō remains a viable political movement despite the fall

of their cabinet, and its dietmen are more inclined to wait out the Ishida cabinet than to work with it.

To get anything Liberal done, Ishida must craft a new political consensus that offers both the Peers and the Representatives things they dearly desire, and get each house to defend the consensus against the other. This can involve concessions to the material interests of nobles and dietmen or adopting elements of their ideological programs. It also involves great amounts of political money, supplied by Zaibatsu who back Ishida for his relatively pro-business ministry. Whatever the contents of the resultant Ishida agenda, it is an elite pact, and not likely to gain much popularity with the public. Even within the Liberals, morale will drop, and the party risks becoming a group supported only by money and the Home Ministry.

Crises

Early-Game

Yasuda Scandal

The Yasuda Crisis marks a pivotal moment in Japanese political and economic history, shaking the foundations of the existing consensus between reformists and the conservative Yokusankai. Unlike the structural economic collapse of the 1991 bubble burst in our timeline, the Yasuda Crisis is primarily a crisis of political economics and the efficacy of the Yokusankai's subsidization of national champions. The crisis is modeled after the 1965 Market Crash but diverges sharply due to the absence of aggressive monetary expansionism and the ambitious economic recovery plans characteristic of the Tanaka finance ministry. Instead, the response to the Yasuda Crisis is plagued by poor execution, limited scope, and a lack of coherent strategy, leading to widespread disillusionment with the establishment.

At its core, the crisis stems from the Yokusankai's overreliance on subsidizing national champions, the bureaucratic blind spots inherent to the co-prosperity sphere, and the growing imbalance between capital and consumption. The government's response is characterized by dubious bailouts for major corporate losers and a desperate attempt to return to the status quo by heating the economy through increased colonial labor and a renewed focus on boosting Japanese exports. This approach, however, is widely seen as corrupt. Holding it up provides a chance for the Privy Councillors, who despise Funada, to throw a spoke in the wheels of his cabinet, but also further erodes public trust in the Yokusankai and the broader political system. As they maneuver against each other, both the Cabinet and the Council will leak to the media, inadvertently maximizing the damage to the System.

As the response to Yasuda stagnates in the Privy Council, the crisis gets worse. Companies who have little to do with the core issues of underperforming investments in the Sphere, but who did rely on credit from Yasuda Bank, will begin to have sudden working capital problems. The news of failure in the banking industry shakes confidence in banks' liquidity and even solvency. Consumer confidence will plummet, and both consumption and investment will fall.

The crisis creates a political vacuum, with three potential paths emerging in its aftermath: the rise of Kaya, Kono, or Konoe. The outcome hinges on Prime Minister Funada's ability to navigate the crisis and push through a series of emergency measures against the Privy Council. Funada's success or failure in this endeavor determines the trajectory of Japanese politics and the fate of the IRAPA.

1. The Kono Path: If Funada fails to pass any meaningful measures through the Privy Council, the IRAPA fractures under the weight of internal divisions and public discontent, with the Anti-Mainstream factions defecting en masse to Kono Ichiro's Liberals. Arita and Kishi make the case to Kido that a Liberal government would be best suited to rehabilitate

the floundering stimulus effort, and he is appointed as prime minister. The establishment is thoroughly discredited, and the IRAPA only continues to break up afterwards.

2. The Konoe Path: If Funada manages to push through some measures but falls short of a comprehensive response, the IRAPA still breaks up, but the Jushin remain confident in the ability to get the remaining necessary parts of the stimulus enacted eventually. However, with the diet very divided, an IRAPA cabinet is seen as risky, so instead Konoe Fumimaro is appointed to form a national unity government.
3. The Kaya Path: If Funada successfully pushes through a significant number of measures, the damage from the Yasuda Crisis is minimized, and the IRAPA retains its influence. However, the new Diet (Peers as well as Representatives) is angry at the cabinet for its Income Doubling Plan and demands to investigate the money disbursed under both it and the stimulus. Unable to command the Diet, Funada resigns, and Kaya Okinori, a longtime critic of Income Doubling from the Peers, is appointed as the leader of yet another IRAPA cabinet.

Each path will have some common issues to deal with immediately. Confidence must be restored, and the supply of credit must be increased. The government must decide what to do about the fallen national champions and the many bad debts on the balance sheets of both collapsed and intact companies. Due to the intense political controversy of the Funada stimulus, governments may consider alternative ways of increasing economic liquidity. In the longer term, the issues of debt-favoring capital market practices and poor reporting will require structural reforms.

Mid-Game

Peerage Crisis

The Peerage Crisis will take place in 1966. In response to the bold new path signaled by the Miki/Kishi administration, a critical mass of the Kenkyūkai, influenced by liberals such as Ishida Hirohide and other remnants of the Kono government, decide that the new PM must go.

Following a caucus meeting of the Kenkyūkai, a vote to censure the cabinet will appear on the Peers docket, and shortly afterwards the vote will occur. A successful censure would show that the Miki/Kishi cabinet is unable to control the House of Peers and by extension the Diet, whereupon they would have to resign rather than let the entire government get thrown into gridlock.

From the time where the censure is placed on the docket, the Miki/Kishi cabinet may begin its operations to influence the Peers. To do this, they will appeal to the various divisions of Asia's greatest deliberative body. Konoe's strong personal Restorationist beliefs lead him to be easily led to support the Cabinet, and Kishi's appointees are also strongly in favor of their patron, as are Cooperativist taxpayer representatives for Miki. The Barons are also a good target to be picked

off due to their internal competition: while the Kōseikai has only a paltry few votes, the prospect of a Kōseikai flouting the 1960 election results by wielding more influence in the government may cause the Gunjin Dōwakai to seek terms. Additionally, there are a significant number of internal dissidents to the Kenkyūkai's course of action against the cabinet, especially outside the Viscount core, and given proper security they might defy it.

The censure vote almost certainly can not be stopped, as it will have the Kenkyūkai, the liberal independents, and the mainstream independents strongly in favor, and the baronial factions also well-disposed towards it. If a thumping majority of the Peers does vote to censure the government, it must resign and the Ishida fail state begins. However, through its efforts the government can minimize the size of the majority arrayed against it and wage war against the censure in the press. The Kenkyūkai is already controversial among the Japanese public and many peers are sensitive to being called out as a feudal relic. This press campaign may convince the imperial court to give the Miki/Kishi government another chance, especially if Kenkyūkai dissidents can be brought out to insinuate that the actual anti-government majority in the Peers is considerably smaller than the vote indicates, perhaps even a minority. However, this chance will be contingent on the government getting rid of the oppositional majority in the Peers through reform.

The Diet, including the Peers, must agree to any reform of the Peers. Therefore the main struggle in Peers Reform will be among the Peers. The Miki/Kishi administrations can choose between a wide reform and a narrow reform. The narrow reforms will be similar, aiming to systematize the system of peerage associations so that proportionality can be introduced into the mutual elections and so the Kenkyūkai's binding caucus resolutions can be banned. It may also be laden with targeted expansions of taxpayer or baronage representation to make the reforms go down easier with those groups. The wide reforms will introduce many more categories of people to be represented in the Peers, turning it into a body of corporatist representation. Its precise content will vary between Miki and Kishi. In either case, these reforms will be much more controversial among the Peers and harder to pass, though if passed they may yield benefits later. If a wide reform fails to pass, then the state of the pro-government press campaign will determine whether to begin the Ishida failstate or to start again with a narrow reform and a hit to political power. If a narrow reform fails to pass, the Ishida failstate begins.

Akō Crisis⁹

The Akō Crisis will take place in mid-1966 as the Pro-System counterpart to the Peerage Crisis. Despite the efforts (or lack thereof) of the Kawashima or Fukuda cabinet, the plight of tenant farmers will have improved little since the Niigata Crisis, and has if anything deteriorated under the influence of technological innovations widening the productivity gap between the poor tenants on the one hand and wealthy gentry and smallholders on the other. The result of this will

⁹ This is a compressed summary of the crisis. The full summary may be found [here](#).

be increased evictions, lower incomes, and eventually another explosion of tensions in the countryside.

Throughout the game, there will be events warning the player of the worsening situation in the countryside. This will come to a head in mid-1966 when, in rural Hyōgō, the local Agricultural Association will forcibly attempt to remove an evicted tenant farming family. The attempt will fail and spark protests across the district, soon making headlines and forcing the police to be brought in, where the protests will reach a tense equilibrium.

The crisis should last a few to several months. During this time, Tanaka's movement will attempt to take it national. If the countryside is gripped by out-of-control protests and remains so by the end of the crisis, the Prime Minister will have no choice but to resign, and Tanaka will be appointed PM as the only solution to calming public anger. The turnout at their sympathy protests will depend on the support and activism of the Tenant Farmer IG and the regional Agricultural Committee Regulation. The government can intervene regionally to ease tensions, or expend police resources to crack down on protests (which will also sour Mass IG relations).

Gentry and even smallholder IGs may also form vigilante groups to protect themselves from the more lawless fringe of the tenant protestors. This is more likely the higher their activism is and the lower the Agricultural Committee Organization. Vigilante groups will try to help suppress the protests, but mostly they will just commit atrocities and inflame tensions further. However, with high support from these IGs, you can persuade them to refrain from independent violence and simply reinforce your police resources, which should at least sharply reduce their atrocities. Another way to bolster police resources is to declare martial law and use the Army to suppress the protestors. This will be unpopular (especially with the Military IG) and will certainly result in atrocities which may lead to a disgraceful resignation and the beginning of the Tanaka path.

Additionally, unhappy and activist mass IGs in urban areas may also attempt to destabilize matters further with their own protests. This is especially likely if the Mass Media is not supportive of the government, and in areas where there have been conflicts over immigration, as that is one of the HPM's main wedge areas in cities. Like their rural counterparts, protests in urban areas may further divert police resources and contribute to a negative mood in the Imperial Court. Concessions over imperial migration may soothe tensions in urban areas.

While police and protestors fight in the regions, the government may also partake in direct negotiations with the HPM and Tanaka. Their demands are large and also duplicitous: they would not be satisfied if demands of the protestors surrounding the agricultural associations and land reform were met and the country pacified with them still on the outside of politics, and in fact their main goal is simply to destroy the GJPA. However, if the cabinet is willing to negotiate (Kawashima almost certainly won't be) and has good enough relations with the HPM to gain

insight into its leadership, a deal can be reached for the HPM to be integrated within the system itself, making Tanaka a Minister of State without portfolio and giving him and several of his comrades places on a land reform commission. Meeting these demands would represent a big change in government policy, anger many of the System's constituents, and require negotiation within the cabinet to accomplish, but if it is done the protests will soon subside across the nation. The government can also make unilateral policy concessions which may rob the protests of their force.

Finally, the protests may simply fall to a pessimism that true results can ever be had from popular protest in Japan. This pessimism will grow over time, though it can be reduced temporarily by governmental concessions, or increased by government actions such as being publicly firm or successfully smearing the HPM's leadership. Given enough time with the protests remaining under control and not being pacified either by the government or by its own leaders, it will simply fade away and the crisis will end, though events about scattered rural protests will continue.

Late-Game

Oil Crisis

As the Italian Middle East spirals into chaos in 1970 and oil exports from the region largely cease, Japan's economy will be hard-hit. As well as the direct effects of high oil prices making certain economic activities less profitable, there will be loss of confidence on the market, leading to rampant speculation in and hoarding of commodities, a plunge in stock prices, and the sudden end of any investment boom that may have been occurring at the time. There will be calls from both elites and the masses for government action to alleviate the crisis.

Common avenues of response will include the following:

- Rationing of oil and gas, the efficacy of which will depend heavily on agricultural and industrial associations
- Intervention in financial markets to curb speculation and restore levels of productive investment
- Encouragement of fuel substitutes, like sugarcane ethanol and pine root oil
- New technology, such as more efficient engines, which Zaibatsu will invent and seek government and regulatory backing for
- Appeals to the public to patriotically adjust the levels or content of their consumption or investment, the efficacy of which will depend heavily on neighborhood associations
- Squeezing more oil from the Co-Prosperity Sphere, particularly from Manchuria and Indonesia, and compelling the oil-importing members to make do with less

However, each path will have its own ways to deal with the domestic situation brought about by the Crisis.

The Oil Crisis is unique among major Japanese crises because it originates from outside the Sphere. Japan's Middle Eastern policy up until the 1970s has been to support Italian interests in

the region, and Japanese companies have invested large amounts of money in Middle Eastern economic development. In particular, Lebanon, the financial hub of the Middle East, is home to many Japanese subjects. And as Lebanon descends into chaos, the rebel factions there will seek to safeguard themselves from the inevitable Italian intervention by taking "yellow" expatriates hostage, entangling even dovish cabinets in the affairs of that small, ancient, hilly country on the other side of Asia.

As Italy is hard-pressed in the region, they will seek Japanese assistance. This assistance will be primarily military in nature (with some financial aid also welcome), but they will also want Tokyo to take a hard line against India, which will be heavily supporting Middle East rebel movements even if they are in the Sphere themselves. Japan's diplomatic path through this international crisis is an area where the Cabinet has much latitude on policy, however, and should the Italian position look hopeless they can simply abandon Italy and attempt to make deals for oil with the new nationalist governments. However, this outcome will prove extremely damaging to Japan as well, as they will lose international credibility, a major geopolitical partner, and decades of hard work in crafting advantageous commercial treaties in the region.

The oil crisis will continue until at least 1972. The historical crop failures of this year in China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand will add to the general agricultural production problem stemming from high petrochemical input prices, leading to food shortages throughout the Sphere and higher prices in Japan itself. Stabilizing rice prices, whether through imports, rationing, or some other way, will be an important issue that year and following, as harvests will remain disappointing until 1975.

Colonial Riots

The "Colonial Riots" Crisis will take place around five-six months after the Oil Crisis starts. As the economy crashes, Korean, Taiwanese, and other foreign workers living in Japan are fired en masse by firms trying to fix their balance sheets. Unemployed workers are unable to find new work, and some are forcibly deported from the metropole. Worsening economic conditions also stoke racial tensions which the authorities are unable or unwilling to suppress.

People living in the colonies are also hard hit by the Oil Crisis, which devastates already struggling local agricultural sectors and widens the gap between natives and Japanese colonists. Six months after the start of the Oil Crisis, riots will start, kicked off by a street fight in Osaka between a group of drunken workers and police. This turns into the trigger for unrest across migrant worker communities all over the city.

News of the unrest will also spread quickly both to other cities in metropolitan Japan as well as the colonies via television, which the government will only begin to suppress once it is too late to make a difference.

As the rioters have no leader, the PM will simply have to maintain order until the unrest dies down. What migrant and colonial associations there are (depending on the route taken so far, possibly very few) will themselves be blindsided by the riots, will be unable to decisively intervene against 'malcontents', and in their confusion may even seek to balance the interests of

the protestors and the nation. However, to get the 'best' ending, players will need to avoid alienating the more integrated middle classes who form these organizations by refraining from being hard-handed and by promising reforms, though this will sacrifice support among other IGs. If the player fails to maintain order, the government will have no choice but to crush the protests by declaring martial law and deploying the Army, destroying support with the Migrant Workers IG but also solving the problem. Unrest can also be reduced through heavy-handed measures during the crisis, but these will alienate pro-integration colonial intellectuals.

If the player succeeds, however, then addressing the issue of the status of the colonies will have become unavoidable to also maintain a bare minimum of support from pro-integration colonial activists. They and the Home Ministry concur that the major cause of the unrest was the government's reluctance to embrace the colonials as real Japanese, and will agitate for a bill giving Diet representation to Korea and Taiwan. However, many Japanese commentators, intellectuals, and especially dietmen will oppose this measure, claiming that suffrage will turn Korea into a Japanese Ireland. In some routes many of the cabinet will oppose this measure, meaning they can not propose it. For the others, it will still be hard to pass.

Somewhat less controversially, all routes will be able to submit a minor reform to the Diet that tries to placate the new class of overly-educated colonial middle classes by easing their professional advancement (like affirmative action).

Everything will seem fine for a while after the riots, but in 1972 a broad popular front Korean independence organization (possibly covertly funded by the CIA) will form, aiming to achieve independence from the unreasonable Japanese state through terror. Inspired by Arab rebel movements, they will seek to execute a major attack, taking the Governor-General of Korea hostage and demanding the impossible. The government will of course be caught by surprise by the attack, staining the PM's record. The results will vary based on the route and situation but will invariably be bad for the government.

Player who have passed the minor reform will still have a terrorist hostage event chain, although it won't be nearly as severe and the cabinet will survive. Players who have passed the major Diet reform will be able to avoid the crisis entirely.

Core Mechanics

Domestic GUI (Decisions)

Interest Groups

The main drivers of the narrative in TNO Japan are class conflict and unresolved social tensions that the wartime system has failed to resolve. As such, representing these and resolving these tensions is the main goal of Japan's mechanics, and Interest Groups are how this is done.

There will be **twelve** Interest Groups in total divided into **two** groups - Mass and Elite - of six each. They are:

- **Elite:** Rural Gentry, Military, Business, Bureaucracy, Nobility, Mass Media
- **Mass:** Tenant Farmers, Smallholders, Workers, Salarymen, Petit-Bourgeois, Migrant Workers

The Mass IGs, along with Rural Gentry, are considered Local (that is, fragmented among Japan's different regions and effectively acting separately in each one, as described in National Development) and for national IG purposes their variables will be the average of their components.

Mass Media and Migrant Worker IGs will not exist at the beginning of the game, but will emerge during it. The emergence of Mass Media as an IG (representing a long-brewing loss of confidence among official censors to control newsrooms for the government's benefit) will occur after the Yasuda crisis, while Migrant Workers will first emerge as a local IG in one Urban region in the mid-late game and may also emerge in others. In addition to these emergent IGs, Worker and Salaryman IGs may emerge in Rural regions. The emergence of these local IGs can be influenced by player actions. Newly emergent IGs will have no or very little activism, making them initially politically irrelevant until subsequent government actions or events raise it.

Each group will have **two** variables - **Support** and **Activism** - as well as a Leader.

- **Support**, as the name implies, represents an IG's level of support for the current government. High levels of Support will give bonuses, while low levels of Support will give penalties. Different paths will be more vulnerable to loss of Support from certain Interest Groups (Asanuma and Workers, for example) and will suffer further penalties if their Support is lost.
- **Activism** represents how conscious and active an IG is in politics. Activism acts as a multiplier on Support, with high levels of Activism amplifying its effects and low levels dampening. High Activism will also drastically increase how often voters vote for Anti-System candidates (Kishi, Miki, Tanaka) and vice-versa, as well as increasing the rate at which a government loses Support.
- The main methods of altering Support and Activism will be
 - Passing legislation
 - Working through the National Development GUI
 - Working through the Election GUI during Election periods
 - Completing Agendas for the Elite IGs
- **Leaders** of the Interest Groups will partially determine what bonuses or penalties an IG can give, how that IG will vote in elections, and its reactions to legislation. Players will be able to select leaders for the Mass IGs relatively freely, but will have no control over Elite IGs, representing the government's top-down control of civic life through organizations like the Sanpō.

Each path will have the goal of **Integrating** into or **Excluding** the IGs from their new system, achieved when a certain level of Support and Activism has been reached. The ideal levels will depend on the path. This will have no immediate effect, but will determine how a path ends.

The Elite IGs will have a nationally-minded outlook compared to the Mass ones, and will thus have yearly **Agendas** that the player can complete to change their Support or Activism. Examples can be reaching a GDP of \$X Billion, winning a Proxy War, reaching a certain Law Effectiveness, completing a certain National Focus, and so on. There will be no penalty for failing to complete an Agenda.

Players will be able to view the Interest Groups through a tab on the Domestic GUI displaying all the relevant information outlined above.

National Development

The National Development tab will both allow the player greater control over the economy and to give them a long-term path to slowly integrate the different IGs. It is in this area that the player's performance will either make or break their playthrough.

The National Development tab will be based on a map of Japan divided into the aforementioned Regions (which will also be used in the Elections mechanic). Each Region will be classified as either **Urban** or **Rural**, and contain corresponding Interest Groups as well as three **Economic Variables (EVs)**.

Economic Variables will initially depend on whether a Region is Urban and Rural. These will be

- **Economic Concentration (Urban/Rural):** A measure of how dependent Small and Medium Business are on the Zaibatsu. Low Economic Concentration will be associated with a thriving Petit-Bourgeois, and vice-versa.
- **Sanpō Organization (Urban):** A measure of how organized and active the state-controlled Sanpō workplace councils are in a region. High Sanpō Organization will generally be positive for Workers. If Rural regions see the emergence of a Worker IG, this variable will also emerge and be initialized according to one or more reference urban regions.
- **Neighborhood Association Organization (Urban):** A measure of how influential the Neighborhood Associations are in the lives of ordinary urban Japanese. Salarymen will be pleased with weak Neighborhood Associations. If Rural regions see the emergence of a Salaryman IG, this variable will also emerge and be initialized according to one or more reference urban regions.
- **Agricultural Committee Organization (Rural):** A measure of how adept the Agricultural Committees in the countryside are at resolving disputes between tenants and landlords. Tenant Farmers will support a strong Agricultural Committee, while the Rural Gentry will not.
- **Agricultural Regulation (Rural):** A measure of how heavily the government intervenes to say what farmers can and cannot do with their land. Smallholders will dislike high Agricultural Regulations.

There will be additional social variables which are less manipulable than EVs, but still important and influenceable for the player:

- **Urban Overcrowding:** Only present in Urban regions. Urban Overcrowding increases poverty, makes the healthcare and education laws less effective, and decreases the support of Workers, Salarymen, and Migrant Workers. Every month, it increases by a number relating to the difference in GDP from three months ago in the main state.
- **Urban Development:** Only present in Rural regions. Dictates the base probability (government policy may make this gaining of political consciousness more or less likely)

that Worker and Salaryman IGs will emerge in these regions, the latter being less likely than the former. Once these IGs have emerged, it also scales any increases in Activism among them. Unlike Economic Variables, Urban Development can not go down for any reason and will be slowly ticking up at almost all times until it reaches a maximum of 100. The rate of increase is influenced by regional GDP growth, relevant Projects, and certain combinations of other EVs. The rate of increase equals **Land Speculation**, increasing Rural Gentry and Petit-Bourgeois support but decreasing Smallholder and Tenant support and increasing their activism.

- **Upland Kaso**: Only present in Rural regions. Like Urban Development, will tick up slowly at all times. Rate of increase is influenced by regional Urban Development and further increased by all infrastructural projects. As it progresses, it creates increasing penalties, starting with a malus to Rural Gentry support and a smaller malus to Military support, and progressing to maluses to support of other rural IGs and healthcare and education law effectiveness. As it reaches its maximum of 100, the maluses will go down as the disappearing villages disappear fully and stop being a problem. However, Rural IGs will also resist Kaso much more strongly, and their activism will bring its rate of increase down, keeping the player at the worst section on the curve so only full exclusion can break through the problem. Additionally, about midgame it will become possible to keep Kaso down through a project. Exceptional success on this project, possible only through the integration of rural IGs, can even eliminate this variable. However, it will be a perpetual commitment of budget and PUs, even after the highest success.

Urban Regions will contain Workers, Salarymen, and Petit-Bourgeois (and later Migrant Workers) as local IGs, while Rural Regions will contain Tenant Farmers, Smallholders, Petit-Bourgeois, and Rural Gentry (and later Workers and Salarymen). Each IG will also have local Support and Activism variables, with the tag-wide Support and Activism calculated as an average across all Regions. If Support is low enough and Activism high enough in a Region, it will cause recurring bad Events to occur. Elite Interest Groups aside from Rural Gentry will only have representation at a national level.

In addition to the effects the value of each EV has on their regions and regional IG values, the interaction between different EVs may also have effects; for example, weak Agricultural Committees and low Agricultural Regulation will cause especially high eviction rates, leading to increasing regional Poverty and Tenant Farmer Activism and decreasing Tenant Farmer Support. The more 'national' Elite IGs will also have their support affected by how many regions meet their preferences for combinations of EVs.

Some changes in EVs may be path-determined, occurring thanks to focuses, events, or cabinet-unique mechanics. However, the player will also be able to gradually adjust them on their

own by setting **Policy** for each Region. Policies will expire after one year, though the player can change them at any time by spending political power. There will be five Policies:

1. **Workplace Organization Policy** (Home Ministry/Ministry of Welfare) Represented as a slider between Repression and Encouragement. Repression will lower Sanpō Organization; Encouragement will raise it. Any deviations from the middle of the slider, however, will increase expenses and slightly drain PP.
2. **Neighborhood Association Enforcement** (Home Ministry) Represented as a slider between Enforcement and Inaction. Enforcement raises Neighborhood Association Organization while slightly draining PP and raising expenses; Inaction does nothing.
3. **Tenant Organization Policy** (Home Ministry/Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) Represented as a slider between Repression and Encouragement. Repression will lower Agricultural Committee Organization; Encouragement will raise it. Any deviations from the middle of the slider, however, will increase expenses and slightly drain PP.
4. **Agricultural Subsidies** (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) Represented as a slider between High and None. High Agricultural Subsidies will cost significant amounts of money, but will increase Agricultural Regulation at the same time as it increases the support of Smallholders, Rural Gentry, and Tenant Farmers.
5. **Bank Lending Policy** (Ministry of Finance) Represented as a triangle with its angles SME lending, Zaibatsu lending, and Prudent lending. Depending on its proximity to the angles of the triangle, the policy may boost GDP and decrease Economic Concentration, boost even more and raise it, or contribute to lowering Inflation.

Additionally, in some paths there should be unique Central Bank policies which have an effect on EVs.

All Policies will be circumscribed in their values by the relevant Ministry (in parentheses) and its Minister, depending on the path. This means that, for example, Tenant Organization Policy can never be in Encouragement so long as Kawashima Shōjirō is premier. The player will also be able to set a national model policy and sync some or all regional policies to it, so that he can easily change all at once if he wishes.

Players will also have access to different repeatable **Actions** which use the Corporations to provide some benefit in exchange for some cost (For example, making zaibatsu re-invest planned dividends, causing a temporary boost in GDP growth in exchange for a PP cost and a disappearing malus to Nobility support). These actions will be national, but their effectiveness will be based on the EVs in each region (in the example, it would be more effective the higher Economic Concentration is in each region). There will also be a limited set of cooldown-based Actions whose purpose will be to apply a one-time modification to an EV. This should serve as a sort of emergency increase, so the short term benefit will carry with it a long term malus (for example: +10 one-time, -0.5 weekly over the next 20 weeks). In addition to Actions available at game start, more Actions and improvements to already existing ones may be unlocked in different

paths through the Focus Tree and through passing reforms. New actions may be single-use rather than repeatable.

Players will also be able to complete different **Projects** in various Regions. Projects will cost Money and PUs, and take time to complete, but once finished will give permanent bonuses to the (possibly multiple) Regions involved, which will involve both IG support and economic components. At each stage of the process there will be an event dealing with various aspects of construction, such as the contracting of the engineering company and labor issues on the project. The content of the events may also be contingent on local IG variables; for instance, tenant farmers with high activism may prove especially difficult to resettle away from a Shinkansen site. Regardless, the events will give the player choices as to how to proceed. These choices may affect project schedules, costs, and local IG variables.

Regions

(Note: Effects are tentative, this is just to give people an idea of what things will look like)

South Kantō: Tōkyō. Kanagawa

Capital Region (Boosts GDP and population growth, all projects somehow benefit here as well)

Zaibatsu Hub (Bonus to nationwide GDP to PU ratio from high economic concentration, low Neighborhood Association Organization, and/or high Sanpō organization)

Tōdai (Increase to bureaucratic activism from low Neighborhood Association Organization; increase to bureaucratic support from high NAO; increased Research Facilities growth from non-low NAO)

Waseda and Keiō (Increase to salaryman activism from low and high NAO)

Shipbuilding Hub (Bonus to industrial equipment growth and decrease to worker activism from high economic concentration, otherwise bonus to dockyard output)

Tooling Hub (Bonus to production efficiency from low economic concentration)

Completed Project: **Tōkaidō Main Line** (Boosts GDP growth, until Shinkansen is finished decreases Worker and Salaryman support and raises worker and salaryman activism)

Project in Progress: **Tōkaidō Shinkansen** (Boosts GDP growth, increases Salaryman support)

Project in Progress: **Tōkyō Expansion** (Reduces overcrowding, never finishes)

Keishinhan: Kyōtō. Ōsaka. Hyōgō

Shipbuilding Hub (Bonus to industrial equipment growth and decrease to worker activism from high economic concentration, otherwise bonus to dockyard output)

Light Industrial Hub (Bonus to regional economic growth and petit-bourgeois support from low Economic Concentration and Sanpō Organization)

Tooling Hub (Bonus to production efficiency from low economic concentration)

Kyōdai (Increase to salaryman activism from low and high NAO)

Handai (increase in research speed, unless NAO is not high)

Completed Project: **Tōkaidō Main Line** (Boosts GDP growth, until Shinkansen is finished decreases Worker and Salaryman support and raises worker and salaryman activism)

Project in Progress: **Tōkaidō Shinkansen** (Boosts GDP growth, increases Salaryman support)

Tōkai: Aichi, Shizuoka

Automotive Hub (Bonus to GDP growth from middling economic concentration, vulnerable to economic shocks)

Light Industrial Hub (Bonus to regional economic growth and petit-bourgeois support from low Economic Concentration and Sanpō Organization)

Tooling Hub (Bonus to production efficiency from low economic concentration)

Meidai (increase in research speed, unless NAO is not high)

Completed Project: **Tōkaidō Main Line** (Boosts GDP growth, until Shinkansen is finished decreases Worker and Salaryman support and raises worker and salaryman activism)

Project in Progress: **Tōkaidō Shinkansen** (Boosts GDP growth, increases Salaryman support)

Fukuoka: Fukuoka

Genkai Sea Society (Lower Worker support, Migrant Worker IG most likely to emerge here)

Material Industry Hub (Bonus to nationwide GDP growth from high Economic Concentration, low Sanpō Organization)

Chikuhō and Miike Coalfields (Upward Worker Activism trend)

Kyūdai (increase in research speed, unless NAO is not high; increase to worker activism if it is low)

Completed Project: **Kanmon Tunnel** (Boosts GDP growth, increases Salaryman support)

Chūshikoku: Hiroshima, Okayama, Shimane, Tottori, Yamaguchi, Ehime, Kagawa, Tokushima, Kōchi

Shipbuilding Hub (Bonus to industrial equipment growth and decrease to worker activism from high economic concentration, otherwise bonus to dockyard output)

Automotive Hub (Bonus to GDP growth from middling economic concentration, vulnerable to economic shocks)

The Inland Sea Between Us (lowers growth in Shikoku states, lowers Smallholder support, can be mitigated by projects)

Shadows of the Chūgoku Range (lowers growth in Shimane and Tottori, lowers Rural Gentry support, can be mitigated by projects)

Completed Project: **San'yō Main Line** (Boosts GDP growth, increases urban development, increases Salaryman support)

Tōhoku: Akita, Yamagata, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima

Tōhokudai (increase in research speed, unless NAO is both present and not high; emergence of salaryman IG more likely)

Northern Land Issue (Economic effects from Agricultural EV doubled, increased Smallholder and Tenant activism, decreased Smallholder and Tenant support)

Moribund Sericulture (Increased Rural Gentry, Smallholder, Tenant activism)

Hokuriku: Niigata, Tōyama, Ishikawa, Fukui

Tooling Hub (Bonus to production efficiency from low economic concentration)

Northern Land Issue (Economic effects from Agricultural EV doubled, increased Smallholder and Tenant activism, decreased Smallholder and Tenant support)

Inner Kantō-Kōshin: Tochigi, Saitama, Gunma, Nagano, Yamanashi

Light Industrial Hub (Bonus to regional economic growth and petit-bourgeois support from low Economic Concentration and Sanpō Organization)

Military Industrial Redoubt (Decreased Worker Activism, Decreased Worker Support, bonus to Military IG support from low Sanpō Activism)

Moribund Sericulture (Increased Rural Gentry, Smallholder, Tenant activism)

Birthplace of the Tenant Movement (Increased Tenant Activism)

Colonizers of Manshū (Possible exposure to events in Manzhouguo)

Urban Hinterland (Increased GDP growth, increased urban development trend, increased Rural Gentry and Petit-Bourgeois support, decreased Smallholder and Tenant support)

Project in Progress: **Saitama New Towns** (Moves population and GDP from Tōkyō to Saitama, increases Urban Development, renewable after completion)

East Kantō: Chiba, Ibaraki

Urban Hinterland (Increased urban development trend)

Hitachi-no-Kuni (Decreased Worker Support, bonus to nationwide GDP to PU ratio from high economic concentration)

Kantō Land Boom (Economic effects from Agricultural EVs doubled, increased activism for Rural Gentry, Petit-Bourgeois, Smallholders, and Tenant Farmers)

Completed Project: **Keiyo Industrial Zone** (Increased GDP growth in Chiba and Tōkyō, worker IG more likely to emerge)

Project in Progress: **Chiba New Towns** (Moves population and GDP from Tōkyō to Chiba, increases Urban Development, renewable after completion)

Kinki-Nagoya Periphery: Shiga, Gifu, Mie, Nara, Wakayama

Railroad overcomes Kii (lowers GDP growth in Wakayama and Mie prefectures, lowers urban development, decreases Smallholder support)

Moribund Sericulture (Increased Rural Gentry, Smallholder, Tenant activism)

Urban Hinterland (Increased GDP growth, increased urban development trend, increased Rural Gentry and Petit-Bourgeois support, decreased Smallholder and Tenant support)

Completed Project: **Tōkaidō Main Line** (Boosts GDP growth, until Shinkansen is finished decreases Worker and Salaryman support and raises worker and salaryman activism)

Completed Project: **Yokkaichi Kombinat** (Boosts GDP growth in Mie and Aichi, increase to Salaryman and Petit-Bourgeois support, trend to lower support and higher activism in all local IGs which can be mitigated by event chain)

Project in Progress: **Tōkaidō Shinkansen** (Boosts GDP growth, increases Salaryman support)

Kyūshū: Nagasaki, Saga, Ōita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Kumamoto

Silicon Island (exposure to Guangdong product cycle, GDP growth bonus from middling Economic Concentration and/or low Sanpō Organization)

Shipbuilding Hub (Bonus to industrial equipment growth and decrease to worker activism from high economic concentration, otherwise bonus to dockyard output)

Minamata Disease (No effect, the mercury spills were finally fixed by the installation of a wastewater treatment machine at the plant so there shouldn't be any more problems going forward)

Hokkaidō-Karafuto: Hokkaidō, Karafuto

Land of Large Farms (Economic effects from Agricultural EV doubled, Increased Rural Gentry Activism, Increased Tenant Activism, Reduced Smallholder Activism)

Worker IG present (though low urban development)

Ishikari Coalfield (Upward Worker Activism Trend)

Hokudai (increased Agriculture Methods growth, unless NAO is both present and not high; emergence of salaryman IG more likely)

Political GUI (Pop-Out)

The Imperial Diet

The Imperial Diet is another important part of Japan that ought to be represented. Unlike in Germany, the parliament in Japan was never transformed into a rubber stamp committee, and it is something that all paths will have to grapple with to make any meaningful changes to the system.

Many tools relating to the domestic situation as well as budget increases in general will require the player to first get legislation through the Diet before they can be effective or usable. Once the player introduces legislation (except in special circumstances, only the player can introduce legislation), it will be added to the Representatives section of the GUI, and the player will be able to see the favorability of all factions towards the bill, how many votes it has, and where those votes are coming from, in addition to all the usual information conveyed by this section. The player will be able to interact with factions and wings in various ways to increase the number of yes votes, paying various costs to do so. Then the bill will move to the Peers, where a very similar process will repeat.

The Imperial Diet Mechanics will consist of two parts - one pertaining to the House of Representatives, and one pertaining to the House of Peers. Players will require a majority in both houses to pass any piece of legislation, but they will *not* need to maintain anything like a Diet majority to stay in power.

The House of Representatives

The House of Representatives (HoR) will contain 466 seats, split among various **parties** that contain **wings**, which contain **factions**. Though Japan is in theory a one-party state, in practice, the ruling party (the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association) is divided into several factions existing alongside several independent 'legislator caucuses'.

Factions are the building blocks of Japanese politics. Each one is organized around a leader and a particular IG or combination of IGs of the Elite and/or Mass groups and will have a unique position towards each bill. Every Representative is part of a faction, and during cabinet formation or reshuffle, factions can be greatly influenced by giving their members posts.

Aside from the number of their members, Factions also have the important qualities of **power** and **support**. Power is a variable which encompasses the collective importance of their members, the ratio of their resources to their members, and the general regard the faction is held in. Factions with low power may have the votes of some of their lesser members bought with less political power than it would take to buy the whole Faction, but if their power stays low the faction is at risk of dissolving and giving its members to a more powerful faction in its wing.

Faction power can be increased by spending PP (though this has decreasing returns), by giving Faction members Cabinet positions (note that PMs can not fire ministers, vice ministers, or counselors, so this is an event-only opportunity driven by path plot), by giving concessions, by good performances in elections, through the activism of a similarly-aligned IG, and by path-specific mechanics. Faction power can be decreased by ignoring factions during legislation, by bad performances in elections, and by path-specific mechanics.

Support represents the degree to which a Faction supports a cabinet. Support of all factions for all paths will be hard-coded, but can be changed somewhat through the assignment of the cabinet, through the influence of an activist IG, through path-specific mechanics or passing bills favourable to the Faction. Getting a Faction to vote for a bill without applying concessions should be very difficult.

At various times in the game, Factions may move from wing to wing, or even from party to party, and at other times large Factions without commensurate power may spawn new Factions.

Wings represent broader commonalities of one or more factions and work as voting blocs in the HoR. Players will be able to gain votes on bills from Wings by making **concessions**, usually removing bonuses from the bill or adding maluses. The **cohesion** of each wing (calculated from the power of component factions, increasing with the highest-power faction's power and decreasing with the second-highest's) influences the efficacy of concessions at moving votes as well as the effect of the concession. Each bill will have one concession per wing available, and

applying self-contradictory concessions will not be possible, so the Player will have to decide carefully about which Wing to work with.

Additionally, governments may spend Political Power to win votes on certain bills. This use of PP may be directed at Factions, lowering the support they need to approve of a bill at the cost of increasing their power and causing a semi-persistent increase in required support for other Factions in the same Wing, or at backbenchers in a Faction, which lowers the Faction's power, but is only effective against factions which have low power already. This method of gathering votes should be more difficult than through concessions.

Wings will be tied to ideologies in the political pie chart, with the combined power of all Factions in a Wing influencing the size of its slice of the pie. Each Wing contains one or more Factions.

Parties (a term which includes technically non-partisan associations of independent dietmen) are the top-level unit of Representative politics. Each party has some sort of leadership apparatus which contains powerful positions and allocates resources, allowing the Player additional interactions with Factions in their Party, the exact quality of which will vary according to path. At game start, the only party with more than one wing or faction will be the IRAPA, but more may emerge in other paths. Each Party contains one or more Wings.

Additional mechanics related to the HoR and unique to different paths will probably exist, but the mechanics outlined above will apply to all paths.

The House of Peers

The House of Peers (HoP) will function as a simpler version of the House of Representatives, displayed on the same GUI. It will have around 400 seats¹⁰, divided into various **Peerage Groups**.

Peerage Groups function as voting blocs and represent exclusively the interests of Elite IGs. Like the Factions in the HoR, they will take a unique stance on each bill and their support can be gained by either making concessions or spending Political Power. Some Groups will have special behaviors.

¹⁰ The number of seats in the House of Peers was never set and changed over time. It would be accurate to have the number fluctuate over the course of the game, but if this is hard to implement, 400 is a fine number.

To represent the hereditary nobility, there will be a unique IG exclusive to the HoP representing their interests, based on their disproportionate ownership of land and government bonds but also extending to their extensive interests as non-managing shareholders and general reactionary sentiment.

The House of Peers factions will be represented on the ideology wheel as one collective entity. The size of their slice of the pie will not be proportionate to any characteristic of the Peers, but will tend to vary inversely to the power of the Representatives factions.

Elections

You can't represent the Imperial Diet without also modeling elections. The purpose of elections in TNO Japan will be to check the player's performance and translate the status of the Interest Groups into Diet representation.

Elections will occur at fixed points throughout the game and be shown through a tab on the Political GUI displaying various Regions of Japan.

Each Faction will have a **Backing** variable in each Region, usually somewhere between 0-100. One will be able to determine a Faction's share of the vote in a Region through the formula $Vote\ Share = Backing / Total\ Backing$, where Total Backing is the Backing variables of all the Factions in a region added together. Vote Share will then be multiplied by the number of seats in a Region to get that Faction's number of seats won. Players will be able to intervene through the Elections tab, directly boosting or suppressing Faction's Backing in a Region at the cost of Political Power, or reducing an IG's Support/Activism for the duration of the season.

The Interest Groups will be the main way of influencing Faction Support in the Regions. Each IG will have one or more Factions they align with (ex. Tenant Farmers -> Kishi, Miki, Tanaka, Young Turks).

When a Mass IG has high Support, they will tend to vote less for Factions that oppose the government, and vice-versa, reducing their Backing. When a Mass IG has high Activism, they will tend to vote more for Factions they align with, increasing their Backing. Thus, Pro-System paths will generally seek to maintain High Support + Low Activism, while Anti-System paths will seek to maintain High Support + High Activism.

Elite IGs will follow the same principles, but will overwhelmingly tend to align with the Pro-System Factions. Anti-System paths will want to keep Activism low, while Pro-System paths will want to keep Activism high. High Support and Activism from the Elite IGs will increase a player's options to intervene through the Elections tab and make them more effective. Elite IGs will also be harder to influence through the Elections tab, requiring more promises for permanent changes to Support and Activism.

Sphere GUI

The Sphere GUI will depict all of the members of the Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and their diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. As the GEA-CPS is a vast and maritime empire, a realistic map is counterproductive. Instead, all Sphere members will be depicted as a